Enforcement body independence

The section establishes a statutorily-grounded, multi-branch appointment process for the five-member commission: minority and majority leaders of both chambers appoint members, the Governor appoints a member (who must be unaffiliated), and at least one member must be unaffiliated. The requirement that no more than two members be from the same party, combined with staggered three-year terms (post-2011) and a prohibition on consecutive terms beyond two, ensures the body cannot be captured by a single party in a single election cycle. Multi-branch appointment and structural protections against political control are clearly defined in statute.

“There is established a State Elections Enforcement Commission to consist of five members, not more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party and at least one of whom shall not be affiliated with any political party. (1) Of the members first appointed under this subsection, one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives and shall hold office for a term of one year from July 1, 1974; one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate and shall hold office for a term of three years from said July first; one shall be appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and shall hold office for a term of one year from said July first; one shall be appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate and shall hold office for a term of three years from said July first and one shall be appointed by the Governor, provided such member shall not be affiliated with any political party”

§ 12¹⁰ codifies the independence of the Political Party Funding Supervision Committee — members appointed by the Chancellor of Justice, the Auditor General, the National Electoral Committee and a Riigikogu party (the latter barred from being an MP or minister), each serving a fixed five-year term.

“a member appointed by the Chancellor of Justice;”

§ 106.24 establishes the Florida Elections Commission as an independent enforcement body with statutory separate-budget-entity status, dedicated to investigating and enforcing Ch. 104 and 106 violations.

“There is created within the Department of Legal Affairs, Office of the Attorney General, a Florida Elections Commission, hereinafter referred to as the commission. The commission shall be a separate budget entity”

Election Code Article 29 codifies CEC member-tenure protection (early termination only by Parliament resolution, with carve-outs for party-appointed members). Article 8 codifies commission rules of operation. Article 42 codifies electoral subject representation. Article 78 codifies Constitutional Court jurisdiction. Multi-tier independence framework for enforcement bodies.

Ν. 3023/2002 Άρθρο 21 establishes the Επιτροπή Ελέγχου (Audit Committee) as a special body under Σύνταγμα Άρθρο 29(2). Composition includes one MP per party + a Council of State member + a Court of Audits member + an Areios Pagos prosecutor — clearly multi-branch independent enforcement body. Supported by a dedicated Parliament service.

“Επιτροπή Ελέγχου”

The statute establishes the board as an independent agency (not subordinate to executive branch) with six members appointed by the governor but subject to senate confirmation, and explicitly requires political-affiliation balance. This multi-branch appointment (executive + legislative) and balanced composition insulate the body from in-cycle partisan control and satisfy the independence criterion.

KRS 121.120(5) codifies the enforcement independence of the Registry of Election Finance: 'all policy and enforcement decisions concerning the regulation of campaign finance shall be the ultimate responsibility of the registry,' no officeholder or other person may secure privileges or advantages that leave the Registry no alternative but to comply with their wishes, and Registry members and employees 'shall be free of obligation or the appearance of obligation to any interest other than the fair and efficient enforcement of the campaign finance laws.' Enforcement-body independence codified.

§ 26 names the Central Electoral Commission as the campaign-finance monitor — continuous monitoring of party funding plus campaign-period monitoring of political advertising. The CEC's statutory independence is established in § 5 of the CEC Law.

“Monitoring of funding of political parties and political campaigns, and of political advertising shall be carried out by the Central Electoral Commission”

The section establishes that the head of the Technical Audit Unit (campaign-finance enforcement body) is appointed by the General Council under procedures prescribed in article 191(1)(e), with specified professional qualifications, rather than by a single political branch or at the discretion of in-cycle officials. The reference to multi-branch procedural requirements and fixed qualification standards demonstrates statutory protection from direct political control.

Montana's campaign-finance enforcer — the Commissioner of Political Practices — is statutorily independent: § 13-37-111 vests investigation and enforcement powers with recusal safeguards, and § 13-37-102/103 give the commissioner a fixed six-year term, multi-branch nomination and for-cause removal.

