Multi-branch appointment

The Fair Ballot Commission is composed of members appointed by multiple branches: executive (Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner, Secretary of State), legislative (Speaker of House), and academic/institutional entities (three universities). No single branch unilaterally controls the 18-member composition, and appointment authority is explicitly distributed by statute across distinct power centers.

“The Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Secretary of State, or their designees, shall each serve as a member on the commission and shall each appoint to the commission one member who is an attorney licensed in the state and one member who is a private citizen of the state who is not an attorney. The Alabama State University School of Public Policy, the Samford University School of Public Policy, and the Miles College School of Law shall each appoint a member to the commission.”

The Redistricting Planning Committee is statutorily composed of five members appointed by four separate institutional actors: the senate president (legislative), the house speaker (legislative), the chief justice (judicial), and the governor (executive, two appointments). No single branch controls composition; the governor holds only 40% of appointments, and the combined legislative and judicial branches hold 60%. This structure protects against unilateral capture and meets the multi-branch appointment requirement.

“One member shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one member shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one member shall be appointed by the chief justice of the Alaska Supreme Court, and two members shall be appointed by the governor.”

Article 49 establishes electoral junta composition by direct reference to judicial officers (appellate court presidents and electoral judges) whose appointment and tenure are constitutionally grounded in the judiciary, not subject to unilateral executive control. This structural design ensures judicial independence in electoral administration through multi-branch separation of powers, satisfying the multi-branch appointment criterion.

The statute establishes multi-branch appointment: the judiciary nominates (via the commission on appellate court appointments), and the executive branch selects, with additional safeguards including staggered five-year terms, political-party balance (no more than two from same party), and alternating governor/opposition-party-official selection for subsequent vacancies. No single branch controls composition.

This section establishes statutory multi-branch appointment: five commissioners are appointed by five different state officials (executive branch via Governor and Attorney General; legislative branch via Speaker and President Pro Tempore; and executive via Lieutenant Governor). No single branch controls composition, and terms are fixed at five years with succession protections. The structure clearly prevents unilateral control.

The statute vests appointment and leadership of cantonal electoral boards exclusively in the judiciary—specifically trial court presidents, division presidents, and justices of the peace. No branch other than the judiciary appoints or designates these officials. While the electoral framework itself is set by statute (a multi-branch product), the immediate control of electoral administration is entrusted to an independent judicial branch, which satisfies the structural requirement against single-branch (executive) unilateral capture.

The statute mandates a multi-branch composition: three and two judges are elected (by the judiciary itself) from the Supreme Court and Federal Court of Appeals respectively, while two additional members are nominated by the President but selected from a list of six candidates pre-screened by the Supreme Court. This structure prevents unilateral control by any single branch—the President cannot appoint arbitrary candidates and must choose from judicially-vetted candidates. The judiciary controls 5 of 7 seats directly or indirectly, creating genuine structural independence from executive discretion.

The statute vests appointment power in the House of Commons (one legislative chamber) and removal power jointly in both the Senate and House of Commons (bicameral protection), preventing unilateral control by any single branch. The 10-year fixed term with removal only "for cause" by concurrent resolution of both chambers creates strong structural insulation from executive discretion and partisan cycling.

“There shall be a Chief Electoral Officer who shall be appointed by resolution of the House of Commons to hold office during good behaviour for a term of 10 years. He or she may be removed for cause by the Governor General on address of the Senate and House of Commons.”

The statute explicitly mandates multi-branch appointment: three members appointed by legislative branch leaders (minority and majority from both chambers), one by the Governor (executive), and balanced composition (no more than two from same party, at least one unaffiliated). No single branch controls composition. The structure includes Senate confirmation of all appointments, fixed staggered terms, and a political-balance requirement—all codified safeguards against single-party capture.

“Of the members first appointed under this subsection, one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives and shall hold office for a term of one year from July 1, 1974; one shall be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate and shall hold office for a term of three years from said July first; one shall be appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives and shall hold office for a term of one year from said July first; one shall be appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate and shall hold office for a term of three years from said July first and one shall be appointed by the Governor, provided such member shall not be affiliated with any political party, and shall hold office for a term of five years from said July first”

The Constitutional Court of Croatia (a judicial branch actor) appoints all members of the Ethics Commission based on nominations from parliamentary political parties (legislative branch actors). This multi-branch appointment structure—where the judiciary makes final appointment authority but legislature nominates candidates—prevents unilateral control by any single branch and satisfies COMM.2. The requirement that appointees be prominent public figures unaffiliated with political parties further strengthens institutional independence.

