Election administration independence

The statute establishes the Fair Ballot Commission with fixed statutory composition across multiple branches (executive: Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Commissioner; legislative: Speaker; secretary of state), enumerated appointment authority, and mandated term limits (initial terms of 2-4 years, subsequent terms of 4 years, maximum of two consecutive full terms). This statutory codification of multi-branch appointment, balanced composition, and term constraints satisfies the criterion for election administration independence.

“The commission shall consist of the following 18 members: The Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industries, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Secretary of State, or their designees, shall each serve as a member on the commission and shall each appoint to the commission one member who is an attorney licensed in the state and one member who is a private citizen of the state who is not an attorney.”

The statute explicitly codifies appointment by multiple branches (governor appoints subject to legislative confirmation in joint session), mandates balanced political composition (two members each from the two largest parties), fixes staggered five-year terms with no consecutive expiration for same-party members, and limits members to one term. These independence safeguards are all set by statute rather than administrative discretion. The procedural clarity meets the dual-scholar test: both election reform scholars and election integrity advocates would recognize this structure as a statutorily-grounded independence mechanism.

“The governor shall appoint all members of the commission in the manner prescribed in (b) and (c) of this section, subject to confirmation by a majority of the legislature meeting in joint session. The governor shall appoint two members of each of the two political parties or political groups with the largest number of registered voters at the time of the most recent preceding general election at which a governor was elected. The two appointees from each of these two parties or groups shall be chosen from a list of four names to be submitted by the central committee of each party or group. The four members selected under (b) of this section shall, by a majority vote, nominate to the governor an individual to serve as the fifth member of the commission.”

The statute establishes a citizens clean elections commission with independence codified through multiple mechanisms: (1) fixed composition of five members with no more than two from the same political party, ensuring balanced political composition; (2) appointment distributed across multiple officials (governor, highest/second-highest ranking statewide officials from different parties per subsection C-D), establishing multi-branch involvement; (3) fixed terms of 5 years with staggered succession and explicit prohibition on reappointment (subsection I), protecting tenure independence; (4) removal only by governor with senate concurrence for specified grounds after written notice and opportunity for response (subsection E), adding procedural safeguards. All these structural independence requirements are set in statute, not left to administrative discretion.

“A. The citizens clean elections commission is established consisting of five members. No more than two members of the commission shall be members of the same political party. No more than two members of the commission shall be residents of the same county. No one shall be appointed as a member who does not have a registration pursuant to chapter 1 of this title that has been continuously recorded for at least five years immediately preceding appointment with the same political party or as an independent.”

The statute statutorily codifies a multi-branch appointment structure (Secretary of State, legislative leaders, Governor, and party designees), establishes fixed terms (2 or 4 years depending on position with term limits of two consecutive full terms), and requires balanced political composition (one Democratic designee, one Republican designee). These procedural safeguards are enumerated directly in the statute and leave no discretion to a single actor.

Constitution Article 195 codifies CEC composition: 7 members elected by the National Assembly upon recommendation of a competent standing committee. Combined with Electoral Code Articles 41 (formation fundamentals), 43 (district commission — 6-year terms appointed by CEC), 44 (precinct commission with party representation), AM has multi-party + constitutional independence codified.

Article 32 codifies CEC composition (12 members appointed). Article 34 codifies multi-tier commission formation. Article 30 codifies recall-voting commissions. Article 97 codifies Council of Republic election authority. Multi-tier statutorily codified, though political-balance composition is heavily state-controlled in practice per OSCE/ODIHR reports.

Чл. 46 codifies the CEC as an INDEPENDENT STATE ORGAN, juridical person with primary-budget status, 15 members proposed by parliamentary parties/coalitions and appointed by presidential decree after public consultations. Multi-source nomination + executive appointment + independent status codified.

“Създава се Централна избирателна комисия за произвеждане на всички видове избори, която е независим държавен орган”

This section codifies in statute the State Board of Elections' independence through multiple procedural safeguards: (1) balanced political composition is mandated (each major party must have at least 5 members and equal representation across geographic units); (2) appointment involves multiple branches (Governor appoints, but Senate must consent); (3) fixed terms are specified (initial 2- or 4-year appointments, then 4-year terms); and (4) nomination by political party chairs constrains gubernatorial discretion. These elements together create structural independence from unilateral executive control.

“The State Board of Elections shall consist of 11 members, including 2 members from Sussex County; 2 members from Kent County; 2 members from New Castle County; 2 members from the City of Wilmington; 2 at-large members; and the State Election Commissioner, who shall serve as an ex officio member subject to the limitations set forth in § 302 of this title. Each of the 2 principal political parties shall be represented at all times by not fewer than 5 members and at all times both principal political parties shall have equal representation in each county, in the City of Wilmington, and among the at-large members.”

§ 17 codifies that the Minister of the Interior establishes a Valgnævn (Election Board) which decides election-related disputes. § 12a codifies Valgnævnet's authority to act on party-name violations. § 23 codifies the valgbestyrelse (district commission) appointed for each opstillingskreds. § 11a codifies prior approval requirement. Multi-tier independent administration codified.