“the commissioner is responsible for investigating all of the alleged violations of the election laws”

This section assigns enforcement authority over affiliate-entity designation to the Dutch Minister (Onze Minister), who operates within the Dutch executive branch's institutional structure and is subject to parliamentary oversight, collegial cabinet governance, and established administrative-law principles that protect decisional independence. The requirement for prior hearing of affected parties further ensures procedural safeguards against in-cycle political manipulation of individual enforcement decisions, consistent with Dutch constitutional and administrative practice.

“Indien ten aanzien van een rechtspersoon als bedoeld in het eerste lid ten onrechte geen aanwijzing heeft plaatsgevonden, wijst Onze Minister de rechtspersoon als neveninstelling aan. Onze Minister stelt de rechtspersoon en de politieke partij in de gelegenheid te worden gehoord alvorens tot aanwijzing te besluiten.”

§ 3-102 codifies state board general powers and duties including enforcement authority. § 3-100 codifies multi-branch appointment of state board (governor + legislative leaders, bipartisan structure) — the enforcement body has codified appointment-process independence. § 3-104 codifies enforcement powers (investigation, civil action).

§ 4-1 codifies the National Election Board (Riksvalgstyret) operating 'independently of the Storting' (selvstendig og uavhengig av Stortinget), with 3-of-5 judicial members, prohibition of political-officeholder membership, and independent secretariat. Enforcement-body independence statutorily codified.

The section establishes that the enforcement body (Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos) is appointed by the Constitutional Court, a judicial body independent from political branches, and mandates that at least one member must be an official auditor, ensuring technical expertise and institutional independence from in-cycle political control. The appointment by a court rather than executive or legislative bodies provides structural protection against partisan manipulation during campaign periods.

“A Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos é composta por um presidente e dois vogais, designados pelo Tribunal Constitucional, dos quais pelo menos um deverá ser revisor oficial de contas.”

Law 2820 Article 101 (and Articles 74–76, 88, 101 collectively) codify Anayasa Mahkemesi (Constitutional Court) as the enforcement body for party-finance violations and party-closure procedures. AYM members are appointed via the multi-source process in Anayasa Article 146 (TBMM 3 members, Cumhurbaşkanı 12 members from a list including Yargıtay/Danıştay/Sayıştay nominees, bar association nominee, etc.) — protected from in-cycle political control by 12-year non-renewable terms.

The section establishes statutory protection for Electoral Commission independence by disqualifying its members and staff from serving simultaneously in Parliament (House of Commons), creating a structural separation that insulates the enforcement body from direct political control and in-cycle legislative pressure. This mechanism protects the Commission's institutional independence through statutory codification.

“in Part II (bodies of which all members are disqualified), insert at the appropriate place— The Electoral Commission. ; and b in Part III (other disqualifying offices), insert at the appropriate places— Deputy Electoral Commissioners. , Assistant Electoral Commissioners. , and Member of the staff of the Electoral Commission.”

52 USC § 30106 codifies the FEC: 6 voting members appointed by President with Senate advice/consent, 6-year staggered terms, party balance (no more than 3 of same party). Multi-branch (Executive + Senate) and party-balanced — but not protected from in-cycle political control as commissioners can serve past term until successor confirmed and Senate-deadlock often paralyzes the FEC. Partial independence.

“No more than 3 members of the Commission appointed under this paragraph may be affiliated with the same political party”

The section establishes the Cámara Nacional Electoral as the enforcement body with specific audit and oversight powers (including a dedicated Auditor Corps and funding mechanism), satisfying statutory grounding of enforcement authority. However, the text does not address the appointment process or protections against in-cycle political control—it only enumerates powers. A complete assessment of multi-branch appointment and insulation from political pressure requires reference to external constitutional or institutional law not provided in this excerpt.

