Political-balance requirement

The statute mandates balanced composition of the state ballot counting review board by requiring the director to appoint an equal number of persons (two each) from the governor's party and the second-largest party statewide. This statutory requirement prevents single-party capture of the board's composition and ensures structural political balance regardless of which party controls the directorship.

“The director shall appoint two persons from the political party of which the governor is a member and two persons from the political party that received the second largest number of votes statewide in the preceding gubernatorial election to participate in the state ballot counting review.”

Arizona A.R.S. § 16-531(A) mandates statutory political balance on election boards through an explicit equal-division requirement between the two largest political parties for inspectors, marshals, and judges. The statute also requires that when one party holds the inspector position, the other party must hold the marshal position, creating institutional checks at the precinct level. This structural balance is constitutionally grounded and applies uniformly across all precincts.

“they shall be divided equally between these two parties. There shall be an equal number of inspectors in the various precincts in the county who are members of the two largest political parties. In each precinct where the inspector is a member of one of the two largest political parties, the marshal in that precinct shall be a member of the other of the two largest political parties.”

Article 44 codifies the precinct-commission party-balance requirement: 'Members of precinct electoral commission shall be appointed by: (1) political parties (alliances of political parties) having a faction in the National Assembly.' Multi-party composition statutorily required.

§ 19 Abs. 4 NRWO mandates that the composition of election commissions (Wahlbehörden) must be adjusted to reflect current party strength (Parteienstärke) following National Council elections, and §§ 14-16 establish that party representation is proportional to electoral support. This creates a statutory requirement for political balance indexed to actual election results, automatically rebalancing commissions when party representation changes. The mechanism is codified in statute and self-executing, not subject to discretionary appointment.

“so sind die der neuen Parteienstärke entsprechenden Änderungen durchzuführen”

Connecticut law establishes by statute a five-member commission with explicit political-balance requirements: no more than two members from the same party, and at least one member unaffiliated with any party. This structure is further reinforced by multi-branch appointment (House minority leader, Senate minority leader, Speaker, President pro tempore, and the Governor), ensuring neither party can control commission composition. The statute also bars recent political-party officers from appointment, protecting institutional independence from short-term partisan pressure.

“There is established a State Elections Enforcement Commission to consist of five members, not more than two of whom shall be members of the same political party and at least one of whom shall not be affiliated with any political party.”

The statute mandates a fixed 2-2 party balance in the expanded electoral commission: two representatives from the majority party/coalition and two from opposition parties/coalitions, appointed according to the parliamentary composition. This ensures structural political balance and prevents single-party capture, even if a fallback mechanism (random selection) exists when agreement fails.

“Prošireni sastav izbornog povjerenstva izborne jedinice čine po dva predstavnika većinske političke stranke, odnosno koalicije i dva dogovorno predložena predstavnika oporbenih političkih stranaka, odnosno koalicija sukladno stranačkom sastavu Sabora i njihovi zamjenici.”

Delaware statute § 220(b)(4) explicitly mandates equal representation of the two principal political parties on the Reports Appeals Subcommittee. This is reinforced by § 220(b)(3.a), which requires the Chair and Co-Chair to represent opposite parties on a rotating basis, and § 220(b)(5), which protects balanced voting. The statutory requirement for party balance is clear and enforceable.

“Each of the 2 principal political parties shall have equal representation on the Subcommittee.”

Estonia's National Electoral Committee is a non-partisan expert body — judges, a public prosecutor, a State Audit Office official and advisers, appointed by independent constitutional offices rather than by parties; § 10 satisfies COMM.4 through the independent-appointment path rather than party balance.

“a judge of a court of first instance appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;”

The statute mandates a nine-member commission with three members each drawn from the Conseil d'État, Cour de cassation, and Cour des comptes—three co-equal senior courts—and designated by decree upon the proposal of the heads of each institution. This multi-branch, multi-court appointment structure (explicitly rooted in judicial institutions rather than political appointees) provides structural insulation from single-party capture. The requirement that proposals come from the vice-president and first presidents of these courts (with notice to their internal bodies) ensures independent selection by professional judicial bodies, satisfying the statutory political-balance criterion through institutional independence.

