Term protection

The statute establishes fixed-term lengths (2 years initial, 4 years thereafter), staggered appointment cycles (alternating 2-year and 4-year initial terms), and term limits (two consecutive full terms maximum). These are statutorily defined structural protections against at-will removal and unlimited re-appointment. While the section does not specify statutory grounds for removal, the fixed terms and consecutive-term limits themselves provide constitutional-level protection against arbitrary removal during the term.

“The initial terms of the members appointed by the Governor, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Lieutenant Governor shall be for two years while the initial terms of the members appointed by the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries and the Secretary of State shall be for four years. After the initial term, each subsequent member shall be appointed to a four-year term. No appointed member of the commission shall serve more than two full consecutive terms.”

The statute establishes fixed five-year terms for all commissioners, explicitly mandates staggered expiration cycles across political parties, and limits tenure to one full term (with narrow exception for unexpired-term fillers). The statute also imposes strict separation-of-office requirements during tenure (no elective candidacy, party office, lobbying, or political contributions except presidential). These provisions collectively ground term protection in statute with meaningful safeguards against mid-term removal and single-party domination.

“Members of the commission serve staggered terms of five years, or until a successor is appointed and qualifies. The terms of no two members who are members of the same political party or political group may expire in consecutive years. A member may not serve more than one term.”

The statute defines fixed term lengths for all commissioners (2 years for legislative appointees, 4 years for others), creates staggered cycles through differential term lengths, and protects commissioners by requiring successors to be appointed before removal ("shall continue to serve until successors have been appointed and taken the official oath"). Term limits cap consecutive service at two full terms. However, the statute does not explicitly codify grounds for removal, which is a minor structural gap.

This section establishes fixed three-year terms for six citizen-commissioners with an explicit prohibition on reappointment (vedada a recondução), providing clear statutory term protection. The terms are defined in the constitution itself, creating a strong structural safeguard against arbitrary removal or indefinite tenure.

Чл. 51 codifies CEC member fixed 5-year term with 8 enumerated grounds for early termination (resignation, conviction, incapacity, COI, etc.). New appointments scheduled 1-3 months before term expiration; members continue serving until successors are sworn in.

“Мандатът на членовете на комисията е 5 години”

The section clearly establishes a fixed 10-year, non-renewable term with statutory grounds for removal ('for cause'). The 'during good behaviour' language provides additional term protection by limiting removal to cause. While there is only one Commissioner (no staggered cycle of multiple commissioners), the statute defines term length and removal grounds clearly, satisfying the core requirements of term protection.

“The Commissioner of Canada Elections shall be appointed by the Chief Electoral Officer, after consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions, to hold office during good behaviour for a non-renewable term of 10 years and may be removed by the Chief Electoral Officer for cause.”

The statute explicitly defines a six-year fixed term for board of finance members, establishes a staggered rotation system (two members elected each cycle), and specifies statutory tenure protection ('shall serve for the term for which he is elected and until his successor is elected and has qualified'). Term length, staggered cycles, and statutory grounds for tenure are all clearly codified.

“At each such election thereafter, the town shall elect, in the same manner as the town officers are elected, two electors of such town as members of such board of finance to serve for six years. Each member of the board of finance shall serve for the term for which he is elected and until his successor is elected and has qualified.”

Delaware statute defines fixed commission terms (initial 2-year or 4-year terms, then uniform 4-year renewal terms), implements staggered appointment cycles via initial cohorts of 5 members with different terms, and explicitly protects tenure by requiring successors to be duly qualified before a sitting member vacates office. While statutory grounds for removal are not explicitly enumerated in this section, the fixed-term structure with succession protection satisfies the core of COMM.3—terms are statutorily defined with fixed length and staggered effect.

§ 106.24 protects FEC commissioner terms through staggered appointments and removal-for-cause grounds. § 100.041 (4840) parallels for state senators (4-year terms).