The section explicitly establishes the enforcement body (Úřad) as an independent organ protected from arbitrary political interference through statutory mandate ('řídí se pouze zákony' / governed only by laws; intervention permitted only 'na základě zákona' / on basis of law). However, the text does not enumerate the appointment mechanism or describe whether the process involves multiple branches; it addresses independence but not the procedural details of multi-branch appointment, which is the core of ENF.2.

“Úřad je nezávislý orgán; ve své činnosti se řídí pouze zákony a jinými právními předpisy. (3) Do činnosti Úřadu lze zasahovat jen na základě zákona.”

The section identifies the Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques as the enforcement body with authority to challenge receipt validity and audit compliance. However, the section provides no information about how this body is appointed, whether the appointment process involves multiple branches, or what protections exist against in-cycle political control. The procedural grant of enforcement power is clear, but the institutional independence criterion cannot be assessed from this text alone.

“La Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques peut mettre en cause la validité du reçu délivré par le mandataire et enregistré par elle si elle constate, lors du contrôle du compte de campagne, une irrégularité au regard des dispositions des articles L. 52-4 à L. 52-13 et L. 52-16.”

10 ILCS 5/1A-9 establishes the State Board's executive-director structure (Board appoints + can remove by 5-vote supermajority of 8 members). Indirect independence via the Board's bipartisan composition (4-4 political balance per § 1A-2) but no separate, structurally-walled-off enforcement body.

“The executive director and assistant executive director may be removed from office at any time by a vote of at least 5 members of the Board”

Latvia's campaign-finance enforcer is the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, whose independence is established in its own Law outside this corpus; the surfaced sections establish the independence of the election commissions (§ 2 of the Election Commissions Law) and the multi-branch-elected Central Election Commission.

The section identifies the Board of Ethics as the enforcement body and references its establishment in R.S. 42:1132, but this section alone does not specify the appointment process or protections from political control. The criterion requires both multi-branch appointment and in-cycle political insulation; this section delegates to another statute without providing those details here. Statutory grounding exists but procedural clarity on independence is incomplete without reviewing the referenced statute.

The section establishes a multi-branch appointment process (political parties, executive, judiciary/academy) for selecting the director, and provides a six-year term insulating the director from in-cycle political control. However, the statute does not explicitly protect the director from removal on political grounds in-cycle beyond requiring unanimous commission vote for removal, leaving some discretionary power with politically-aligned actors.

“The state chairman of each of the two leading political parties, the state secretary, and a dean of a law school located in the commonwealth, to be appointed by the governor as provided hereinafter, shall serve as a commission for the purposes of selecting the director of campaign and political finance.”

ORC 3517.15 codifies the jurisdiction of the Ohio Election Integrity Commission to hear referred campaign-finance complaints. Combined with § 3517.14's multi-appointer composition (not surfaced for this datapoint), the commission has some structural independence — but the SoS retains substantial in-cycle control by referring complaints.

“Ohio election integrity commission shall hear all matters referred to the commission by the secretary of state”

The section establishes the State Electoral Commission (PKW) as the enforcement body for electoral-committee registration disputes and provides procedural independence in adjudication (no appeal from PKW decisions). However, the statute does not address PKW's appointment process, tenure protections, or structural safeguards against in-cycle political control. The procedural finality provided here is insufficient to establish multi-branch appointment or constitutional protection from external political pressure during campaign periods.

Art. 31 codifies AEP's data-security instructions for the Electoral Register; AEP independence visible at sub-domain level.

Article 28 (commission collegiate operation), Article 24 (municipal commissions), Article 29 (status restrictions), Article 22 (multi-tier formation), Article 43 (attorneys). Enforcement bodies are state commissions with statutory independence frameworks — though political-balance and multi-branch appointment aren't strictly codified for the CEC.

The section establishes multi-branch balance through bipartisan composition requirements and removal mechanisms (Governor or legislature via Supreme Court action), protecting against single-branch dominance. However, the Governor alone appoints all five members, and the statute does not explicitly address protection from in-cycle political pressure or define what constitutes prohibited political interference during election periods, leaving some procedural ambiguity regarding real-time political insulation.

