Standard of proof & evidence

Cal. Elec. Code § 16602 codifies the evidentiary regime: 'In the trial and determination of election contests, the court shall be governed by the rules of law and evidence governing the determination of questions of law and fact, so far as the same may be applicable.' Standards of proof, admissibility, and dismissal are codified by reference to the general code of civil procedure.

Louisiana R.S. 18:567.3 codifies both the standard of proof and evidentiary rules for election disputes. The standard of proof is clearly established as 'preponderance of the evidence' in subsection G(1) and G(2). The evidentiary rules are explicitly codified in subsection F(4), which states 'The Louisiana and federal rules of evidence shall not apply to this hearing.' This creates a clear, statutory deviation from normal rules of evidence applicable to these proceedings. Additionally, the statute specifies what constitutes admissible evidence (testimony under oath, tangible evidence presented at hearing) and establishes procedures for evidence presentation. The statute also requires compilation and maintenance of an official record containing specific types of evidence. This satisfies the full criterion by establishing both the standard of proof AND specific evidentiary rules in statute.

§ 13-36-202 codifies pleading and evidence rules for contests grounded on illegal votes — including that testimony of illegal votes is not received unless the party gives advance notice — § 13-36-207 governs the production of evidence at the hearing, and § 13-36-211 sets the standard for setting aside a result. Standard plus evidentiary rules; level 2.

“When the reception of illegal votes is alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally”

§ 16-11(1)(a) codifies the standard of proof for invalidation: 'balance of probabilities' (sannsynlighetsovervekt) that violations of Constitution, statute, or regulation affected mandate distribution. § 16-11(1)(b) extends to Penal Code §§ 151-154 violations. § 16-11(2) codifies overall assessment by Riksvalgstyret. Explicit codified standard of proof.

“når bestemmelser i Grunnloven, lov eller forskrift om hvordan valg skal forberedes og gjennomføres, er brutt, og det er sannsynlighetsovervekt for at dette har påvirket den samlede fordelingen av mandatene mellom listene”

14 kap. 30 § codifies that 'the Valprövningsnämnden shall examine evidence for Riksdag members or European Parliament members and substitutes to determine whether these have been properly elected.' 14 kap. 28-29 § codify evidence form. 14 kap. 31 § codifies internal review. 15 kap. 12 § codifies that authorities must provide information requested by the Board. Standard of proof + evidence rules statutorily codified.

“Valprövningsnämnden skall granska bevis för riksdagsledamöter eller ledamöter i Europaparlamentet och ersättare för att pröva om dessa blivit”

Section 20A-4-403 codifies evidentiary rules governing election-contest evidence with specificity. For general elections, subsection (1)(d) establishes that: (i) the court may not receive evidence of contested votes unless the contesting voter provides written notice to the respondent at least three days before trial specifying the number and identity of allegedly illegal/rejected votes; and (ii) the court may only receive evidence of votes actually listed in that written notice. Parallel rules appear in subsection (2)(d) for primary elections. Additionally, subsections (1)(c) and (2)(c) allow plaintiffs to plead illegal/rejected votes generically (without naming every individual) if they establish that the allegedly illegal/rejected votes would be outcome-determinative. The statute thus sets both a notice requirement (procedural gatekeeping) and an admissibility rule (votes outside the list are barred). While the statute does not explicitly codify a burden of proof standard (e.g., preponderance vs. clear and convincing), it does establish concrete, judicially-enforceable evidentiary rules limiting what evidence courts may receive. This satisfies the criterion's requirement for 'evidentiary rules codified in statute' and achieves the maximum score of 2.

Article 112(5) codifies procedural structure for evidence receipt and practice, specifying (1) the court may order evidence reception, (2) probative phase follows contencioso-administrativo rules, and (3) the temporal limit is five days maximum. However, the statute delegates substantive evidentiary standards and admissibility rules to the generic contencioso-administrativo framework rather than codifying them directly within the electoral statute. A standard of proof is not explicitly stated (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, or balance of probabilities). Paragraph 4 permits 'los documentos que, a su juicio, puedan servir' ('documents that, in their judgment, may serve'), which is discretionary language, not a codified admissibility rule. The cross-reference to administrative procedure rules, while providing some clarity via incorporation, does not satisfy full codification within the electoral statute itself. This represents a midpoint: the structure and deadlines for evidence phases are clear and statutory (supporting 1 point), but the substantive standard of proof and detailed evidentiary rules are not codified in the electoral statute (preventing achievement of 2).

§ 17-16-48 codifies procedural notice requirements and timing constraints for presenting evidence of illegal or rejected votes in election contests. It establishes a mandatory notice rule (written notice identifying specific votes, voters, precincts, and recipients) and a 10-day advance notice deadline before testimony. However, the statute does not codify a standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt) or substantive admissibility rules governing what types of evidence are admissible or how they should be evaluated. It prescribes only notice procedure—a gatekeeping mechanism—not evidentiary standards or burdens of proof. Under the scoring rule, this qualifies as partial satisfaction: a procedural evidentiary rule is codified, but the standard of proof and core admissibility doctrine are not.

“No testimony must be received of any illegal votes or of the rejection of any legal votes in any contested election commenced under the provisions of this article unless the party complaining thereof has given to the adverse party notice in writing of the number of illegal votes and by whom given and for whom given, and at what precinct or voting place cast, or the number of legal votes rejected, and by whom offered, and at what precinct or voting place cast, which the party expects to prove on the trial. Such notice must be served personally or left at the residence or usual place of business of the adverse party at least 10 days before the taking of testimony in reference to such votes.”