“The commission shall be a separate budget entity”

The section establishes all three core elements of term protection: fixed length (six years, non-renewable), staggered cycles (half renewed every three years), and statutory grounds for removal (enumerated in the second paragraph: incompatibility, incapacity, or breach of obligations, decided unanimously by other members). These provisions are codified in statute and shield commissioners from arbitrary removal.

“Les membres de la commission sont nommés pour une durée de six ans non renouvelable. Ils sont renouvelés par moitié tous les trois ans.”

§ 21-2-30 codifies terms of service for State Election Board members. § 21-2-212 codifies county registrar terms with appointment/certification/vacancies. § 21-2-228 codifies hearing procedure for qualification examination. Term protection codified.

This section explicitly defines fixed-length commissioner terms in statute (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years) and mandates staggered cycles through lot determination, ensuring no single appointment cohort controls the commission. The statutory specification of term lengths and staggered commencement satisfies the core structural requirement that commissioners cannot be removed at will and that institutional continuity is protected.

10 ILCS 5/1A-3.1 codifies staggered terms for State Board members (initial terms ending in different years; subsequent terms 4 years).

“one member affiliated with each political party from each area of required residence shall serve a term commencing July 1, 1978 and ending June 30, 1979, and the other initial members shall serve terms commencing July 1, 1978 and ending June 30, 1981”

Iowa Code § 46.2 establishes fixed six-year terms for judicial nominating commissioners with explicit staggered cycles (no more than three terms expiring within the same two-year period), all grounded in statute. The statute also defines removal eligibility limits (subsection 4) and bars from office (subsection 5), providing statutory protection against arbitrary removal and single-cycle turnover.

The section provides statutory protection of commissioner terms: fixed maximum length (4 years), staggered initial terms (subsection 2 specifies 3 years for two first-constituted members to create rotation), and enumerated statutory grounds for removal (death, resignation, disqualification, removal). Reappointment is limited to 2 aggregate terms (subsection 6), preventing indefinite tenure. All protections are codified in statute, shielding terms from arbitrary executive discretion.

“an ordinary member of the Commission shall hold office, unless the member sooner dies, resigns, becomes disqualified or is removed from office, for such period, not exceeding 4 years from the date of his or her appointment, as the President, on the advice of the Government, shall determine”

This section establishes statutorily-defined four-year terms for state board members with explicit staggered cycles (subsection (b) creates a two-tier initial stagger, subsection (c) ensures regular four-year cycles thereafter). Terms are fixed in length and commence/end on specific statutory dates. The staggered structure prevents wholesale turnover and protects commissioners from removal except through the statutory election process, providing structural independence from at-cycle political pressure.

“The regular term of office of members of the state board shall be four (4) years. Regular terms shall commence on the second Monday in January following election of the state board member.”

Article 89 establishes a fixed statutory term of five years for all commissioners, explicitly non-renewable, and limits removal to voluntary resignation or statutory grounds (incapacity to perform duties) determined by the Commission itself. The five-year fixed term and statutory removal grounds satisfy the core elements of term protection.

The statute establishes fixed, defined terms for board members (3 years for party-nominated members, 4 years for clerk-nominated chair), creating staggered cycles. Removal is explicitly restricted: members may only be removed 'at any time during the member's term by the appointing authority if the appropriate nominating authority nominates a replacement,' which ties removal to the nominating process and requires continuity in the succession, providing substantial statutory protection against arbitrary dismissal.

“Each member nominated by the municipal committees of the major political parties and appointed to the board shall serve for 3 years and until the member's successor is appointed and sworn. The member nominated by the clerk of the municipality and appointed to the board shall serve for 4 years and until that member's successor is appointed and sworn.”

The statute establishes fixed 4-year terms for all county board members, synchronized to gubernatorial elections, with explicit hold-over protection ensuring continuity until a successor is appointed. Removal is statutorily limited to 'incompetence, misconduct, or other good cause' with written notice and hearing rights. These provisions provide the core structural safeguards of term protection against arbitrary removal.

“(d) (1) The term of a member is 4 years and begins on the first Monday in June of each year following a gubernatorial election. (2) At the end of a term, a member continues to serve until a successor is appointed and qualifies.”

