Post-election integrity check

The statute explicitly grants parties and coalitions the right to verify that the programs loaded into electronic voting machines are identical to those that were previously sealed in a public session. This is a direct post-election integrity check mechanism that ensures the actual running binary matches the committed one before the machines are sealed for use on election day.

Cal. Elec. Code § 19233 mandates that 'The Secretary of State shall conduct random audits of the software installed on direct recording electronic voting systems ... to ensure that the installed software is identical to the software that has been approved for use on that voting system.' This is the post-election software-integrity verification right.

Wis. Stat. § 5.905 grants the elections commission inspection rights over the escrowed software components — establishing the post-election software-integrity verification mechanism. Combined with § 5.84 (pre/post-election testing of automatic tabulating equipment), Wisconsin codifies the integrity-check regime.

§ 13-17-103(1)(l) grants auditors the right to monitor voting-system software while it runs, and § 13-17-507 / § 13-17-509 require expert software examination of any machine that fails the random-sample audit; there is, however, no committed-binary hash to verify against.

“allows auditors to access and monitor any software program while it is running on the system to determine whether the software is running properly”

§ 10-12 codifies that in the second count the election board shall control the conduct of the election in the municipality and register personal preference votes. § 10-15 codifies protocols documenting election conduct. The dual-count regime (§ 10-5) functions as the integrity-verification mechanism for Norway's paper-based system.

§ 12-17B-13 codifies the tabulating-vote procedure: 'The results printed by the automatic tabulating equipment shall constitute the immediate unofficial returns. These returns shall be open to the public. The final returns printed by the automatic tabulating equipment shall be presented to the canvassing board for review and certification as the official returns.' Public-review + canvass-board certification chain codified.

9 kap. 5 § codifies that vote-receivers must check outer envelopes for messenger ballots. 9 kap. 6 § codifies pre-acceptance check that ballot envelopes are properly prepared and that the voter is on the electoral roll. 9 kap. 9 § codifies window-envelope and outer-envelope checks for postal ballots. Multi-stage verification of every cast ballot codified.

§ 129.023 codifies a public logic-and-accuracy test that includes a § 129.023(c-1) demonstration, using a representative sample, that the source code of the equipment has not been altered; § 129.023(f)(2) requires preserving a copy of the system's software at a secure location outside the administrator's control for 22 months after election day, enabling later verification. Post-election binary verification is supported but not framed as an enforceable citizen right.

The section requires capability for auditing source code and executing the application on a clean baseline system, but does not explicitly grant a right to verify that the running binary matches a committed one. The statute addresses source code auditability and clean execution environment, which are related to but distinct from post-election binary verification.

“The capability for auditing the secure remote voting application source code, and the capability for this application to be executed on a clean computer which, at a minimum, has a baseline operating system on its hard disk and no other software or driver installed.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires software to be tested and certified under AS 15.20.900, but it does not grant a right to verify that the actual running binary matches a previously committed one. The statute addresses testing and certification procedures and paper record requirements for voter verification, but does not establish mechanisms for post-election verification of binary code integrity.

The statute grants parties the right to verify and test the electoral software system and requires it be made available in advance. However, it does not explicitly address verification that the running binary matches a previously committed one—it addresses system verification generally, not cryptographic or binary-level integrity checking against a prior commitment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses digital impersonation of candidates and citizens, establishing civil remedies for non-consensual publication of manipulated recordings or images. It does not address software verification, binary matching, or post-election integrity checks of voting systems or election software. The statute is entirely focused on defamation-type relief for deepfakes and similar media, not election technology verification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 7-1-101 contains only definitions of election-related terms and does not address post-election integrity checks, binary verification, or software verification procedures. This is a definitional statute section that does not grant rights related to verifying running binaries against committed ones.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 60 codifies physical seals on commission members, ballot boxes, and 'technical equipment' approved by the Central Electoral Commission. The 'technical equipment' refers to biometric voter-ID terminals, not voting software — and the article codifies physical sealing, not software-integrity verification.

The section requires post-election verification that the software used matches the assessed version and mandates publication of this verification. However, this verification is performed by the Electoral Commissioner (a state actor) and published as a statement, not granted as an affirmative right to independent observers or the public to verify the running binary themselves. The public receives notification of verification rather than the means or right to conduct independent verification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16 of the BPräsWG addresses procedural rights for candidates to challenge numerical election result determinations made by regional election authorities, and the federal election authority's review and correction of those determinations. The section concerns post-election result verification and administrative appeals—it does not address software verification, binary matching, or any commitment-and-verification mechanism for election software code or executables.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 435 addresses the physical removal of items from the voting table before opening the ballot box and access controls for ballot handling by commission members. It does not address software verification, binary code matching, or post-election integrity checks related to software systems. This section concerns ballot box procedures, not cryptographic or software verification mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses village committee disclosure obligations and government oversight of information publication accuracy. It does not address election software verification, binary code matching, or post-election integrity checks of voting systems or technology. The criterion concerns technical verification of election software, which is entirely outside the scope of this administrative transparency provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section consists entirely of statutory definitions (subsections 46 through 50.9). It defines terms such as 'special election,' 'statewide voter registration system,' 'voter-verified paper record,' and 'voting system,' but does not grant any right to verify that running binary code matches committed binary code. The section provides no substantive legal provisions concerning post-election integrity checks or software verification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the examination and approval of voting tabulators by the Secretary of State, including requirements for accuracy, efficiency, and compliance with standards, as well as prohibition of hole-punch voting systems. It does not address verification that the actual running binary code matches a previously committed or publicly disclosed version, which is the core requirement for post-election software integrity checks.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses oversight bodies and their authority to monitor political party financing, election campaign financing, and conduct audits. It does not address software, binary code verification, or any form of technological integrity checking of election systems. The criterion concerns post-election verification of software binaries, which is entirely outside the scope of this provision on financial oversight.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

