Contribution limit framework codified

Article 16 of Ley 26.215 explicitly sets contribution limits in statute by specifying maximum donation amounts for both legal entities (1% of permitted expenses) and natural persons (2% of permitted expenses), indexed to a spending limit defined in the same legislative text. The framework is codified in law, not delegated to administrative discretion.

The statute explicitly sets partnership contribution limits by precise dollar amounts for each category of candidate office, with no delegation to administrative discretion. The limits are codified in statute (A.R.S. § 16-917(A)), satisfying the requirement that contribution-limit frameworks be grounded in statutory law rather than administrative regulation.

“A partnership may not contribute more than the following amounts per election cycle: 1. Six thousand two hundred fifty dollars to a candidate committee for city, town, county or district office. 2. Six thousand two hundred fifty dollars to a candidate committee for legislative office. 3. Six thousand two hundred fifty dollars to a candidate committee for statewide office.”

§ 6(1a) explicitly establishes contribution limits in statutory text: €750,000 per calendar year per party, with enumerated exceptions for new parties and those entering new state elections. The limits are defined directly in the law with no delegation to administrative discretion. This satisfies the criterion's requirement that contribution limits (if they exist) be set by statute rather than left to administrative bodies.

“Jede politische Partei im Sinne des § 2 Z 1 darf pro Kalenderjahr höchstens Spenden im Gesamtwert von € 750.000 annehmen.”

The statute explicitly codifies a contribution limit framework by setting a numerical ceiling (one thousand UFIR) for individual voter expenditures in support of candidates, with statutory exceptions for legal and accounting services. The limit is defined directly in the law, not delegated to administrative discretion.

Section 367(1) explicitly and exhaustively codifies contribution limits in statute, specifying four distinct categories with precise dollar amounts and temporal applicability. The limits are set directly by law, not delegated to administrative discretion, and subsection (1.1) establishes an automatic annual indexing mechanism, further demonstrating statutory grounding. This satisfies the procedural clarity requirement for CONT.1.

“no individual shall make contributions that exceed (a) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to a particular registered party; (b) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to the registered associations, nomination contestants and candidates of a particular registered party; (c) $1,500 in total to a candidate for a particular election who is not the candidate of a registered party; and (d) $1,500 in total in any calendar year to the leadership contestants in a particular leadership contest.”

Colorado's complete repeal of the contribution-limit section via statutory amendment (L. 2000) explicitly establishes in statute the absence of contribution limits. This satisfies CONT.1 because the jurisdiction's framework—absence of limits—is codified in statute rather than left to administrative discretion. Both left-leaning and right-leaning scholars would agree that a statutory repeal creates clear, procedurally-grounded policy, regardless of their views on whether such limits should exist.

“L. 2000: Entire section repealed, p. 129, § 12, effective March 15.”

Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-611(a) explicitly codifies contribution limits by statute for individual contributions to candidate committees, specifying dollar limits differentiated by office type. The limits are enumerated in the statute itself with no delegation to administrative discretion, satisfying the core procedural requirement that the contribution limit framework be statutory.

“No individual shall make a contribution or contributions to, for the benefit of, or pursuant to the authorization or request of, a candidate or a committee supporting or opposing any candidate's campaign for nomination at a primary, or any candidate's campaign for election, to the office of (1) Governor, in excess of three thousand five hundred dollars; (2) Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of the State, Treasurer, Comptroller or Attorney General, in excess of two thousand dollars; (3) chief executive officer of a town, city or borough, in excess of one thousand dollars; (4) state senator or probate judge, in excess of one thousand dollars; or (5) state representative or any other office of a municipality not previously included in this subsection, in excess of two hundred fifty dollars.”

Article 17 explicitly establishes spending limits for election campaign costs across all election categories (presidential, parliamentary, European, local, and regional) with specific numerical thresholds set directly in the statute. The limits are enumerated exhaustively by election type and jurisdiction size, with no delegation to administrative discretion. The statutory framework is comprehensive and unambiguous.