“Članove Povjerenstva, na temelju prijedloga parlamentarnih političkih stranaka, imenuje Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske”

Delaware's statutory framework requires gubernatorial appointment combined with mandatory Senate confirmation, creating a genuine multi-branch check: the executive cannot unilaterally install commissioners without legislative approval. This dual-branch structure satisfies COMM.2, as neither the Governor nor the Senate alone controls composition. The provision also includes fixed four-year terms and explicit conflict-of-interest bars (subsections d and e), further insulating the office from political capture.

“The State Election Commissioner shall be appointed by the Governor for a term of 4 years and confirmed by a majority of the members elected to the Senate.”

§ 10 spreads appointment of the National Electoral Committee across multiple branches and independent offices — two judges by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, plus appointees of the Chancellor of Justice, the Auditor General, the Chief Public Prosecutor and the State Secretary — so no single branch controls composition.

“a judge of a court of first instance appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court;”

§ 106.24 establishes the Florida Elections Commission with multi-source appointments (Governor + leaders). § 102.111 (4972) Elections Canvassing Commission requires Governor + 2 Cabinet members.

“The commission shall be a separate budget entity”

§ 21-2-30 codifies State Election Board composition: Secretary of State (ex officio), plus 1 member elected by majority of Senate, 1 by majority of House, 1 by each major political party's state executive committee, and 1 by joint majority. Multi-branch appointment statutorily codified.

§ 4(3) of the BWO establishes that judicial branch members (federal administrative court judges and state administrative court judges) are appointed to electoral commissions on the recommendation of court presidents—a multi-branch structural safeguard. Combined with § 4(2), which mandates that political parties proposed by statute be appropriately considered when selecting lay members (Beisitzer), the statute creates a framework where executive officials (Wahlleiter) cannot unilaterally control composition. Judges nominated by the judiciary and parties nominated through statutory process provide distinct sources of appointment authority independent of any single branch.

“Der Bundeswahlleiter beruft zwei Richter des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts, die Landeswahlleiter berufen je zwei Richter des Oberverwaltungsgerichts des Landes und jeweils einen Stellvertreter. Die Berufung erfolgt auf Vorschlag des Gerichtspräsidenten.”

10 ILCS 5/1A-3 codifies executive-and-legislative-branch appointment: Governor appoints 4 members from each political-party slate; Senate confirms all appointments (§ 1A-4); state executive officers (AG, SoS, Comptroller, Treasurer) submit nominee lists for opposition-party seats.

“The Governor shall appoint 2 members of the same political party with which he is affiliated”

Section 19(4) vests appointment of the chairperson (on vacancy) in the Chief Justice, a judicial branch officer, which constitutes multi-branch appointment when combined with the initial appointment mechanism in section 9 referenced in 19(1). The judiciary's explicit statutory power to nominate the chairperson prevents unilateral executive control and satisfies the structural independence criterion for multi-branch appointment.

“In the event of the death, resignation or expiry of the term of the chairperson, the Chief Justice shall nominate a new chairperson.”

§ 2 of the Central Election Commission Law spreads appointment across branches — the Saeima elects the chairperson and seven members, and the Supreme Court elects one member from among its judges; no single branch controls the composition.

“shall be elected by the Saeima, whereas one member shall be elected from among judges - by the Supreme Court during its Plenary Session.”

Maryland's statute vests appointment authority in the Governor with mandatory Senate confirmation, dividing control between the executive and legislative branches. Additionally, § 2-101(e)(2) imposes a statutory political-balance requirement (2-3 members from each principal party), and § 2-101(f)(3) limits members to three consecutive terms, all of which are codified structural safeguards against unilateral single-branch capture.

“be appointed by the Governor in accordance with paragraph (2) of this subsection, with the advice and consent of the Senate of Maryland”

The section establishes multi-branch appointment by requiring the President Counselor to be elected by a two-thirds supermajority of the Chamber of Deputies (legislative branch), with the Electoral Counselors elected under a separate constitutional procedure that mandates competitive nomination and deliberative selection. Neither the executive nor judiciary controls unilateral appointment; the legislative branch must achieve consensus across party lines (two-thirds threshold), and the Electoral Counselors are insulated from single-branch capture by constitutional mandate.

