Custody documentation

The statute mandates comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation with specific required information on ballot transfer forms, and further provides that 'The marked absentee or provisional ballot transfer form under subdivision (c)(3) of this section shall be considered a public record,' making the documentation publicly available.

Article 72 codifies ballot-text approval and printing under Central Commission supervision: 'The text of the ballot for the election of the President of the Republic of Belarus is approved by the Central Commission' — implies controlled production and distribution chain. Article 118 codifies referendum ballot custody. Article 13 codifies transparency in all stages. Chain-of-custody documentation codified.

Cal. Elec. Code § 15551 codifies court-order custody of the sealed voted-ballot package if a contest or criminal prosecution is pending — ballots cannot be destroyed and remain under court custody. Combined with § 15279 (ballots 'carefully sealed in a strong envelope' with all precinct-board signatures on the seal — though that section wasn't FTS-surfaced for this datapoint) and § 18564 (criminal penalty for tampering with election materials), CA codifies a chain-of-custody regime with court-enforced retention.

§ 104 codifies retention of the election book, polling books, electoral rolls, voter cards, ballots, and other election material by the municipal council. § 104(3) codifies destruction of materials after the complaint period expires. § 72 codifies that the materials are present at the fintælling (final count). § 66 codifies postal-ballot envelope custody. § 74 codifies sealed packaging. Comprehensive chain-of-custody codified.

§ 99 codifies that 'if ballot counting or processing is interrupted, all ballots and tallies must be stored so that no outsider can get hold of them,' and after the result is confirmed the ballots are placed in packaging sealed in the Ministry-prescribed manner and retained until the next equivalent election. § 64 codifies ballot-envelope transport packaging. § 62 codifies envelope delivery to the central committee. Comprehensive chain-of-custody codified.

“Jos äänestyslippujen laskenta tai käsittely keskeytetään, kaikki äänestysliput ja laskelmat on säilytettävä siten, ettei kukaan ulkopuolinen saa niitä käsiinsä.”

§ 21-2-377 codifies custody and storage of ballot scanners: 'The superintendent shall designate a person or persons who shall have custody of the ballot scanners of the county or municipality when they are not in use at a primary or election'. § 21-2-331 codifies parallel for voting-machine custody. § 21-2-405 codifies poll-officer custody at polling places. § 21-2-51 codifies public-record access to chain-of-custody documentation.

KRS 117.135 codifies chain-of-custody for voting equipment: on acquisition it must be 'immediately placed in the custody of the county clerk,' remain in the clerk's custody at all times except during voting or court proceedings, be protected from tampering, and be secured and locked so access is restricted to county board members. KRS 117.295 adds the 30-day locked-and-video-surveilled post-election custody period. Chain-of-custody documentation codified.

§ 204B.182 codifies that 'the county auditor must develop a county elections chain of custody plan' accounting for 'both the physical and cyber security of elections-related materials,' filed with the Secretary of State, with sample documentation. § 209.05 codifies candidate visual guard over ballots. § 206.845 codifies system-security custody. Comprehensive chain-of-custody framework codified.

“The county auditor must develop a county elections chain of custody plan to be used in all state, county, municipal, school district, and special district elections held in that county.”

§ 16.1-15-12 codifies that 'ballot boxes and voting machines are to be under the care and custody of the county auditor and assigned staff members.' § 16.1-07-10 codifies absent-voter ballot custody. § 16.1-15-08 codifies sealed-wrapping return-to-county-recorder procedure. Chain-of-custody clearly codified.

§ 6-13 codifies that 'the election board shall ensure that election material is stored and transported in a secure manner' (Valgstyret skal sørge for at valgmateriellet oppbevares og transporteres på sikker måte). § 6-14 codifies regulations for packing, storage, transport, and handover of election material. § 10-16 codifies parallel for ballots. Custody-documentation mandate codified.

“Valgstyret skal sørge for at valgmateriellet oppbevares og transporteres på sikker måte.”