“Ukupan iznos troškova izborne promidžbe po kandidatu, odnosno kandidacijskoj listi ne smije prelaziti iznos veći od: – 8.000.000,00 (osam milijuna) kuna na izborima za Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske, – 1.500.000,00 (jedan milijun i petsto tisuća) kuna u jednoj izbornoj jedinici na izborima za zastupnike u Hrvatski sabor, – 1.500.000,00 (jedan milijun i petsto tisuća) kuna na izborima za članove za Europski parlament, – 1.000.000,00 (jedan milijun) kuna na izborima za gradonačelnika Grada Zagreba, – 600.000,00 (šesto tisuća) kuna na izborima za župana i gradonačelnika velikog grada, – 250.000,00 (dvjesto pedeset tisuća) kuna na izborima za gradonačelnika i općinskog načelnika u jedinicama lokalne samouprave koje imaju više od 10.000 tisuća stanovnika, – 100.000,00 (sto tisuća) kuna na izborima za gradonačelnika i općinskog načelnika u jedinicama lokalne samouprave koje imaju od 3.001 do 10.000 tisuća stanovnika, – 50.000,00 (pedeset tisuća) kuna na izborima za gradonačelnika i općinskog načelnika u jedinicama lokalne samouprave koje imaju do 3.000 stanovnika.”

Delaware explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute rather than delegating them to administrative discretion. Section 8012(a) sets a specific $50 cash-contribution limit; subsection (e) establishes a $100 aggregate threshold for entity contributions triggering disclosure obligations; and subsection (b) prohibits party contributions to PACs entirely. All limits are enumerated directly in the statutory text with defined applicability. The dual-scholar test is satisfied: both left and right would recognize this as clear statutory procedure regardless of policy views on the limits' stringency.

“No person shall make, and no candidate, treasurer or any other person acting on behalf of a political committee shall accept, any contribution in excess of $50 in cash to a political committee during an election period.”

§ 12³ of the Political Parties Act sets the donation framework in statute — only natural persons who are citizens or long-term residents may donate, legal-person donations are prohibited, and cash donations are capped at 1200 euros per financial year.

“A political party is allowed to accept cash donations from a natural person to the extent of up to 1200 euros per financial year.”

§ 106.08 codifies a detailed tiered contribution-limit framework: limits by office (statewide, retention as Supreme Court justice, etc.), by donor (person, committee), with per-election ceiling. § 106.075 (5074) adds loan-reporting and post-election contribution-to-pay-loan limits.

“Except for political parties or affiliated party committees, no person or political committee may, in any election, make contributions in excess of the following amounts:”

The section explicitly establishes contribution limits in statutory text: a €4,600 ceiling for individual donations and a 20% cash-donation cap. The limits are codified in the Code électoral itself, not delegated to administrative bodies. While the section provides that amounts are updated annually by decree, the framework and baseline limits originate from statute, satisfying the criterion for procedural clarity of the contribution-limit framework.

“Les dons consentis par une personne physique dûment identifiée pour le financement de la campagne d'un ou plusieurs candidats lors des mêmes élections ne peuvent excéder 4 600 euros.”

§ 25 establishes a comprehensive statutory framework for contribution eligibility and limits, explicitly codified in statute rather than delegated to administrative discretion. The section enumerates specific donation amounts (€1,000 cash threshold, €35,000 reporting trigger, €500 unidentified-donor threshold) and enumerated categories of prohibited sources (foreign donations, public bodies, charities, certain corporate entities). All contribution limits and restrictions are grounded directly in statutory language.