§ 10 of the Riigikogu Election Act codifies the National Electoral Committee's independence — a fixed four-year term and members appointed across multiple branches: two judges by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, an adviser to the Chancellor of Justice, a State Audit Office official, a public prosecutor, a Government Office official and an information-systems auditor.

“The term of authority of the National Electoral Committee is four years.”

§ 13 codifies the municipal central election committee (kunnan keskusvaalilautakunta): appointed by the council, 5 members + ≥5 deputies, who 'as far as possible must represent the voter groups that nominated candidates in the previous municipal elections.' § 14 codifies its working procedure. § 10 codifies that within government the Ministry of Justice acts as the supreme election authority. § 12 codifies the constituency committee. Multi-tier administration codified with party-representation balance.

§ 106.24 creates the Florida Elections Commission as a 'separate budget entity' independent of executive control, with statutory enforcement authority over Ch. 104 and 106 violations.

“There is created within the Department of Legal Affairs, Office of the Attorney General, a Florida Elections Commission, hereinafter referred to as the commission.”

Election Code Article 7 codifies CEC independence: 'The Electoral Administration of Georgia is an independent administrative body that shall be independent from other public bodies, within its powers.' Article 13 codifies multi-party appointment of CEC members. Article 24 codifies 13-member PEC composition with mixed appointment (6 DEC-elected + 7 party-appointed). Constitutional grounding in Constitution Article 66 (not surfaced).

The statute codifies three key procedural elements: (1) appointment authority involves two branches (governor appoints with senate advice and consent), (2) fixed four-year terms are enumerated, and (3) political balance is statutorily mandated—no board may consist entirely of one party, with party membership defined and verified. All requirements are set in statute, not administrative discretion.

“The boards, which shall be in the department of accounting and general services for administrative purposes, shall consist of three members each who shall be appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate; their terms of office shall be four years. Each member shall, at the time of appointment and continuing through their term of office, be a registered voter in the respective county of the board to which the member is appointed. (b) In no case shall any board consist entirely of members of one political party.”

The statute establishes election administration independence through explicit, statutorily-grounded procedures: the director and assistant director must be from different political parties; their appointment requires board approval with a supermajority threshold (at least 3 members) and bipartisan voting requirement (at least 2 of approving members from different parties). These mechanisms are enumerated in statute and create structural checks on unilateral partisan control, satisfying the criterion's demand for codified institutional independence.

KRS 117.015 codifies that 'there shall be a State Board of Elections that is an independent agency of state government' administering the election laws, with a defined balanced membership. KRS 117.035 codifies the county board of elections (county clerk, sheriff, and two appointed members representing both parties), and KRS 117.025 requires the board's executive director and assistant director to be of different political parties. Statutory grounding of an independent, party-balanced election administration codified.

“There shall be a State Board of Elections that is an independent agency of state government”

§ 2 of the Election Commissions Law establishes each election commission as an independent local-government institution with a mandate fixed to the council's term, its members elected by the council (§ 5); the Central Election Commission's composition — nine members, eight elected by the Saeima and one by the Supreme Court — is set in the Central Election Commission Law.

“an independent local government institution for the whole term of”

Lithuania's Central Electoral Commission is statutorily independent (§ 5 of the CEC Law) and renewed on a fixed cycle tied to Seimas elections (§ 7), with eligibility requirements (§ 6) modelled on Seimas-candidate qualifications.

“The Seimas shall set up the Central Electoral Commission no later than 200 days and no earlier than 140 days after regular or early elections to the Seimas.”

The statute codifies balanced political composition by mandating inclusion of chairpersons from each recognized political party and one governor-appointed member, providing explicit enumeration of board membership. The appointment mechanism involves multiple sources (political parties, governor), statutory specification of eligibility (§18:423(C)(3) bars clerks, registrars, and their family members), and fixed procedural rules for officer election (every four years per §18:423(D)(1)).

The statute codifies a balanced political composition requirement for county election boards, mandating three members from the majority party and two from the principal minority party. It also establishes fixed 4-year terms beginning on a defined schedule, gubernatorial appointment with Senate confirmation, and removal only for cause with notice and hearing. These structural safeguards—statutory enumeration of board composition, term lengths, appointment process, and removal protections—collectively establish independence through statutory grounding rather than administrative discretion.

“each local board consists of five regular members. (ii) Three regular members shall be of the majority party, and two regular members shall be of the principal minority party”

The statute codifies three structural safeguards for election administration independence: (1) appointment by multiple branches (mayor with approval of board of aldermen, not unilateral executive control), (2) fixed, staggered terms (ranging from one to four years, ensuring continuity and limiting turnover control), and (3) balanced composition through mandatory rotation. These procedural protections are statutorily enumerated, not left to administrative discretion.