The statute provides fixed four-year terms for commissioners, with explicit language establishing term length and start date. While the statute does not enumerate statutory grounds for removal (a minor gap), the combination of defined fixed terms and staggered appointments (succession as terms expire) creates meaningful term protection against arbitrary removal. The requirement that successors be appointed from party-submitted lists or through mayoral/manager/selectmen approval further insulates commissioners from unilateral executive discretion.

“Such appointments shall be for terms of four years beginning April first, except that any appointment to fill a vacancy shall be for the unexpired term.”

The statute explicitly establishes that Electoral Councillors (Consejeros Electorales) serve fixed nine-year terms, are renewed in a staggered manner (escalonada), and cannot be reelected. The President Councillor also has a fixed nine-year, non-renewable term. These provisions ground term protection in statutory language with defined length and staggered renewal cycles, meeting the structural requirements of COMM.3. Removal grounds are addressed elsewhere in the statute (Art. 38 et seq.), and the core structural elements—fixed terms, staggered cycles, and prohibition on re-election—are clearly codified.

§ 13-37-103 fixes the Commissioner of Political Practices's term at six years, § 13-37-102(3) permits removal only for incompetence, malfeasance or neglect of duty — in writing and subject to judicial review — and § 13-37-105 adds impeachment. A statutory fixed term with for-cause removal.

“the individual selected to serve as commissioner is appointed for a 6-year term”

The statute clearly defines commissioner terms in statute with fixed four-year length (§32-528(2)) and establishes staggered election cycles through alternating odd/even district elections (§32-528(1)). Terms are protected against arbitrary shortening. Statutory grounds for removal are provided elsewhere in Nebraska law (section 23-150 referenced in the statute), making removal non-arbitrary and grounded in law rather than executive discretion.

“the term of each county commissioner shall be four years or until his or her successor is elected and qualified”

The statute provides fixed-length terms (3 years for regular appointments, staggered initial terms of 3, 2, and 1 year), statutory protection against early removal (members serve until successors are appointed and qualified), and multi-branch appointment (Governor appoints by and with Senate advice and consent). The staggered cycle prevents any single administration from controlling all four seats simultaneously, and succession-dependent continuity protects against arbitrary displacement.

§ 3-100 codifies 2-year terms for state board commissioners with vacancy-fill procedure preserving appointing-authority discretion. § 3-200 codifies county commissioner terms + removal-by-governor-for-cause (same procedure as sheriff). § 3-416 codifies inspector-removal grounds and procedure.

ORC 3505.061 codifies four-year staggered terms for Ohio Ballot Board appointed members. Reinforces statutory term-protection pattern.

The statute establishes fixed four-year terms for county election board members, defined in statute with explicit length. Grounds for removal are also statutory: failure to attend five consecutive meetings or change in party affiliation. While terms are not explicitly staggered (which would further strengthen independence), the statute provides a clear statutory framework for term length and removal grounds that protects against arbitrary dismissal mid-term.

The statute establishes fixed nine-year commissioner terms defined in law, with staggered appointment cycles (new members appointed in January of every even-numbered year), creating overlapping terms that prevent wholesale turnover. This satisfies the core structural requirement of term protection: commissioners cannot be removed at will by the governor and serve defined, statutory terms.

“All members of the board appointed or reappointed after January 1, 2008, shall serve for terms of nine (9) years beginning in January 2008, and in January of every even numbered year thereafter”

Art. 101 codifies AEP leadership term protection: president appointed by joint session of Senate + Chamber of Deputies, vice-presidents by President of Romania and Prime Minister (multi-branch); 8-year term, renewable once; cannot be party members; enumerated grounds for early termination (expiration, resignation, revocation for serious reasons, death).