Article 69 codifies the chain-of-custody for protocols: 'First original copies of the protocol of voting results...' transmitted up the commission hierarchy. Article 62 codifies absentee certificate custody. Article 58 codifies electoral fund accounting. Article 4 establishes voter eligibility framework. Chain-of-custody documentation is codified.

Article 29 (Local Elections) codifies chain-of-custody handover of election material no later than 24 hours before election day; Articles 4514 (МП Election Law Art 62 — 48 hours) and 4605 (Local Elections Art 38 — record of handover signed by commission rep and ≥2 board members) reinforce the custody documentation regime.

“Примопредаја изборног материјала врши се најкасније 24 часа пре дана одржавања избора.”

§ 12-21-30 codifies court custody of sealed ballots in judicial proceedings. § 12-21-50 codifies certiorari writs addressed to officials with custody. § 12-20-20 codifies ballot-box sealing after counting. § 12-20-21 codifies return-of-materials procedure. Chain-of-custody framework codified throughout.

10 kap. 7 § codifies that 'continuous notes shall be kept of vote-reception in a polling station' and that if vote-reception is interrupted 'the notes and election material received shall be stored securely during the interruption.' 8 kap. 10 § codifies envelope custody handover to valnämnden. 8 kap. 11 § codifies sealed sorting/forwarding. 12 kap. 5 § codifies messenger-ballot envelope custody. 13 kap. 6 § makes improperly-stored ballots invalid. Comprehensive chain-of-custody codified.

“Det ska fortlöpande föras anteckningar över röstmottagningen i en röstningslokal.”

§ 129.052 requires the general custodian to adopt secure storage and transport procedures whose chain-of-custody provisions 'must require two or more individuals to perform a check and verification check whenever a transfer of custody occurs.' § 129.051(b) codifies tracking custody of each storage medium from storage through the election to post-election disposition. Comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation codified.

“Procedures relating to the chain of custody must require two or more individuals to perform a check and verification check whenever a transfer of custody occurs.”

Law 298 Article 107 codifies a full chain-of-custody handover: counted ballots, signed tally sheets, all rejected/contested ballots, and the record book go into separately sealed packets, placed in a sealed bag signed by chair and members, transported by the committee chair plus two lot-selected members to the district election board. Reinforced by Article 77 (ballot-box sealing) and Article 68 (sealed transport).

Art. II-115 codifies comprehensive ballot-paper chain of custody: printer → CEC → district commission with three-copy protocol (one for CEC, one for commission, one posted publicly), then to precinct commissions under the same protocol. Ballot storage requires safe / metal case / separate room. Art. III-166 / IV-242 reinforce for MP and local elections.

“A district election commission shall, at its meeting, accept the ballot papers, packaged by the printing enterprise, from a representative of the Central Election Commission”

§ 2590 codifies chain-of-custody documentation: the presiding officer collects and delivers to the town clerk, in securely sealed containers, the ballots, tally sheets, and checklists. § 2506 places ballot boxes in the town clerk's custody when not in use, and § 2499 requires two election officials for any transfer of voted ballots from a tabulator. Custody documentation codified.

Wis. Stat. § 7.54 codifies contestant rights to have ballots opened and inspected: 'the contesting parties have the right to have the ballots opened and to have all errors of the inspectors, either in counting or refusing to count any ballot, corrected by the board of canvassers or court.' § 5.84 codifies equipment testing + retention. § 5.06 codifies compliance-review procedure. § 7.37 codifies inspectors' duties around ballot handling.

§ 48⁸ requires that all operations processing electronic votes be logged, that the collector component be retained until votes are destroyed, and that the process audit verify the transfer of the electronic ballot box to the State Electoral Office — codified chain-of-custody documentation for the electronic channel, though the logs are not codified as publicly available.

“All operations related to the processing of electronic votes are logged.”