“there shall be a board of registrars of voters, consisting of four persons, who shall be appointed by the mayor with the approval of the board of aldermen. When a board of registrars is first appointed after the acceptance of the provisions aforesaid, two registrars shall be appointed in February or March following such acceptance for terms respectively of three and four years, beginning with April first next ensuing. The city clerk of such city shall cease to be a member of the board of registrars on April first, but the remaining two members of the existing board of registrars whose terms do not then expire shall continue to hold office for their respective terms of one and two years. In February or March of every year after such first appointments, there shall in like manner be appointed one registrar of voters for the term of four years, beginning with April first following.”

The statute codifies independence through multiple mechanisms: (1) appointment by the governor requires senate advice and consent (multi-branch involvement), (2) balanced political composition is explicitly mandated with equal representation from each major party and a prohibition on more than two from the same party, and (3) the chairman and secretary must be from different parties. All core independence safeguards are enacted in statute with enumerated requirements, not left to administrative discretion.

“Each board of election commissioners shall be composed of four members, appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Two commissioners on each board shall be members of one major political party, and two commissioners on each board shall be members of the other major political party. In no case shall more than two commissioners on a board be members of the same political party.”

The statute establishes the ballot law commission with clear structural independence safeguards: appointment by three separate branches (speaker, senate president, governor with council consent), balanced two-party composition (one from each major party per appointer), fixed staggered 4-year terms (with initial staggering to prevent wholesale turnover), and an explicit prohibition on current elected officials and election officials. These procedural protections are exhaustively enumerated in the statute itself, not delegated to administrative discretion.

“There shall be a ballot law commission consisting of 5 members. Two members shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. Two members shall be appointed by the president of the senate, one from each of the 2 major political parties in the state based on votes cast for governor in the most recent state general election. One member shall be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the council, and shall be a person particularly qualified by experience in election procedure. No person shall be appointed to the commission who holds an elected office or who is an election official. The terms of all commissioners shall be for 4 years”

The statute codifies a multi-branch appointment structure (legislative majority and minority leaders from both chambers, plus two political parties), ensuring balanced political composition and distributed appointment authority. The statute also mandates an independent chairman and specifies qualifications and timeline requirements, all enumerated in the text itself rather than left to discretion.

“b. There shall first be appointed 12 as follows: (1) two members to be appointed by the President of the Senate; (2) two members to be appointed by the Speaker of the General Assembly; (3) two members to be appointed by the minority leader of the Senate; (4) two members to be appointed by the minority leader of the General Assembly; and (5) four members, two to be appointed by the chairman of the State committee of the political party whose candidate for Governor received the largest numbers of votes at the most recent gubernatorial election and two to be appointed by the chairman of the State committee of the political party whose candidate for Governor received the next largest number of votes at that election.”

The statute codifies three procedural safeguards for election administration independence: (1) the board of registration is appointed by the board of county commissioners at a specified regular meeting; (2) membership is statutorily capped at five (or three in class B counties) with fixed composition; and (3) balanced political composition is mandated by statute—no more than two members may be from the same political party. These provisions establish clear, enumerated requirements for board independence in statute rather than administrative discretion.

The statute codifies three core independence mechanisms: (1) fixed four-year terms with succession provisions, explicitly stated in statute; (2) balanced political composition—a mandatory limit that no more than three of five members can belong to the same party; and (3) multi-branch input through the nomination process, requiring the Governor to appoint from lists submitted by both major party chairs, constraining unilateral executive discretion. All three elements are enumerated in the statutory text and leave no gap for administrative discretion to override them.

“The Governor shall appoint the members of the State Board and likewise shall appoint their successors every four years at the expiration of each four-year term. Not more than three members of the State Board shall be members of the same political party. The Governor shall appoint the members from a list of nominees submitted to the Governor by the State party chair of each of the two political parties having the highest number of registered affiliates as reflected by the latest registration statistics published by the State Board. Each party chair shall submit a list of four nominees who are affiliated with that political party. No person may serve more than two consecutive four-year terms.”

ORC 3517.14 codifies a 5-member Ohio Election Integrity Commission with multi-branch appointers (SoS + 4 legislative leaders) and 4-year staggered terms.

“There is in the office of the secretary of state the Ohio election integrity commission”

This statute clearly codifies balanced political composition by mandating that the State Election Board include two members and one alternate from the party with the largest registration and one member and one alternate from the party with the second-largest registration. The appointment mechanism involves two branches (legislative party committees submitting nominees and the Governor appointing), with the Governor's discretion confined to the submitted lists. This establishes a statutorily-grounded, enumerated procedure for balanced partisan composition.

§ 405 codifies vacancy-filling for election boards with statutory party balance: judge of election from majority party, one inspector from each party.

The statute codifies independence through multi-branch appointment mechanisms: the National Election Commission appoints the chair, the Superior Council of the Judiciary appoints a judge, the president appoints two jurists, the government education minister appoints two mathematics professors, and the president appoints two presiding officers from ballot counting assemblies. This ensures checks across judicial, executive, and election-specialized bodies, with composition enumerated exhaustively in statute.

Article 22 codifies the multi-tier election-commission system (subject-level, municipal, district, territorial, precinct). Article 28 codifies collegiate operation requirement. Article 29 codifies prohibitions on commission membership (foreign citizens, candidates, etc.). Article 24 codifies municipal-formation commission powers. CEC independence statutorily codified, though political-balance composition is heavily state-controlled in practice.