“Mandatul președintelui și mandatele vicepreședinților Autorității Electorale Permanente sunt de câte 8 ani”

The statute establishes fixed five-year terms with staggered initial appointments (three-year and five-year mix), ensures term-limited service with no hold-over, and specifies statutory removal grounds for each appointing authority. Removal is limited to defined causes (malfeasance, misfeasance, incompetency, absenteeism, conflicts of interest, misconduct, persistent neglect of duty, incapacity) that protect against arbitrary dismissal.

“The terms of the members are for five years. Vacancies must be filled in the manner of the original appointment for the unexpired portion of the term only. Members of the commission who serve less than a full five-year term may be reappointed for one full five-year term. Members of the commission who have completed a full five-year term are not eligible for reappointment. A member shall not serve on the commission in hold-over status after the member's term expires.”

§ 12-1-5 codifies State Board terms: 4-year terms for county-auditor members, staggered appointment dates for legislative-leader appointees ('the appointee of the democratic leader of the House of Representatives, 1980 and each fourth year thereafter…'). § 12-21-46 codifies court removal of recount board member 'not acting in good faith' — protected removal procedure. § 12-17B-1 codifies definitions. Term protection codified.

§ 32.002 codifies term protection for election judges: 'judges appointed under Subsection (a) serve for a term of one year' (or two years by recorded order), with defined term-start dates and a codified vacancy-filling procedure. § 32.002(g) codifies the grounds and procedure for removal — only following an oral warning, with the concurrence of the relevant county party chair, and only where the judge causes a disruption or wilfully disobeys the code. Fixed terms plus statutory removal grounds codified.

“Judges appointed under Subsection (a) serve for a term of one year”

Law 298 Article 18 codifies fixed statutory terms for district election boards: 'iki yılda bir ocak ayının son haftasında, bir başkan ile altı asıl ve altı yedek üyeden kurulur ve iki yıl süre ile görev yapar' — every 2 years in the last week of January, 1 chair + 6 main + 6 alternates, 2-year term. Reinforced by Madde 19 (party-member assignment rules) and Madde 23 (ballot-box-committee terms).

The statute establishes fixed statutory terms ('the period specified in relation to him in the address pursuant to which he is appointed') and provides detailed statutory grounds for removal—including failure to discharge functions for 3+ months, breach of appointment terms, criminal conviction, insolvency, unfitness, and removal by parliamentary Address following Speaker's Committee scrutiny. This is statutory term protection with defined grounds, satisfying COMM.3's requirement for fixed-length terms and statutory removal provisions.

The statute establishes fixed four-year terms for State Board of Education members (with limited transition provisions for realignment), defined by statute rather than administrative discretion. Terms are staggered across electoral cycles (2022 and 2024 General Elections for different districts), creating a rotating appointment structure. Statutory grounds for removal are implied through the electoral process and the explicit prohibition on concurrent employment with the State Board of Education.

“voters in the following districts, as designated in the Senate block equivalency file, shall elect a State Board of Education member for a term of four years”

The statute provides fixed four-year terms for Board members with explicit staggering, succession limits (maximum two consecutive four-year terms), and a defined appointment cycle. The Commissioner also has a statutory four-year term beginning July 1 following a gubernatorial election. Removal is implicitly limited to statutory grounds (offer for office, party work, family conflict with candidates/Board members). The structure creates durable tenure protection independent of gubernatorial preference.

“After the initial staggering of terms, Board members shall serve terms of four years, which shall begin on February 1 of the year of the appointment. Vacancies shall be filled for the unexpired terms. No member shall be eligible for more than two successive four-year terms.”

The statute provides fixed five-year terms with statutory grounds for removal limited to neglect of duty or misconduct in office, protecting commissioners from arbitrary removal. However, the statute does not explicitly address staggered cycles (rotation of appointment dates to ensure continuity), which is a component of best-practice term protection though not strictly required by the criterion as written.

The section establishes fixed-term appointment (up to 7 years) and re-eligibility, satisfying the length element. However, it does not specify staggered cycles (all commissioners could be appointed and removed simultaneously), and § 8(5) grants the Governor-General unilateral power to set removal grounds via executive determination rather than codifying them in statute. This creates vulnerability to executive discretion despite the nominal term protection.

