Independent funding line

Electoral Code Article 24 codifies the independent funding line: 'The funding of expenditures for organising and holding elections (including drawing up lists of electors, organising professional courses for holding elections), as well as of expenditures necessary for the activities of electoral commissions, shall be carried out at the expense of the funds of the State Budget.'

Section 9-7c(b) provides explicit statutory protection against executive-branch mid-cycle reallocation by prohibiting the Governor from reducing allotments for the Commission. Section 9-7c(a) further establishes that budget recommendations originate from the Commission's executive director, not the executive branch, creating structural independence in the budget-formulation process. This is a clear statutory safeguard against unilateral executive reduction during the fiscal year.

“the Governor shall not reduce allotment requisitions or allotments in force concerning the State Elections Enforcement Commission”

§ 14 of the Riigikogu Election Act makes the State Electoral Office an independent structural unit of the Chancellery of the Riigikogu — the parliament's office, not the executive — and its election budget a separate, identified part of that Chancellery's budget, insulated from executive mid-cycle reallocation.

“The budget for the preparation and holding of the elections means a separate part of the budget of the Chancellery of the Riigikogu”

§ 106.24 establishes a separate budget entity for the Florida Elections Commission, providing independent funding line.

“The commission shall be a separate budget entity”

Article 57(1) codifies separate funding line: 'Expenses related to preparation and conduct of elections of a relevant level in the Russian Federation, operation and improvement of means of automation, training of election officials and voter education shall be funded' from the respective level budget. Statutory independent funding line codified.

MP Election Law Article 8 codifies that funding for conducting MP elections is provided in the Republic Serbia budget. Article 98 (4550) reinforces this for election-organ working funds, election materials, and other election expenses. Local Elections Law Article 57 (4624) mirrors at the municipal level. This is an independent statutory funding line.

“Средства за спровођење избора за посланике обезбеђују се у буџету Републике Србије.”

Law 298 Article 181 codifies a separate statutory line item: 'Yüksek Seçim Kurulu giderleri ile her türlü seçim işleri giderleri genel bütçeden ödenir. Bunun için gerekli ödenek Adalet Bakanlığı Bütçesi içindeki ayrı bir programda gösterilir' — YSK and all election-related expenses are paid from the general budget through a SEPARATE PROGRAM within the Ministry of Justice budget.

Art. III-148 codifies financial support for MP elections from the state budget. Art. II-91 codifies presidential-election funding. Art. IV-210 codifies local-election funding. Art. IV-225 codifies candidate financial deposit. Independent funding line through state budget appropriation codified per election type.

The section establishes a statutory minimum funding floor (5% of the Permanent Party Fund) for the audit body and requires quarterly verification, which provides some protection against arbitrary mid-cycle cuts. However, the funding remains dependent on multiple sources including discretionary national budget allocations ('fondos previstos en el Presupuesto General de la Nación') and executive transfers subject to election cycles, and the ultimate shortfall backstop requires communication to the Interior Ministry rather than automatic appropriation. This creates vulnerability to executive discretion rather than true statutory independence.

The section establishes a separate statutory account for civil penalties dedicated to implementing and enforcing campaign finance law. However, this addresses only campaign finance enforcement, not the broader election administration budget. The statute does not establish election authority operational funding as an independent, multi-year line item protected from mid-cycle executive reallocation. The surcharge mechanism itself is also subject to commission discretion to suspend, weakening funding stability.

“Civil penalties collected for violations of this chapter shall be deposited in a separate account in the citizens clean elections fund established pursuant to chapter 6, article 2 of this title and used to defray the costs of implementing and enforcing this chapter.”

The section establishes a statutory mechanism for election-related expenses to be paid from the Consolidated Revenue Fund upon the Chief Electoral Officer's certification, which provides some insulation from discretionary executive reallocation. However, the phrase 'unappropriated moneys' suggests dependency on annual parliamentary appropriation cycles rather than a dedicated, pre-allocated multi-year funding line, and the statute does not explicitly prevent mid-cycle reallocation or establish a protected funding reserve. The structure is better than pure executive discretion but weaker than a constitutionally guaranteed or statutory fixed-allocation funding mechanism.