“Spenden von außerhalb des Geltungsbereiches dieses Gesetzes, es sei denn, dass a) diese Spenden aus dem Vermögen eines Deutschen im Sinne des Grundgesetzes, eines Bürgers der Europäischen Union oder eines Wirtschaftsunternehmens, dessen Anteile sich zu mehr als 50 vom Hundert im Eigentum von Deutschen im Sinne des Grundgesetzes oder eines Bürgers der Europäischen Union befinden oder dessen Hauptsitz in einem Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union ist, unmittelbar einer Partei zufließen”

Ν. 3023/2002 Άρθρο 8 codifies contribution limits: €15,000/year per individual to a party/coalition, €3,000 per individual to a candidate during pre-election period. Criminal penalty for violators.

“δεν επι- τρέπεται να υπερβαίνει το ποσό των δεκαπέντε χιλιάδων (15.000) ευρώ”

The section explicitly sets contribution limits by statute rather than delegating to administrative discretion. It codifies specific numerical thresholds: 550,000 kr. annually for legal-entity contributions to political organizations, 400,000 kr. for candidates, with enumerated exceptions (founding contributions may be up to double these amounts). The framework is exhaustively defined in the statute itself.

“Stjórnmálasamtökum er óheimilt að taka á móti hærri framlögum frá lögaðilum en sem nemur 550.000 kr. á ári. Stjórnmálafélögum innan samstæðu stjórnmálasamtaka er þó heimilt að taka á móti framlögum frá lögaðilum umfram þá fjárhæð, samtals að hámarki 100.000 kr. Frambjóðendum er óheimilt að taka á móti hærri framlögum frá lögaðilum en sem nemur 400.000 kr. á ári.”

10 ILCS 5/9-8.5 codifies a tiered contribution-limit framework: $5,000/individual, $10,000/corporation-or-union, $50,000/candidate-committee-or-PAC per election cycle; uncapped from party committees; additional restrictions for judicial elections (no out-of-state, no anonymous-source contributions).

“$5,000 from any individual”

K.S.A. 25-4153 explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute by enumeration of specific dollar amounts across different office types, elections, and contributor categories. The limits are not delegated to administrative agencies but are set directly in the statutory text, satisfying the requirement that the framework be defined by law rather than discretion.

“(a) The aggregate amount contributed to a candidate and such candidate's candidate committee and to all party committees and political committees and dedicated to such candidate's campaign, by any political committee or any person except a party committee, the candidate or the candidate's spouse, shall not exceed the following: (1) For the pair of offices of governor and lieutenant governor or for other state officers elected from the state as a whole, $4,000 for each primary election, or in lieu thereof, a caucus or convention of a political party, and an equal amount for each general election.”

KRS 121.150 ('Campaign contribution restrictions and expenditure limitations') codifies Kentucky's contribution-limit framework by statute, restricting the making and receiving of contributions and setting the maximum legal contribution per candidate per election. KRS 121.175 codifies allowable campaign expenditures. The limits are fixed in statute, not by administrative discretion.

§ 2 of the Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties) sets the donation framework in statute — parties may receive income only from enumerated sources, and a natural person's total gifts, membership and joining fees may not exceed 30 per cent of their previous-year income.

“may not exceed 30 per cent of the income earned by such persons in the previous calendar year.”

§ 10 of the Funding Law sets the contribution-limit framework — one natural or legal person may donate up to 20 average monthly earnings per political party per calendar year; § 12 enumerates eligible donors.

“may, during a calendar year, donate a donation for each political party which does not exceed the amount of 20 average monthly earnings”

Section 18:1505.2(C)(1) explicitly codifies in statute a specific contribution limit ($200 per calendar year for cash contributions) with a clear mechanism for above-threshold contributions (must be by named instrument). The limit is set by statute itself, not delegated to administrative discretion, and the framework is enumerated with precision regarding the form and amount.

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute with precise dollar amounts for different office types. Limits are set by the legislature, not delegated to administrative discretion, though the statute does provide for automatic CPI adjustments to be posted by the commission. The framework is statutorily grounded and enumerated exhaustively by candidate office type.

“An individual may not make contributions to a candidate in support of the candidacy of one person aggregating more than $1,950 in any election for a gubernatorial candidate, more than $475 for a legislative candidate, more than $575 for a candidate for municipal office and more than $975 in any election for any other candidate.”