§ 101.015 grounds custody-documentation rulemaking via the standards regime. § 102.141 (canvassing board) and § 101.5614 (board canvass of returns) operationalize chain-of-custody at the local level.

“The Department of State shall adopt rules which establish minimum standards for hardware and software for electronic and electromechanical voting systems.”

Article 33 codifies the mobile-ballot-box list (chain-of-custody documentation for mobile voting). Article 68 codifies seal integrity verification. Combined with the polling-day log-book (Article 62) requirement, Georgia has codified custody documentation for ballot boxes.

10 ILCS 5/18A-10 codifies sealed-container chain-of-custody for provisional ballots transported to county clerk; partial chain-of-custody for one ballot class.

§ 75 and § 77 codify sealed-box opening and counting in the presence of the polling-district committee, with the counting record drawn up and signed, and § 1-303-style retention follows; the surfaced section addresses voter-list updates rather than ballot custody, so chain-of-custody documentation is codified piecemeal across the act.

Montana codifies sealed-package custody — ballots are sealed in the presence of the election administrator and the recount board and delivered to the administrator for custody (§ 13-16-417), judges sign across all seals (§ 13-15-205), and election records are public (§ 13-1-109); but a single comprehensive publicly-available chain-of-custody log is not mandated.

“must be delivered to the election administrator for custody.”

§ 8-104 (polling place) + § 8-102(h) (inspectors unlock ballot boxes / containers and allow examination by watchers, then re-lock so watchers and persons outside guard-rail may see boxes empty) codify procedural chain-of-custody at the precinct. § 8-416 codifies secure absentee-ballot drop-box requirements. § 3-107 confers investigation authority.

The statute requires election officials to certify records and sign containers, establishing some chain-of-custody documentation for voted ballot containers. However, the section does not explicitly mandate that such documentation be publicly available, nor does it specify comprehensive chain-of-custody procedures beyond sealing and signing requirements. The criterion requires both 'full' documentation and public availability, neither of which is clearly established here.

“Each election official shall certify to the accuracy of the record and shall sign the envelope or container across the seal.”

The statute requires that ballots and certificates be sent in sealed packages to the director and election supervisors, establishing some custody procedures. However, it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation (such as signatures, dates, transfer logs, or witness verification at each handoff point) nor does it explicitly require that such documentation be publicly available. The statute delegates detailed custody procedures to the director's discretion rather than mandating them by law.

“The director may authorize election boards in precincts in those areas of the state where distance and weather make mail communication unreliable to forward their election results by telephone or radio.”

The section establishes that political parties may oversee and guard ballot boxes and documentation, and requires transportation without delay, but does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or specify that such documentation must be created, maintained, or made publicly available. The provision addresses custody oversight by party monitors rather than systematic documentation requirements.

The statute requires documentation of ballot box transfers in emergency situations and other special circumstances, but it does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody requirement for all ballot handling. Additionally, the statute requires reports to be filed with the officer in charge of elections but does not explicitly mandate that such documentation be made publicly available—only that reports be made to political party chairpersons in certain circumstances.

“All election board members who accompanied the locked ballot box to the new location and the one or two election board members who verified the ballot box's arrival shall file a report with the officer in charge of elections that describes the actions taken by the election board members.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the physical construction of ballot boxes (secure fastening capability) but does not establish any requirement for chain-of-custody documentation or make such documentation publicly available. The section is silent on documentation, custody procedures, and public access to records.

The section requires documentation of ballot envelope transfers (Wahlkuverts) including a written record ('Schreiben') of quantities and documented transmission ('nachweislich zu übermitteln'). However, the statute mandates internal chain-of-custody documentation between election authorities but does not explicitly require that this documentation be made publicly available. The criterion requires both full documentation AND public availability.