Article 115 of the Argentine Electoral Code establishes substantive grounds for annulation of an election at a polling station (malicious deprivation of voting rights, missing signatures, non-compliance with formal requirements). These grounds function as implicit standards of proof—they require verification ('se compruebe') of specific factual conditions before annulation is permitted. However, the statute does not codify a formal standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt) nor does it establish explicit admissibility rules for what types of evidence may be presented, how evidence must be presented, or how the Junta should weigh competing evidence. The text identifies the conditions that trigger jurisdiction but does not specify evidentiary procedures or burdens. This satisfies the threshold for 'standard set' (score 1) because the grounds themselves imply factual verification requirements, but falls short of score 2 because evidentiary rules and formal standards of proof are absent.

Section 362 establishes a substantive standard for when findings trigger relief (bribery/corruption triggering automatic voiding; other illegal practices requiring satisfaction that result was 'likely to be affected' and declaration would be 'just'). This articulates a threshold of proof or evidentiary burden—the court must be 'satisfied' of factual predicates. However, the statute does not codify formal standards of proof (e.g., 'beyond reasonable doubt,' 'preponderance,' 'clear and convincing'), does not specify admissibility rules (hearsay, expert testimony, document authentication), and does not detail procedural rules for presenting evidence. The section establishes substantive predicates but leaves evidentiary procedure and proof standards to common law or court discretion. This yields a score of 1: a standard is set (satisfaction that result affected, justice requirement) but admissibility and formal proof rules are not codified.

§ 16 BPräsWG establishes a standard of proof for election contest objections ('hinreichend glaubhaft zu machen' — sufficiently credible demonstration) and a threshold requirement that objections must demonstrate why and how regional election authority determinations violate statutory law. This codifies a standard of proof at the statute level. However, the statute does not provide detailed evidentiary rules governing what types of evidence are admissible, how evidence is weighted, procedural rules for presenting evidence, or standards for evaluating documentary evidence beyond the requirement that objections be 'sufficiently credible' and 'adequately reasoned.' The Federal Election Authority reviews objections 'on the basis of documents at its disposal' (§ 16(3)), but no statutory rules specify what documents qualify, how disputes over document authenticity are resolved, or how the authority evaluates conflicting evidence. The section thus sets a proof standard but lacks detailed codified evidentiary rules.

“In den Einsprüchen ist hinreichend glaubhaft zu machen, warum und inwiefern die ziffernmäßigen Ermittlungen der Landeswahlbehörde nicht den Bestimmungen dieses Bundesgesetzes entsprechen. Fehlt diese Begründung, so kann der Einspruch ohne weitere Überprüfung abgewiesen werden.”

The statute codifies a procedural requirement (filing deadline: before verification of credentials) but does not address standard of proof or admissibility rules for evidence. The provision establishes a temporal gating rule ('before verification') but lacks substantive evidentiary standards—no specification of what burden of proof applies, what types of evidence are admissible, how evidence must be presented, or what factual findings are required to succeed in an election contest. This satisfies only the first component of the scoring rule (standard set), and then only obliquely by establishing temporal boundaries, not substantive evidentiary thresholds. Admissibility and proof standards remain absent from this provision.

“Toute réclamation contre l'élection doit être faite avant la vérification des pouvoirs.”

Article 97 of the Brazilian Electoral Code establishes a procedural framework for candidate registration challenges with codified standing (candidates, parties, any voter) and a statutory 2-day filing deadline. § 3 requires that electoral challengers offer 'prova do alegado' (proof of allegations), which establishes a basic requirement to present evidence. However, the statute does not codify a specific standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt) nor does it articulate evidentiary rules governing admissibility, weight, procedure, or the burden of proof. The provision requires evidence but leaves substantive evidentiary standards and procedures to judicial discretion. This satisfies the requirement for a standard to be 'set' (scoring 1) but falls short of the full 2-point threshold, which requires both a standard AND articulated evidentiary rules.

Section 524(1) of the Canada Elections Act codifies substantive grounds for contesting elections (ineligibility and irregularities/fraud/corrupt or illegal practices) and thereby implicitly establishes what must be proven. However, the provision does not codify a standard of proof (e.g., balance of probabilities, clear and convincing evidence, beyond reasonable doubt) nor does it codify admissibility rules for evidence. The statute delegates to the competent court the manner of proof and evidentiary standards without statutory specification. This satisfies the first element (standard set by identifying what must be proven) but fails the second element (evidentiary rules codified). The dual-scholar test would recognize that standing is clearly defined but procedural/evidentiary standards are left to common law or court rules, not statutory codification.

“may, by application to a competent court, contest the election in that electoral district on the grounds that (a) under section 65 the elected candidate was not eligible to be a candidate; or (b) there were irregularities, fraud or corrupt or illegal practices that affected the result of the election”

The statute codifies a clear standard of proof: 'preponderance of the evidence' (subsection 6(a)). This satisfies the first component of the criterion—the standard of proof is explicitly set in statute. However, the statute does not codify detailed evidentiary rules or admissibility standards. Subsection (3) permits the administrative law judge to 'take and consider such additional evidence' but provides no statutory codification of what evidence is admissible, how it must be presented, what weight it receives, or other procedural evidentiary rules. The focus is on limiting the ALJ's findings to 'questions certified,' but this is a jurisdictional boundary, not an evidentiary standard. The statute establishes the standard of proof but lacks the evidentiary rules component needed for a score of 2.