§ 21-2-408 codifies bipartisan poll-watcher structure (one per candidate / two per precinct per party). § 21-2-30 codifies State Election Board political-balance (1 member appointed by each major party's state committee). § 21-2-139 codifies nonpartisan elections form. Political-balance requirement codified throughout.

Section § 4(2) BWO mandates statutory political balance by requiring that election commission members (Beisitzer) be selected in proportion to parties' performance in the most recent federal election and that party-nominated candidates be appointed. This is a clear statutorily-grounded party-balance requirement. Additionally, § 4(3) ensures independent judicial appointment of court members (judges from federal and state administrative courts) proposed by court presidents, providing structural multi-source appointment.

“Bei der Auswahl der Beisitzer der Wahlausschüsse sollen in der Regel die Parteien in der Reihenfolge der bei der letzten Bundestagswahl in dem jeweiligen Gebiet errungenen Zahlen der Zweitstimmen angemessen berücksichtigt und die von ihnen rechtzeitig vorgeschlagenen Wahlberechtigten berufen werden.”

Hawaii statute explicitly requires that boards of registration cannot consist entirely of members of one political party, establishing a statutory political-balance mandate. The statute further clarifies that party membership is determined by the respective political party and must be tracked throughout the member's tenure, with notice requirements for party-membership changes. This structural requirement prevents single-party capture of the boards.

“In no case shall any board consist entirely of members of one political party.”

Iowa Code § 49.15(2)(a) statutorily requires that election board panels include members of each political party, with names designated by county party chairpersons. This creates a clear statutory mandate for political balance in the composition of precinct election boards, protecting against single-party capture through explicit multipartisan inclusion requirements.

The statute explicitly requires that in hearings before a subcommittee of the commission, not more than a majority of the members shall be of the same political party. This is a direct, statutorily-mandated political-balance requirement that prevents single-party capture of the adjudicatory process.

“of whom not more than a majority shall be of the same political party”

KRS 117.025 codifies a political-balance requirement: the State Board of Elections appoints an executive director and 'shall also appoint an assistant director, who shall be of a different political party than the director,' and must employ its staff 'on a bipartisan basis.' KRS 117.035 codifies the county board with two appointed members representing both parties, and KRS 117.015 seats the State Board from both parties' lists. Statutory party balance codified.

“The board shall also appoint an assistant director, who shall be of a different political party than the director.”

Louisiana's statute mandates a mechanical, transparent political-balance requirement: after random selection of the initial slate of commissioners, the drawing process must explicitly verify that each recognized political party with candidates on the ballot has at least one representative, and if not, the process continues until such balance is achieved. This requirement is set in statute, is automatic and non-discretionary, and applies at the precinct level across the state.

The statute mandates a three-member registration appeals board with explicit political-balance safeguards: two members must be nominated by and enrolled in the major political parties (one per party), and the third is nominated by the municipal clerk and represents a neutral/independent position. This structure ensures neither party can unilaterally control the board and prevents single-party capture.

“The municipal committee of each of the major political parties shall nominate one member, who must be enrolled in the party of the municipal committee that nominates the member, and the municipal officers shall appoint the persons nominated by the municipal committees and the 3rd member must be nominated by the clerk of the municipality and appointed by the municipal officers.”

The statute explicitly mandates political-balance requirements through two mechanisms: (1) a positive duty to appoint successors to represent the two leading political parties 'as nearly as possible,' and (2) a hard cap preventing any single party from holding more than two of the board's seats (plus the clerk, who need not be party-enrolled). This creates an enforceable structural constraint on composition rather than discretionary guidance.

“the selectmen or the appointing authority shall so appoint their successors that as nearly as possible the members of the board shall represent the two leading political parties, as defined in section one of chapter fifty; provided, that a city or town clerk need not be enrolled in a political party; and provided further, that in no case shall an appointment be made as to cause a board to have more than two members, including the city or town clerk, of the same political party.”

