Conflict-of-interest disclosure

The statute explicitly requires board members to file statements of financial interest under section 68B.35, establishing a mandatory, statutory disclosure mechanism for conflict-of-interest accountability. This is a codified institutional safeguard that applies to all commissioners regardless of current administration.

§ 12-25-29 codifies that convention nominees for state office must file statements of financial interest. § 12-25-29.1 codifies parallel for alternative-status parties. § 12-25-30 codifies parallel for candidates for local office. § 12-25-31.1 codifies judicial-officer PII exclusions. Comprehensive financial-interest disclosure framework codified.

Чл. 51(2)(7) codifies early termination of CEC members upon a finding of conflict of interest under the general Conflict of Interest Law; addresses COI enforcement via cross-reference but does not directly codify a public financial-interest disclosure regime.

“влизане в сила на акт, с който е установен конфликт на интереси”

§ 16¹ of the Central Election Commission Law subjects the CEC chairperson, deputy and secretary to the law On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials (public-official interest declarations); ordinary election-commission members, however, are expressly excluded from public-official status (§ 6 Election Commissions Law).

“shall be determined in the law On Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials.”

The section imposes conflict-of-interest prevention through restrictive employment rules and prohibits misuse of confidential information, establishing behavioral accountability. However, it does not mandate affirmative public disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, or party affiliations—it only prevents simultaneous employment. True COI.1 compliance requires statutory requirement for commissioners to publicly disclose assets, sources of income, and connections to candidates or vendors, not merely employment restrictions.

§ 13-37-108 imposes detailed conflict-of-interest restrictions on the Commissioner of Political Practices — no conflicting positions, no political activity, no contributions, recusal from conflict matters — but a public financial-disclosure requirement for election officials sits in the general ethics code (Title 2, ch. 2), outside this corpus.

This statute establishes a conflict-of-interest *restriction* (prohibition on financial interests) applicable to nonelective governmental bodies, which could include election commissions, but it does not mandate *disclosure* of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The rule prevents certain conflicts but does not require public transparency about interests held or their extent; it is a prophylactic rule, not a disclosure mechanism.

“the majority of the members of a nonelective governmental body, or of a committee or subcommittee of a governmental body, whether that body is elective or not, shall not have a financial interest, either personally or through a member of their immediate family or a business with which they are associated, other than an interest of a de minimis nature or an interest that is not distinct from that of the general public, in matters subject to the jurisdiction of the body or committee or subcommittee”

Article 29 codifies commission-member status restrictions: foreign citizens, candidates, their attorneys, deputies of state-power bodies, party-list members, etc. cannot serve. Some structural conflict-of-interest provisions codified, though financial-disclosure for commissioners isn't explicitly required.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 17-5-14.1 regulates disclosure by separate segregated political funds (corporate PACs), not by election commissioners or senior election staff. The section requires funds to file financial disclosures with the Secretary of State, but this applies to fund custodians as political actors, not to the institutional leadership of election administration. The statute contains no conflict-of-interest disclosure requirement for commissioners or senior election staff.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses presidential succession upon candidate resignation in the first electoral round. It contains no statutory requirement for commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The text is entirely procedural regarding ballot vacancies, not institutional governance or accountability mechanisms.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 16-312 addresses write-in candidate filing procedures and requirements, not election administration governance, commission structure, or staff accountability. The section contains no provisions regarding commissioners, senior election staff, conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements, or public financial-interest reporting for election officials. It is entirely outside the scope of COI.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 365A addresses judicial review of disputed elections and the admissibility of delivery failures as grounds for voiding an election result. It contains no provisions regarding conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for commissioners or senior election staff. The section does not establish, reference, or implement any statutory disclosure mechanism.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 13 NRWO addresses the appointment timeline, oath-taking, and procedural duties of election board chairs and representatives. It requires an oath of impartiality (subsection 2) but contains no statutory requirement for public disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The oath mechanism is a form of accountability but does not constitute conflict-of-interest disclosure as defined by COI.1.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 143 of the Belgian Electoral Code addresses voting procedures and ballot handling—specifically the mechanics of ballot preparation, stamping, compartmentalization, and voter authentication. It contains no provisions regarding conflict-of-interest disclosure, financial interest reporting, or accountability mechanisms for commissioners or election staff. This section is procedurally focused and does not engage with the governance or ethics framework required by COI.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. 94 concerns candidate registration procedures and documentation requirements (party delegation authorization, convention minutes, voter certification, party affiliation proof, criminal record clearance, asset declarations). It does not address conflict-of-interest disclosure by election commissioners or senior election staff. The section contains no provisions requiring commissioners or election officials to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or other potential conflicts to the public.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Section 24(6) imposes a statutory prohibition on partisan conduct and party affiliation, which is a conflict-of-interest safeguard. However, the section does not require PUBLIC DISCLOSURE of financial interests, vendor relationships, or party connections—it only prohibits such conduct. COI.1 specifically asks whether disclosure is REQUIRED by statute, not merely prohibited. The statute mandates compliance but not transparency/disclosure as an accountability mechanism.