The statute establishes a fixed four-year term and provides staggered election cycles (e.g., in counties under 70,000 population, one commissioner elected every four years and two every four years on a different schedule). However, the statute does not specify statutory grounds for removal of commissioners, which is a required element of term protection under COMM.3. The structure satisfies two of three elements (fixed length and staggered cycles) but lacks explicit removal protections.

§ 10 sets a fixed four-year term for the National Electoral Committee and provides an alternate for every member, but does not codify staggered cycles or statutory for-cause removal grounds for individual members.

“The term of authority of the National Electoral Committee is four years.”

Constitution Article 60 codifies Constitutional Court 10-year terms. Election Code Article 10 (not surfaced) sets CEC member 5-year staggered terms; Article 29 (in v0 1.1 cands) codifies early-termination grounds. Term protection partially codified in surfaced corpus.

KRS 117.015 codifies the composition and fixed membership of the State Board of Elections, and KRS 117.035 codifies the county board of elections with appointed members serving defined terms. Fixed terms are codified, but explicit cause-only removal protection for commission members is not clearly codified.

§ 7 of the Seimas Election Law (Openness) requires public meeting notices for electoral committees, and the CEC term and removal grounds are codified in the Central Electoral Commission Law (§ 7 formation cycle, § 10 powers); a discrete staggered-term-with-removal-grounds rule is codified piecemeal across the acts.

The statute defines fixed two-year terms for board members, satisfying the fixed-length requirement. However, the section provides no information on staggered cycles (which would prevent wholesale replacement), and critically, it includes no statutory grounds for removal—only a default hold-over clause. Without specified removal protections or grounds, commissioners lack full term protection against arbitrary dismissal.

The statute establishes fixed-length terms (one year from July 1 to June 30 following the election) but does not specify staggered cycles for board members or statutory grounds for removal. The section provides clear term length and timing but lacks the removal protections and staggered-term structure that would fully satisfy COMM.3.

§ 204 codifies the Voting Standards Development Board: each member serves until expiration of his term; vacancies filled in same manner as original appointment.

Article 29 codifies grounds for non-appointment of commission members (statutory removal-grounds equivalent). Article 21-23 (in other dumps) codify commission term lengths. Statutory term-protection framework partially codified.

52 USC § 20924 codifies the EAC Executive Director with a fixed 4-year term; reinforces term-structure framework for senior EAC staff.

“The Executive Director shall serve for a term of 4 years”

§ 2646 codifies fixed terms for town officers, including the town clerk — the principal local election official — whose term is one year (or three years by town vote), serving until a successor is chosen. Fixed statutory terms are codified, but staggering and cause-only removal protection for election-administration roles are not comprehensively codified.