§ 203B.23 codifies the absentee ballot board with bipartisan election-judge composition. § 204C.32 codifies the canvass of state primaries. § 204B.04 codifies candidacy prohibitions (anti-conflict). § 204C.31 codifies that county canvassing boards exclude candidates. § 203B.121 codifies bipartisan ballot boards (judges from different major parties). Political-balance requirement codified.

The statute provides a clear, binding political-balance requirement: exactly two commissioners from each major party, with prohibition on party-same chairman and secretary. This statutory structure prevents single-party capture by mandating bipartisan composition and ensuring divided leadership regardless of which party the governor belongs to. The balance is codified and enforceable.

§ 13-4-102 codifies political balance for election boards — each board of election judges must include judges from all parties that submitted lists, and no more than a simple majority may come from one party; § 13-13-225 requires absentee election boards to take one member from each of the two leading parties.

“No more than the number of election judges needed to obtain a simple majority may be appointed from the list of one political party in each county.”

The statute mandates political balance by requiring at least one representative from each of the two major parties casting the highest and next-highest vote totals in the prior gubernatorial/presidential election, and further requires that any additional appointees be balanced between the political parties. This creates a statutorily-grounded structural safeguard against single-party domination of the county canvassing board.

“One registered voter shall be appointed from the political party casting the highest number of votes for Governor or for President of the United States in the county in the immediately preceding general election, and one registered voter shall be appointed from the political party casting the next highest number of votes for such office. The election commissioner or county clerk may appoint additional registered voters to serve on the county canvassing board and may appoint registered voters to serve in case of a vacancy among any of the members of the county canvassing board. Such appointees shall be balanced between the political parties and may include registered voters unaffiliated with any political party.”

The statute mandates explicit party-balance through multi-branch appointment: the House Speaker and Senate President each appoint one member from each of the two major parties (4 members, 2-2 balanced), and the Governor appoints one member with executive council consent. This creates a structural requirement that no single party can control the commission, and the staggered terms (2, 3, 4 years) prevent wholesale turnover.

“Two members shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. Two members shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. One member shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the council”

The statute imposes a clear statutory requirement that no more than two of the four commission members may belong to the same political party, ensuring that the majority cannot come from a single party. Additionally, the prohibition on appointing holders of public or party office reinforces political independence. This satisfies the political-balance structural requirement without reliance on administrative discretion.

“No more than two members shall belong to the same political party, and no person holding a public office or an office in any political party shall be eligible for appointment to the commission.”

§ 3-400 codifies that election inspectors are appointed in bipartisan pairs (two from different parties at each polling place). § 3-100 codifies bipartisan state-board structure. § 9-211(1) codifies bipartisan-committee audit. § 9-208 codifies bipartisan recanvass. Political-balance is structurally codified throughout the administration.

§ 16.1-15-15 codifies county canvassing-board composition with bipartisan representation: 'both political parties must be represented.' § 16.1-15-33 codifies state-board parallel. § 16.1-05-04 codifies bipartisan election-board duties. Political-balance requirement explicitly codified.

“The county canvassing board must be composed of the county recorder, county auditor, chairman of the board of county commissioners, and a representative of each of the two political parties that received the highest number of votes cast for governor at the most recent general election at which a governor was elected.”

§ 1204(a)(3) codifies an explicit party-balance rule for registrars in counties of the first class: 'Not more than one-half of the number of registrars appointed annually for each registration place may be members of the same political party.' Reinforces party-balance pattern with § 405 (one majority + one minority inspector).

Article 22(1) codifies political-balance requirements for subject-level + municipal-level + district commissions: 'on the basis of proposals by political parties' having representation in legislative bodies. Article 25 reinforces for district commissions. Article 35 governs party nominations. Multi-party commission composition statutorily codified.