“The following shall be paid out of unappropriated moneys forming part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund on the certificate of the Chief Electoral Officer”

The section establishes that election costs are covered within the state budget and administered by the State Election Commission, providing some statutory grounding for funding. However, it does not specify that election funding is a separate, protected line item or establish multi-year appropriation; the text permits funds to flow through the general state budget, which remains subject to executive reallocation during the fiscal year absent explicit statutory protection against mid-cycle cuts.

“Sredstva za pokriće troškova izbora osiguravaju se u državnom proračunu Republike Hrvatske, a njima raspolaže Državno izborno povjerenstvo.”

Ν. 3023/2002 Άρθρο 1(5) codifies a dedicated state-budget line under the Ministry of Interior (capped at 1.24‰ of state regular revenue) for political-party financing. Codifies a recurring election-related budget appropriation but is for parties, not the Board's operations directly.

“Οι αναγκαίες πιστώσεις για τη χρηματοδότηση των πολιτικών κομμάτων εγγράφονται στον προϋπολογισμό του Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών”

The section establishes a dedicated campaign finance enforcement account that does not revert to the general fund, which provides partial insulation from mid-cycle reallocation. However, the account requires 'approval of the budget agency' for fund deployment (subsection b), and the account is funded solely by civil penalties collected under IC 3-9-4 rather than by statutory appropriation or a guaranteed revenue source. This creates vulnerability: penalty-dependent funding is inherently unpredictable and subject to fluctuation, and budget agency approval introduces discretionary control that undermines true independence. The statute lacks multi-year authorization, dedicated general fund appropriation, or explicit protection from executive reallocation.

§ 6 of the Central Election Commission Law has the CEC divide the State-allocated election funds among commissions, and § 24 of the Election Commissions Law requires commissions to report on fund use; election funding is State-allocated and CEC-administered, but not codified as a ring-fenced statutory line item insulated from executive reallocation.

“shall determine the division of the funds allocated by the State for other election commissions”

§ 14 of the Funding Law allocates state appropriations for political parties through 'a separate budget programme implemented by the Central Electoral Commission'; the CEC's own administrative budget is set in the annual state budget, not codified as an independent ring-fenced line item.

The statute establishes that election registrar salaries are 'annually appropriated' to the secretary of state, creating a formal statutory budget line, but it does not explicitly shield that appropriation from mid-cycle executive reallocation. The dual-fund structure (state and parish components) provides some structural protection for the state portion, yet lacks language prohibiting reallocation or establishing multi-year dedicated funding. The merit-evaluation freeze language in subsection F shows legislative intent to control salary progression, but does not address budget flexibility.

The statute creates a special, continuing, nonlapsing fund with explicit protection from lapsing (reversion of unspent funds), satisfying the mid-cycle reallocation concern. However, this section does not establish a statutory appropriation or budgetary carve-out; instead, it depends on moneys 'appropriated in the State budget' and 'approved budget amendments' (subsection (b)), leaving execution vulnerable to annual legislative discretion and executive budget recommendations. The structural safeguard is incomplete without a mandatory dedicated appropriation or statutory minimum funding level.

“The Fund is a special, continuing, nonlapsing fund that is not subject to § 7-302 of the State Finance and Procurement Article.”

Article 31(2) establishes that the Instituto receives annual budget allocations (partidas) from the Federal Budget (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación), creating a statutory line-item structure. However, the text does not prohibit mid-cycle reallocation by the executive branch or provide multi-year funding certainty. Article 31(4) subjects the Instituto's organization and control to constitutional provisions and applicable law, but this section alone does not explicitly shield the budget from executive reallocation. The language 'anualmente' (annually) suggests vulnerability to year-to-year discretion.

The section establishes that election expenditure is part of the CEC's budget line, satisfying the separation requirement. However, it lacks statutory protection against mid-cycle reallocation: paragraph (6) permits the Government to reallocate funds from its reserve fund if the initial budget is insufficient, and paragraph (8) requires unused funds to revert to the State budget, both mechanisms that undermine true independence. The statute does not guarantee multi-year funding, protected carve-outs, or prevent executive reduction during an electoral cycle.

The statute establishes a separate Elections Fund and provides continuous appropriation, which protects HAVA-related spending from mid-cycle reallocation. However, the Fund is limited to HAVA compliance costs and other amounts the Legislative Assembly chooses to appropriate; it does not create a guaranteed multi-year or comprehensive election administration budget independent of legislative discretion. The continuous appropriation for specified HAVA activities satisfies structural insulation from executive reallocation, but the funding remains subject to future legislative amendment and does not cover all election administration operations.