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute, specifying dollar amounts ($6,000 per entity, $24,000 aggregate) and defining the scope (per election cycle, directly or indirectly). The limits are set by the legislature in statutory text rather than delegated to administrative discretion, satisfying the procedural requirement that contribution-limit frameworks be grounded in law.

“a person may not, either directly or indirectly, in an election cycle make aggregate contributions in excess of: (1) $6,000 to any one campaign finance entity; or (2) $24,000 to all campaign finance entities”

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute, specifying dollar amounts ($1,000 for candidates, $5,000 for party committees, $500 for other committees, $200 for gaming licensees and legislative/executive agents) with no delegation to administrative discretion. The framework is wholly grounded in statutory text.

“(a)(1) An individual may make campaign contributions to candidates or candidates' committees. The aggregate of all such contributions for the benefit of any 1 candidate and that candidate's committee shall not exceed the sum of $1,000 in a calendar year”

Article 56(2) explicitly codifies contribution limits directly in statute for three categories of private financing: member contributions (2% of public funding), candidate and sympathizer contributions (10% of prior presidential spending cap), and individual sympathizer contributions (0.5% of prior presidential spending cap). The limits are numerically defined and tied to objective benchmarks, not delegated to administrative discretion. This satisfies the statutory grounding requirement for CONT.1.

Contribution limits are set explicitly in statute with enumerated dollar amounts by office, satisfying statutory codification of the contribution limit framework.

“a person other than an independent committee or a political party committee shall not make contributions to a candidate committee of a candidate for elective office that, with respect to an election cycle, are more than the following: (a) $6,800.00 for a candidate for state elective office other than the office of state legislator”

§ 211A.12 codifies statutory contribution limits for local candidates/committees: $600 (election year) / $250 (other years) per contributor, rising to $1,000 / $250 for offices serving populations over 100,000. Statewide contribution limits live in chapter 10A (separate). Comprehensive statutory contribution-limit framework codified.

“A candidate or committee may not accept aggregate contributions made or delivered by an individual or an association, a political committee, political fund, or political party unit in excess of $600 in an election year for the office sought and $250 in other years”

The statute explicitly codifies contribution limits by setting specific dollar thresholds ($2,500 and $5,000) directly in the statutory text, with clear enumeration of the covered offices and the nature of the prohibited transactions. The framework is entirely statutory with no delegation to administrative discretion.

Missouri's contribution limits are explicitly set by statute rather than delegated to administrative discretion. § 130.031(1) codifies a cash contribution limit of $100, and subsection (4) establishes a $25 threshold for anonymous contributions. Both limits are numerically defined in the statute itself, satisfying the requirement that contribution-limit frameworks be grounded in statutory text rather than regulation or agency discretion.

“No contribution of cash in an amount of more than one hundred dollars shall be made by or accepted from any single contributor for any election by a continuing committee, a campaign committee, a political party committee, an exploratory committee or a candidate committee.”

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute for both natural and legal persons, specifying precise numerical ceilings (6 average monthly salaries for citizens, with reductions for public officials and benefit-recipients, and 12 average monthly salaries for legal entities). The limits are enumerated exhaustively by donor category and are statutorily grounded, not delegated to administrative discretion. This satisfies the CONT.1 criterion for statutory codification of the contribution-limit framework.

§ 13-37-216 codifies the contribution-limit framework — aggregate per-election limits of $1,000 (governor/lieutenant governor jointly), $700 (statewide office) and $400 (other public office), with statutory inflation adjustment.

“aggregate contributions for each election in a campaign by a political committee or by an individual”

Article 32(1) of the Wfpp establishes a clear statutory disclosure threshold of €1,000 per contributor per calendar year for independent (non-party) candidates in Second Chamber elections. The contribution-limit framework is explicitly codified in statute, specifying the triggering amount, the reporting party (first candidate on the list), the reporting timeline (21st to 14th day before voting), and the recipient authority (the Minister). This is statutorily grounded procedure, not administrative discretion.