“at least one of whom shall be a member of the majority political party represented in the General Assembly and at least one of whom shall be a member of the largest minority political party represented in the General Assembly, to be appointed by the Governor”

Art. III-142 codifies precinct-commission establishment procedures. Art. II-119 / III-174 / IV-249 codify voting-at-place-of-stay procedures. The CEC is the enforcement body for campaign finance; its independence is codified in the separate 'On the Central Election Commission' law (President nominates, Verkhovna Rada confirms with party-balance requirements).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electronic vote-counting equipment certification and testing procedures, not campaign-finance enforcement. It establishes a technical review committee's role in certifying voting systems but contains no provisions regarding the appointment structure, multi-branch process, or political insulation of any campaign-finance enforcement body. ENF.2 requires evaluation of an enforcement body's independence in campaign-finance administration; this section is entirely outside that domain.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-941 establishes spending and contribution limits and compliance procedures for Arizona candidates, but contains no provisions regarding the composition, appointment, independence, or political insulation of any enforcement body. The section references enforcement of violations (subsection B mentions 'civil penalties and procedures set forth in section 16-905, subsections J through M and section 16-924'), but does not itself address enforcement-body appointment or protection from in-cycle political control. Procedural clarity on enforcement-body independence must be found in other statutory provisions, not in this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes complaint procedures and investigation authority for the State Board of Election Commissioners but does not address the appointment process or structural protections against in-cycle political control. The statute describes what the Board does (investigate, render findings, impose sanctions) but is silent on how Board members are appointed, by whom, their term lengths, removal protections, or insulation from political pressure during election cycles.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 314AM addresses only the appointment of authorized officers to exercise investigative powers under the Subdivision; it does not establish the appointment process, multi-branch involvement, or political insulation of the Electoral Commission itself. The section merely grants the Commission discretion to authorize subordinate officers, without any mechanism ensuring the Commission's independence from in-cycle political control.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 116 governs candidate-nomination procedures (submission signatures, candidate identity fields, list symbols), not campaign-finance enforcement. The section contains no provisions regarding appointment of enforcement bodies, multi-branch processes, or protection from political control. ENF.2 requires statutory grounding of enforcement-body independence, which this nomination article does not address.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Brazilian Constitution addresses the powers of the National Congress, including oversight of the Executive, appointment of tribunal members, and approval of nuclear activities. It contains no provisions regarding campaign-finance enforcement, the independence of any election commission or campaign-finance regulator, multi-branch appointment procedures for such bodies, or protections from in-cycle political control. The criterion requires procedural clarity on enforcement-body independence; this section is entirely silent on campaign finance and electoral enforcement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Чл. 498 codifies the procedural framework via the Administrative Offences Act; does not address enforcement-body independence. The Bulgarian Audit Office ('Сметна палата') has constitutional independence (Конст. Чл. 91) but is not surfaced for this datapoint.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 509.2 describes the Commissioner's enforcement duties and powers (investigation, prosecution, compliance agreements, penalties, undertakings) but contains no information about how the Commissioner is appointed, the appointment process, or protections from political control. The criterion requires procedural clarity on independence via multi-branch appointment and in-cycle insulation; this section addresses only the scope of enforcement authority, not the structural safeguards that would establish independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 35 addresses village-affairs disclosure (村务公开), a transparency mechanism for local village committees. It contains no provision establishing, defining, or protecting an independent enforcement body for campaign-finance regulation. The section mandates public disclosure of certain matters and specifies frequency and duration, but does not create or describe any enforcement authority, multi-branch appointment process, or political insulation for regulators. This is a transparency rule, not an enforcement-body governance rule.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-45-109 addresses filing locations, timeliness, public access, and website requirements for campaign finance reports. It does not establish or describe an enforcement body, its appointment process, or protections from political control. The section mentions penalty appeals to 'the appropriate officer' but provides no detail on that officer's appointment, independence, or insulation from in-cycle political pressure. Procedural clarity regarding enforcement-body independence is entirely absent from this section.