The statute establishes a standard of proof—'sufficient reason' for ordering a recount and 'finds any error' or 'mistake' for certification—but these standards are implicit and general rather than codified with specificity. The section does not enumerate admissibility rules for evidence (e.g., burden allocation, weight of evidence, hearsay exceptions, expert testimony standards). It prescribes the judge's hearing process and decision-making authority but leaves evidentiary rules to common law or judicial discretion. The statute codifies the *standard* (the judge must find error, mistake, or violation) but not the *evidentiary procedures* governing how those findings are proven. This satisfies the lower half of the ordinal scale (1=standard set) but falls short of the full criterion (2=standard + evidentiary rules).

Section 60(2)–(4) establishes a substantive standard of proof by requiring that statutory violations be committed "in a manner that grossly affected" (způsobem, který hrubě ovlivnil) the results. This formulation codifies a materiality threshold—evidence of violation alone is insufficient; the violation must have substantially influenced the outcome. However, the statute does not codify specific rules governing the admissibility, form, or weight of evidence. There is no enumeration of admissible evidence types, no procedure for challenging evidence, and no codified evidentiary burdens or standards of review. The standard is set at the statute level, satisfying the lower tier of the criterion, but evidentiary rules are not provided. This places the section at score 1 rather than 2.

“Návrh na neplatnost hlasování může podat navrhovatel, má-li zato, že byla porušena ustanovení tohoto zákona způsobem, který hrubě ovlivnil výsledky hlasování”

This section codifies one specific admissibility rule—exclusion of ballots and records that came into possession of a candidate/party member—and grants the court general examination authority over ballots. However, it does not establish an affirmative standard of proof (e.g., preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence) required to overturn an election. The section addresses evidentiary exclusions but lacks comprehensive codification of the burden and standard applicable to the contestant's affirmative case. The scoring rule requires both standard of proof AND evidentiary rules; this section provides partial evidentiary rules (one exclusionary rule) but no articulated standard of proof, yielding a score of 1 rather than 2.

§ 9 codifies the standard for overturning a result — the National Electoral Committee may declare results invalid and order a repeat vote only where the violation 'significantly affected or could have significantly affected the voting results', a materiality standard; detailed evidentiary admissibility rules are not separately codified.

“where the violation significantly affected or could have significantly affected the voting results;”

This provision codifies substantive grounds for election annulation (fraud in electoral list establishment, irregularity in voting procedure) and establishes the administrative tribunal as the forum, but does not codify the standard of proof required to establish these grounds or the admissibility rules for evidence. It identifies what must be proven (manoeuvres, irrégularité) but not how evidence must be presented, what weight it bears, or what burden of proof applies. The statute sets a procedural framework (suspension of mandates, appellate deadlines) but leaves evidentiary standards to case-law development by the administrative judiciary. This satisfies the first component (substantive grounds exist in statute) but not the second (evidentiary rules and proof standards are not codified).

§ 21-2-493 codifies investigation of discrepancies in vote counts with subpoena power. § 21-2-504 codifies special-election procedure. Standard of proof in contest proceedings (preponderance + materiality of irregularity) is partly statutory (§ 21-2-522) and partly case-law-defined (Mead v. Sheffield, 278 Ga. 268).

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 11-173.5(b) codifies procedural requirements for election contests, including mandatory summary hearing format and written evidence reduction. However, the statute does not codify a specific standard of proof (e.g., preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence) nor does it establish evidentiary rules governing admissibility, burdens, or types of evidence permissible in election contests. The phrase 'hear the contest in a summary manner' indicates procedure but not evidentiary standards. The requirement that the court state 'all findings of fact and of law' creates an obligation to articulate reasoning but does not itself establish what evidence is admissible or what quantum of proof is required. Under the dual-scholar test, one scholar would view this as codifying procedural clarity (hearing format, timeline, written record) without codifying substantive evidentiary rules, scoring it at 1. A second scholar might argue that 'summary manner' implies statutory reference to summary-proceeding rules elsewhere in Hawaii law, but the text here does not explicitly cross-reference those rules, leaving evidentiary standards ambiguous at the statutory level of this section.

“the court shall hear the contest in a summary manner and at the hearing the court shall cause the evidence to be reduced to writing and shall not later than 4:30 p.m. on the fourth day after the return give judgment fully stating all findings of fact and of law”

The statute codifies substantive grounds for invalidation and establishes standards of proof implicitly through the terms 'ineligible,' 'flawed in a manner likely to have affected,' and 'deliberate and material irregularities.' These constitute a standard of proof framework embedded in the invalidation criteria. However, the statute does not codify explicit evidentiary rules governing admissibility, weight, burden allocation, or procedural treatment of evidence. The National Electoral Commission submits a 'reasoned opinion' but the statute does not specify what evidence is admissible, how it shall be assessed, or what burden of proof applies. The framework sets a standard (substantive grounds) but lacks codified evidentiary procedures and rules of admissibility.