“Indien een kandidaat, die deelneemt aan een verkiezing van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal zonder dat boven de kandidatenlijst waarop hij is geplaatst de aanduiding van een politieke partij is geplaatst, van een gever in een kalenderjaar bijdragen heeft ontvangen van in totaal € 1.000 of meer, verstrekt de kandidaat die als eerste op de lijst is geplaatst tussen de eenentwintigste en de veertiende dag voor de dag van de stemming voor deze verkiezing aan Onze Minister een overzicht van deze bijdragen”

The section explicitly codifies a contribution limit of $10,000 in statute for legal defense funds, with the limit amount and applicability period defined in the statutory text itself. The framework is set by statute, not delegated to administrative discretion, and includes a defined penalty (category E felony) for violation.

The section establishes a clear statutory framework for loan-based contributions by capping them at twice the maximum contribution limit set by statute (referencing § 19:44A-11.3). The limit is defined in the statute itself, not delegated to administrative discretion, and applies directly and exhaustively to all persons, partnerships, associations, and political committees making such loans. The statutory cross-reference anchors the rule to an enumerated contribution cap.

“the aggregate total of the unrepaid portion of all such loans by that lender shall not exceed an amount equal to twice the maximum amount of contributions in the aggregate which, under subsection a. of section 18 of P.L.1993, c.65 (C.19:44A-11.3), the lender is permitted to make to such a candidate”

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute: a $100 per-election-cycle limit per qualified elector. The limit is defined with specificity (amount, contributor class, and temporal scope), leaving no discretion to administrative agencies. The framework is grounded entirely in statutory text.

“Total contributions from a qualified elector to a candidate shall not exceed one hundred dollars ($100) per election cycle.”

§ 14-114 codifies contribution and receipt limitations by statute — explicit per-cycle dollar limits for candidate, party, and independent committees, with statutory CPI-indexing. § 14-130 codifies the personal-use prohibition. § 14-126 codifies violations/penalties. Comprehensive statutory contribution-limit framework.

North Carolina statute explicitly codifies a contribution limit of $5,600 per election. The limit is set directly in statute, not delegated to administrative discretion. While the statute does authorize the State Board of Elections to adjust the dollar amount annually based on inflation using a specified Consumer Price Index formula, the foundational limit framework, the adjustment methodology, and the effective dates are all defined in statute itself, not left to administrative discretion.

“No individual, political committee, or other entity shall contribute to any candidate or other political committee any money or make any other contribution in any election in excess of five thousand six hundred dollars ($5,600) for that election.”

The section establishes specific contribution limits by statute, not by administrative discretion. The limits are enumerated exhaustively across multiple election types (primary, runoff primary, general), with clear dollar amounts, aggregation rules, and an inflation-adjustment mechanism that is itself codified with defined procedures. The framework is grounded entirely in statutory text.

ORS 260.014 explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute across multiple subsections and office categories. The limits are enumerated with specific dollar amounts and timeframes (per election, per year, per election cycle) applied to different contributor types and candidate offices. No delegation to administrative discretion occurs; the statutory text itself establishes the permissible contribution framework.

Article 134 § 2 and § 3 establish contribution limits by statute for Polish citizens and candidates, respectively. The limits are defined in the electoral code itself (15x and 45x minimum wage) and pegged to a statutory reference (the minimum wage law), not delegated to administrative discretion. The framework is explicit and codified.

Article 7(1) explicitly codifies a contribution limit in statute: individual identified donors are subject to an annual limit of 25 times the value of the IAS (Indexante dos Apoios Sociais) per donor. The limit is set by law, not delegated to administrative discretion. The mechanism is unambiguous and statutorily grounded, satisfying the core procedural requirement that contribution limits—if they exist—must be defined by statute rather than regulation or administrative determination.