Article 1 is purely definitional and scope-setting; it identifies the law's subject matter (financing of political parties, independent candidates, and election campaigns) and what 'financing' means, but contains no provisions regarding the establishment, appointment, composition, or independence protections of any enforcement body. The criterion requires statutory specification of enforcement-body appointment and political-control safeguards. This section does not address those questions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 8044 describes the procedural mechanics of tardy-report penalties and appeals but does not establish or describe the appointment process, qualifications, or political protections of the Commissioner or the Reports Appeals Subcommittee. The statute grants enforcement authority to the Commissioner and Subcommittee but is silent on whether they are appointed by a multi-branch process or protected from in-cycle political control. Procedural clarity on enforcement structure and independence is absent from this section.

§ 12b codifies Ministerial rule-making. § 63 codifies postal-vote regulation by Minister. § 51 / § 62 codify impartiality of officials. Minister of the Interior is the enforcement body but is a partisan-political appointee; Valgnævnet handles specific disputes per § 17. Enforcement independence is partial.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 27a concerns procedural requirements for reporting advertising measures by third parties to political parties, but it does not address the appointment, composition, or independence of any enforcement body. The section imposes duties on private persons and parties regarding disclosure and donation acceptance, but does not establish or describe an independent enforcement institution or mechanism. Enforcement-body independence is not a topic addressed in this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 62 addresses conduct rules for election observers and polling-place officials (prohibiting interference with voters and breach of ballot secrecy), not the appointment, composition, or independence of an enforcement body. It contains no provisions regarding how an enforcement authority is constituted, whether it is multi-branch appointed, or how it is protected from political control. The section is procedurally clear within its scope but does not address the criterion's topic.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the appointment and governance of the chief election officer, not the independence or appointment structure of the enforcement body (elections commission) itself. It describes how the elections commission appoints the CEO but does not establish whether the elections commission itself is appointed through a multi-branch process or protected from in-cycle political control. The criterion requires examination of the commission's independence, not the CEO's.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedural requirements for campaign-finance reporting and audits (submission deadlines, disclosure of contributor names and amounts, annual follow-up filings) but does not address the appointment process, independence, or political-control protections of the enforcement body. The section names ríkisendurskoðandi (State Auditor) as the recipient and publisher of reports but provides no statutory language governing how that office is appointed or shielded from in-cycle political pressure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural mechanics of filing compliance and notice requirements but does not establish or describe the independence, appointment structure, or political protection of the election division or county election boards that enforce campaign-finance rules. The criterion requires statutory grounding of enforcement-body independence and multi-branch appointment safeguards; this section is silent on those governance questions.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § K.S.A. 25-4144 establishes procedural requirements for appointment and reporting of campaign treasurers and candidate committees, but contains no provisions addressing enforcement-body independence, appointment methodology, or protection from political control. The section governs candidate filings and treasurer eligibility, not the structure or safeguards of the entity that enforces campaign-finance rules.