Idaho Code § 34-2033 establishes a standard for evidence production (that courts may order 'such evidence as it deems necessary'), but it delegates the detailed evidentiary rules to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure rather than codifying them directly in the election statute. The section does not specify a standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing, preponderance) for election contests, nor does it codify specific admissibility rules within the statute itself. The delegation to civil procedure rules is procedurally clear but falls short of the criterion's preference for codification of evidentiary standards within the election dispute-resolution framework itself. This represents a partial satisfaction: a standard is implicitly set (necessity and materiality via civil procedure), but without statutory codification of proof standards or specific evidentiary rules in the election code.

“The court may order the production of such evidence as it deems necessary for the proper disposition of the primary contest pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.”

10 ILCS 5/23-23 incorporates civil case standards by reference, so the preponderance-of-evidence standard applies; the section also codifies evidence preservation/production. The standard is not named explicitly, but the framework is codified.

“The case shall be tried in like manner as other civil cases”

This section establishes that contests are determined by court without jury and are subject to Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, which provides a procedural framework. However, the statute itself does not codify a specific standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence) or specific evidentiary rules for election-contest evidence. Instead, it defers to general trial procedure rules rather than establishing election-specific evidentiary standards in the statute. The section addresses judicial determination and specific remedies (declaration of winner, ballot-printing errors, voting-system malfunctions, deliberate acts) but does not codify the burden of proof or admissibility standards tailored to election contests. This represents a 'standard set' (procedurally, via reference to trial rules) without election-specific evidentiary codification.

§ 54 codifies a burden-of-proof rule — the burden lies with the participants to the administrative proceedings — and § 37¹/§ 45³ set the materiality standard for overturning a result (violations that have affected the distribution of seats); detailed evidentiary admissibility comes via the cross-referenced Administrative Procedure Law.

“The burden of proof shall lie with the participants to the administrative proceedings.”

Lithuania codifies the contest procedure and short timelines (§ 86, § 74) but does not enumerate a specific standard of proof or evidentiary admissibility rules — the cases follow the Administrative Procedure Law cross-reference.

The statute codifies a clear standard of proof: 'reasonable cause to believe' at the petition-granting stage, and proof of 'violations' (implicitly a preponderance standard) at the hearing stage. It also establishes specific affirmative defenses that define what must be proven (section 32 violations) and what can defeat liability even if violations are shown (inadvertence, reasonable cause, triviality, immateriality). However, the statute does not codify evidentiary rules (admissibility, chain of custody, expert qualification, confrontation rights, etc.). It delegates procedural rules to the Superior Court justices (section (c): 'the justices of the superior court may from time to time make such rules... as they deem expedient'). The standard of proof is statutory; evidentiary rules are not. This satisfies the 'standard set' criterion (score 1) but falls short of 'standard + evidentiary rules' (score 2).

Article 77 Ter establishes a standard of proof—that grounds for nullity must be 'plenamente acreditadas' (fully substantiated) and shown to be 'determinantes para el resultado de la elección' (determinative of the election result). This codifies a clear burden: clear substantiation plus causation. However, the statute does not codify specific evidentiary rules governing what evidence is admissible, how it is presented, examined, or weighed. It sets the threshold but not the procedural mechanics of proof. Under the EDRI scoring rubric (0=none; 1=standard set; 2=standard + evidentiary rules), this satisfies the 'standard set' tier but falls short of tier 2 because admissibility and procedural rules for evidence are not detailed in statute.

The section codifies specific evidentiary rules for contested elections: it authorizes production of ballot boxes/ballots/poll books, allows evidence of unqualified voters, establishes a prima facie proof rule tying ballot numbers to voters, and sets conditions under which a ballot may be inspected/identified. However, it does not articulate a general standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing) for the contest itself. It provides partial evidentiary rules without a codified overall standard.

Missouri § 115.599 codifies procedural rules for evidence-gathering in election contests (depositions, witness subpoenas) by incorporating civil procedure by reference. This addresses evidentiary PROCEDURE and admissibility mechanics ('may be read in evidence'). However, the statute does not codify a substantive STANDARD OF PROOF (e.g., clear and convincing, preponderance, beyond reasonable doubt) for resolving contested-election claims. The reference to 'as in civil cases' delegates the standard of proof to the civil procedure framework rather than establishing an election-specific codified standard. The section satisfies the 'evidentiary rules' component (depositions, witness process) but not the 'standard of proof' component, yielding a score of 1 rather than 2.

“the contestant and the contestee shall be allowed process for witnesses, and either party may take depositions, as in civil cases, to be read as evidence at the trial, as is authorized in civil cases”

The section establishes a procedural standard—that the Constitutional Court must wait until 'final settlement by electoral bodies and courts of appeals' before acting—and sets a temporal deadline (10 days). This codifies a standard of proof implicitly: 'confirm or invalidate the legality of the elections' presupposes that a legality finding must be made. However, the section does not explicitly codify the *standard of proof* (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt) nor does it specify admissibility rules for evidence (e.g., what documents, witness testimony, expert reports are admissible; what foundation or authentication is required). The phrase 'confirm or invalidate the legality' is substantive but procedurally thin on evidentiary rules. The statute sets the *timing* and references appeal settlement but does not detail how evidence is evaluated or what evidence is admissible.