“Die Wahlkuverts sind sodann ungeöffnet mit einem Schreiben, in dem die Anzahl der übermittelten Wahlkuverts anzuführen ist, der Landeswahlbehörde, aus deren Bereich die Wahlkuverts stammen, in einem versiegelten Umschlag auf die schnellstmögliche Art nachweislich zu übermitteln.”

The section requires that ballots be kept in sealed envelopes until counting begins, which represents a basic custody control measure. However, the statute does not require comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation or specify that such documentation must be public. It addresses physical security of ballots but not the documentation and public availability aspects central to the criterion.

“Les bulletins sont conservés sous enveloppe fermée jusqu'au début des opérations de dépouillement.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Brazilian Constitution addresses maritime and transport regulations, including the organization of air, water, and land transport, national shipowner requirements, and cabotage rules. It contains no provisions regarding chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such documentation. The section is entirely unrelated to election integrity or custody procedures.

The section requires the Central Electoral Commission to prepare and publish a security plan describing measures for storage and transport of technical devices for machine voting, but it does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The statute addresses planning and transparency of security measures rather than establishing a requirement for detailed custody records.

“съхранение и транспорт на техническите устройства за машинно гласуване”

The section requires recording of seal conditions, which is a minimal form of custody documentation. However, it does not require or address full chain-of-custody documentation (tracking every transfer, handler, time, and location) or public availability of such records. The requirement is limited to seal condition examination and recording by the returning officer.

“examine and record the condition of the seals affixed to it”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the PRC Constitution addresses rural and urban collective economic organizations, cooperative economics, and property rights. It contains no provisions related to election integrity, chain-of-custody documentation, or custody of hardware used in election processes.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes penalties for neglecting election duties and breaking seals on ballots or ballot boxes, but does not address chain-of-custody documentation requirements or public availability of such documentation. It is a penalty provision, not a custody documentation requirement.

The statute requires written reports documenting tabulator condition and sealing procedures, and mandates a report of repairs made on election day. However, it does not explicitly require a full chain-of-custody documentation tracking the movement and handling of tabulators throughout the election process, nor does it specify that such documentation must be made publicly available.

“The registrar or registrars shall file a written report of the condition of each tabulator certifying that (1) they have prepared the tabulators, (2) all the counters are set at zero (000), (3) the ballot is properly prepared, (4) the tabulator has been properly adjusted according to the ballots, and (5) each tabulator is otherwise in readiness for the election.”

The section requires municipal/city electoral commissions to maintain a record (zapisnik) of their work documenting voter numbers, ballot counts, and results. However, the statute does not explicitly address full chain-of-custody documentation (tracking the movement and handling of ballots/materials through all stages) or public availability of such documentation. The requirement is limited to record-keeping and delivery of materials to the unit electoral commission.

“O svom radu općinsko, odnosno gradsko izborno povjerenstvo vodi zapisnik u koji će ubilježiti:”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the termination of alternate councilor positions in Czech local elections and addresses resignation procedures. It contains no provisions regarding chain-of-custody documentation, ballot security, equipment handling, or public availability of custody records. The section is entirely unrelated to the custody_hardware dimension.

The section requires completion of documentation when securing voting devices and when handling ballot containers and election media, but does not explicitly state that this documentation is publicly available or that it constitutes a full chain-of-custody requirement. The statute references "required documentation" and "as instructed" without specifying the scope or public accessibility of such records.

“the inspector shall close and secure each voting device as instructed and complete the required documentation”

The statute mandates secure custody and control of voting materials, files, and data under seals, with oversight by an independent expert and electoral commission. However, the text does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation or mandate that such documentation be publicly available—it addresses custody arrangements and oversight mechanisms but not the documentation and transparency aspects of the criterion.