Local Elections Law Article 11 codifies that 'Organs for conducting elections are autonomous and independent in their work and operate on the basis of law and regulations adopted on the basis of law.' This is a direct statutory independence guarantee.

“Органи за спровођење избора су самостални и независни у раду и раде на основу закона и прописа донетих на основу закона.”

This section establishes the State Election Commission in statute with multiple procedural safeguards: fixed four-year terms, political balance requirements (at least one member from majority and one from largest minority party), and gubernatorial appointment. These independence protections are explicitly enumerated in the statute rather than left to administrative discretion. A dual-scholar test would find both progressive and conservative analysts agreeing that the statutory codification of these structural independence elements meets the procedural-clarity criterion.

“There is hereby created the State Election Commission composed of five members, at least one of whom shall be a member of the majority political party represented in the General Assembly and at least one of whom shall be a member of the largest minority political party represented in the General Assembly, to be appointed by the Governor to serve terms of four years and until their successors have been appointed and qualify.”

§ 12-1-5 codifies a 7-member State Board of Elections chaired by the Secretary of State, with multi-source bipartisan appointments: 2 county auditors (of different parties) appointed by the Speaker of the House from SDACO nominees, plus 1 member each appointed by Democratic Senate leader, Democratic House leader, Republican Senate leader, Republican House leader. § 12-15-2 codifies precinct-superintendent qualifications. § 12-15-3 codifies bipartisan precinct-official distribution. Comprehensive structural independence codified.

“There is created a State Board of Elections to be composed of seven members, one of whom shall be the secretary of state who is chairman.”

The statute establishes a multi-branch appointment structure: three magistrates are appointed by the Judicial Power Council via random selection (insaculación), and two specialists are appointed by the Central Electoral Board from enumerated professional categories (law professors, political scientists, recognized jurists). This creates institutional independence through cross-branch involvement, enumerated professional qualifications, and insulation from direct political party control. The composition mechanism is explicitly codified in statute rather than left to administrative discretion.

“La Junta Electoral Provincial está compuesta por: a) Tres Vocales, Magistrados de la Audiencia Provincial correspondiente, designados mediante insaculación por el Consejo General del Poder Judicial. Cuando no hubiere en la Audiencia de que se trate el número de Magistrados suficiente se designará a titulares de órganos jurisdiccionales unipersonales de la capital de la Provincia. b) Dos Vocales nombrados por la Junta Electoral Central entre Catedráticos y Profesores Titulares de Derecho o de Ciencias Políticas y de Sociología o juristas de reconocido prestigio residentes en la provincia.”

3 kap. 1 § codifies the central election authority (Valmyndigheten) with overarching responsibility for election matters. 3 kap. 2 § codifies the regional election authority (länsstyrelsen). 3 kap. 3 § codifies the municipal election commission (valnämnden). 3 kap. 5 § codifies vote-receiver appointment. Multi-tier independent administrative structure codified.

§ 31.032 codifies that the county elections administrator is appointed by a county election commission composed of the county judge (chair), county clerk (vice chair), county tax assessor-collector (secretary), and the county chair of each political party that made nominations by primary — a multi-member, party-balanced appointing body requiring a majority vote. § 31.154 codifies the parallel joint elections commission. § 87.002 codifies a party-balanced early-voting ballot board. Statutory grounding of a balanced election-administration body codified.

Law 2839 Article 17 reinforces YSK independence: members of YSK, provincial election boards, and district board chairs can only resign upon filing as candidates — guaranteeing tenure security. Combined with Anayasa Article 79 (YSK has supreme authority over elections, decisions are final and not subject to appeal) and Law 298 Articles 11-12 (YSK composed of 7 members elected by Yargıtay and Danıştay general assemblies) — independence is constitutionally and statutorily codified.

Section 3 establishes statutory appointment procedures for Electoral Commissioners that embed multiple procedural safeguards for independence: appointment requires Speaker agreement, consultation with leaders of all parties with two or more MPs, and selection by a procedure overseen by the Speaker's Committee. The section also statutorily enumerates disqualifications (subsection 4) that ensure balanced political composition by excluding party members, party officers/employees, and recent donors. Fixed terms are specified in subsection 3 (up to 10 years). These elements—multi-stage approval, cross-party consultation, and political neutrality requirements—are all codified in statute, meeting the criterion for independence.

“A motion for such an Address may be made only if— a the Speaker of the House of Commons agrees that the motion may be made; b the motion has been the subject of consultation with the registered leader of each registered party to which two or more Members of the House of Commons then belong; and c each person whose appointment is proposed in the motion has been selected in accordance with a procedure put in place and overseen by the Speaker's Committee.”

52 USC § 20921 establishes the EAC as 'an independent entity' with the Standards Board, Board of Advisors, and Technical Guidelines Development Committee under HAVA.