Article 35(4) establishes multi-branch appointment of second-level constituency council members: the judiciary (district courts) appoints two members, the legislature (local councils/People's Assembly) appoints two members, and political parties represented in Parliament each appoint one member. The chairperson is appointed by the Central Electoral Commission but subject to civil service law protections. This structure ensures no single branch unilaterally controls composition and satisfies the multi-branch appointment requirement.

The statute establishes statutory multi-branch appointment: the speaker of the house appoints 2 members (one per major party), the president of the senate appoints 2 members (one per major party), and the governor appoints 1 member with council advice and consent. This fragmented structure prevents any single branch from unilaterally controlling the 5-member composition, and partisan balance is guaranteed by statute.

“Two members shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. Two members shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. One member shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the council”

The statute mandates multi-branch appointment: the Governor proposes, but the Senate must provide advice and consent. This shared appointment power between executive and legislative branches prevents unilateral control by a single branch. The requirement that no more than two members belong to the same political party further ensures structural balance against capture.

“The members shall be appointed by the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of 3 years”

This section creates a seven-member citizen redistricting committee appointed through explicitly multi-branch mechanisms: four members appointed by legislative leadership (both chambers, both majority and minority), two members appointed by the state ethics commission without party affiliation, and one member appointed by the ethics commission who must be a retired state supreme court or appellate justice. No single branch controls composition—legislative appointment is split between majority/minority and both chambers, while the judiciary (via retired judges) and an independent ethics body provide additional checks. The statutory requirement of political balance (no more than three members from any party) further reinforces structural independence.

§ 3-100 codifies a 4-commissioner state board with split multi-branch appointment: governor appoints two on recommendation of major-party state-committee chairs, plus two on joint recommendation of legislative leaders (one per party). The legislative-leader-appointed commissioners serve as co-chairs. Genuine multi-branch + bipartisan structure codified.

§ 16.1-15-33 codifies state canvassing-board membership: Supreme Court clerk, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, and chairs (or designees) of the two political parties with highest vote for governor. Genuine multi-branch + bipartisan composition (judiciary + executive + parties). § 16.1-15-15 codifies parallel for county canvassing board.

“The clerk of the supreme court, the secretary of state, the state treasurer, and the chairman, or chairman's designee, of the state committee of the two political parties which cast the highest vote for governor at the last general election at which a governor was elected shall constitute the state canvassing board.”

§ 4-1(1) codifies that 'after each Storting election the Storting shall appoint a National Election Board (riksvalgstyret) that functions for four years from 1 January of the second turn of the year after the Storting election' and 'shall perform its tasks independently and independently of the Storting' (selvstendig og uavhengig av Stortinget). § 4-1(2) codifies that 3 of 5 members must be judges. § 4-1(3) codifies disqualifications for ministers, MPs, councillors, etc. Multi-branch independent-appointment framework explicitly codified.

“Etter hvert stortingsvalg skal Stortinget oppnevne et riksvalgstyre som fungerer i fire år fra 1. januar det andre årsskiftet etter stortingsvalget.”

The statute mandates that all nine commission members are judges from three independent judiciary institutions (Constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Court, and National Administrative Court), nominated by the heads of those courts and formally appointed by the President. This represents a multi-branch structure: the judiciary branches dominate nomination through their respective court leadership, and the executive (Presidency) has only formal appointment power. No single branch unilaterally controls composition—the judiciary nominations are binding, and the President cannot refuse appointment or appoint non-judges. This satisfies the structural requirement for institutional independence.

Local Elections Law Article 14 establishes that the municipal election commission is appointed by the local assembly on proposal of councillor groups, proportional to seats. MP Election Law Article 33 (4485) requires the Republic Election Commission to be appointed by the National Assembly on proposal of parliamentary groups (so by parliament, not by the executive). This is multi-source appointment by representative body, not unilateral executive appointment.

“Изборну комисију у сталном саставу чине председник и најмање шест чланова које именује скупштина јединице локалне самоуправе, на предлог одборничких група у скупштини јединице локалне самоуправе, сразмено броју одборника”

The statute establishes a clear multi-branch appointment structure: the Governor appoints four members (subject to political balance), the Senate selects two members (one per major party caucus), and the House selects two members (one per major party caucus), all subject to General Assembly confirmation. No single branch unilaterally controls composition, and the structure is constitutionally grounded with party-balance safeguards built into each appointment pathway.