The statute mandates statutory-grounded political balance by requiring at least one appointee from the majority party and at least one from the largest minority party. This structural requirement applies to every county board and is not subject to executive discretion. The balance mechanism is explicit and enforceable, satisfying the dual-scholar test for institutional protection against single-party capture.

“At least one appointee on the board shall be a member of the majority political party represented in the General Assembly and at least one appointee shall be a member of the largest minority political party represented in the General Assembly.”

§ 12-18-3.1 codifies impartiality requirements for simulated-election polling-place access. § 12-15-3 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies bipartisan distribution of precinct officials with superintendent from majority party + deputy from minority. § 12-17B-11 codifies equal party representation among tabulation staff. § 12-20-48.1 codifies canvass-board procedures. Political-balance requirement codified.

§ 87.002 codifies a political-balance requirement for the early-voting ballot board: each county party chair submits a ranked list and 'the same number of members must be appointed from each list,' with the presiding and alternate presiding judges drawn from the two parties whose gubernatorial nominees placed first and second. § 51.002 and § 31.032 likewise seat the county chair of each primary-nominating party. Statutory party balance codified.

“The same number of members must be appointed from each list”

Art. IV-203 codifies territorial-commission establishment with party-organization nomination quotas (parliamentary-faction parties + local organizations). Art. IV-204 codifies precinct-commission establishment with party nomination. Political-balance requirement codified — commissions are formed with party representation.

52 USC § 20943(a)(3) codifies an explicit party-balance rule for the EAC Standards Board. § 30106 (FEC, in COMM.1 candidates) caps same-party members at 3 of 6.

“The two members of the Standards Board who represent the same State may not be members of the same political party”

§ 2143 codifies a political-balance requirement for the board of civil authority — the town election body: if it does not contain 'at least three members of each major political party,' an underrepresented party may compel additional appointments. § 2454 requires assistant election officers to be appointed, as far as possible, equally from each major party, and § 2455 codifies political-party representation among election officials.

“at least three members of each major political party”

Virginia's electoral board statute mandates political balance by requiring that two of three members represent the party with the highest gubernatorial vote share, with the remaining member from the second-ranked party. This is a clear statutory requirement, enforceable through the appointment process and subject to judicial oversight. The structure satisfies COMM.4 because the composition balance is codified in statute, not left to administrative discretion.

“In the appointment of the electoral board, representation shall be given to each of the two political parties having the highest and next highest number of votes in the Commonwealth for Governor at the last preceding gubernatorial election. Two electoral board members shall be of the political party that cast the highest number of votes for Governor at that election.”

The statute explicitly requires political balance by capping commissioners of the same party at three of five, ensuring that no single party can control the commission. This structural requirement is set by statute, does not depend on executive discretion, and would be enforceable across administrations regardless of current political composition. The requirement directly addresses the core concern of preventing single-party capture.

“No more than three commissioners shall have an identification with the same political party.”

This section mandates statutory political balance at the operational level by requiring that every team of poll clerks and election commissioners consist of persons from opposite political parties, with explicit prohibition of same-party or no-party teams. This structural requirement ensures bipartisan composition for the officials who directly conduct and oversee voting and ballot counting, satisfying the political-balance criterion through mandatory statutory design rather than discretionary appointment.

“The term "team of poll clerks" or "team of election commissioners" means two persons appointed by opposite political parties to perform the specific functions of the office: Provided , That no team of poll clerks or team of election commissioners may consist of two persons with the same registered political party affiliation or two persons registered with no political party affiliation”

Article 35 codifies multi-source nomination to commissions: 'Political parties, other public associations, labor collectives of organizations' may nominate representatives. Article 34 codifies formation. Article 62 codifies party nomination of deputies. Article 70 codifies cancellation. Multi-source nomination framework codified, though political-balance composition is heavily state-controlled in practice per OSCE/ODIHR reports.

The statute requires political-balance representation on precinct election boards, but only conditionally — balance is mandatory only 'if a list of applicants has been provided' by party precinct committeemen at least 60 days before the primary. This makes balance discretionary and dependent on party initiative rather than a binding statutory mandate. The requirement lacks teeth: there is no enforcement mechanism, no obligation on parties to submit lists, and no consequence if political balance is not achieved.