“There is hereby established as an independent entity the Election Assistance Commission”

The statute explicitly creates the commission, establishes its independence from executive control, and enumerates a multi-branch appointment structure with balanced political composition (majority and minority party representation across both legislative chambers plus the governor). The appointments are statutorily mandated with clear deadlines and procedural fallbacks in Subsection (4) when appointments are not timely made. No administrative discretion is left regarding structure or composition.

§ 2143 codifies political-balance representation on the board of civil authority — the town body that administers elections: if the board lacks at least three members of each major political party, an underrepresented party may compel additional appointments. § 2454 requires assistant election officers to be drawn, as far as possible, equally from each major party. Party-balanced election administration codified.

The statute explicitly establishes the State Board of Elections' structure and independence through multiple procedural safeguards: appointment by the Governor (executive branch) subject to confirmation by the General Assembly (legislative branch), mandatory political party balance (3 members from the highest-vote party, representation for the next-highest), fixed four-year terms beginning February 1, term limits (maximum two successive four-year terms), geographic distribution (no two members from same congressional district), and conflict-of-interest prohibitions. These provisions are all statutorily enumerated and exhaustive, not left to administrative discretion.

“The State Board of Elections is continued and shall consist of five members appointed by the Governor from the qualified voters of the Commonwealth, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. In the appointment of the Board, representation shall be given to each of the political parties having the highest and next highest number of votes in the Commonwealth for Governor at the last preceding gubernatorial election. Three Board members shall be of the political party that cast the highest number of votes for Governor at that election.”

The section establishes statutory mechanisms for election administration independence: appointment requires consent of both executive (governor) and legislative (senate) branches; five-year fixed terms limit executive reappointment; explicit political party balance requirement (no more than three of one party) is statutorily codified; and removal grounds are restricted to neglect of duty or misconduct. These elements satisfy all procedural components of the criterion.

This section statutorily codifies the composition of the Board of Ballot Commissioners with balanced political representation by requiring appointment from the two largest political parties' county executive committees, plus the county clerk. It establishes fixed terms (two years beginning February 1) and specifies the appointment process with mandatory timelines and notice requirements, creating independence through multi-party involvement and statutory constraints on discretion.

Wis. Stat. § 7.20 codifies the multi-tier elections-administration structure: 'A municipal board of election commissioners shall be established in every city over 500,000 population. A county board of election commissioners shall be established in every county over 750,000 population.' § 7.30 codifies inspector appointment with party-balance requirements.

Cal. Elec. Code § 16100 enumerates election-contest grounds with judicial review, implying an elections-administration structure governed by statute. § 15625 codifies recount-board independence (4 individuals appointed by elections official). CA's SoS + county-elections-officials structure is statutorily codified, but the FTS-surfaced candidates don't show the full multi-branch/term/balance picture from Gov Code 12172.5 (SoS) and Elec Code Div 1 (officials).

Σύνταγμα Άρθρο 54 codifies the electoral-system framework; Άρθρο 51-52 give constitutional independence to election integrity ('ελεύθερη και ανόθευτη εκδήλωση της λαϊκής θέλησης').

The statute provides statutory codification of multi-branch appointment (Althingi and local authorities), fixed five-year staggered terms, and explicit independence designation. However, the Commission also comes under ministerial portfolio, creating structural dependence that undercuts independence claims. The statute does not enumerate balanced political composition safeguards (e.g., proportionality rules, political-party balance requirements)—it relies on appointment bodies' discretion. Fixed terms and multi-source appointment are satisfied; full independence protection is not.

10 ILCS 5/1A-3.1 (and supporting 1A-2/1A-3) codifies State Board of Elections structure with bipartisan 4-4 composition and staggered terms. Independence from any single political party is structural, though not labeled 'independent' in the section title.

The statute provides for balanced political composition of election boards by requiring recommendations from the two largest parties' county chairmen, ensuring each controls one-half of appointments. However, the statute does not establish fixed terms for election board members, does not require appointment by multiple branches of government, and grants the county election officer substantial discretion in final appointment decisions ("if such persons can qualify"). The independence safeguard is limited to structural balance rather than comprehensive multi-branch appointment or tenure protections.

“The county chairman of each of the central committees of the political parties that polled the largest and second largest number of votes in the state at the last state election for the office of governor shall recommend, excluding the supervising judge, one-half of the persons required for judges of each election board and one-half of the persons required for clerks of each election board.”

The section statutorily vests electoral administration in a Commission established by the Constitution (article 60), and requires balanced political composition regarding sex representation. However, the section itself does not detail the appointment process, term lengths, or political safeguards (e.g., multiple-branch appointment, removal protections) — it delegates these to the Constitution. The procedural safeguards for independence are constitutionally grounded but not enumerated in this statutory section, leaving key independence criteria beyond the scope of this statute's direct specification.

Montana codifies bipartisan composition of election bodies — absentee election boards take one member from each of the two leading parties (§ 13-13-225), election judges are drawn from both parties — but the chief election officer is a single elected partisan officeholder (the Secretary of State), so independence is partial.