“(a) four members must be appointed by the Governor, no more than two of whom are members of the appointing Governor's political party; (b) two members must be selected by the Senate, one upon the recommendation of the members of the majority political party in the Senate and one upon the recommendation of the members of the largest minority political party in the Senate; (c) two members must be selected by the House of Representatives, one upon the recommendation of the members of the majority political party in the House and one upon the recommendation of the members of the largest minority political party in the House. Each member must be appointed with the advice and consent of the General Assembly.”

The statute mandates multi-branch appointment: the judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) selects eight Supreme Court magistrates by lottery, and the legislature (Congreso de los Diputados, via represented parties) proposes five academic experts. The President is elected from judicial members, and fallback designation is by the Congress Mesa. No single branch unilaterally controls composition; each branch holds a necessary, non-delegable role. Term protection runs through the next legislature's constitutional session.

“a) Ocho Vocales Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo, designados mediante insaculación por el Consejo General del Poder Judicial. b) Cinco Vocales Catedráticos de Derecho o de Ciencias Políticas y de Sociología, en activo, designados a propuesta conjunta de los partidos, federaciones, coaliciones o agrupaciones de electores con representación en el Congreso de los Diputados.”

The statute distributes appointment authority across three branches: the governor appoints two members (with constraining nominations from majority and minority parties), the state senate appoints two members with partisan balance (one Democrat, one Republican), and the state house appoints two members with partisan balance (one Democrat, one Republican). No single branch controls the composition; all six seats are allocated by statute to different appointers, with fixed terms (five years, staggered) and explicit partisan balance requirements preventing unilateral capture.

“The governor shall appoint two (2) members. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of three (3) nominees submitted by the state executive committee of the majority party. One (1) member shall be appointed from a list of three (3) nominees submitted by the state executive committee of the minority party. The governor's solicitations and the replies shall be public records. The governor shall give due consideration to such nominations. The governor may request a second list of nominees; provided, however, no nominees from the original list of nominees may appear on the second list of nominees. The senate shall appoint two (2) members, with one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the senate democratic caucus and one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the senate republican caucus; and The house of representatives shall appoint two (2) members, with one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the house of representatives democratic caucus and one (1) member to be chosen by the members of the house of representatives republican caucus.”

The statute explicitly distributes appointment authority across the executive branch (governor), majority and minority leadership in both legislative chambers, and joint appointments. No single branch controls composition; the governor appoints one of seven, while the legislature controls six of seven seats through majority, minority, and joint mechanisms. This multi-branch structure is constitutionally grounded and codified, preventing unilateral capture.

The statute establishes multi-branch appointment: the Governor appoints Board members, but the General Assembly (legislative branch) must confirm them. This shared power between executive and legislative branches prevents unilateral control by either. The requirement for political balance (3-2 representation) and the mandatory consideration of party recommendations further institutionalize structural independence from single-party capture.

“The State Board of Elections is continued and shall consist of five members appointed by the Governor from the qualified voters of the Commonwealth, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly.”

The statute establishes a multi-branch appointment structure: the executive branch appoints the secretary of state and state director of elections; the legislature appoints four members (two from each chamber, one from each major party caucus); county auditors (a semi-independent body) appoint four members; and political party chairs designate representatives. No single branch controls composition. The prohibition on the secretary of state or state director serving as chair further prevents executive dominance.

The statute does provide some structural protection: the Chairperson must be selected by the Governor-General from a list of three eligible Federal Court judges submitted by the Chief Justice (judiciary involvement in filtering), and the non-judicial appointee must hold a senior public service office. However, the critical appointment power is exercised unilaterally by the Governor-General (the executive), and there is no legislative role in appointment, confirmation, or veto. The judiciary's role is limited to list-submission, not direct appointment. This falls short of the multi-branch control envisioned by COMM.2, where no single branch unilaterally dominates.

ΠΔ 26/2012 Άρθρο 58 codifies per-precinct εφορευτικές επιτροπές: judicial-authority representative as chair + 4 members drawn by lot from electoral rolls within 15 days of pre-election period start. Quasi-multi-branch (judicial chairs civilian-lottery members).