This statute establishes one evidentiary rule—that the election official's certificate is prima facie evidence and can be contradicted by witness testimony. This codifies a minimal standard of proof (prima facie) and a narrow rule of admissibility (direct examination witnesses present at ballot inspection). However, the statute does not establish a comprehensive standard of proof governing the overall burden in an election contest (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence) nor does it codify broader evidentiary rules governing admissibility of other types of evidence (expert testimony, statistical analysis, prior election records, etc.). The codified element addresses only ballot examination evidence. The statute satisfies the threshold of setting *a* standard and rule but falls short of comprehensive evidentiary framework.

“The certificate of the election commissioner or county clerk certifying the total number of votes received by a candidate shall be prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the certificate, but the persons present at the examination of the ballots may be heard as witnesses to contradict the certificate.”

Article V 4(1) establishes that the representative body 'examines the credentials without delay and decides whether the appointed person is admitted as a member' and 'decides the disputes which arise with regard to the credentials or the election itself.' This codifies a standard—examination must be 'onverwijld' (without delay) and disputes must be resolved—but it does not codify specific standards of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing evidence) or detailed evidentiary rules (e.g., what evidence is admissible, burdens of proof, witness procedures). The provision delegates procedural detail to standing orders ('reglement van orde') rather than statute. The statutory text sets a dispute-resolution obligation and temporal standard but lacks substantive evidentiary codification required for a score of 2.

“Het vertegenwoordigend orgaan waarvoor de verkiezing is geschied, onderzoekt de geloofsbrief onverwijld en beslist of de benoemde als lid van dat orgaan wordt toegelaten. Daarbij gaat het na, of de benoemde aan de vereisten voor het lidmaatschap voldoet en geen met het lidmaatschap onverenigbare betrekking vervult, en beslist het de geschillen welke met betrekking tot de geloofsbrief of de verkiezing zelf rijzen.”

Section 665:16 establishes a standard of proof by requiring that findings of fact be 'supported by the requisite evidence,' which is codified language indicating a proof threshold. However, the statute does not define what 'requisite evidence' means, does not specify evidentiary rules (e.g., admissibility, burden allocation, types of evidence permitted), and does not articulate the standard of proof explicitly (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, substantial evidence). The section also limits appeals to 'questions of law' while leaving factual findings final if supported by unspecified 'requisite evidence.' This reflects a partial articulation of standards—the statutory language acknowledges proof requirements—but lacks the specificity needed for complete procedural clarity regarding evidence admissibility and burden of proof. A score of 1 reflects that a standard is set ('requisite evidence') without detailed evidentiary rules.

“Findings of fact made by the commission shall be final if supported by the requisite evidence.”

The statute provides procedural rules for how challenged ballots are handled during a contested election, including that the board of elections shall consider each challenged ballot and may take 'such further evidence as it deems necessary' with subpoena power. However, the section does not codify a specific standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence) nor does it establish detailed admissibility rules for evidence. The phrase 'such further evidence as it deems necessary' delegates evidentiary discretion to the board rather than establishing statutory evidentiary standards. The statute sets a procedural framework but lacks the codified evidentiary rules needed to satisfy the full criterion.

“the board of elections shall then convene and consider each challenged ballot and rule as to which ballots shall be counted. In such consideration, the board may take such further evidence as it deems necessary, and shall have the power of subpoena.”

§ 16.1-16-08 codifies the judgment-on-contest framework: court pronounces judgment on who was elected/nominated, sets aside election if no one elected, awards court costs based on contest action outcomes. § 16.1-15-13 codifies ballot preservation as evidence. Standard of proof in election contests is partly statutory and partly developed through case law.

Oklahoma § 26-8-118 addresses contest procedures and establishes that a district judge has authority to compel witnesses and evidence, which provides a procedural framework for evidence presentation. However, the statute does not codify (1) a specific standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt) for determining whether fraud or irregularities have occurred, nor (2) specific admissibility rules governing what types of evidence may or may not be presented. The statute delegates the evidentiary framework to judicial discretion rather than establishing it in statutory text. Under the dual-scholar test, this satisfies the threshold requirement of establishing a procedural mechanism for evidence introduction but falls short of full statutory codification of evidentiary standards and proof burdens. Score reflects presence of procedural rules (subpoena authority, witness compulsion) without codified substantive standards of proof or admissibility.

ORS § 258.055(5) codifies a clear standard of proof—'clear and convincing evidence'—which addresses the first component of the criterion (standard of proof is codified). However, the statute does not codify admissibility rules or evidentiary standards governing what evidence may be introduced, how it is authenticated, or how it is weighed. The section provides only procedural framework (notice, service, hearing timeline, jury trial waiver, written findings) and burden allocation, but lacks substantive evidentiary rules that would permit consistent case-by-case application of evidence standards. A score of 2 would require codification of both the burden and specific evidentiary rules (e.g., who may testify, what documents qualify, hearsay exceptions, chain-of-custody rules). This section satisfies approximately half the criterion.

Article 392 § 2 establishes that a protester must formulate allegations and present or indicate evidence supporting those allegations. This codifies a basic evidentiary requirement — that evidence must be presented or referenced in the protest itself. However, the statute does not codify: (1) a specific standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt); (2) rules of admissibility (which evidence is permissible); (3) burdens of proof allocation; or (4) procedural standards for evaluating evidence. The provision requires evidence submission but leaves substantive evidentiary standards and admissibility determinations to judicial discretion under Article 394 (referenced but not excerpted). This satisfies the minimal requirement of codifying that evidence must be presented, but falls short of codifying both standard of proof and admissibility rules as the criterion requires.