“No returning officer shall, while in office, knowingly engage in politically partisan conduct and in particular shall not make a contribution to a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant or belong to or make a contribution to, be an employee of or hold a position in, a registered party, an eligible party or an electoral district association.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 8 of the Village Organization Law addresses composition, gender representation, and kinship recusal within village committees—it does not establish or reference any statutory requirement for commissioners or election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The kinship recusal rule is a limited conflict management tool, not a comprehensive financial disclosure regime.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes campaign finance disclosure requirements for candidates and political committees, not conflict-of-interest disclosure for election commissioners or senior election staff. It does not address whether commissioners or election staff must disclose personal financial interests, vendor relationships, or party affiliations. COI.1 requires statutory mandates for commissioner/staff disclosure; this section governs campaign finance transparency, a different accountability mechanism.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses parliamentary deputy succession and substitute deputy procedures when a mandate lapses or incompatibility arises. It contains no statutory requirement for commissioners, election officials, or any personnel to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The text is entirely procedural regarding parliamentary representation and is unrelated to election administration accountability mechanisms or conflict-of-interest disclosure frameworks.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses incompatibilities for European Parliament members under Czech law (§ 53 of Act 62/2003) and does not establish conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff. It contains no structural provisions governing election administration integrity, financial disclosure obligations, or accountability mechanisms for electoral officials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate financial disclosure requirements, not commissioner or senior election staff conflict-of-interest disclosure. It establishes a procedural consequence (publication of non-compliant candidate names) but contains no statutory requirement for commissioners or election staff to disclose their own financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 99.061 candidate qualification method. Not COI disclosure for election officials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article L270 of the French Electoral Code addresses succession of municipal council seats and incompatibility rules but contains no statutory requirement for conflict-of-interest disclosure by commissioners or senior election staff. The section does not establish any accountability mechanism for disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections.

Constitution Article 51 codifies conflict-of-interest provisions for the President. No specific CEC commissioner financial-disclosure regime FTS-surfaced — Article 35 of Election Code (CEC member status) has incompatibility rules but not surfaced.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 21-2-379 codifies ballot arrangement when optical scanning impracticable. § 21-2-310 (Definitions) and § 21-2-379.2 (DRE review) — none codify conflict-of-interest disclosure for election administrators. COI is governed by Georgia's general Ethics in Government Act (separate instrument).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 69 of the BWO regulates the procedural mechanics of ballot counting and vote tallying at the polling place level. It contains no provisions requiring commissioners, election officials, or Beisitzer (poll observers/assistants) to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party affiliations, or candidate connections. The section addresses only the chain of custody, verification, and counting of ballots under the supervision of the Wahlvorsteher (presiding officer), not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate nomination procedures and ballot name display rules within Greenland's election law. It contains no provisions regarding conflict-of-interest disclosure for commissioners or senior election staff. The statute does not establish any requirement for public disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or other conflicts by election administrators.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 82 governs the management of polling sessions—specifically voter conduct, polling booth procedures, and room access during voting. It contains no provisions regarding conflict-of-interest disclosure, financial interest reporting, or accountability mechanisms for commissioners or election staff. The section addresses operational procedures only, not institutional governance or disclosure requirements.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