The statute establishes gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation, a two-branch mechanism that prevents unilateral executive control. However, it does not involve the judiciary, and the legislature's role is passive confirmation rather than affirmative co-appointment. The statutory requirement for political balance (subsection b) strengthens structural independence, but the criterion's dual-scholar test asks whether no single branch unilaterally controls composition—here, the governor retains primary nominating power, and legislature confirms or rejects. This falls short of true multi-branch (executive, legislative, judicial) appointment structures that appear in some other jurisdictions.

“appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate”

The statute provides multi-branch appointment: the Althingi (legislature) elects three members including the chairperson, local authorities nominate two, and the Minister (executive) appoints all five. However, the final appointment power rests solely with the executive Minister, meaning the executive technically retains unilateral control over composition despite legislative and local input. This falls short of structural parity across branches because the Minister appoints the full body rather than each branch appointing its designated seats.

This section provides multi-branch appointment (Governor appoints from a list, Legislature confirms), which safeguards against unilateral executive control for the variable third-party seat. However, the section does not clarify the appointment mechanism for the base commission structure itself (referenced but not detailed here), leaving unclear whether all commissioners receive the same multi-branch protection. The Legislature confirmation requirement is a structural safeguard, but the Governor's narrowed discretion (list submission by party, five-person minimum) provides additional accountability.

“The additional member shall be appointed by the Governor from a list of at least five individuals who are qualified to serve pursuant to section 49-14,106 and subsection (2) of section 49-14,111 submitted by the state chairperson of the political party receiving such five percent vote and shall be subject to confirmation by the Legislature in the same manner as the other appointed commissioners are selected and confirmed.”

The statute provides for gubernatorial appointment with Senate confirmation, which involves two branches (executive and legislative) and thus prevents unilateral executive control. However, this structure is weaker than multi-branch appointment that would include the judiciary or structural party-balance requirements, and does not prevent a unified partisan legislature and governor from entirely controlling composition. The design provides some statutory safeguard but falls short of robust multi-branch insulation.

This article establishes a multi-branch appointment structure for the general count assemblies: the National Electoral Commission (executive/administrative), the Superior Council of the Judiciary (judiciary), the President (executive), and a Government minister (executive). However, the executive branch (President and Government) designates five of nine voting members, while the judiciary and electoral commission appoint only one and two respectively. The structure lacks meaningful political balance and concentrates appointment power in the executive, falling short of genuine multi-branch constraint on composition.

This section establishes a two-branch appointment structure (executive nomination and legislative confirmation), which partially satisfies multi-branch appointment by preventing unilateral executive control. However, it lacks the full structural independence that would come from independent judicial appointment or a truly balanced commission design, and the confirmation power remains with a single legislative chamber rather than a more dispersed appointment authority.

“The governor, in making these appointments, and the senate, in confirming them, shall consider the abilities and integrity of the qualified electors under consideration”

The Speaker's Committee achieves appointment diversity within the legislative branch (Speaker appoints five members under s.2(4); PM appoints two members under s.2(3) and 2A), preventing unilateral control within Parliament. However, all members are drawn exclusively from the House of Commons and the executive branch answerable to Parliament—no judicial branch participation and no truly independent external appointments. The multi-branch test (legislature, judiciary, executive) is satisfied only within Westminster's parliamentary structure, not across separation-of-power institutions. The institutional shield against single-party capture exists at the legislative level but depends on maintaining parliamentary conventions rather than structural independence from executive pressure.

52 USC § 20944 codifies the EAC Board of Advisors with 37 members appointed by 14 stakeholder organizations (NGA, NCSL, NASS, NACo, US Conference of Mayors, etc.) plus federal officials — multi-stakeholder rather than strictly multi-branch federal. The FEC commissioners (§ 30106 in COMM.1 candidates) are appointed by the President with Senate advice/consent.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes party-controlled nomination of election board members (Beisitzer and Ersatzbeisitzer) submitted to executive branch officials (federal interior minister, state governors, election directors). No statutory role for legislature or judiciary in appointment; the executive branch (with party input) unilaterally controls composition of electoral bodies. This represents single-branch executive control, not multi-branch appointment structure required by COMM.2.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Чл. 133 codifies party registration documents; not commission appointment.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section vests control of election administration entirely in the people's congress standing committees (the legislative branch), with no role for judicial or executive branches in appointment or oversight. The text explicitly provides that election committees are 'under the leadership' (受...的领导) of standing committees alone, creating single-branch control rather than multi-branch appointment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: C.R.S. § 1-4-802 addresses minor party and unaffiliated candidate nomination procedures — petition requirements, signature thresholds, and filing deadlines. It contains no provisions regarding the appointment, composition, or governance of any election commission. The criterion COMM.2 requires statutory structure for multi-branch appointment of commission members; this section does not address commission structure at all.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 42 of Law 247/1995 establishes procedural requirements for election record-keeping and vote tabulation by district electoral commissions (okrskové volební komise), specifying what information must be recorded and how votes are counted. It contains no provisions regarding the appointment, composition, or multi-branch oversight of any electoral commission. The section addresses administrative procedures for documenting election conduct and results, not institutional governance or appointment structure.