Art. 34º establishes a formal procedural requirement that appeals must be filed with 'fundamentos' (grounds) and 'todos os elementos de prova' (all proof elements), indicating evidence must accompany the appeal. This codifies a basic standard that evidence must be presented with the contest petition. However, the statute does not establish explicit evidentiary rules—such as burden of proof standards, admissibility thresholds, weight of evidence requirements, or standards for evaluating competing evidence. The provision requires grounds and evidence to be included but does not specify what constitutes sufficient proof, the burden allocation between parties, or how courts should evaluate competing evidence submissions. This satisfies the first component (a standard is set: evidence must accompany grounds) but not the second component (detailed evidentiary rules governing admissibility and evaluation).

“O requerimento de interposição de recurso, do qual devem constar os seus fundamentos, é entregue no tribunal que proferiu a decisão recorrida, acompanhado de todos os elementos de prova.”

Section 110(2) establishes a substantive standard of proof—the 'materiality' test—that governs when election contests may succeed. It codifies that errors alone are insufficient; the challenger must prove the mistake or non-compliance 'materially affected the result.' This satisfies the first element (standard set). However, the section does not codify evidentiary rules (admissibility, burden allocation, witness procedures, documentary standards, etc.). It states the legal threshold but leaves the mechanics of presenting evidence to case-by-case judicial administration. The statute sets a standard but not the evidentiary framework for proving it.

This section codifies admissibility rules for specific categories of election-contest evidence (poll books, voter signature lists, ballot applications), establishing that certified versions are official records receivable as evidence, and that uncertified versions may be proved by other credible evidence. However, it does not codify a clear standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt) for resolving election contests. The statute addresses which evidence types are admissible and their evidentiary status, but stops short of establishing the burden or quantum of proof required to prevail in a contest. Under the scoring rule (0=none; 1=standard set; 2=standard + evidentiary rules), this section provides evidentiary rules without a statutory standard of proof, warranting a score of 1.

“Poll books, voter signature lists and ballot applications, or copies of them, certified by the officer having custody of them, are official records and shall be received as evidence in any case arising out of the election. They may be impeached by other evidence. If the poll books, voter signature lists and ballot applications or copies of them are not certified, they may nonetheless be proved by other credible evidence and received as evidence in an election contest.”

§ 221.010 codifies an evidence/admissibility rule for election contests: where an examination of ballots is needed but the ballots are lost, destroyed, or beyond the tribunal's reach, 'the voters who cast the ballots may testify as to how they voted.' § 129.003(d) makes the paper record the official record for a Title 14 contest. A specific admissibility rule is codified, but a general standard-of-proof provision for election contests was not surfaced.

Section 157(2) explicitly references 'evidence' as a principle and rule to be observed in election petitions, establishing that evidentiary rules exist and must be applied. However, the statute does not codify the substantive evidentiary standards or the standard of proof in the RPA 1983 itself. Instead, it incorporates by reference 'the principles, practice and rules on which committees of the House of Commons used to act' and directs courts to apply principles 'so far as may be' or 'as far as may be'—language that suggests incorporation of common law and historical practice rather than statutory codification. Subsection (3) grants the High Court the same powers as if the petition were an ordinary action, further delegating evidentiary standards to general civil procedure rather than statutory specification. The criterion requires codification in statute; incorporation by reference to common law principles and historical practice does not satisfy a demand for statutory codification of the standard of proof and admissibility rules, though it does acknowledge that such rules exist and must be observed.

“the principles and rules with regard to— a agency, b evidence, c a scrutiny, and d declaring any person elected in place of any other person declared not to have been duly elected, shall be observed, as far as may be, in the case of a petition questioning an election”

RCW 29A.68.090 establishes a procedural pleading standard—what a contestant must allege to state a sufficient cause regarding illegal votes. It specifies that general allegations of illegal votes are sufficient if they would, if credited, change the election outcome. This codifies a standard of proof (outcome-determinative margin) applicable to illegal-vote contests. However, the section does not codify evidentiary rules governing admissibility, burden of proof mechanics, witness qualification, or how to establish that votes were illegal. It addresses pleading sufficiency but not the evidentiary framework for proving allegations at hearing. Thus it satisfies the 'standard set' benchmark (score 1) but falls short of 'standard + evidentiary rules' (score 2).

“When the reception of illegal votes is alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that illegal votes were cast, that, if given to the person whose election is contested, or to the winning choice for a measure, in the specified precinct or precincts, will, if taken from that person, or winning choice for a measure, reduce the number of the person's legal votes below the number of legal votes given to some other person for the same office or reverse the outcome of the measure.”

W. Va. Code § 3-7-8 establishes a standard of proof by requiring that claims be 'shown, by proper evidence' before the competent tribunal. This codifies a requirement that evidence be presented and that corrections follow only to the extent proven. However, the statute does not define what constitutes 'proper evidence,' does not specify the quantum of proof (clear and convincing, preponderance, etc.), and does not articulate admissibility rules for specific categories of evidence (e.g., affidavits, documents, testimony). The provision thus sets a procedural standard—evidence must be presented to the tribunal—but leaves the substantive definition of 'proper evidence' and the burden of proof to common law, case law, or tribunal discretion. This satisfies the 'standard set' criterion (score 1) but falls short of the fuller codification of evidentiary rules (score 2).