“Each election board shall contain personnel representing all existing political parties if a list of applicants has been provided to the county clerk by the precinct committeemen of the precincts at least sixty (60) days prior to the primary election.”

The statute mandates that the two co-directors cannot be from the same political party, establishing a basic political-balance requirement. However, the structure is incomplete: both co-directors are appointed unilaterally by the governor (a single-branch appointment), and there is no requirement for confirmed appointment by the legislature or independent judicial appointment. Additionally, the secretary of state—an elected executive—has final dispute-resolution authority, further concentrating power within the executive branch. While the sameparty prohibition prevents total single-party capture, the absence of multi-branch appointment or legislative confirmation leaves the framework structurally vulnerable to executive dominance.

“The co-directors may not be members of the same political party.”

Lithuania's Central Electoral Commission composition is multi-source — nominees of political parties meeting a threshold, parties with Seimas seats, the Minister of Justice, and the Bar Council — providing de facto political balance; the surfaced section codifies the CEC's funding-monitoring role rather than a specific balance rule.

The statute requires the Governor to appoint three of eleven members based on recommendations from Democratic and Republican Senate leadership, plus a member from the largest opposition party—creating a partial multi-party balance mechanism. However, statutory balance is incomplete: the Governor retains unilateral appointment power (even with recommendations), no supermajority confirmation is required, six of eleven members are appointed without explicit partisan balance requirements, and no accountability mechanism (judicial review, conflict disclosure, removal protection) is specified. The structure addresses party composition for only 3/11 seats without independent judicial appointment or supermajority protections.

The statute mandates a mixed appointment structure: eight judges selected by the judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) via lottery, and five academics designated by joint proposal of parliamentary parties. This creates de facto cross-party input, but the statute does not explicitly require political balance, supermajority thresholds, or prevent a single party coalition from controlling the academic appointments. The judiciary component is independently appointed, but the academic component lacks an explicit balance safeguard.

“Cinco Vocales Catedráticos de Derecho o de Ciencias Políticas y de Sociología, en activo, designados a propuesta conjunta de los partidos, federaciones, coaliciones o agrupaciones de electores con representación en el Congreso de los Diputados”

The statute requires members to be of 'different political parties,' which provides explicit political balance on the canvassing board itself. However, the critical structural weakness is that both appointees are chosen solely by the county clerk—a single executive official—with no multi-branch appointment, confirmation requirement, supermajority threshold, or judicial involvement. This creates vulnerability to single-party control at the appointing level, even though the resulting board must be internally balanced. A dual-scholar test would likely split: left-leaning scholars might credit the internal balance requirement; right-leaning scholars would flag the lack of appointment safeguards (no confirmation, no independent appointment authority). The statute satisfies the balance *requirement* but not the institutional *insulation* that COMM.4 prioritizes.

“The county canvassing board is the county clerk and two (2) electors of different political parties resident in the county appointed by the county clerk.”

The section requires political balance at the precinct level (inspectors and clerks must be from opposing parties 'if practicable'), but this applies to poll workers, not to the election commission itself. COMM.4 measures whether the commission's composition is statutorily balanced. This statute does not address commission appointment, composition, or balance requirements; it only governs how precinct election officials are selected. The 'if practicable' language also weakens the requirement, making balance discretionary rather than mandatory.