This section imposes conflict-of-interest restrictions (disqualifying candidates and committee members from board service) but does NOT establish a disclosure requirement. COI.1 requires PUBLIC DISCLOSURE of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, and candidate connections—a transparent reporting mechanism. This statute merely bars certain persons from serving; it does not mandate that commissioners or staff disclose conflicts or financial interests to the public. The restriction is prophylactic (preventing conflicts before they arise), not accountability-based (requiring transparency and documentation).

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 121.015 (campaign-finance definitions) is unrelated. No financial-interest / conflict-of-interest disclosure requirement for election commissioners or senior staff was surfaced.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 83 governs polling-place conduct and security authority of the bureau president during voting operations. It contains no provisions establishing conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for commissioners or senior election staff, nor does it address financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. This is a procedural rule about election-day management, not an accountability mechanism.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 124 addresses only the physical location and facilities for polling places (bureaux de vote). It contains no provisions regarding conflict-of-interest disclosure, financial disclosures, or any accountability mechanisms applicable to commissioners or senior election staff. The section is purely administrative/logistical and does not engage with the institutional independence or accountability framework required by COI.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

Article 58 establishes disqualification criteria (candidate status, family relations to candidates, voter registration) and requires publication of Assistant Commissioners' names and basic identifiers (ID number, address, occupation, nominating party, polling booth assignment). However, it does not require statutory disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or ongoing conflict-of-interest certifications. The provision addresses eligibility screening and transparency of assignment, not comprehensive conflict-of-interest disclosure.

“A person shall not hold the office of Assistant Commissioner if he is a candidate for election to the House, or is a relative by consanguinity or affinity up to the second degree to any candidate for election, or is not registered as a voter in the last published Electoral Register or is manifestly in the opinion of the Commission, after consulting the party delegates, unsuitable or not sufficiently qualified to perform the functions of Assistant Commissioner.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 5-304 addresses candidate filing requirements and financial disclosure for candidates running for office, not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff. The section does not establish or reference any statutory framework requiring commissioners or election administrators to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. This section is procedurally focused on candidate candidacy forms and does not address institutional accountability mechanisms for election officials themselves.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires financial interest disclosure by elected officials generally (those elected to office), not specifically by election commissioners or senior election staff. It does not establish a statutory requirement for election administrators to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections as a condition of their role in administering elections.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses jurisdictional authority and filing procedures for campaign finance disclosures to the Missouri Ethics Commission, but contains no statutory requirement for election commissioners or senior election staff to disclose their own financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section does not establish conflict-of-interest disclosure obligations for election administrators themselves.