“it may be shown, by proper evidence before the tribunal authorized by law to hear and determine contested elections, for whom such illegal votes or any of them were cast, or for whom the legal votes which were rejected would have been given, and the returns shall be corrected only to the extent that it is so shown.”

The statute codifies a procedural mechanism for evidence-gathering (depositions and compulsory process) by reference to civil action standards. It establishes that depositions may be taken and witnesses/evidence may be compelled. However, the section does not establish a codified standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance, or other burden standard) for election contests themselves, nor does it codify specific admissibility rules beyond the general incorporation of civil procedure. The statute delegates to civil procedure rather than stating evidentiary rules directly. Under the scoring rubric, this satisfies the 'standard set' criterion (score 1) but falls short of 'standard + evidentiary rules' (score 2) because specific evidentiary rules are not independently codified in this section or, based on its text alone, delineated for election contests.

“Depositions shall be taken as in a civil action and the officer taking depositions has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, objects, and other evidence, by subpoena.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 16-552 addresses early ballot challenges and procedures but does not codify standards of proof or evidentiary rules for election contests. The statute delegates grounds for challenge to section 16-591 (by reference) and requires written notice with 'brief statement of grounds,' but neither codifies what standard of proof applies (preponderance, clear and convincing, etc.) nor specifies admissibility rules for evidence in the challenge process. The provision states 'The burden of proof is on the challenger' but does not quantify that burden. This section concerns early ballot challenge procedures within the election administration process, not election-contest proceedings under section 16-672 (which the statute explicitly excludes from appeal). The criterion requires codification of standard of proof and admissibility rules for election-contest evidence, which this early ballot challenge section does not provide.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 7-5-702 addresses ballot preservation, chain of custody, and the procedural conditions under which ballots may be opened or destroyed. It establishes that ballots may be used as evidence in election contests and directs tribunals to control access. However, it contains no codified standard of proof for election contests and no statutory evidentiary rules governing how ballot evidence or other evidence must be evaluated, weighted, or admitted. The section explicitly delegates evidentiary authority to 'some competent tribunal'—deferring to common law or case-by-case judicial discretion rather than codifying standards. It does not specify burden of proof (preponderance, clear and convincing, etc.), admissibility criteria, or substantive rules for evaluating contested election claims. This is a ballot-custody statute, not an election-contest procedure or evidence statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Чл. 39 codifies the procedure for exclusion from the 'list of struck-off persons' before election day; not the contest evidentiary standard.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 41 of the PRC Constitution establishes a general right to petition, complaint, and accusation against state organs and officials for unlawful conduct. However, this provision: (1) does not specifically address election contests or election disputes; (2) contains no codified standard of proof applicable to election-contest proceedings; (3) establishes no evidentiary rules governing the admissibility or weight of evidence in election disputes; (4) creates only a generic duty for relevant state organs to investigate complaints without specifying procedural, evidentiary, or temporal requirements. The provision is aspirational and administrative in character, not a procedural framework for election dispute resolution. It does not satisfy the criterion requiring codification of evidentiary standards and admissibility rules specific to election contests.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 83 BWO addresses procedural implementation of repeat elections (Wiederholungswahl) following a Wahlprüfungsverfahren (election contest) decision. It specifies which ballot districts repeat voting, rules for voter registers, ballot certificates, candidate nominations, and the state election director's authority to adapt procedures to special circumstances. However, the section contains no codification of standards of proof or evidentiary admissibility rules for election contests themselves. It presupposes that a Wahlprüfungsentscheidung (election contest decision) has already been rendered and governs only the mechanics of executing that decision. The substantive standards for what evidence proves contestable irregularities, burdens of proof, and admissibility thresholds are not addressed in this section. The statute delegates some discretionary authority to election commissions regarding candidate nomination changes (Absatz 6) and to the state election director regarding procedure adaptation (Absatz 7), but these are administrative implementation powers, not codified evidentiary standards for the contest proceeding itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Άρθρο 71 governs ballot printing and distribution; not contest-evidence standards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 4 addresses candidate eligibility criteria and bars from candidacy based on criminal measures, not standards of proof or evidentiary rules for election contests. It specifies who may stand for office, not how disputes over election results or validity are to be resolved or what evidence standards apply in such disputes. The section is silent on burden of proof, admissibility of witnesses, documentary evidence, or any procedural rules governing the presentation and evaluation of evidence in an election contest. This is purely candidate-qualification law, not contest-dispute resolution procedure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The surfaced candidates concern the prohibition on agreeing not to contest (KRS 120.360) and the composition of legislative contest boards (KRS 120.195, 120.205, 120.215). The evidence/trial-procedure provision for contests — KRS 120.065, under which the court hears all questions of law and fact without a jury — was not surfaced for this datapoint.