§ 12b codifies Ministerial rule-making on digital solution. § 63 codifies postal-vote regulation. § 64 codifies postal-ballot logging. § 62 codifies postal-ballot impartiality. The dual-count regime under §§ 68 + 72-73 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) functions as the integrity verification mechanism for Denmark's paper-based system.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 106.0705 electronic campaign-treasurer filing. Off-topic for post-election integrity check.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 184 (2012-specific voter-list verification commission) is unrelated to software-integrity check. Georgia has no voting-software regime to verify.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the role and responsibilities of the Electoral Commission (Valgnævnet) regarding election management, record-keeping, and publication of election information. It contains no provisions whatsoever concerning software verification, binary matching, source code verification, or technical integrity checks of election systems. The criterion concerns post-election software verification—a concept entirely absent from this administrative section about election procedures.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines terms used in Idaho's voting machine and vote tally system chapter, but contains no provisions regarding verification of running binaries, source code, software integrity, or post-election auditing mechanisms. It is purely definitional and does not address the criterion of granting rights to verify that actual running binary matches committed binary.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses post-election audits and county designation procedures, but does not address verification that the actual running binary of voting software matches a committed binary. The criterion concerns software integrity and binary verification, which is a distinct technical matter from post-election audits of vote counts.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 50.51 addresses post-election audits through hand counts of ballots and administrative recounts, but does not address verification of software, binaries, or the matching of actual running code against a committed version. The criterion requires verification of binary code integrity, which is a software/technology-specific control not contemplated by this ballot-audit statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 117.001 defines an 'audit log' and a 'voter-verified paper audit trail,' but the Election Code grants no right to verify that the actual running software binary matches a pre-committed version.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: There is no voting-system software in Lithuania (paper ballots, hand counting), so no codified post-election software-integrity check exists; § 23 of the Funding Law governs the audit of party-finance, not voting equipment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses public access to voter registration records and restrictions on disclosure of personal voter information. It contains no provisions regarding software verification, binary matching, post-election integrity checks, or any technical controls over voting system software. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 252 describes the manual aggregation and verification procedures for votes after the fact, focusing on counting ballots and recording results in paper forms. It does not address software, binary code verification, or any mechanism to verify that election software matches committed code—issues central to post-election software integrity checks.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes post-election audits based on visual examination of paper ballots and chain-of-custody review, but does not address verification that running election software binaries match committed ones. The statute focuses on auditing election outcomes through manual ballot examination, not software verification or binary integrity checks.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration verification and enquiries by the Electoral Commission, not software integrity or verification of election system binaries. It is unrelated to post-election software verification or cryptographic integrity checks.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 11-309 establishes post-election auditing procedures including automated software audits and manual audits of paper records, but does not address verification that the actual running binary of the voting system matches a previously committed binary. The section concerns accuracy verification of vote tabulation results, not source code or binary integrity verification.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electronic filing and internet disclosure systems for campaign finance reporting, including requirements for electronic filing and signature verification of statements. However, it does not address or grant any right to verify that the actual running binary of election software matches a committed one—a technical requirement for post-election software integrity verification. The section is focused on campaign finance disclosure procedures, not software verifiability or election system auditing.