“Os donativos de natureza pecuniária feitos por pessoas singulares identificadas estão sujeitos ao limite anual de 25 vezes o valor do IAS por doador”

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute with specific dollar amounts ($1,000 for individuals, $25,000 for PACs, $10,000 for party committees with restrictions). The limits are numerically defined with clear applicability rules, leaving no room for administrative discretion in setting the ceilings. This satisfies the procedural requirement that contribution limits be set by statute rather than administrative determination.

“No person, other than the candidate to his or her own campaign, nor any political action committee shall make a contribution or contributions to any candidate, as defined by § 17-25-3 , or political action committee or political party committee that, in the aggregate, exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) within a calendar year; nor shall any political action committee make such contributions that in the aggregate, exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) within a calendar year; nor shall any candidate or any political action committee or any political party committee accept a contribution or contributions that, in the aggregate, exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) within a calendar year from any one person or political action committee.”

Article 58 codifies the electoral fund framework with statutory contribution-limit framework: candidates must establish electoral funds and contributions are limited per individual and entity (specific lira/ruble amounts in subordinate laws). Statutory framework codified, though specific amounts are in separate federal laws.

Finance Law Article 40 codifies a contribution-limit framework anchored at 1,500,000 RSD as a criminal threshold for concealed financing. Article 22 (referenced) bounds annual contribution amount per donor by Article 10. Article 47 enforces forfeiture for non-compliance with ownership-divestiture deadlines.

“Ако су извршењем дела из става 1. овог члана дата или примљена средства у износу који прелази милион и петстотина хиљада динара, учинилац ће се казнити затвором од шест месеци до пет година.”

The statute explicitly codifies a contribution limit ($3,500 per calendar year) in statutory language, leaving no discretion to administrative agencies. The framework is grounded directly in the statute, satisfying the requirement that contribution limits be set by statute rather than administrative discretion.

“A person may not contribute to a committee and a committee may not accept from a person contributions aggregating more than three thousand five hundred dollars in a calendar year.”

§ 12-27-7 codifies contribution limits to statewide candidates. § 12-27-8 codifies parallel for legislative/county candidates. § 12-27-9 codifies PAC limits ($10,000 per person/year). § 12-27-10 codifies political-party limits ($10,000 per person/year). § 12-27-10.4 codifies aggregation across affiliated entities. Comprehensive statutory contribution-limit framework codified.

The statute explicitly sets contribution limits by legislative enactment with specific dollar amounts for different classes of candidates and multicandidate committees, leaving no discretion to administrative agencies to establish the framework. The limits are comprehensive, enumerated by office type (statewide vs. local), and include adjustment procedures tied to a transparent indexing formula published by the Registry of Election Finance.

“No person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election which, in the aggregate, exceed: For an office elected by statewide election, two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500); or For any other state or local public office, one thousand dollars ($1,000).”

§ 253.155 codifies contribution limits by statute: a judicial candidate or officeholder may not accept political contributions from a person exceeding the per-office limits set in § 253.155(b) ($5,000 statewide; $1,000-$5,000 by judicial-district population). § 253.157 codifies parallel limits on general-purpose-committee contributions, § 253.159 a family exception, and § 253.167 population-based notice of the limits. The limits are fixed in statute, not by administrative discretion (Texas imposes no general contribution limit on non-judicial candidates).

Law 6271 Article 14 and Law 2820 Articles 64–69 codify the contribution-limit framework in statute. Article 66 sets a statutory cap on individual donations per year (lira amount indexed annually). The framework is statutory, not regulation.

Art. III-150 codifies basic principles of formation and functioning of electoral funds. Art. III-152 / II-96 / IV-215 codify per-election-type fund formation including statutory contribution limits expressed as multiples of the minimum monthly wage. Limits codified statutorily, not by administrative discretion.

52 USC § 30116 codifies the FECA contribution-limit framework with specific dollar limits ($2,000 to candidate, $25,000 to national party, $5,000 to PAC, $10,000 to state party). Statutory framework.