The section establishes election commissions as enforcement bodies but provides only single-branch (maslikhat/legislature) appointment without multi-branch checks or statutory protections against in-cycle political control. While members are elected rather than appointed, and political parties propose candidates, the maslikhat (local legislature) has sole formation authority. There is no independent judiciary veto, executive branch role, or statutory insulation from political pressure during election cycles. Removal is possible during term without enumerated cause.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 70 addresses the termination of treasurer functions and does not describe the appointment process, composition, or independence protections of the Commission de contrôle du financement de la vie politique. The section merely names the body as a recipient of campaign accounts but provides no information about how it is appointed, which branches appoint its members, or what protections exist against political control.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 1014 prescribes disclosure and authorization requirements for political public communications but contains no reference to an enforcement body, its appointment process, its independence, or protection from political control. The section is purely substantive, defining what must be disclosed in campaign advertisements. Enforcement-body independence is a structural question about the election commission or regulatory agency itself, not addressed in this disclosure statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 87 addresses the appointment and duties of ballot counters, supervisors, and calculators during vote counting—operational election administration, not campaign-finance enforcement. It contains no provision regarding the appointment process, independence, or political insulation of an enforcement body responsible for campaign-finance regulation or oversight. The section is entirely outside the scope of ENF.2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 13-227 establishes transfer limits and exemptions but contains no provisions addressing the structure, appointment, independence, or political protection of any enforcement body. The criterion requires statutory specification of multi-branch appointment and in-cycle political insulation; this section deals exclusively with substantive transfer rules and affiliation definitions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses filling vacancies in metropolitan district officer positions, not the appointment or independence of any campaign-finance enforcement body.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs ballot access and candidate qualifications, not campaign-finance enforcement. It addresses petition filing deadlines, signature requirements, and electoral commission duties to verify candidate eligibility—matters of ballot administration, not enforcement of contribution limits, disclosure rules, or financial-integrity violations. The section contains no language about appointing, structuring, or protecting independence of a campaign-finance enforcement body.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs voting-system approval and cybersecurity standards, not campaign-finance enforcement or the structure of enforcement bodies. It does not address whether any enforcement body is appointed through multi-branch processes or protected from political control. The criterion applies to campaign-finance law and administrative structure; this section is procedural-technical election administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the tasks and powers of the Central Electoral Commission in campaign-finance supervision but does not address how the Commission is appointed, by which branches, or what protections exist against in-cycle political control. The statute delegates enforcement authority to the CEC but does not establish the structural or procedural safeguards (multi-branch appointment, term protections, removal limits) required to satisfy ENF.2.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 664:6 prescribes the filing requirements, deadlines, forms, and disclosure details for political committees but does not address the appointment, composition, independence, or insulation from political control of any enforcement body. The section delegates form-prescription authority to the secretary of state but contains no language establishing or protecting an independent enforcement body structure or multi-branch appointment process.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-19-34.7 establishes contribution limits and procedural rules for handling excess contributions, but does not address the appointment process, structure, or independence of any enforcement body. The section references the secretary of state's role in publishing adjusted limits and making findings about contribution-limit violations, but contains no language defining how that official is appointed, whether multi-branch processes are required, or what protections exist from political control. Enforcement-body independence is not addressed in this statutory section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section enumerates the State Board's procedural powers regarding investigation, reporting, and civil-penalty assessment, but does not address the appointment process, tenure protections, or structural independence of the State Board itself. The criterion asks whether the enforcement body is appointed by multi-branch process and protected from in-cycle political control—questions of structural governance that are outside the scope of this section's administrative duties. No quote supports the appointment mechanism or independence safeguards because the section does not address them.

§ 16.1-09-02 codifies statement-of-interest filing (financial disclosure for elected officials/candidates). § 16.1-08.1-01 codifies CF definitions. Secretary of State is the enforcement body (partisan-elected statewide officer). Enforcement independence is partial — SoS oversight is codified but the SoS is itself politically elected.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines permissible uses of candidate-committee funds and reimbursement procedures but contains no information about enforcement-body structure, appointment process, or political independence. The criterion requires demonstration that the enforcement body itself is appointed through multi-branch processes and insulated from in-cycle political control. This section addresses substantive campaign-finance rules, not enforcement-body governance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORS 260.061 establishes Secretary of State responsibilities for dashboard reporting and biannual review but contains no definition of an enforcement body, no appointment process, no protection from political control, and no enforcement mechanism. The section addresses procedural reporting requirements, not the structural independence of campaign-finance enforcement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 913 codifies filing place/time and filing fees; not enforcement-body independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 17-25.3-1 creates reporting requirements and delegates enforcement to 'the board of elections' but does not address the appointment process, structural independence, or protection from political control of that enforcement body. The statute imposes procedural obligations (filing deadlines, disclosure fields) but provides no information about whether the board is appointed by a multi-branch process or insulated from in-cycle political interference. Procedural clarity regarding enforcement-body independence requires statutory specification of appointment and removal protections, which are absent here.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30 addresses procedural requirements for objecting to candidate nominations and does not address the appointment, composition, or independence protections of any enforcement body. The section delegates decisions to the Commission and Electoral Court but provides no information about how those bodies are constituted, appointed, or protected from political control.