§ 203B.05 (municipal-clerk absentee administration) is the FTS-top candidate — limited relevance. The integrity-check function in Minnesota operates through § 206.83 (pre-election testing), § 206.88 (SoS partial recounts to verify accuracy), and the post-election review framework rather than a binary-attestation regime.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a centralized voter registration database system and its management procedures, but it does not address post-election integrity checks or the verification of running binaries against committed code. The statute focuses on database functionality, data conversion, security controls for unauthorized access, and advisory committee structure—not on post-election software verification or binary matching.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses petition signature verification procedures and permits the use of software to assist in processing petitions, but explicitly prohibits its use for signature verification. The section does not address post-election integrity checks, binary verification, or any mechanism to verify that software matches a committed version. The criterion concerns technical verification of election software, which is not the subject of this statute section.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires voter registration system software to be verified, identified, and approved by the secretary of state, but it does not address post-election integrity checks or grant a right to verify that the running binary matches a committed one. The statute concerns approval and safeguarding of software, not post-election verification or binary matching procedures.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 14-106 (political communication filings) is the only FTS-surfaced candidate — unrelated. The right to verify binary against committed version is not codified; the § 9-211 audit compares tallies, not binary integrity.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section requires a post-election audit report to be submitted to legislative committees but does not address verification of running binaries or software code. The statute concerns audit reporting procedures, not binary verification or source code attestation.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the appointment and dismissal of prosecutors by the highest procuratorial office. It contains no language concerning election integrity, binary code verification, software, or any form of post-election verification procedure. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion's focus on verifying that executed election software matches committed binaries.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions of voting and tabulation equipment terms used throughout Ohio election law. It does not address software verification, post-election integrity checks, or the matching of running binaries to committed ones. The section is definitional in nature and does not grant any rights or procedural guarantees related to software verifiability.

The statute authorizes post-election audits to check that voting devices and software 'correctly tabulated votes,' but it does not specifically grant a right to verify that the running binary matches the committed/certified binary before or after the election. The audit focuses on ballot examination outcomes, not source code or binary integrity verification. This addresses election integrity generally but not the specific technical verification criterion requested.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns verification of candidate residence and inhabitancy requirements for legislative candidates. It does not address software verification, binary code matching, election systems integrity, or any post-election technical auditing. The criterion relates to cryptographic or technical verification of voting software against committed versions, which is entirely outside the scope of this residence verification statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Pennsylvania Election Code addresses enforcement jurisdiction, election integrity grant funding, and ballot canvassing procedures. It does not address software verification, binary code verification, or any requirement to verify that actual running software matches a committed or reviewed version. The grant program's eligible uses focus on staffing, physical security, and ballot handling—not software integrity verification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 203 of the Polish Constitution establishes the powers of the Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) to conduct audits of government bodies, state legal persons, and local government units on grounds of legality, economy, and reliability. It does not address election integrity, software verification, or the verification of election-related binary code or systems. The criterion concerns post-election verification of software running in election systems, which is entirely outside the scope of this constitutional provision about general auditing authority.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the procedural steps for district-level vote tabulation (verification of total registered voters, voters, and votes by candidacy, blank and null votes). It addresses post-election vote counting operations but contains no provision regarding verification of software binaries or matching of actual running code to committed code. The section is about manual or standard vote verification procedures, not about software verifiability.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute specifies voting equipment requirements, including physical audit trails and hand-countable ballots for accuracy checks, but does not address verification of software binaries or the ability to verify that the actual running binary code matches a previously committed version. The criterion requires a right to verify software at the binary level, which this section does not grant.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 23 addresses voter registration for EU citizens in local elections, specifically the documentation requirements for supplementary electoral lists. It contains no provisions regarding software verification, binary code comparison, or post-election integrity checks of any voting systems or software.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Local Elections Law Article 35 describes the immediate post-vote count procedure (open box, verify control sheet, separate valid/invalid ballots). This is contemporaneous tallying, not a post-election integrity check of the system.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section defines voting systems and assigns the State Election Commission duties to approve and adopt systems, provide training, and create ballots, but does not grant any right to verify that the actual running binary matches a committed one. There is no mention of binary verification, source code transparency, or post-election integrity checks of software.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates the counting and verification of votes during the tallying process (escrutinio) by the electoral board, including error correction and representation rights. It does not address verification of running binaries or committed code in any form, which is a technical software integrity concern wholly outside the scope of this electoral procedure statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 2972 Article 2 declares local-election principles + judicial supervision in general — not a software-integrity verification.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes voting system standards including voter verification of ballot selections, manual audit capacity, and paper record requirements. However, it does not address verification of the actual running binary code against a committed version, which is a distinct cybersecurity concern related to software integrity. The statute mandates voter-facing verification and post-election audit trails but does not grant rights to verify that deployed voting system software matches any previously committed or certified source code.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires software validation procedures and database access logging, but neither provision grants a right to verify that the running binary matches a committed binary. Software validation rules and access records do not address the core element of post-election verification of actual running code against a known committed version.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides a definition of 'voting system' that includes software, firmware, and audit trail components, but does not grant any right to verify that the running binary matches a committed one. The section describes what a voting system comprises and what practices and documentation are used, but contains no provision establishing a right to post-election verification of binary code integrity.

The statute requires vendors to enable verification that software 'performs according to specification,' which addresses functional behavior but does not explicitly grant a right to verify that the actual running binary matches a cryptographically committed binary (e.g., source code hash verification or reproducible builds). The requirement is about specification compliance rather than binary integrity verification.

“System and vendor make it possible to verify that the software performs according to specification.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section mandates a post-election audit of ballots using automated tabulating equipment, but it addresses ballot verification and machine testing, not verification that the running binary code matches a committed/compiled version. The statute does not grant any right to verify software binaries or source code integrity; it only requires processing test ballots through machines to check tabulation accuracy.