§ 1122-A codifies voting-apparatus bonds via the PA Economic Development Financing Authority — partial multi-year capital-financing path for voting equipment, not a separate operating-budget line item.

The section establishes a separate statutory line item (wyodrębnionymi — 'separated' or 'carved out') for the National Electoral Office within the state budget, satisfying the independence-of-allocation requirement. However, it does not explicitly restrict mid-cycle reallocation by the executive branch; the Head of the National Electoral Office 'disposes of' (dysponuje) these funds, suggesting administrative discretion within that line rather than protective earmarking or legislative requirement for non-reallocation. The provision lacks statutory language prohibiting executive in-cycle modification.

§ 31.100 codifies a separate, insulated election-services-contract fund: money paid under an election-services contract is 'deposited in a separate fund in the county treasury,' the county election officer 'may make expenditures from the fund without budgeting or appropriation by the commissioners court,' and § 31.100(g) bars the commissioners court from considering the fund in adopting the office's budget. This insulates contract funds, though the election authority's core staff budget is still annually appropriated by the commissioners court.

“deposited in a separate fund in the county treasury. The county election officer may make expenditures from the fund without budgeting or appropriation by the commissioners court”

52 USC § 21133 codifies transfer of property/records/personnel from FEC's Office of Election Administration to EAC; touches budget mechanics but not a separate statutory line.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs corporate and nonprofit political action committees and voluntary contribution funds — it does not address election authority funding, budget structure, or protection from mid-cycle reallocation. It contains no statutory framework for independent election administration funding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Alaska Stat. § 15.13.068 is a substantive campaign finance rule governing foreign contributions and expenditures. It contains no provision establishing an election authority budget, funding line, or budgetary independence structure. The criterion requires statutory protection of election authority funding from mid-cycle executive reallocation; this section addresses only foreign-influence restrictions on contributors.

The statute requires the county election board to prepare and submit a budget estimate, but it does not create a separate statutory line item shielded from mid-cycle reallocation. The budget is submitted to the county judge and comptroller "in the same manner as required of other county departments," placing it within the ordinary county appropriation process where the executive (county judge) retains discretionary control. There is no statutory prohibition on mid-cycle reallocation or guarantee of independence from executive branch budget adjustments.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 126 governs the procedural requirements for registering political parties with the Electoral Commission. It establishes eligibility criteria, application procedures, and documentation requirements for party registration. The section does not address the Electoral Commission's budget structure, funding mechanisms, or whether the Commission's budget is a separate statutory line item protected from executive reallocation. This section is entirely procedural and does not engage with institutional funding independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section (§ 26b BPräsWG) addresses procedural arrangements for a single rerun of the 2016 Austrian presidential election runoff, including voter registration, ballot procedures, and timing. It contains no provisions regarding election authority funding, budget structure, or financial independence. The statute does not establish any independent funding mechanism or statutory budget line item for election administration.

Article 55 (vote counting) and Article 52 (voting at polling station) — wrong target. Funding framework lives in Article 48 (Expenses for election preparation), partially surfaced. Belarus's elections are state-budget funded but separate-line-item codification not directly surfaced.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 116 of the Belgian Electoral Code addresses candidate presentation procedures, signature requirements, and ballot symbolism. It contains no provisions regarding election authority budgeting, funding mechanisms, or statutory appropriations. The section is entirely procedural and does not establish any independent funding line for electoral administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance rules for individual donors and candidates (donation limits, receipt requirements, and contribution channels). It does not address the institutional budget, funding structure, or fiscal independence of the election authority itself. FUND.1 requires a separate statutory line item for the election authority's operations protected from mid-cycle reallocation; this section regulates private campaign contributions, not public election administration funding.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

§ 19218 establishes a civil-penalty cap ($10k) for unauthorized voting-system changes, with funds collected — but this is enforcement, not an independent funding line. CA's elections budget lives in the annual Budget Act, not codified as a separate statutory line in the ingested mechanics divisions.

The section mandates that election expenses be included in the fiscal budget and funded from the national treasury, providing statutory grounding for election funding. However, it does not establish (1) a separate, dedicated line item insulated from executive reallocation, (2) multi-year appropriation, (3) legislative oversight of mid-cycle transfers, or (4) any mechanism preventing executive freezing or diversion of funds. In the PRC institutional context, where executive authority (not parliament) controls treasury disbursement and budget implementation, this language provides no genuine independence from executive discretion.