“les fichiers supports comprenant la copie des programmes sources et des programmes exécutables, les matériels de vote, les fichiers d'émargement, de résultats et de sauvegarde ainsi que l'ensemble des données à caractère personnel enregistrées sur le traitement prévu à l'article R. 176-3 sont conservés sous scellés, dans un lieu sécurisé par le ministère des affaires étrangères, sous le contrôle de l'expert indépendant”

The section requires documentation of ballot box and material transfer in electoral records of both sending and receiving electoral boards. However, it does not establish that this documentation is publicly available or address a complete chain of custody from initial receipt through final counting. The requirement is limited to transfer points in specific low-turnout scenarios.

“Die Übergabe der Wahlurne und der Wahlunterlagen ist in den Wahlniederschriften des abgebenden und des aufnehmenden Wahlvorstands zu vermerken.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 42 establishes requirements for polling places, voting booths, and ballot boxes (their design, security, and functionality), but does not address chain-of-custody documentation or its public availability. The section concerns physical infrastructure and election-day conduct, not documentation procedures for ballot handling.

The statute requires secure handling and supervision of ballots but does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such records. It delegates specific procedures to administrative rules rather than statutory requirement.

“The voted ballots shall be kept secure and handled only in the presence of representatives not of the same political party or official observers in accordance with rules adopted for the various voting systems.”

The section addresses physical security measures for ballot boxes through sealing requirements that create visible traces of tampering, but it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or require public availability of such documentation. The statute describes equipment design and operational procedures but lacks explicit requirements for documenting the handling, transfer, and storage of ballots or ballot boxes throughout the electoral process.

The statute requires the clerk to maintain documentation of chain of custody for ballots, which partially addresses the criterion. However, the section does not mandate that this documentation be publicly available, which is a key component of the criterion question. The statute only requires that documentation be maintained, not disclosed to the public.

“The clerk shall maintain documentation of the security measures taken and the chain of custody of all ballots.”

The statute requires marking the container with the number of provisional ballots, which is a minimal form of documentation. However, it does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody system requiring detailed documentation of transfers, handlers, or timestamps, nor does it explicitly mandate public availability of such documentation. The requirement is limited to marking container counts.

The section requires board members to sign seals on ballot envelopes, which is a basic chain-of-custody measure, but it does not establish comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation requirements or mandate public availability of such documentation. The statute addresses only envelope sealing and signature placement, not full documentation of custody transfers or public disclosure.

The section requires the returning officer to make provision for safe custody of postal ballot boxes, which implies some form of custody measures. However, it does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The requirement is vague and does not address the documentation or transparency components of the criterion.

“the returning officer shall make provision for the safe custody of such ballot box”

The section requires that ballots be sealed and labeled, which are minimal chain-of-custody documentation steps. However, it does not mandate comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation (such as written records of who handled materials, when, and where) nor does it require that such documentation be publicly available. The statute addresses packaging and sealing procedures but lacks explicit requirements for full custody records or public disclosure.

“Such bags or sacks shall be sealed and appropriately labeled. The method of sealing and labeling shall be a method approved by the secretary of state and directed by the county election officer.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 40 addresses the procedural opening of polling stations and checking of ballot boxes for integrity, but does not establish requirements for full chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such documentation. The section describes pre-voting checks by commission members but does not mandate the creation, maintenance, or public disclosure of custody records.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced campaign-finance and signature-collection sections ('custody' matched the Orphan's and Custody Court). Latvia seals and packages election materials with election-procedure-log references (§ 36), but a comprehensive, publicly available chain-of-custody documentation regime is not codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: La. R.S. 18:1316 addresses rejection of ballots with distinguishing marks. It contains no provisions regarding chain-of-custody documentation, public availability of custody records, or documentation requirements for ballot handling and storage. This section is about ballot acceptance criteria, not custody procedures.

The section requires that ballot counts be recorded in a verbal report (procès-verbal), which documents some aspects of custody. However, it does not explicitly require a complete chain-of-custody documentation system or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The provision addresses recording of ballot numbers but does not establish comprehensive custody procedures or public disclosure requirements.

“Le nombre des votants et celui des bulletins sont inscrits au procès-verbal.”