The section establishes incompatibility rules (family ties, financial support, public advocacy) that members must observe, creating grounds for removal. However, it does not mandate PUBLIC DISCLOSURE of financial interests, vendor relationships, or party positions—it only prohibits certain activities and provides for removal if violated. COI.1 requires affirmative disclosure mechanisms (e.g., filing statements, public registers), not just prohibition and removal.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the mechanical voting process (marking ballots, use of voting booths, ballot insertion) and contains no statutory requirements for conflict-of-interest disclosure by commissioners or senior election staff. It does not address institutional accountability mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires candidates for public office to file financial disclosures with the NJELECC, but does not address disclosures by election commissioners or senior election staff themselves. COI.1 requires statutory conflict-of-interest disclosure obligations for the commissioners and staff administering elections, not candidates running for office. The section is about candidate transparency, not institutional accountability for election administrators.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses complaint procedures and arbitration for School District Campaign Reporting Act violations, not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for commissioners or senior election staff. It establishes administrative remedies and arbitration processes but contains no requirement for public disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections by any officials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 3-106 codifies adoption of a 'fair campaign code' (ethical standards for candidates/parties), unrelated to administrator conflict-of-interest disclosure. No statutory COI-disclosure regime for election administrators codified in ELN.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses termination and suspension procedures for county directors of elections, including grounds for discipline and due process protections. It contains no provision requiring commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section does mention recusal procedures for actual or apparent conflicts of interest but does not mandate public disclosure of those conflicts or financial interests.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORC 3517.16 governs filing of complaints with the SoS regarding campaign-finance violations; does not codify financial-interest disclosure by commissioners or senior election staff.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 197 regulates the procedural rights of electoral committees representing national minorities—specifically exemptions from voter thresholds and filing deadlines with the State Electoral Commission (PKW). It contains no statutory requirements for conflict-of-interest disclosure by commissioners or senior election staff, nor does it establish any accountability mechanism for financial interest reporting. The section addresses candidate committee registration, not institutional governance or ethics safeguards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 17.º addresses the distribution of parliamentary seats within electoral lists and the succession of candidates in case of death or incompetency. It does not establish conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff, nor does it create any accountability mechanism related to financial interests or party affiliations. This section pertains to candidate succession, not institutional governance of election administration.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 57 addresses the procedural mechanics of result determination and declaration, including timeline, objection handling, and Electoral Court oversight. It contains no requirements for commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section does not engage with conflict-of-interest disclosure at all.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: While § 8-13-310 imposes eligibility restrictions on State Ethics Commission members (including prohibitions on recent campaign contributions, family ties to elected officials, and lobbying registration), it does not establish a statutory requirement for ongoing public disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections by commissioners or staff. The section addresses conflict-of-interest avoidance through appointment screening but not through codified transparency mechanisms.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses incompatibility rules for Provincial Deputies (elected officials), not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff. It establishes who cannot hold elected office simultaneously with certain positions, but does not establish any statutory disclosure regime for election administrators' financial interests, vendor relationships, or party affiliations. The criterion requires public disclosure by commissioners and election staff; this text regulates candidate eligibility and incompatibilities for elected representatives.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs campaign fund investment rules for candidates and political committees, not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff. It imposes penalties on candidates for improper fund investments but contains no provisions addressing whether commissioners or election administrators must disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section UCA § 20A-1-608.1 addresses criminal penalties for electronic communications abuse related to elections. It contains no statutory requirement for commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section references conflict-of-interest disclosure only as a source of information that may be misused by a criminal actor, not as a mandatory disclosure regime for election officials themselves.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 24.2-949.10 establishes disclosure requirements for out-of-state political committees and their contributors, not for election commissioners or senior election staff. It addresses campaign finance transparency, not conflict-of-interest disclosure by election officials themselves. The section does not create any statutory obligation for commissioners or election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, or other conflicts.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29B.05.010 is a declaration of public policy on campaign finance disclosure and government transparency. It does not establish any statutory requirement for election commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section articulates aspirational goals regarding public confidence and disclosure of campaign financing and elected officials' financial affairs, but contains no operative language creating binding conflict-of-interest disclosure obligations for election administration personnel.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires candidates for general public office (state, county, municipal, school board) to file financial disclosures with the Ethics Commission, but does not address disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff. COI.1 requires statutory disclosure obligations specifically for those who administer elections, not candidates running for office. The section is outside the scope of election administration institutional structure.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute concerns a school or water district board, not an election administration commission. It is completely inapplicable to election commissioners or election staff. Even if it were applicable, the section requires disclosure and board approval of financial interests only when a trustee is 'directly interested financially in any contract, work done or property purchased by the district'—a narrow category covering vendor conflicts but not party positions, candidate connections, or broader financial entanglements relevant to election integrity. The section does not apply to the election administration institutional framework.