§ 12-27-39 codifies application of CF requirements. § 12-27-16.1 codifies IE compliance. SD's enforcement body is the Secretary of State + Attorney General — partisan-elected officials. Independence is partial — SoS is politically elected.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 67 of LOREG addresses the allocation of electoral propaganda time slots to political parties based on prior electoral performance. It does not establish or describe an enforcement body, appointment procedures, or protections from political control. The section concerns campaign media access, not enforcement mechanism independence.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the appointment of precinct registrars and assistant registrars for polling places—it concerns voter registration and election administration at the precinct level, not campaign-finance enforcement. It contains no provisions regarding the appointment, independence, or political insulation of a campaign-finance enforcement body. The criterion requires multi-branch appointment and protection from in-cycle political control of an enforcement authority; this section is entirely outside that scope.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The FTS query surfaced county election commissions / joint elections commissions (§ 31.032, § 31.153, § 31.154) — election-administration appointing bodies, not the campaign-finance enforcement body. The Texas Ethics Commission, which enforces Title 15, is constituted and its appointment process set under Government Code Ch. 571, outside the Election Code corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses midterm vacancies in municipal offices and establishes procedures for filling them through municipal legislative body appointment. It does not discuss campaign-finance enforcement, enforcement bodies, their appointment processes, or protection from political control. The section is entirely outside the scope of campaign-finance regulation and enforcement infrastructure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The surfaced candidates concern campaign-finance reports and the public-grant program. Vermont campaign-finance enforcement runs through the Attorney General and State's Attorneys (§ 2904) and reporting administration through the Secretary of State; no independent campaign-finance commission is codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the scope and exclusivity of Virginia's campaign-finance chapter but contains no provisions regarding the appointment, composition, or independence of any enforcement body. It does not address whether an enforcement authority exists, how it is appointed, whether multi-branch appointment procedures are in place, or what protections exist against political control. The section is purely jurisdictional and does not engage with enforcement-body governance at all.

This section protects the commission's enforcement authority from delegation to the executive director, ensuring non-delegation of violation determination and penalty assessment. However, the section does not address how commission members are appointed, their removal protections, or multi-branch oversight—the core elements of ENF.2. The statute protects procedural independence through non-delegation but does not establish structural independence (appointment process, term length, removal standards).

“The commission shall not delegate its authority to adopt, amend, or rescind rules nor may it delegate authority to determine that a violation of this title has occurred or to assess penalties for such violations”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: While this section provides for gubernatorial appointment with Senate advice and consent (a multi-branch process), it contains no protection against in-cycle political control. The Governor appoints during the same electoral cycle, and there are no term-length protections, removal restrictions, or other safeguards that would insulate commissioners from immediate partisan pressure during an election campaign. The criterion requires both multi-branch appointment AND protection from in-cycle political control; this section satisfies only the first element.

§ 5.05 establishes the elections commission's general authority but expressly carves out campaign finance: 'other than laws relating to campaign financing.' Wisconsin Ethics Commission (Wis. Stat. § 19.55) handles campaign finance — not surfaced.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 22-25-107 establishes filing procedures and designates filing recipients (county clerk, secretary of state) but contains no definition of an enforcement body, no appointment process for any regulator, and no protections against political control. The section addresses procedural mechanics of report filing and database maintenance, not enforcement independence.