“全 国 人 民 代 表 大 会 和 地 方 各 级 人 民 代 表 大 会 的 选 举 经 费，列 入 财 政 预 算，由 国 库 开 支。”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-5-105 addresses polling location restrictions and facility requirements; it contains no provisions regarding election authority budgeting, funding mechanisms, or statutory line items. This section is procedurally focused on election conduct logistics and does not engage with the institutional funding structure that FUND.1 evaluates.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedural rules for cancellation and conduct of supplementary elections in Czech municipalities (specifically, conditions under which supplementary elections are not held and when new elections are declared). It contains no provisions establishing election authority budget structure, funding lines, budget allocation mechanisms, or protection against mid-cycle executive reallocation. The section does mention that certain election administration expenses are covered from the state budget (§ 58b(6)), but this is a cost-allocation rule, not a funding independence framework. FUND.1 requires statutory grounding of a separate, protected budget line; this section provides neither.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 4512 addresses polling place designation, preparation, and facility requirements. It contains no provisions regarding election authority budgeting, funding mechanisms, statutory line items, or protections against mid-cycle reallocation. The section is procedural and operational, not fiscal.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes criminal penalties for campaign finance violations by candidates and donors. It does not address election authority funding structure, budget lines, or protection against mid-cycle executive reallocation. It is a criminal law provision, not a funding statute for the election administration apparatus.

Article 63 codifies ballot-paper printing under CEC decree. Article 53 (in COMM.4 cands) codifies the funding-plan submission procedure: CEC submits plan to Ministry of Finance 55 days before polling. Statutory funding flow exists; whether it's a separate line item with mid-cycle protection isn't directly codified.

§ 21-2-286 codifies printing specifications/numbering/binding of ballots (state-funded). § 21-2-284 codifies form of primary ballots. State Election Board funding flows from general state budget appropriation — independent funding line not separately codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § BWO § 80 addresses the procedural notification of elected candidates by election officials and contains no provisions regarding budget allocation, funding lines, or fiscal independence. It is a purely operational/administrative rule governing post-election communication, not a budgetary statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 11-110 allocates election expenses between state and counties but does not establish an independent, separate statutory line item for the election authority's budget. The section requires funding to come from 'appropriations as may be made by the legislature' (for state) and 'county councils' (for counties), meaning budgets remain subject to standard appropriations processes and mid-cycle reallocation by the executive branch. No multi-year funding mechanism, budget reserve, or protection against in-cycle cuts is specified.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 34-914 governs ballot disclosures and levy election procedures; it does not establish or address the budget structure of any election authority. It contains no statutory line item for election administration funding, no protection against mid-cycle reallocation, and no specification of how election authorities are to be funded. The section is silent on institutional funding independence.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 68A.304 addresses campaign property disclosure and disposition rules for candidate committees, not the election authority's budget structure. It contains no provisions regarding how the Iowa State Election Board or any election administration agency is funded, whether funds are set as a separate line item, or protections against mid-cycle reallocation. This section does not engage with institutional funding independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes that expenses are paid from monies provided by the Oireachtas, but critically subjects the payment to discretionary sanction by the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform. This creates executive-branch discretion over the scope and timing of funding and permits mid-cycle reallocation or withholding without statutory protection. A separate, dedicated statutory line item with multi-year appropriation would be required to satisfy FUND.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot packing, separation, and the appointment of write-in boards—purely procedural and operational matters. It contains no provisions establishing a budget line item, funding mechanism, multi-year appropriations, or protection against executive reallocation. The criterion requires statutory language that creates independent funding structure for the election authority; this section does not engage that topic.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section addresses election timing, candidate nomination, and akim (mayor) election procedures, but contains no language establishing an independent funding line, budget mechanism, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. The text focuses exclusively on procedural rules for holding elections and candidate requirements, not on the financial autonomy or budgetary structure of election commissions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The surfaced candidates concern political-party building funds, the income-tax party designation, and campaign-finance reporting — not the election authority's budget. No separate statutory funding line insulated from executive reallocation was surfaced.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 193 addresses eligibility conditions, forfeiture of office, and administrative procedures for removing officials who lose eligibility. It contains no provisions establishing an election authority budget, funding mechanisms, or statutory appropriations. The section is purely procedural and disciplinary in nature, entirely unrelated to funding structures.