§ 7.21 codifies the duties + regulations of election commissioners. § 7.20 sets the 4-commissioner board structure with fixed terms. WEC commissioner terms (5 years staggered) live in § 15.61 (not surfaced).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section (Art. 3 and Art. 3 bis of the Argentine Electoral Code) addresses voter eligibility and exclusions from the electoral roll, plus voting rights for pre-trial detainees. It contains no provisions regarding commission structure, commissioner appointment, term length, staggered cycles, or statutory grounds for removal. The criterion COMM.3 requires statutory definition of commissioner terms with fixed length, staggered cycles, and removal grounds; this section is entirely outside that domain.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-564 addresses ballot box handling procedures and emergency protocols during election day operations. It contains no provisions regarding commissioner appointment, term length, staggered cycles, or removal grounds. This section governs operational mechanics at polling places, not the institutional structure of election commissions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 201 covers Central Bank board — wrong target. CEC member terms (6 years staggered) are in Electoral Code Article 42 but weren't FTS-surfaced for this datapoint.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes a precinct election board (Sprengelwahlbehörde) but provides no statutory definition of term length, staggered cycles, or grounds for removal. The mayor (Bürgermeister) appoints the chair and deputies with no mentioned term protection or removal safeguards. Appointment discretion rests entirely with the municipal executive, creating vulnerability to political replacement outside any statutory framework.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 146 of the Belgian Electoral Code addresses post-election procedural duties of polling station bureaus (relevés of absent voters, late arrivals, and unlisted voters admitted to vote). It contains no provision regarding commissioner appointment, term length, staggered cycles, or statutory removal grounds. The section governs operational election administration, not institutional structure of an election commission.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines term length for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (a legislative body, not an election commission) and term limits for its leadership. It does not establish an independent election commission, define grounds for removal of election administrators, or create staggered commissioner cycles. The PRC does not have a statutorily independent, multi-branch election commission; election administration is controlled by the Communist Party apparatus. This section does not provide the institutional structure required by COMM.3.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 39 addresses public disclosure and reporting obligations for political party financing and campaign finance—a transparency and accountability mechanism. It contains no provisions defining commissioner terms, staggered cycles, removal procedures, or tenure protections. The criterion COMM.3 requires statutory definition of commissioner term structure; this section is entirely procedural and does not address the institutional structure of the election commission itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 57 of Czech election law addresses post-election judicial review of candidate validity and mandate termination, not the statutory structure of commissioner appointments, terms, or removal grounds. The section provides no framework for defining, staggering, or protecting the tenure of any election commission members.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

§ 11 codifies a defined term for the constituency committee: 'its term continues until a new committee has been elected,' ensuring continuity across the electoral cycle. § 13 codifies that the municipal central election committee is appointed 'for the council's term.' Fixed/continuing terms are codified, but explicit removal-protection (cause-only dismissal) for committee members is not codified in Vaalilaki.

The statute establishes a fixed term tied to the Bundestag's electoral period (Wahlperiode), satisfying the 'fixed length' element. However, the section provides no staggered removal cycles and, critically, no statutory grounds for removal—removal appears to rest entirely on the Bundestag's discretion between elections. This lacks the institutional insulation that term protection requires; commissioners serve at the pleasure of a single political branch.

“Der Wahlprüfungsausschuß wird vom Bundestag für die Dauer der Wahlperiode gewählt.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs voter complaint procedures and election certification (post-election review by the election committee and reporting to the legislature). It does not address the composition, appointment, tenure, or removal of election commissioners or the election board. It contains no statutory definition of commissioner terms, term length, staggered cycles, or statutory removal grounds. No structural independence safeguard is present.

The statute fixes commissioner terms at four years and requires gubernatorial appointment with senate consent, providing some statutory structure. However, the section provides no explicit statutory grounds for removal, no staggered cycle (all three board members serve co-terminus four-year terms), and does not shield members from at-will removal by the governor between sessions. While term length is defined, the absence of removal protections and staggered appointments means the structure does not fully satisfy the criterion's requirement for fixed-length terms with statutory grounds for removal.

“their terms of office shall be four years”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 34-2413 addresses the procedural preparation of voting machines and training of election board members before elections. It contains no provisions regarding commissioner appointment, term length, staggered cycles, or statutory removal grounds. It does not establish any institutional structure for an election commission or commissioners.

The statute defines fixed two-year terms for appointed board members, satisfying the 'fixed length' element. However, the section provides no staggered cycle (all terms expire simultaneously), no statutory grounds for removal, and the clerk's ex officio status lacks term protection. Moreover, appointment authority rests entirely with county party chairmen—a single-party mechanism—rather than multi-branch assignment, which undermines institutional independence. Term definition alone is insufficient without removal protection and staggered renewal.

“serve a term of two (2) years or until their successors are appointed”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. 28 addresses pre-election campaign rights and media access — it does not establish any commission structure, commissioner term protections, removal grounds, or staggered appointment cycles. COMM.3 requires statutory definition of commissioner terms and removal protections; this section concerns campaign conduct rules only.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced constitutional judicial-tenure and campaign-accounting provisions; the surfaced sections do not establish election-commissioner term protection (CEC member terms and local-commission recall grounds sit elsewhere in the Central Election Commission Law and § 11 of the Election Commissions Law).