The section requires documentation of certain ballot irregularities (removal of excess ballots) in the official report with signatures and sealing, which addresses some custody documentation. However, it covers only one specific scenario (excess ballots) and does not establish comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation requirements for all ballot materials from creation through storage and counting, nor does it address public availability of such documentation.

The statute requires documentation of sealed containers through certificates recording container numbers, security mechanism identifiers, sealers, and times. However, it does not explicitly state that this documentation is publicly available, which is a key component of the full criterion. The requirement addresses chain-of-custody documentation but lacks the public availability mandate.

“Each sealed container must be recorded on a certificate identifying the container number, any unique numbers associated with the security mechanism and the person sealing the container and the time of sealing.”

The section requires attestation and witness signatures for the sealing of ballot boxes, documenting that the boxes are empty before polling begins. However, it does not establish a full chain-of-custody documentation system covering the entire lifecycle of ballot boxes (storage, transport, opening, closing, counting, and storage after election), nor does it explicitly require such documentation to be publicly available.

“the Chairperson of the Assistant Commissioners shall so attest on the form provided by the Commission and shall ask all the persons present at the sealing to sign as witnesses”

The statute requires the State Board to establish chain of custody procedures for ballot drop box materials, which addresses documentation requirements. However, the statute does not explicitly state that documentation must be full/complete or that procedures must be publicly available, only that they must be established. The requirement for public availability is absent from the text.

“The State Board shall establish chain of custody procedures governing removal of election–related materials from ballot drop boxes and the return of the materials to the local board.”

The statute requires sealing and securing of ballots and election materials, demonstrating basic custody procedures. However, it does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation (recording transfers, handlers, times, and conditions) nor does it require such documentation to be publicly available. The section addresses physical custody and sealing but falls short of comprehensive documentation and transparency requirements.

“Upon the completion of the canvass and the counting, the warden shall place all ballots including absentee ballots, and all lists into a container and place a seal upon all such containers. The clerk shall receive from all the polling places such sealed containers and shall place all election material, so far as practical, in a locked facility.”

The section requires documentation to be organized and kept in the custody of the council president for oversight by electoral authorities and other institute bodies. However, it does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation (tracking transfer points, times, and custodians) nor does it require such documentation to be publicly available—only that it be available to the Electoral Tribunal and institute bodies upon request.

The statute requires county clerks to provide a receipt when receiving ballot boxes, which is a minimal form of custody documentation. However, it does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody system or require that documentation be publicly available, only that officers and clerks exchange receipts between themselves.

The section requires documentation of ballot box seals (seal numbers recorded by the clerk), but does not mandate a full chain-of-custody record tracking the movement, handling, and custody of ballot boxes and materials throughout their lifecycle. It also does not explicitly require that such documentation be publicly available.

The section requires a written statement only for unsealed ballot containers, not comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation for all ballots and supplies. Additionally, the statute does not address whether such documentation is publicly available. The requirement is limited in scope and does not establish full chain-of-custody procedures.

“the election authority shall make a written statement of the facts which includes the location of the polling place and date of the election printed on the container and the reason the container is not sealed, if known”

The section requires seal-checking and presence of observers during ballot box opening, which demonstrates some procedural safeguard and documentation through witness presence. However, it does not explicitly require full chain-of-custody documentation nor does it mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The statute addresses ballot handling procedures but lacks explicit requirements for comprehensive chain-of-custody records.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses fraudulent assistance of illiterate voters and ballot manipulation as criminal offenses, but does not establish or require chain-of-custody documentation procedures or public availability of such documentation. The criterion concerns custody documentation requirements, which is a procedural/administrative matter distinct from the criminal prohibition articulated here.

The section requires documentation (a record/minutes) of ballot package destruction, but it does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation system or require public availability of such records. The requirement is limited to documenting destruction at the end of the retention period, not full custody tracking throughout the electoral process.