§ 17 codifies Valgnævnet established by the Minister of the Interior and Health. Multi-branch appointment is partial — the Minister appoints, but selection criteria are codified. § 122 / § 109 are MP-compensation provisions (unrelated). § 55 codifies postal-vote receivers appointed by municipal council. § 57 codifies vote-receivers abroad appointed by Minister.

§ 11 codifies that the constituency committee (vaalipiirilautakunta) is appointed by the State Provincial Office (lääninhallitus — executive), while § 13 codifies that the municipal central election committee is appointed by the municipal council (valtuusto — local legislative body). Appointment is thus distributed across executive and legislative bodies at different tiers, but a formal multi-branch (executive/legislative/judicial) appointment of a single national commission is not codified — within central government the Ministry of Justice is sole supreme authority (§ 10).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section merely specifies that the Martinique assembly comprises 51 members. It contains no provisions regarding appointment procedures, branch involvement, or structural safeguards for any election commission. The text does not address commission composition, appointment authority, or multi-branch oversight.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Constitution Article 52 (President's powers) — not multi-branch CEC appointment. CEC members appointed by Parliament + parties (Election Code Article 10-13), not multi-branch in the EAdI sense.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section vests appointment power solely in Naalakkersuisut (the executive government). Composition includes the department head (executive), legal chief (executive), a municipal representative (indirect executive control), the bishop (religious authority, not a separate governmental branch), and a rector (institutional representative, not a separate branch). No legislative or judicial appointment mechanism is present, and the executive branch dominates composition unilaterally.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: I.C. § 34-1701 addresses recall elections and defines which public officers are subject to recall (governor, state legislators, county commissioners, mayors, city council members, etc.). It does not establish, authorize, or regulate any election commission or its appointment structure. The section is entirely procedural with respect to removals of elected officials, not institutional governance of an election administration body. It therefore contains no statutory structure governing multi-branch appointment of election commissioners.

The provided text is incomplete and truncates mid-sentence before explaining the appointment mechanism. While it references 'state chairman of the major political party,' the clause ends with 'may' without stating what power follows (nominate? appoint? recommend?). The incomplete excerpt does not establish whether appointment involves multiple branches or is controlled by a single branch. Full statutory text is required to assess multi-branch appointment structure.

“the state chairman of the major political party of the state represented by that member may”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 46.15 addresses appointment of judicial officers (supreme court, court of appeals, district court judges) from nominees generated by judicial nominating commissions. It does not establish the composition, appointment mechanism, or governance structure of election commissions or any body responsible for election administration. The section is about judicial appointments, not election administration institutional structure, and therefore does not satisfy COMM.2 for election administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs gubernatorial inauguration contribution reporting and does not establish or describe the appointment structure of any election commission. It addresses treasurer duties, financial disclosures, and penalties for inaugural fundraising, not the institutional framework by which commission members are selected. No appointment mechanism—multi-branch or otherwise—is specified here.

No matching sections in corpus.

KRS 117.015 establishes the State Board of Elections as an independent agency whose members are appointed by the Governor from lists submitted by the two major political parties' state central executive committees — a party-balanced appointment, but appointment by a single branch (the executive) rather than a multi-branch process.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

The board composition is heavily dominated by executive-branch officials (lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general) who are not appointed to the board but serve by virtue of their elected or appointed offices. While subsection (7) requires gubernatorial appointment subject to Senate confirmation, this single appointment is insufficient to prevent executive capture when five of eight voting slots are controlled by the executive. The judiciary is entirely absent from the appointment structure, and the legislature has no direct appointment power—only a confirmation check on one position. This fails the multi-branch independence test despite the legislative confirmation requirement on one seat.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 60 addresses the appointment of polling place assessors and staff at the local level, not the institutional structure of an election commission. The article prescribes that bureau presidents designate assessors from registered voters, but contains no provision for multi-branch appointment of commission members, nor does it establish a commission with statutory independence from executive control. This section governs operational polling procedures, not the institutional safeguards required by COMM.2.