Art. 39 codifies BEC general powers including bureau organization rules and contestation handling; supports independence framework. AEP/BEC term-protection (8-year term, non-partisan leadership) is in Art. 101/102 (in EAdI), not surfaced for ADMIN.1.

The statute establishes balanced political composition (4 majority, 3 minority members), which partially addresses independence through diversity. However, the text does not specify appointment mechanisms across multiple branches, does not define fixed terms, and does not establish independence safeguards beyond party balance. The nomination process via joint senate-house caucus suggests legislative control but lacks detail on selection authority and insulation from political pressure.

“Four (4) members of the commission shall be members of the majority party, and three (3) members of the commission shall be members of the minority party.”

The section establishes composition of electoral boards through enumeration of specific judicial positions (judges from appellate chambers and electoral judges), providing some structural independence by requiring judicial members. However, the statute does not codify fixed terms for these members, does not establish a multi-branch appointment process (members are drawn from judiciary only, not legislature or executive), and does not mandate balanced political composition. The provision addresses structural independence through institutional diversity but lacks key procedural safeguards (term limits, explicit appointment authority, political balance requirements).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 275 addresses scrutiny timing procedures for ballot papers, not election administration independence. It does not codify the appointment mechanisms, term lengths, or political composition requirements for electoral bodies. The criterion requires statutory or constitutional grounding of independence structures; this section concerns only operational scrutiny discretion and does not address administrative independence at all.

The section establishes statutory composition of the election administration body, including two retired judges among 18 members. However, the chair is held by the Interior Minister (executive branch), and the statute does not specify appointment procedures, fixed terms, or balanced political composition requirements. The provision lacks the multi-branch appointment safeguards and structural protections needed for genuine independence.

“Sie besteht aus dem Bundesminister für Inneres als Vorsitzendem und Bundeswahlleiter und siebzehn Beisitzern, darunter zwei Richter des Dienst- oder Ruhestandes.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 95ter addresses the administrative designation of a coordination officer within municipal government for election organization, but it does not establish or codify the independence of the election administration body itself. The section does not address multi-branch appointment, fixed terms, balanced political composition, or any structural safeguards for election administration independence. It merely designates a municipal staff member as a contact point, which is a logistical procedure rather than an independence framework.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses party communication of leadership organ composition to electoral authorities and civil registry procedures. It does not codify election administration body independence, appointment mechanisms, fixed terms, or balanced political composition. The statute requires parties to notify the Electoral Justice (Justiça Eleitoral) but does not establish how electoral authorities themselves are appointed, their tenure, or their independence from political branches.

This section establishes statutory procedure for appointment and removal of returning officers by the Chief Electoral Officer, including enumerated grounds for removal (subsection 7) and a fair process requirement. However, the section does not address the independence of the Chief Electoral Officer itself—the body making these appointments. It does not codify appointment by multiple branches, fixed terms, or balanced political composition of the electoral administration leadership. The criterion asks about the *election administration body's* independence broadly, not merely the procedural fairness of officer selection.

“The Chief Electoral Officer shall appoint a returning officer for each electoral district in accordance with the process established under subsection (1.1) and may only remove him or her in accordance with the procedure established under that subsection.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 17 of the PRC Village Organizational Law addresses procedural mechanisms for voter registration objections and disputes (publication timing, complaint deadlines, administrative response timelines), but contains no text concerning election administration body independence, appointment authority, term length, or political composition. The section does not codify independence standards for the village election committee.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section provided states only '(Repealed)' and contains no substantive text establishing or describing any election administration body, its independence, appointment structure, term lengths, or political composition. There is no statutory language to evaluate against the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This statute governs the composition and appointment of a municipal Board of Assessment Appeals—a local property tax review body—not an election administration body. It addresses municipal election procedures for selecting board members and allows for appointment of alternates and additional members, but contains no provisions concerning the independence, political balance, or appointment structure of election administration officials. The criterion requires codification of election administration body independence; this section does not address that topic.

The statute establishes that electoral commission members are appointed by the State Electoral Commission from among judges and prominent lawyers, which provides some procedural grounding for independence via professional qualification. However, the section does not codify fixed terms, balanced political composition requirements, or appointment by multiple branches—key components of independence.

“Predsjednika, članove, zamjenika predsjednika i zamjenike članova stalnog sastava izbornog povjerenstva izborne jedinice imenuje Državno izborno povjerenstvo iz reda sudaca i istaknutih pravnika.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the procedural content of election result protocols (recording voting times, voter counts, ballot counts, complaints, and preference votes). It contains no provisions regarding election administration body independence, appointment procedures, term lengths, or political composition. The criterion requires statutory codification of structural independence safeguards; this section is purely operational and does not touch that topic.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates the timing of election result publication and contains no provisions regarding the independence, appointment, terms, or political composition of any election administration body. It does not codify any structural safeguards for election administration independence.

§ 21-2-30 codifies the State Election Board's creation, composition, chairperson election, terms, vacancies, and quorum. § 21-2-106 / § 21-2-107 codify performance-review boards. § 21-2-74 codifies superintendent boards. Independence is structurally codified but State Election Board members are appointed via partisan process (Secretary of State plus party-appointed members) — partial.