“one inspector and at least three clerks shall be appointed for each county from members of opposing political parties, if practicable”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses succession rules for National Deputies and Mercosur parliamentarians following death, resignation, or incapacity—it governs the mechanics of filling vacancies in legislative seats, not the composition or structure of an election administration body. It contains no provisions regarding the appointment, composition, or political balance of an election commission. The section is legislatively procedural, not institutionally structural for electoral governance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 7-7-306 addresses ballot content and preparation duties of county election boards but contains no language establishing or requiring political balance in the composition of those boards. It prescribes operational procedures (separate ballots for parties, nonpartisan offices, measures) rather than structural safeguards for balanced appointment, term protection, or multi-branch oversight of commissioners themselves.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 9 addresses only leave-of-absence procedures for commissioners and contains no language regarding composition, appointment, political balance, party representation, supermajority confirmation, or judicial selection. It is a narrow procedural provision unrelated to the structural safeguards required by COMM.4.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 146 addresses post-election reporting procedures for polling station officers—specifically the compilation and transmission of voter records, absences, and staffing gaps to the justice of the peace. It contains no provisions relating to the composition, appointment, balance, or structural independence of any election commission. The criterion COMM.4 requires statutory protection of commission political balance; this section deals entirely with administrative vote-closing procedures and has no bearing on commission structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 112 addresses party representation substitutes (suplentes) but contains no language establishing statutory requirements for political balance, multi-party composition, supermajority confirmation, or judicial appointment of any commission. It does not establish or govern commission composition requirements.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Чл. 109 codifies the appeals path for overseas section commission decisions to CEC; not political balance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 19260 covers a Pooled-Money-Investment-Board loan mechanism — unrelated to commission political balance. CA's elections commission structure (Fair Political Practices Commission for campaign-finance, statutory single SoS for elections) lives in Gov Code 81000+, not ingested.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses penalty-determination criteria and procedural consultation requirements for the Chief Electoral Officer's enforcement powers. It does not establish or specify the composition requirements of any election commission. COMM.4 evaluates statutory provisions governing commission membership balance; this section concerns administrative monetary penalties and does not touch that institutional structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains only general procedural principles (leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, democracy, and rule of law) and does not establish any electoral commission structure, appointment mechanism, or political-balance requirement for any institutional body. No commission composition rules are present.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-12-207 governs vacancy-filling on nonpartisan boards through appointment by remaining directors or county commissioners, with no statutory requirement for political balance, party representation, supermajority confirmation, or judicial appointment. The statute ensures vacancies are filled but does not mandate any composition requirement addressing partisan representation or independent judicial selection.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 20 addresses the definition and eligibility of electoral candidates (political parties, coalitions, independent candidates), not the composition or structure of any election commission. It contains no provisions regarding commission appointment, political balance requirements, supermajority confirmation, or judicial independence mechanisms. The section is substantively irrelevant to COMM.4.

§ 73 codifies that valgbestyrelsen conducts the fintælling. § 76 / § 77 / § 78 codify mandate distribution. § 82 codifies party-list count. § 30 (not in FTS top-5) codifies that tilforordnede vælgere are selected by 'proportional representation' (forholdstalsvalg) among municipal voters. § 29 codifies parallel for valgstyrere. Political-balance through proportional appointment partially codified.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 105.041 — nonpartisan ballot form. Not commission political-balance.