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 109 of the Luxembourg Electoral Law of 18 February 2003 addresses criminal penalties for ballot fraud and misconduct by electoral officials. It does not codify standards of proof or admissibility rules for election-contest evidence. Instead, it establishes criminal sanctions (imprisonment and fines) for ballot counterfeiting and fraudulent alteration of ballots during voting or counting. The provision requires that facts be noted in the official record ('procès-verbal') but contains no statutory codification of evidentiary standards, burden of proof, or admissibility rules applicable to election contests. The criterion requires codification of standard-of-proof and admissibility rules for election-contest proceedings; this section addresses criminal law enforcement, not dispute-resolution procedure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 162 addresses the right to observe voting and ballot-counting operations and to append observations, protests, or contestations to the minutes of those operations. However, the provision does not establish either a standard of proof or evidentiary rules for election contests. It grants procedural access to observers and candidates to lodge objections but does not codify what evidence is required, admissible, or what burden or standard of proof applies to contest claims. The section creates an administrative record-keeping mechanism (a form for documenting irregularities) but does not define statutory standards for adjudicating disputes based on that evidence. This is a right-to-observe and right-to-object provision, not a substantive codification of proof standards or evidentiary rules for contest proceedings.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration cancellation and relates to electoral eligibility, not to the standard of proof or admissibility rules for evidence in election contests. The provision uses the phrase 'is satisfied' but provides no codified standard of proof (e.g., preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt) and contains no statutory evidentiary rules governing what evidence may be admitted, how it must be presented, or how credibility is assessed. The section delegates the satisfaction standard to the Commission's discretion without statutory definition. It falls outside the EDRI.4 criterion, which specifically targets contest-stage evidence standards. This is a registration eligibility rule, not a procedural rule for resolving election disputes through recount, contest, or certification mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: NRS § 293.430 addresses procedural mechanics of filing, notification, and legislative handling of election contests for statewide offices. It specifies what documents must be filed and the timeline for legislative convening, but it does not codify any standard of proof (such as 'clear and convincing,' 'preponderance,' or 'beyond reasonable doubt') or admissibility rules for evidence in election contests. The statute permits filing of 'depositions, ballots and other documents' without establishing evidentiary standards, burdens, or criteria for what constitutes sufficient proof of contested claims. The decision and substantive standards are left to the joint session of the Legislature, not governed by statutory rule.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-3-6 addresses precinct boundary and polling place disputes through mandamus petition to district court, but contains no codified standard of proof or evidentiary rules. The statute requires petitioners to set forth 'facts and reasons for their dissatisfaction' and directs the court to 'hear the evidence, decide the issues involved and issue its order as the law and facts require,' but does not establish: (1) a specific standard of proof (e.g., clear and convincing evidence, preponderance); (2) rules governing admissibility of evidence; (3) burden of proof allocation; or (4) evidentiary procedures. The framework delegates these determinations entirely to court discretion under general law principles ('as the law and facts require'). This is a procedural clarity deficiency—no statutory codification of evidence standards for this category of election dispute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The cited constitutional provision (Article 68 of the DPRK Socialist Constitution) addresses the general right to petition and complaint (신소와 청원), stating that citizens may lodge petitions and that the state shall review and handle them fairly according to law. However, this provision: (1) does not address election contests specifically; (2) contains no codified standard of proof; (3) contains no codified rules of evidence or admissibility; (4) delegates the substantive procedural framework to law ("법이 정한 데 따라" — according to law as prescribed), without itself specifying evidentiary standards. The provision is a general constitutional guarantee of access to petition mechanisms, not a codification of election-dispute evidence rules. No EDRI criterion elements (standard of proof, admissibility rules, or evidentiary codification for election contests) are satisfied in this text.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 1703 codifies recount/recanvass procedure and the court's duty to correct/certify votes 'justly, regardless of any fraudulent or erroneous entries'; does not codify a specific standard of proof or admissibility rules for contest evidence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Rhode Island General Laws § 17-19-37.4 addresses post-election audits, specifically risk-limiting audits after elections. It does not codify standards of proof or evidentiary rules for election contests. The statute defines what a risk-limiting audit is, prescribes the audit procedure (manual tallying, statistical methods, public notice), and specifies what happens if the audit reveals a discrepancy (manual tally results replace the original count). However, it contains no provisions governing the standard of proof required in an election contest proceeding, nor does it codify admissibility rules for evidence in such contests. The section is procedurally focused on audits themselves—timing, methodology, notice, and publication—rather than on the adjudication of disputes or the evidentiary burdens applicable to contestants challenging election results. To satisfy CONT.EDRI.4, the statute would need to specify (for example) the burden of proof (clear and convincing, preponderance, etc.) and rules governing what evidence is admissible in a contest action, neither of which appears in this section.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 19 is about voter-list dispute procedure, not evidentiary standards in election contests.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 298 Article 112 codifies the FORM of challenges (written or oral with transcribed reasoning, signature/fingerprint required, identity proof, evidence and grounds must be submitted), but does NOT codify a defined standard-of-proof (preponderance/clear-and-convincing/etc.) for election contests. Election boards decide on the merits without a formal evidentiary standard.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 24.2-669 addresses ballot custody, inspection, and destruction procedures. While it references Chapter 8 (§ 24.2-800 et seq.) as the governing framework for contests and recounts, it does not itself codify standards of proof or evidentiary rules for election contests. The section merely permits ballot inspection 'on the order of a court' in pending contest proceedings but does not establish what standard of proof applies, what evidence is admissible, how evidence must be presented, or what burdens of persuasion contestants must meet. The criterion requires codification of 'standard of proof and admissibility rules'—substantive evidentiary standards—not procedural logistics for ballot access. This section provides only procedural mechanisms for ballot custody and access, not the evidentiary framework governing contest adjudication.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Only § 9.10 (Recall) was FTS-surfaced — recall doesn't have a substantive evidentiary standard for results contests. The Wisconsin contest standard-of-proof lives in case law + § 9.01 procedural rules.