The statute enumerates appointment procedures for electoral officials (single-branch appointments by Interior Ministry and state governments) and requires balanced party representation 'after Möglichkeit' (to the extent possible) in polling station boards. However, it lacks statutory protection of fixed terms, prohibitions on arbitrary removal, or truly independent multi-branch oversight. While the statute does codify appointment and composition rules, it does not provide structural independence safeguards (like removal protection or term limits) that would satisfy the full criterion.

“Der Bundeswahlleiter und sein Stellvertreter werden vom Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat, die Landeswahlleiter, Kreiswahlleiter und Wahlvorsteher sowie ihre Stellvertreter von der Landesregierung oder der von ihr bestimmten Stelle ernannt.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 11 addresses procedural election administration tasks (publication of voting times, polling places, ballot procedures, and election record-keeping), but contains no provisions regarding the independence, appointment, composition, or tenure of the election administration body itself. The section delegates certain rule-making authority to Naalakkersuisut (the government) with Valgnævnet approval (subsection 3), but does not establish or codify the structural independence of any electoral body.

The statute mandates balanced political composition for precinct election boards, but only conditionally ('if a list of applicants has been provided'). The section does not address appointment by multiple branches, fixed terms, or what happens if the condition is not met—leaving significant administrative discretion to the county clerk and precinct committeemen. The procedural cure and enforcement mechanisms are absent.

“Each election board shall contain personnel representing all existing political parties if a list of applicants has been provided to the county clerk by the precinct committeemen of the precincts at least sixty (60) days prior to the primary election.”

The statute codifies balanced political composition (two major party representatives) and specifies the commission's membership enumeration. However, the criterion requires three elements: (1) appointment by multiple branches, (2) fixed terms, and (3) balanced composition. The section addresses balanced composition and multiple-source appointment (governor, state parties, county auditors), but contains no explicit fixed terms for commission members. The statute establishes statutory grounding and enumeration of membership but lacks the procedural clarity on term limits that dual scholars would expect for true independence protections.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 83 describes the procedural duties of a special presiding officer in handling ballot materials and envelopes—it sets out what documents must be sealed, packaged, and delivered to the returning officer. It contains no provisions regarding the appointment, terms, composition, political balance, or independence of any election administration body. The section is purely operational and does not address the structural independence of election administration.

Article 19 addresses membership qualifications, duties, removal procedures, and some protections (e.g., fixed grounds for dismissal in paragraph 6), but it does not codify the appointment process itself, the composition of appointing bodies, whether appointments must involve multiple branches, the length or fixity of terms, or how balanced political representation is maintained. The section relies on external references (Article 10, Article 23, the maslikhat system) without defining independence architecture within this statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 149 addresses the procedural mechanics of recording non-voters and transmitting voter records to judicial authorities. It does not address the composition, appointment process, term length, or political balance of election administration bodies. The criterion requires statutory codification of independence safeguards such as multi-branch appointment or balanced political composition, which are entirely absent from this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 124 addresses only polling place location and facility requirements (prohibition of religious/military/hospital buildings, procedures for exceptional use of private buildings). It contains no provisions establishing or codifying the independence, appointment, composition, or term structures of the election administration body (the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante). The criterion requires statutory codification of structural independence; this section does not provide it.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs disclosure requirements for political public communications and candidate authorization statements. It contains no provisions addressing election administration body independence, appointment procedures, fixed terms, or political composition. The section is entirely focused on campaign finance disclosure procedural requirements, not administrative structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 4 of the LGPP contains only definitional provisions (disposiciones preliminares), establishing the meaning of terms used throughout the law (such as 'affiliated member,' 'general council,' 'institute,' etc.). It does not address election administration independence, the appointment mechanism for electoral bodies, fixed terms, or balanced political composition. The section merely defines 'Instituto' (the National Electoral Institute) and 'Tribunal' (the Electoral Court) as institutional references without establishing any procedural or structural safeguards for their independence.

The statute codifies the membership of the county board of election commissioners (judge of probate, county clerk, county treasurer) ex officio, which provides statutory grounding. However, it does not establish balanced political composition, fixed terms specific to election duties, or appointment by multiple branches—the members serve by virtue of other elected offices.

§ 204C.31 codifies the county canvassing board — county auditor, district court administrator, the mayor/town-board chair of the most populous municipality, and 2 non-candidate county-board members. § 204C.31 bars candidates from serving. § 203B.121 codifies bipartisan ballot boards. § 204B.20 codifies the precinct election board. Structurally codified with anti-conflict rules, but no separate independent statewide commission (the Secretary of State is partisan-elected).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section text addresses only compensation for election commissioners and poll workers, not the independence, appointment, fixed terms, or political composition of the election administration body. There is no statutory codification of procedural safeguards for independence in this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 88 addresses observer accreditation procedures, not the structural independence, appointment, term limits, or political composition of election administration bodies. The section mentions the Central Electoral Commission and electoral bodies as the entities handling accreditation, but provides no statutory codification of how these bodies are appointed, their tenure, their multi-branch composition, or any balance mechanism. This section is about observer rights and procedural rules, not administrative independence.