“no person shall make contributions—(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $2,000”

Vermont codifies a contribution-limit framework in Title 17, Chapter 61: § 2941 sets the contribution limits per source per election cycle, § 2943 provides that 'the contribution limitations contained in this subchapter shall be adjusted for inflation pursuant to the Consumer Price Index,' and § 2942 codifies the public-question exception. Statutory contribution limits codified.

The section explicitly classifies loans as contributions subject to contribution limitations and codifies this treatment in statute. It establishes a clear statutory framework by defining how loans are treated under the jurisdiction's contribution-limit regime, thereby grounding the framework in law rather than administrative discretion. The section also identifies a statutory exception for commercial loans made in the regular course of business on ordinary terms, further demonstrating that the limits are set by statute.

“A loan is considered to be a contribution from the lender and any guarantor of the loan and is subject to the contribution limitations of this title. The full amount of the loan shall be attributed to the lender and to each guarantor.”

The section explicitly codifies contribution limits in statute by prohibiting contributions 'in excess of the amounts permitted by §3-8-5c' and by reference establishes the framework as statutory rather than discretionary. The limit framework is grounded in the legislative code itself, satisfying the criterion that contribution limits (if they exist) must be set by statute, not administrative discretion.

“A person may not, directly or indirectly, make any contribution in excess of the amounts permitted by §3-8-5c of this code, in connection with any campaign for nomination or election to or on behalf of any statewide office, in connection with any other campaign for nomination or election to or on behalf of any other elective office in the state or any of its subdivisions, or in connection with or on behalf of any person engaged in furthering, advancing, supporting, or aiding the nomination or election of any candidate for any of the offices.”

The statute explicitly codifies contribution limits in statutory text rather than delegating the limits to administrative discretion. The specific dollar amounts ($2,500 for statewide, $1,500 for nonstatewide) and eligible contributor categories (natural persons, political parties, PACs, campaign committees) are defined directly in the statute. The secretary of state's rulemaking authority is limited to defining the operational term 'direct coordination,' not the contribution limits themselves.

The section establishes a statutory registration requirement for non-individual entities making expenditures in support of or opposition to candidates or ballot propositions, which grounds the campaign-finance framework in statute. However, the section does not itself set contribution limits, does not reference existing limit statutes, and does not explicitly state whether limits exist or are absent. CONT.1 requires either explicit statutory contribution limits or an explicit statutory statement of no limits; this section addresses registration procedure but not the limit framework itself.

“each person other than an individual shall register, on forms provided by the commission, with the commission”

This section codifies in statute that local jurisdictions *may* set contribution limits, which satisfies the basic requirement that the framework be grounded in statute rather than pure administrative discretion. However, it provides no specific statutory limits themselves—neither maximums nor minimums—and instead delegates the substantive limit-setting to local discretion with only the vague constraint of 'reasonable limitations.' This fails the core procedural-clarity requirement of enumeration: there is no exhaustive definition of what those limits are, how they are determined, or what amounts are permissible. The dual-scholar test would identify this as partial: both scholars would agree the delegation is statutorily authorized, but both would note the absence of enumerated limits or clear guidance for setting them.

Section 17(8) enumerates permissible sources of income (contributions, membership fees, donations, loans, etc.), establishing a statutory framework for what parties may receive. However, the section does not specify contribution *limits* for any of these sources—neither maximum amounts nor any explicit statement that there are no limits. The statute codifies which types of contributions are allowed but leaves the quantitative framework (whether limits exist and what they are) unclear or to be found elsewhere in the statute.