The section defines statutory grounds for removal (willful misconduct, failure to perform duty, incompetence, etc.) and provides procedural protections (hearing, judicial review), satisfying the 'statutory grounds for removal' element. However, it does not address the core components of COMM.3: it contains no language defining the length of registrar terms, staggered appointment cycles, or fixed term duration. The section only prescribes *how* registrars may be removed, not the structural framework of their tenure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 287 addresses conflict-of-interest incompatibility and pension/compensation rules for Luxembourg public servants elected to the European Parliament. It contains no provisions establishing an election commission, defining commissioner terms, specifying removal procedures, or creating staggered appointment cycles. This section concerns eligibility and benefits, not institutional structure for election administration governance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 112 is a criminal penalty provision addressing election fraud and misconduct (forgery, ballot tampering, unauthorized photography). It contains no institutional framework, does not establish or reference any commission structure, term lengths, appointment procedures, removal grounds, or governance mechanisms. It is entirely outside the scope of commission design.

Section lists grounds for vacancy (including removal for cause) on university/education boards, but does not define fixed term length or staggered cycles, and these are not election commissioner positions.

“Death of the incumbent; his resignation; his removal from office for cause”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

The statute provides fixed four-year terms with clear commencement dates, satisfying the fixed-length requirement. However, the section establishes simultaneous elections of all five commissioners every four years, providing no staggered cycle—all terms expire together. More critically, the statute contains no statutory grounds for removal, which is a required element of term protection under COMM.3. Without removal grounds, commissioners serve at will and lack genuine insulation from arbitrary removal.

This section protects incumbent commissioners from premature termination during their existing term and references statutory removal grounds (§ 115.037), but it is a protective/transitional provision for sitting commissioners only. It does not define the length of commissioner terms, establish staggered cycles, or specify removal grounds—those must be found in other sections of ch. 115. Standing alone, this section provides only negative protection, not affirmative term structure.

“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed in any way as interfering with or discontinuing the term of office of any person now serving as an election commissioner until the term for which he was appointed has expired, or until he has been removed as provided in section 115.037”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural allocation of parliamentary mandates following elections and the role of alternates in filling vacancies. It does not address the composition, terms, appointment, or removal of election commissioners. There is no statutory definition of commissioner term length, staggered cycles, or grounds for removal in this text.

The statute provides fixed four-year terms with limited renewability (max two reappointments), satisfying term definition and length. However, it lacks staggered appointment cycles—all three commissioners could theoretically turn over simultaneously—and crucially provides no statutory grounds for removal, leaving termination entirely to ministerial discretion. The single-branch (executive) appointment structure means term protection operates without structural counterbalance.

“De leden worden door Onze Minister benoemd voor ten hoogste vier jaar. Herbenoeming kan twee maal en telkens voor ten hoogste vier jaar plaatsvinden.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 293.403 concerns the procedural rules for demanding and conducting election recounts (filing deadlines, cost deposits, canvass definitions). It does not address the structure, appointment, terms, or removal grounds of any election commission. The criterion requires statutory definition of commissioner terms with fixed length, staggered cycles, and removal grounds — none of which appear in this recount statute.

This section establishes statutory term lengths (2-year and 4-year terms) and staggered cycles for county commissioners and other county officials. However, it does not address statutory grounds for removal—a critical safeguard against arbitrary removal. The section defines term structure but lacks removal protections that would complete the criterion.

“At every state general election, the following officers shall be elected for 2-year terms except as otherwise provided”

The section establishes a fixed two-year term and a statutory ground for removal ('for cause'), which are positive structural elements. However, COMM.3 requires term protection for commissioners, and this provision addresses only the Executive Director (a staff official), not the State Board members themselves. The criterion is inapplicable to this staff position, making the section inadequate to satisfy COMM.3.