The local electoral census commission members are appointed exclusively by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) through its district-level branch. There is no multi-branch appointment mechanism—no involvement of legislature or judiciary in selection. While the CENI itself may have multi-branch governance, this article describes only single-entity (executive electoral authority) appointment of members, failing the core structural requirement for COMM.2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance reporting requirements for candidates in Maine, not the structure, composition, or appointment of the election commission itself. It contains no provisions regarding how commission members are appointed, by which branches, or what safeguards exist against single-branch control. The section is entirely procedural and does not establish or describe any institutional framework for the commission.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns ballot paper preparation, distribution, and party oversight on polling day—purely operational and procedural matters. It contains no language regarding commission member appointment, appointment authority, or the structural mechanisms by which commissioners are selected. The criterion COMM.2 requires statutory provisions establishing multi-branch appointment of commission members; this section does not address appointment at all.

The commission includes the state chairman of each major party and the state secretary (both executive branch), plus a law school dean appointed by the governor—all appointments flow from the executive branch. The statute does not provide for legislative or judicial appointment of any commission member. Although the commission requires unanimous vote to select the director (a safeguard), the underlying commission structure itself lacks multi-branch appointment and is vulnerable to single-branch (executive) capture.

“The state chairman of each of the two leading political parties, the state secretary, and a dean of a law school located in the commonwealth, to be appointed by the governor as provided hereinafter, shall serve as a commission”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Appointment is by the governor with senate confirmation — both are executive/legislative, but the judiciary is not involved. While there is partisan balance (2 from each major party) and legislative consent, this does not constitute multi-branch appointment in the sense of distributing nomination power across branches; the governor unilaterally nominates all four members.

§ 208.05 codifies the State Canvassing Board which canvasses presidential-elector returns. Minnesota's State Canvassing Board (per § 204C.33) comprises the Secretary of State and judges/justices appointed by the chief justice — a quasi-judicial composition. The FTS-surfaced § 208.05 references the board's function; the multi-branch composition (SoS + judiciary) is codified in § 204C.33.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs appointment of a U.S. Senator to fill vacancies and is not relevant to election administration commission structure. It grants unilateral appointment power to the Governor with no involvement by legislature or judiciary. The section does not establish, modify, or authorize any election administration commission, and therefore cannot satisfy a criterion measuring multi-branch appointment of commission members.

The statute provides gubernatorial appointment with Senate advice and consent, which involves two branches (executive and legislative). However, the 'advice and consent' structure places primary appointment power in the executive, with the Senate exercising only a constrained veto role rather than co-equal appointment authority. True multi-branch appointment under COMM.2 requires appointment mechanisms where multiple branches exercise substantive, independent selection authority (e.g., legislature appoints some members, judiciary appoints others, governor appoints others). This structure does not meet the dual-scholar test of clear, unambiguous multi-branch control.

“appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Montana's election administration is not a multi-branch-appointed commission — the Secretary of State and county election administrators are independently elected; there is no election commission whose composition is shared across branches.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section vests appointment and dismissal of central polling board members exclusively in the executive branch (burgemeester en wethouders—mayor and aldermen). No statutory role for the legislature or judiciary in appointment is specified, meaning a single branch (executive) unilaterally controls composition. This fails the multi-branch requirement.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute divides appointment authority between the State Board of Elections (four of five members) and the Governor (one member as chair). However, the State Board itself is not statutorily required to be multi-branch appointed in this chapter, and the Governor appoints only a single chair position. This creates a structural path to executive dominance: the Governor's office controls the board chair, and the State Board (whose composition is not specified here) appoints the majority. While political-party balance is mandated among the four State Board appointments, the absence of judicial or legislative branch appointment authority and the concentration of chair power in the Governor means no true multi-branch structural independence exists. The criterion requires appointment by multiple branches (legislature, judiciary, executive); this statute shows only state executive branch entities (Governor and State Board).