The statute grants CENI 'autonomy' in administrative and financial matters, which is a structural aspiration. However, the text does not specify a separate statutory budget line, multi-year funding, or protection against mid-cycle executive reallocation. 'Autonomy' is stated as a principle but lacks the concrete budgetary mechanisms (dedicated appropriation, carve-out from general funds, fixed-term appropriation) that FUND.1 requires.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot packaging, security containers, and post-election procedures—procedural election administration mechanics. It contains no provisions establishing a budget, funding structure, or appropriations line item for any election authority. The criterion requires statutory language creating independent funding mechanisms; this section is entirely silent on funding matters.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 90 addresses only the procedural requirements for ballot-counting security, access, and facilities at the election venue. It contains no provisions regarding the Commission's budget, funding mechanisms, statutory appropriations, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. The section is entirely silent on the institutional funding structure required by FUND.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns candidate contribution and expenditure disclosure and reporting requirements, not election authority funding or budget structure. It contains no provision establishing an independent funding line for an election administration agency, nor any statutory shield against mid-cycle executive reallocation. The criterion requires institutional structure for the election authority itself; this section addresses campaign finance recordkeeping by candidates.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs how candidates may use public campaign financing funds, not the election authority's operational budget. It does not establish an independent funding line for the election administration body.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs absentee ballot distribution procedures and material logistics. It contains no provisions regarding election authority budgeting, funding lines, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. The criterion requires statutory establishment of independent funding structure; this section addresses none of those institutional elements.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 115.449 addresses ballot counting procedures and mechanics at the polling place — the duties of election judges, tally sheet recording, and vote announcement. It contains no language regarding election authority budgeting, budget structure, appropriations, funding lines, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. This section is procedurally focused and does not implicate funding independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced petition-form and joint-fundraising provisions; Montana does not codify the election authority's budget as a separate ring-fenced statutory line item — county election administration is county-funded and the Secretary of State is funded by general appropriation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the form and layout of official ballots at statewide general elections. It contains no provisions regarding election authority funding, budget structure, or budgetary autonomy. It does not address whether the election authority's budget is a separate statutory line item or protected from mid-cycle reallocation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article A 9 addresses the appointment and qualification of persons executing election tasks under the Kiesraad, including age requirements, disqualifications, and competency standards. It contains no provision establishing an independent funding line, budget structure, or statutory protection against mid-cycle reallocation by the executive. The section deals exclusively with personnel staffing, not budget autonomy or financial structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot secrecy, early vote reporting procedures, and penalties for premature dissemination of vote counts. It contains no provisions regarding election authority budgeting, funding mechanisms, or protection from mid-cycle budget reallocation. It is a procedural/administrative provision, not a funding statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign contribution limits and restrictions on political donations—it is entirely outside the scope of election authority funding. It contains no provisions about the election authority's budget, budgetary structure, line items, appropriations, or protection from executive reallocation. FUND.1 requires statutory grounding for independent election administration funding; this section does not address that topic.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses record retention and impoundment authority for mail-in ballots, not budget structure or funding mechanisms. It contains no language regarding election authority funding, budget line items, appropriations, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. FUND.1 requires statutory establishment of independent funding; this section is procedurally administrative and entirely silent on that dimension.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-19-34.6 governs civil penalties and enforcement procedures under the Campaign Reporting Act; it does not address election authority budgeting, appropriations, or funding structure. The section assigns enforcement authority to the state ethics commission and secretary of state but contains no statutory provision establishing an independent funding line, multi-year appropriation, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. Funding-related criteria require examination of appropriations statutes, not enforcement-procedure sections.