“for a term of two years with compensation to be determined by the Office of State Human Resources. The Executive Director shall serve beginning May 15 after the first meeting held after new appointments to the State Board are made, unless removed for cause”

§ 16.1-15-16 codifies qualifications of canvassing-board members + replacement procedure + quorum. § 16.1-05-01 codifies election-board appointment. § 16.1-15-34 codifies canvass-board disqualification for familial conflict. Term protection for the canvassing board's duration codified though specific 'fixed term' is not — canvassing boards serve per-election.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the term of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly (a legislative body), not an independent election commission. It specifies that the Standing Committee's term matches the Supreme People's Assembly and continues until a new committee is elected, but provides no statutory framework for an independent election commission with fixed commissioner terms, staggered removal protections, or defined grounds for removal. The EAdI criterion requires institutional independence from the legislative/executive structure itself; a provision governing legislative continuity does not establish such independence.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 358 concerns the technical procedure for allocating parliamentary seats and dividing mandates among electoral lists. It contains no provisions regarding commissioner terms, fixed lengths, staggered cycles, or grounds for removal. The section addresses vote tabulation and mandate distribution algorithms, not institutional structure or personnel governance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 72.º concerns voting rights and civic duties for citizens, not the institutional structure, appointment, or term protection of election commissioners. It addresses voter eligibility and judicial review of abstention justifications, not commission governance. No provision defining commissioner terms, staggered cycles, or removal grounds appears in this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 27 governs the timing of MP elections (30 days before mandate expiry), not commission member term protection.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 73 addresses the powers and duties of presiding officers at voting stations—operational-level election administrators responsible for supervising individual polling places. It contains no provisions defining commissioner terms, term length, staggered cycles, or statutory grounds for removal of commissioners. The criterion COMM.3 concerns the structural independence and tenure protection of the electoral commission itself, not the role of polling-station staff. This section is categorically outside the scope of term-protection requirements for commissioners.

The statute defines a fixed term (one legislative term) and specifies that commissioners serve until the next Junta is constituted at the start of the following legislature. However, the statute provides no staggered cycles (all members turn over simultaneously) and—critically—no statutory grounds for removal. The provision merely states commissioners 'continue in office' until the new body is seated; it does not shield them from arbitrary removal by the appointing bodies, particularly the congressional majority for the academic vocales. This creates vulnerability to mid-term removal by political actors.

“Los Vocales designados serán nombrados por Real Decreto y continuarán en su mandato hasta la toma de posesión de la nueva Junta Electoral Central, al inicio de la siguiente legislatura.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

The section establishes fixed two-year terms for county primary board members, satisfying the fixed-length requirement. However, it lacks staggered cycles (all terms run concurrently) and provides no statutory grounds for removal, only provisions for successor appointment. These omissions mean the institutional protection against mid-term removal and coordinated turnover is incomplete.

“for terms of two (2) years from the date of their appointment and until their successors are appointed and qualified”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

The statute defines a fixed two-year term for ballot commissioners, satisfying the fixed-length requirement. However, the structure fails term protection in critical ways: (1) terms are not staggered—all commissioners turn over simultaneously every two years, creating complete board replacement; (2) commissioners can be reappointed annually by partisan county executive committees, creating no insulation from removal through non-reappointment; (3) no statutory grounds for removal are defined, and the appointment mechanism itself (party-committee discretion) permits practical removal at will. The dual-scholar test would find this insufficient because even a nonpartisan observer cannot distinguish between a genuinely protected term and pure at-will service when reappointment is entirely within partisan hands with no stagger.

“Ballot commissioners shall be appointed between January 15 and January 30, in each year in which a general election is to be held, for a term of two years beginning on February 1 next ensuing.”

While the section specifies that appointed directors serve 'until the next regular election,' it does not establish fixed-length terms, staggered removal cycles, or statutory grounds for removal. The statute addresses only vacancy-filling procedures and interim tenure; it does not define the underlying term structure, removal protections, or cyclical renewal of director positions. Term protection requires statutorily-defined fixed terms with staggered cycles and removal-for-cause grounds—none of which appear in this section.

“An appointee to the office of director shall serve until the next regular election.”