Article 45 (Election campaign) codifies equal rights for parties — not commission political balance. CEC composition (7 parliamentary + 7 party = 15 members) is mixed-party but the surfaced candidates don't directly codify political balance as a structural requirement.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 48 addresses ballot marking rules and vote classification (party votes vs. personal votes), not commission composition or political balance requirements. It contains no institutional framework governing an election commission's structure, appointment, or balance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedural rights of list agents and appeals mechanisms regarding candidate-list validity decisions. It does not establish or define the composition, appointment process, or political balance of any election commission. COMM.4 requires statutory language mandating political balance in commission membership through party-balance rules, supermajority confirmation, or independent judicial appointment—none of which are present in this procedural section.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 48 of the Electoral Reform Act 2022 addresses the registration and notation of political parties and their representatives' membership in European political groups. It imposes no requirement on any commission's composition, does not establish or regulate a commission, and contains no structural safeguards (political balance, multi-branch appointment, term protection, or independence) relevant to election administration governance. The section is purely a procedural registration mechanism for party membership data.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 31 addresses the registration and rights of proxies for candidates and political parties during electoral campaigns. It contains no provisions regarding the composition, appointment, or political balance of the election commission itself. The section is procedural (defining proxy qualifications and authorities) and does not establish any statutory framework for ensuring the commission is politically balanced, appointed through multi-branch processes, subject to supermajority confirmation, or independent.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced vote-counting observer provisions; Latvia codifies no political-balance requirement for election-commission composition — Central Election Commission members are elected by the Saeima (eight of nine) and local commission members by local councils, without a statutory party-balance rule.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 126 addresses parliamentary compensation, benefits, and political leave for members of the Chamber of Deputies. It contains no provisions establishing a commission, defining its composition, requiring political balance, mandating multi-party appointment, or protecting against single-party capture. The section is entirely outside the scope of election administration governance and institutional structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 57 enumerates campaign-conduct principles (neutrality of administration, impartiality of public services, transparency, equity among candidates) but does not establish or govern the composition, appointment, or political balance of any election commission. It addresses campaign rules, not institutional structure of the electoral body.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: While the Medical Board includes doctors appointed by political parties, this is not a political-balance requirement for the election commission itself. Article 14 addresses only a specialized Medical Board for voter eligibility determinations, not the composition or balance of the main election administration body. COMM.4 measures whether the primary election commission is statutorily required to be politically balanced; this section does not establish such a requirement for any central election commission.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate nomination procedures and filing requirements for candidates seeking political party nomination. It contains no provisions regarding commission composition, appointment procedures, political balance requirements, or the structure of any election administration body. The criterion COMM.4 concerns the institutional independence and political balance of an election commission; this section is entirely procedural and candidate-focused, not structural.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 503 designates the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) as the electoral authority for judicial elections and lists procedural principles (certainty, legality, independence, impartiality, transparency, objectivity, gender parity), but contains no statutory requirement for the composition of the INE's governing council to be politically balanced, supermajority-confirmed, or independently appointed. The section addresses electoral conduct standards and timeline, not institutional structure of commission membership. Political-balance safeguards would need to appear in the statute governing INE's internal composition (not presented here).

This section addresses vacancy-filling procedures but only references 'the political party entitled to fill the vacancy' without itself establishing the party-balance composition requirement. The actual balance requirement is in a different section, so this provision alone does not codify political balance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 23-15-785 concerns the preparation and certification of presidential election ballots and elector nominations. It contains no provisions whatsoever governing the composition, appointment, or political balance of any election commission. The section addresses procedural requirements for nominating petitions, elector consent statements, and ballot preparation, but is silent on commission structure or balance requirements.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the procedural logistics of relieving electoral officials from their primary jobs, their remuneration, and their employment arrangements during electoral periods. It contains no statutory language establishing or requiring political balance in the composition of any electoral commission. The section does not address appointment mechanisms, party representation, supermajority voting, judicial appointment, or any structural safeguard against single-party capture of the commission.

The section states that the Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen (Framework Act on Independent Administrative Bodies) applies to the Kiesraad with specified exceptions, but does not itself establish political-balance requirements. The provision is a cross-reference rather than a substantive structural rule. To evaluate COMM.4, one would need to examine the Kaderwet itself and the excepted articles to determine whether statutory political-balance protections exist; this section alone does not provide that content.

“De Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen is van toepassing op de Kiesraad, met uitzondering van de artikelen 12 , 21 en 22 .”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses primary election ballot procedures and nonpartisan voter access, not commission composition or political balance. It contains no provisions regarding the appointment, structure, or composition of any election commission. It does not establish, describe, or constrain the institutional independence or balance of decision-making bodies.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only ballot layout and the order in which offices and questions appear on ballots. It contains no provisions regarding election commission composition, appointment procedures, term protection, political balance, or any structural safeguard against single-party capture. The criterion COMM.4 requires statutory language establishing political-balance requirements for a commission; this section is wholly silent on commission governance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 163-294.1 addresses procedures for candidate death, disqualification, and withdrawal in municipal and special district elections. It contains no provisions regarding the composition, appointment, or political balance of any election commission. The section does not establish or reference commission structure, term limits, multi-branch appointment, or any statutory safeguards against single-party capture.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 4 of the DPRK Socialist Constitution describes the locus of sovereignty in the working people and their exercise of power through the Supreme People's Assembly and local people's assemblies. It contains no institutional framework for an election commission, no appointment mechanism, no political-balance requirement, and no structural safeguards against single-party capture. The section is a statement of constitutional principle about popular sovereignty, not a statutory structure governing election administration independence.