“(8) Příjmem strany a hnutí mohou být: a) příspěvek ze státního rozpočtu České republiky na úhradu volebních nákladů, b) příspěvek ze státního rozpočtu České republiky na činnost strany a hnutí (dále jen "příspěvek na činnost"), c) členské příspěvky, d) dary, dědictví a bezúplatná plnění, e) příjmy z nájmu, pachtu a zcizení movitého a nemovitého majetku, f) úroky z vkladů, g) příjmy vznikající z účasti na podnikání jiných právnických osob podle odstavce 3, h) příjmy z pořádání tombol, kulturních, společenských, sportovních, rekreačních, vzdělávacích a politických akcí, i) zápůjčky a úvěry poskytnuté bankou, platební institucí nebo institucí elektronických peněz nebo pobočkou zahraniční banky, platební instituce nebo instituce elektronických peněz na území České republiky, j) příspěvek ze státního rozpočtu České republiky na podporu činnosti politického institutu.”

This section codifies that contribution limits exist and are binding on contributions to candidates and committees, but it does not enumerate the actual limits themselves—it only cross-references section 4. The statutory framework acknowledges limits exist, but the reader must consult another section to know what they are. For full satisfaction of CONT.1, the limits should be stated in statute directly, not purely by reference.

“is subject to the limitations in section 4 of this chapter”

Article 2 of Cap. 544 provides statutory definitions of key campaign-finance terms ("donation," "campaign expenditure," "candidate") that establish the conceptual framework for contribution regulation. However, the section is definitional only and does not itself establish contribution limits, enumerate limit amounts, specify which donor types are prohibited or restricted, or reference the statutory provisions where such limits are actually codified. The criterion requires that limits (if they exist) be set by statute and made explicit; this section merely defines terms but does not establish or reference the substantive contribution-limit rules.

ORC 3517.109 operates on 'allowable aggregate contribution' that does not exceed 'the preprimary contribution limit applicable to that contributor' — clear statutory reference to the contribution-limit framework codified in § 3517.102 (not surfaced directly).

“preprimary contribution limit applicable to that contributor”

Section 25 establishes a statutory prohibition on campaign expenditure by relevant persons (entities registered as both party and third party), but the actual limits themselves are delegated to Schedule 10 to PPERA (for controlled expenditure) and Schedule 9 to PPERA (for campaign expenditure), which are incorporated by reference rather than enumerated in this section. While the framework is statutory, the specific numerical limits are not transparent within this provision.

“no campaign expenditure may be incurred during that period by or on behalf of the person”

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

This section is a simplified outline that acknowledges the existence of loan limitations but does not codify the limits themselves—it refers to limitations without specifying what they are, their amounts, or their statutory location. The section provides no enumeration of contribution limits, no threshold amounts, and no direct statutory grounding of the limits in this provision. The actual limits must be found elsewhere in the Act, making this outline insufficient for CONT.1 compliance on its own.

“There are limitations on loans made to political parties, State branches, significant third parties, candidates or groups that are more than the disclosure threshold.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 116 of the Belgian Electoral Code addresses candidate nomination procedures, including signature requirements for candidate lists, identity documentation, and ballot-symbol registration. It contains no provisions regarding campaign contributions, contribution limits, or any framework governing financial support to political campaigns. The section is entirely procedural regarding candidate presentation and does not address the contribution-limit criterion at all.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section merely announces procedural matters (deposit of the law, posting of penalties) and introduces the chapter on campaign spending, but does not codify any contribution limits or explicitly state the absence of such limits. No substantive framework governing contributions is articulated here.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 80 defines electoral expenses and the temporal scope of campaign spending, but does not address contribution limits at all—neither establishing limits, setting limits by statute, nor explicitly codifying an absence of limits. The section is purely definitional regarding what constitutes reportable campaign expenditures, not a framework governing who may contribute or in what amounts.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 58 of LOREG addresses campaign advertising expenses and tariff discrimination, not contribution limits. It sets a cap on advertising spending (20% of party spending limits) and requires non-discriminatory pricing for media placements, but does not codify any framework regarding contributions to candidates or parties—whether limits exist, are absent, or how they are defined. The section is procedurally clear on advertising regulation but entirely silent on the statutory definition or absence of contribution limits.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.