“Van deze vernietiging wordt proces-verbaal opgemaakt.”

The statute requires jails to allow the county clerk to establish a chain-of-custody documentation process for mail ballots from detained persons. However, it does not mandate that this documentation be publicly available, only that a method for documenting it exists. The criterion requires both full documentation AND public availability.

The statute requires that election returns be kept by the town or city clerk and be open to public inspection, which provides some transparency. However, the section does not explicitly require 'full chain-of-custody documentation'—it addresses retention and public access to returns, not comprehensive documentation of the complete chain of custody for voting hardware or ballots.

“The other shall be kept by the town or city clerk in accordance with RSA 33-A:3-a and shall be open to public inspection at reasonable times.”

The section mandates visibility and oversight of provisional ballots during handling but does not require written chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such records. It establishes custody procedures and responsibility but does not address documentation or public access to custody records.

“The member shall keep the sealed envelope in full view of the voter, the other district board members and all other persons present until it is placed in the provisional ballot bag.”

The statute requires documentation of notice and confirmation of receipt to political parties and judges, but does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody requirement for ballot boxes, voting machines, or other election materials during recount proceedings. While the section requires certification that the recount occurred and specifies procedural safeguards (presence of county clerk and district judge), it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or require such documentation to be publicly available.

“The county clerk shall keep a log of how each person was notified and confirmation that the notice was received.”

The statute requires sealing and delivery of challenged ballots but does not explicitly mandate comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation or require that such documentation be publicly available. It specifies physical procedures (sealing, delivery) but does not address documentation requirements or public access provisions.

“The chief judge shall retain all such envelopes in an envelope provided by the county board of elections, which he shall seal immediately after the polls close, and deliver to the board chairman at the canvass.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires the director to keep records of board proceedings and money, and to file and preserve records related to elections administration. However, it does not specifically mandate chain-of-custody documentation for election hardware or materials, nor does it explicitly require such documentation to be publicly available. The general record-keeping duty is insufficient to satisfy the criterion's specific requirement for full chain-of-custody documentation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses sealing methods to detect tampering but does not establish requirements for chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such documentation. It focuses on the mechanics of sealing ballots and materials, not on documenting the custody and transfer of election materials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses tax and fee restrictions on real property transfers. It has no relevance to election integrity, custody documentation, or chain-of-custody requirements for voting equipment or materials.

The section requires designation of custody personnel and safe storage of voting systems and keys, but it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or require that such documentation be publicly available. The statute addresses custody responsibility but lacks explicit requirements for documenting the transfer and handling of equipment.

The section requires that election documents be transferred to state archives and may be made available, establishing a custody framework and potential public access. However, it does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or specify that such documentation must be publicly available—it only authorizes the minister to determine procedures for transfer, storage, and disclosure through regulation, leaving the specifics undefined in statute.

“Dokumenty z wyborów są przekazywane do archiwów państwowych i mogą być udostępniane.”

The section requires transfer of voting materials between entities (security forces to municipal presidents, then to parishes, then to voting assemblies) but does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation. Article 79.º-C requires procedural records (ata) documenting voting operations and participant names, but does not establish comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation for ballot materials throughout their transit and custody, nor does it require public availability of such documentation.

“A junta de freguesia destinatária dos votos recebidos remete-os ao presidente da mesa da assembleia de voto até ao dia e hora previstos no artigo 41.º”

The section establishes that voting equipment must remain in the warden's custody during polls and until ballots are sealed and transmitted, addressing physical custody responsibility. However, it does not require documentation of the chain-of-custody nor does it mandate public availability of any such documentation. The statute specifies who has custody but not the documentation procedures that would satisfy the criterion.

“the optical scan precinct count units, memory cartridges, and voted computer ballots shall remain in the care and custody of the warden”

The section requires documented chain-of-custody transfers (proces-verbal) for the stickers from prefects to mayors to polling station officials, and return of unused stickers. However, it does not explicitly require that this documentation be publicly available, only that it be documented. Public availability is a key component of the criterion.