§ 5-4 codifies signature thresholds for candidate-list submission. § 11-7 / § 11-8 codify leveling-mandate distribution between parties. § 5-1 codifies candidate-list requirements. Political balance is structural through proportional representation; explicit party-balance requirement for commissions is not directly codified — § 4-1 prohibits political-officeholder membership but does not require party-balanced composition.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORC 3505.08 governs ballot paper specifications; not commission party balance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains campaign finance reporting requirements for candidate committees and does not address the composition, appointment, or political balance of any election commission. It specifies what information must be reported on contribution and expenditure forms, not structural governance of the commission itself. COMM.4 requires statutory language mandating the commission's political composition; this text provides none.

The statute mandates multi-branch judicial appointment (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and National Administrative Court), which provides structural insulation from executive capture and reflects judicial independence as the source of commissioners. However, the text contains no explicit political-balance requirement, party-balance mandate, or supermajority-confirmation procedure. The reliance on judicial selection mitigates (but does not eliminate) single-party dominance risk, but the criterion specifically requires statutory language demanding balance or independent judicial appointment—both of which are present in principle but the latter is implicit rather than explicitly framed as a balance safeguard.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines electoral propaganda and does not address commission composition, appointment procedures, political balance requirements, or any institutional structure for an election commission. It is a substantive rule governing campaign conduct, not a governance provision relevant to COMM.4.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs polling place operations, equipment arrangement, and the duties of election officials and police at polling sites. It contains no provisions regarding commission composition, appointment procedures, term protection, political balance requirements, or any institutional structure of an election commission. The criterion COMM.4 addresses statutory requirements for balanced commission composition; this section does not address the commission itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. 80 codifies campaign-decision contestation procedure; not political balance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Constitution Article 4 establishes separation of powers — not political balance in election commissions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 84 concerns the accreditation procedures for election observers, not the composition or appointment of the Electoral Commission itself. It contains no provisions regarding commission balance, party representation, appointment authority, term protection, or statutory safeguards against single-party capture. This section is entirely procedural and does not address the criterion.

14 kap. 3-7 § codify proportional mandate distribution among parties — Sainte-Laguë method with 4% national threshold. Political balance is achieved through proportional representation at the legislative level; explicit party-balance requirement for the election commission itself is not codified in Vallagen.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot design and layout requirements (arrangement of offices, candidate names, question formatting). It contains no provisions regarding election commission composition, appointment procedures, political balance, term protection, or institutional structure. The section is purely procedural and does not engage with the criterion COMM.4, which measures whether an election commission's composition is statutorily required to be politically balanced.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS candidates for COMM.4 surface ballot-paper preparation rules (Law 2972 Madde 18, Law 2839 Madde 26), propaganda rules (Law 6271 Madde 13, Law 298 Madde 55/B), and transitional provisions — none address commission political balance. (District boards include 2 party-members per Madde 19 of Law 298 but that wasn't surfaced here.)

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 23 of PPERA 2000 addresses the maintenance of political party registers by the Electoral Commission and administrative procedures for registration. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding the composition of the Commission itself, the appointment of commissioners, the terms of commissioners, or any requirement that the Commission be politically balanced. The section is purely procedural and administrative regarding party registration, not structural regarding commission governance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs financial reporting requirements for school board candidates. It contains no provisions regarding commission composition, political balance, multi-branch appointment, or any institutional structure for an election administration body. It is purely procedural regulation of candidate campaign finance disclosure and does not address the criterion.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.