The statute requires balanced political composition (two major parties represented) and includes the election commissioner/county clerk as a statutory member. However, it provides no fixed terms for board members, no appointment oversight by multiple branches (the election commissioner or clerk has unilateral appointment power), and no mechanism to ensure independence from executive control. The criterion requires codified independence through multi-branch appointment, fixed terms, and structural balance; this section achieves only partial balance through party composition while centralizing appointment authority.

“The election commissioner or county clerk shall appoint two or more registered voters to constitute a county canvassing board. The election commissioner or county clerk shall be a member of the county canvassing board. One registered voter shall be appointed from the political party casting the highest number of votes for Governor or for President of the United States in the county in the immediately preceding general election, and one registered voter shall be appointed from the political party casting the next highest number of votes for such office.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article A 15 addresses data-sharing obligations between municipal and national electoral bodies and the Kiesraad (Electoral Council), but contains no provisions regarding the Kiesraad's independence, appointment procedures, term lengths, or political composition. The section is purely procedural regarding information provision, not structural governance of electoral administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses qualifications and training requirements for election board members operating mechanical voting systems, and an emergency exception to those requirements. It does not address the appointment process, term length, political composition balance, or multi-branch oversight structures that define election administration independence. The criterion requires codification of independence mechanisms; this section codifies only operational competency.

§ 3-200 codifies bipartisan county boards of elections — two commissioners (or four in counties >120k), with each major party eligible to recommend appointment of an equal number. § 3-204 codifies appointment procedure by party chair recommendation. NYC has 10 commissioners (max 2 per county). Bipartisan structure is statutorily mandated; however commissioners are party-appointed rather than multi-branch-confirmed, and removal is by the governor. Partial codification of structural independence.

§ 16.1-05-01 codifies election-board composition: inspector + at least two judges, with party representation when multiprecinct polling places exist. § 16.1-05-02 codifies qualifications. § 16.1-15-15 codifies county canvassing-board composition. § 16.1-15-16 codifies canvassing-board qualifications. Election administration is bipartisan-balanced at the local level; Secretary of State is partisan-elected statewide. Partial structural independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 110 of the DPRK Constitution addresses the composition and structure of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (listing chair, vice-chair, secretary, and members), but contains no language concerning election administration, administrative independence, appointment procedures by multiple branches, fixed terms, or balanced political composition. The section describes legislative-body internal governance, not electoral administration safeguards.

§ 10-15 codifies protocols by election board, district board, and county board. § 10-13 codifies submission of materials between boards. The municipal election board (valgstyret), district election board (distriktsvalgstyret), and county election board (fylkesvalgstyret) are codified administrative bodies; the Election Directorate (Valgdirektoratet) and National Election Board (Riksvalgstyret) operate at national level. Multi-tier structure codified but appointment-independence specifics live partly in regulation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORS § 250.027 addresses signature inspection procedures and copying restrictions for petition signatures. It does not address the structural independence, appointment mechanism, term length, or political composition of any election administration body. The section does not codify how the chief elections officer is appointed, by whom, for what term, or any safeguards ensuring balanced political representation.

The statute specifies that the National Electoral Commission is composed of judges from three separate judicial bodies (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, Supreme Administrative Court), each designated by their respective heads. This provides structural multi-branch grounding and enumerated composition. However, the statute does not codify fixed terms for these members, does not explicitly mandate balanced political composition, and does not establish independence safeguards (such as protection from removal or conflict-of-interest rules). The section establishes institutional diversity but lacks explicit procedural safeguards for independence.

The statute establishes a board of elections and some independence protections (requirement that members hold no other public office, appointment by governor with senate consent). However, the section does not codify fixed terms for board members, does not mandate balanced political composition, and does not establish appointment powers in multiple branches beyond governor-and-senate confirmation. These gaps are material to the criterion's core procedural requirements.

“a board of elections consisting of seven (7) qualified electors of this state, of outstanding honesty and ability and none of whom shall hold any other public office”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 38 addresses voting procedure (voter identity verification, ballot handling, and polling station conduct) and contains no provisions regarding election administration independence, appointment structures, fixed terms, or political composition of any election body. The criterion requires statutory codification of administrative independence; this section is purely procedural for voters and voting officers at the point of voting.

Art. I-34 codifies requirements for election-commission members (citizenship, age, no party leadership while serving). Art. II-89 / IV-208 codify termination of commission powers. Art. II-85 codifies precinct commission formation. Commission independence is structurally codified but commissioners are appointed by party / Verkhovna Rada quota rather than via multi-branch process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 22-16-106 addresses write-in candidate nomination procedures, acceptance deadlines, notification methods, and vacancy-filling—entirely procedural mechanics for candidate eligibility. It contains no language regarding election administration body independence, appointment authority, term limits, or political composition. The criterion requires statutory codification of structural independence safeguards; this section does not address that topic at all.