“Prefecţii distribuie, pe bază de proces-verbal de predare-preluare, timbrele autocolante primarilor, care le predau preşedinţilor birourilor electorale ale secţiilor de votare, pe bază de proces-verbal de predare-preluare”

Section 43 requires completion of a form documenting ballot materials and allows agents to affix seals, establishing chain-of-custody procedures. However, the statute does not explicitly require that this documentation be made publicly available, only that it be completed and sealed in the presence of agents. The requirement is for documentation to be created, not for public access.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses contribution attribution rules for spouses and minor children in campaign finance contexts, not custody documentation or chain-of-custody procedures for election materials or equipment. It is entirely unrelated to the custody_hardware dimension.

The section requires documentation of vote deposit (signature, seal, date) by consular officials, but does not establish comprehensive chain-of-custody procedures or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. It addresses only the initial deposit phase, not the full chain from voting through counting.

“una vez que el funcionario consular firme en el reverso de dicho sobre y estampe en el mismo el sello de la Oficina Consular en el que conste la fecha de su depósito”

The section establishes custody responsibilities and security measures for voting machines and keys, but does not mandate that full chain-of-custody documentation be created, maintained, or made publicly available. It addresses physical custody and security but not documentation requirements.

“The local authority adopting voting machines shall have custody of them when they are not in use at an election and shall preserve and keep them in repair. All keys for voting machines shall be securely locked between elections by the voting machine technician.”

The section establishes a chain-of-custody mechanism through 'completed corresponding number lists' and specifies procedures for sealing, delivery, and retention of documents. However, it explicitly excludes the corresponding number lists themselves from public inspection, thus failing to require that full chain-of-custody documentation be publicly available.

“The documents mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (1A) except— a ballot papers, b the completed corresponding number lists, c certificates as to employment on duty on the day of the poll, shall be open to public inspection.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the administrative transfer of functions from the Federal Election Commission to the Election Assistance Commission. It contains no requirements regarding chain-of-custody documentation for voting equipment or materials, nor does it address public availability of such documentation.

The statute requires documentation of chain of custody for mechanical ballots and voting devices, but does not mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The requirement is procedural and discretionary (procedures are 'developed by the election officer'), and there is no explicit requirement for public access to custody records.

“ensure that security procedures, developed by the election officer, are followed to document chain of custody and to prevent unauthorized access”

The statute requires that inoperative machines be placed in custody of authorized personnel but does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such documentation. While custody transfer is specified, the section lacks explicit requirements for documentation of the chain of custody or its public disclosure.

“Any machine so removed shall be placed in the custody of an authorized custodian, technician, general registrar, or electoral board representative.”

The section requires documentation when the canvassing board opens sealed ballot containers, but it does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation for all handling and custody of ballots, nor does it explicitly require such records to be publicly available. The requirement is limited to recording what happens during specific openings, not comprehensive custody tracking.

“If the canvassing board opens a ballot container, it shall make a full record of the additional tabulation or examination made of the ballots. This record must be added to any other record of the canvassing process in that county.”

The statute requires written certification by precinct election commissioners documenting delivery, sealing, and opening of devices and ballots. However, it does not explicitly mandate a complete chain-of-custody documentation system covering all transfers or handlers throughout the entire election process, nor does it require public availability of these records.

“who shall certify in writing signed by them to the clerk of the county commission that the devices, where applicable, and the ballots have been delivered in their presence, that the devices and packages of ballots were found to be sealed upon delivery and that the seals have been broken and the devices opened in their presence”

The statute requires sealing of ballots and voting machine records but does not establish chain-of-custody documentation requirements or specify that such documentation be maintained or made publicly available. It addresses physical security through sealing but not the documentary tracking of custody transfers.

“Paper ballots shall be sealed by the election judges in an envelope after being counted and tallied”