§ 3-100 codifies board creation within executive department but funding-line independence not separately codified — board funding flows from general state budget appropriations through executive department, no dedicated indemnification statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs campaign finance reporting and treasurer account-keeping requirements for candidates and political committees. It contains no provisions regarding the election authority's budget, appropriations, funding mechanisms, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. FUND.1 requires statutory protection of the election administration agency's own operating budget as an independent line item; this section addresses only candidate and committee financial disclosure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 16.1-13-05 codifies notice-of-election publication with sample ballot. § 16.1-08.1-02.3 codifies campaign-finance disclosures. State Election Board funding flows from general state appropriations; independent funding line not codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section sets out the powers of the Supreme People's Assembly (highest legislative body) in the DPRK constitution, including approval of the state budget (item 15). It does not establish any independent election authority, nor does it create a separate statutory budget line for election administration shielded from executive reallocation. The section is silent on election administration structure entirely, and the budget approval power remains vested in a single-party legislature without multi-branch safeguards or independence from executive control.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORC 3517.121 prohibits foreign-national campaign contributions; not election-authority budget.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes procedures for independent presidential candidates and unrecognized political parties to appear on Oklahoma ballots. It contains no provisions regarding the election authority's budget structure, independent funding lines, or protection from mid-cycle reallocation. The section is entirely procedural and candidate-facing, not institutional.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs public subsidies to political parties and parliamentary groups, not the budget or funding structure of an election authority (Comissão Nacional de Eleições). It establishes formulaic disbursement of party subsidies through parliamentary budget allocations, but contains no statutory protection for an independent election administration budget against executive mid-cycle reallocation. The section does not address institutional funding autonomy for the election authority itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot processing, certification, and counting procedures. It contains no provisions establishing a budget, funding mechanism, or statutory line item for the election authority. It does not address funding independence or protection from mid-cycle reallocation. FUND.1 requires statutory grounding of fiscal structure; this section is procedural and administrative in nature.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 7-7-960 addresses procedural requirements for notifying electors of precinct and ward boundary changes. It contains no language regarding budget structure, funding mechanisms, appropriations, multi-year funding commitments, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. The section is entirely procedural and does not engage with the institutional funding framework that FUND.1 measures.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 133 of LOREG addresses post-election accounting and reimbursement of campaign expenses to political parties, not the independent funding or budget structure of an election authority itself. The section prescribes procedures for the Tribunal de Cuentas to receive party financial disclosures and for the State to disburse campaign subsidies—functions of oversight and party finance regulation, not establishment of the election administration's own independent budget line. No statutory protection against mid-cycle reallocation of election authority operating funds is established here.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 2-10-102 is a definitional section that establishes terminology for campaign finance law (e.g., 'contribution,' 'expenditure,' 'candidate'). It contains no provisions regarding election authority budgets, funding mechanisms, statutory line items, or protection from mid-cycle reallocation. The section does not address institutional funding structure for any election administration entity.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30 of EAA 2006 addresses only ballot paper forms and design specifications. It contains no provision regarding election authority funding, budget structure, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. The section does not touch on the statutory framework for independent funding lines.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a definitional provision for campaign finance regulation of labor organizations and political funds under Utah Code § 20A-11. It contains no language addressing election authority budgeting, funding lines, or protection from mid-cycle reallocation. It does not engage with the structural question of how election administration is funded.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The surfaced candidates concern political-committee registration and the Vermont campaign-finance public-grant fund (§ 2985), not the election authority's operating budget. No separate statutory funding line for election administration, insulated from executive reallocation, is codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural mechanics of nominating candidates when a default nominee dies, withdraws, or is disqualified prior to a primary election. It contains no provisions regarding election authority budgeting, funding lines, or financial independence. The section is entirely procedural and does not establish or reference any statutory structure for election funding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29B.40.090 addresses disposal of surplus campaign funds by candidates and political committees—a campaign finance regulation—not the election authority's budget structure or funding mechanisms. It contains no provision regarding how the election authority itself is funded, whether it receives a separate statutory line item, or protections against mid-cycle reallocation. This section is entirely outside the scope of FUND.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure requirements for candidates and political committees, not the election authority's budget structure. It contains no provisions establishing an independent statutory funding line for the election administration agency itself, nor any protections against mid-cycle reallocation by the executive branch. The section is entirely devoted to what information must be reported by candidates and their treasurers.

§ 7.10 codifies that 'Each county clerk shall provide ballots for every election' — implying county elections-administration funding. § 5.05 codifies the commission's general administrative authority. Specific separate-line-item codification for the WEC budget lives outside the ingested corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs campaign finance contribution limits and prohibitions—disclosure and enforcement of political spending rules—not the election authority's operational budget. It contains no provision establishing an independent statutory line item for election administration funding or protecting election agency budgets from executive reallocation. This is a candidate/PAC regulation statute, not a structural provision for election authority funding.