“Four members of county boards of elections shall be appointed by the State Board on the last Tuesday in June and every two years thereafter, and their terms of office shall continue for two years from the specified date of appointment and until their successors are appointed and qualified. One member of the county boards of elections shall be appointed by the Governor to be the chair of the county board on the last Tuesday in June and every two years thereafter”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section addresses only the term continuity of the Supreme People's Assembly Presidium (최고인민회의 상임위원회), not the appointment mechanism or multi-branch structure for commission composition. It contains no statutory provision establishing multi-branch appointment authority, political balance requirements, or shielding from single-party control. The DPRK's one-party constitutional structure provides no institutional safeguards against executive unilateral control of election administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORC 3521.02 governs filling vacancies in the U.S. Senate; not election-commission appointment.

While the Governor appoints three members based on party leadership recommendations from the Senate, the Governor retains unilateral appointment power with no judicial or independent legislative appointment mechanism. The remaining eight members (two former moderators and six citizen panelists) are appointed 'as described in ORS 250.143,' which is not provided here; without access to that cross-referenced statute, the full appointment structure cannot be verified. However, the Governor clearly appoints or fills all vacancies, indicating executive-branch dominance. The structure falls short of multi-branch appointment because no branch other than the executive independently selects or appoints members to this commission.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 1803-A is repealed/expired.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. 85 codifies Romanian government formation (President designates PM, appointment by Parliament vote of confidence); not BEC/AEP appointment.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 24 addresses the voters' roll certification and publication process, delegating authority to the chief electoral officer. It contains no provision governing the appointment, composition, or structural independence of the electoral commission itself. The section is procedural (voters' roll management) rather than institutional (commission structure), and therefore does not address multi-branch appointment or any safeguard against single-branch control.

§ 12-15-3 codifies distribution of precinct officials among parties with superintendent from majority party. § 12-1-5 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies State Board appointment: SoS chair + Speaker-appointed county auditors (bipartisan) + 4 legislative-leader appointees (2 from each party). Multi-branch appointment framework codified through State Board structure, but FTS-surfaced section is narrower.

14 kap. 18 § codifies central-authority appointment of replacement Riksdag members on the Speaker's notification. 14 kap. 20 § codifies parallel for substitutes. The central election authority (Valmyndigheten) is appointed by the Government as a statutory agency (Förordning 2017:566 — separate instrument). Multi-branch appointment of the agency itself not directly codified in Vallagen.

§ 87.002 codifies that the early-voting ballot board is appointed by the county election board from ranked lists submitted by each political party, and § 31.032 / § 51.002 compose the county election commission and county election board from multiple county officeholders (judge, clerk, registrar, sheriff) plus party chairs. Control is distributed across multiple officeholders and both major parties, but this is not a tripartite legislative/judicial/executive appointment, so the multi-branch criterion is not met.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 79 places elections under judicial-organ supervision. YSK is composed of 7 members elected by the Yargıtay (Court of Cassation) and Danıştay (Council of State) general assemblies — BOTH judicial bodies (same branch). Not multi-branch composition. Madde 41 of Law 2820 (5546) describes district-board mixed civil-servant + party-member composition but the supreme authority (YSK) is single-branch.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2103 is the definitions section. With no election commission, there is no multi-branch commission-appointment provision to codify.

While the statute requires Senate advice and consent for four of five commission members, the Governor retains appointment power and the Secretary of State (a Governor-appointed executive officer) is an ex officio member. This creates executive dominance: the Governor effectively controls a majority of the commission (5 of 6 potential votes if the Governor-appointed Secretary casts a vote, or 4 of 6 if not). The statute lacks appointment by the judiciary or independent commission authority, and the Secretary of State membership ensures executive branch primacy. Advice and consent is a meaningful constraint but insufficient to constitute true multi-branch control when the appointing power remains unilaterally with the executive.

“four persons appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”

§ 7.20 establishes local boards of election commissioners (large cities and counties) — but doesn't codify multi-branch appointment for the WEC itself. The WEC's multi-branch composition (legislative-appointed commissioners) lives in Wis. Stat. § 15.61 (not surfaced).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 22-18-111 governs temporary appointment procedures for vacant elective offices (senator, state offices, legislature, county offices) when vacancies occur mid-term. It does not establish or describe the institutional structure, appointment process, or composition of any election commission. This section addresses successor-filling mechanisms, not commission governance. The criterion requires evaluation of commission appointment authority; this section contains no such content.