Statutory grounding of commission

Electoral Code Article 42 codifies the CEC composition (7 members) and election procedure (NA elects upon committee recommendation). Constitution Article 195 (in EAI ADMIN.1 candidates) constitutionally establishes the CEC. Combined: constitutional + statutory grounding — ordinal level 2.

“The Central Electoral Commission shall comprise of 7 members.”

§ 17 codifies that 'the Minister of the Interior and Health establishes a Valgnævn (Election Board) which decides on voter-list inclusion, party-name approval, and party-deletion.' § 23 codifies valgbestyrelse appointment for each constituency. § 9 codifies polling-district structure. § 11a codifies Valgnævnet authority over party names. § 12a codifies enforcement. Multi-tier statutory grounding codified.

“Indenrigs- og sundhedsministeren nedsætter et valgnævn”

§ 13 codifies the municipal central election committee (kunnan keskusvaalilautakunta): 'the council must appoint, for its term, a municipal central election committee' of 5 members + ≥5 deputies. § 14 codifies its quorum and working procedure. § 11 codifies the constituency committee (vaalipiirilautakunta), appointed by the State Provincial Office for each constituency. § 10 codifies the Ministry of Justice as supreme election authority. § 15 codifies polling committees. Comprehensive multi-tier statutory grounding of election commissions codified.

§ 106.24 statutorily creates the Florida Elections Commission as an independent budget entity. § 102.111 (4972) creates the Elections Canvassing Commission. § 101.5610 (4920) operationalizes precinct-level election boards. Ordinal 2/2 — multiple commissions statutorily grounded.

“There is created within the Department of Legal Affairs, Office of the Attorney General, a Florida Elections Commission”

§ 21-2-34 codifies compensation and expenses of board members. § 21-2-33.1 codifies enforcement procedure including suspension of superintendents. § 21-2-33.2 codifies extraordinary relief. § 21-2-30 (Creation) and § 21-2-107 codify SEB authority. Comprehensive statutory grounding of commission.

Article 57 of the Kazakhstan Constitution explicitly grants Parliament Chambers the power to appoint members of the Central Electoral Commission, establishing the commission's existence and core mandate at the constitutional level rather than by statute or regulation alone. This constitutional grounding satisfies COMM.1 at the highest tier (score 2).

“appoints two members of the Central Electoral Commission”

§ 3-102 codifies the state board of elections' general powers and duties (rule-making, oversight of county boards, statewide list, enforcement). § 3-100 codifies the board's statutory creation within the executive department. § 3-200 codifies county boards. Comprehensive statutory grounding.

Article 114 of the DPRK Socialist Constitution establishes the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly as a constitutional body with explicit mandate to issue ordinances, decisions, and directives. This places the commission's authority at the constitutional level, satisfying the highest tier of statutory grounding (constitution, not statute or executive discretion).

“최 고 인 민 회 의 상 임 위 원 회 는 정 령 과 결 정, 지 시 를 낸 다”

§ 10-15 codifies protocol-keeping by election boards (valgstyret, distriktsvalgstyret, fylkesvalgstyret). § 4-1 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies the National Election Board (Riksvalgstyret) — created by Storting after each election with 4-year term, 5 members including 3 judges, operating independently. § 10-13 codifies inter-board material transfer. Comprehensive multi-tier commission grounding.

The Oregon Constitution directly establishes the existence and core structural requirements for any board or commission empowered to administer election laws—mandate at the constitutional level (Art. XI-D), composition (three members), and a key political safeguard (election without party affiliation or designation). This is the highest institutional grounding available.

“any board or commission created, or empowered to administer the laws enacted to carry out the purposes of this article shall consist of three members and be elected without party affiliation or designation”

3 kap. 1 § codifies the central election authority (Valmyndigheten) with overarching responsibility. 3 kap. 2 § codifies the regional election authority (länsstyrelsen) with responsibility within the county AND for training the municipal commissions. 3 kap. 3 § codifies the municipal election commission (valnämnden). 3 kap. 5 § codifies vote-receiver appointment. Multi-tier statutory grounding of election commissions.

“Det ska finnas en central valmyndighet som har det övergripande ansvaret för frågor om val.”

Art. I-33 codifies the status of election commissions: Central Election Commission (separate law), district, territorial, and precinct commissions established per this Code. Art. I-37 codifies commission documentation. Art. II-115 / III-170 codify ballot delivery to commissions. Comprehensive statutory grounding.

Article 25 codifies the multi-tier commission system: CEC, regional, district, precinct, referendum commissions. Article 34 codifies formation procedures. Article 37 codifies organization of work. Article 42 codifies district commission powers. Article 83 codifies regional aggregation. Statute-level grounding strong; Constitution Article 71 grounds CEC (not surfaced).

Cal. Elec. Code § 15651 + § 15652 references the Secretary of State as the statutory authority for cross-county election determinations. The SoS office is established constitutionally in Cal. Const. Art. V § 11 (not ingested). The COMM.1 candidates surface only statutory roles; full constitutional grounding requires reading Art. V, which wasn't in the FTS-surfaced candidates.

The section provides statutory grounding for the Chief Electoral Officer's existence and appointment (satisfying the statute-based minimum), but the criterion explicitly asks whether grounding is constitutional rather than statutory alone. Canada's Chief Electoral Officer is established by statute (the Canada Elections Act) rather than the Constitution, which limits the score to 1 rather than the maximum of 2. The office lacks the supreme-law entrenchment that constitutional grounding would provide.

“There shall be a Chief Electoral Officer who shall be appointed by resolution of the House of Commons to hold office during good behaviour for a term of 10 years.”

The section establishes the election commission (Državno izborno povjerenstvo) and its subordinate bodies in statute (the Election Law) rather than executive order, satisfying the statutory grounding requirement. However, the criterion explicitly asks whether grounding is in the constitution rather than statute alone; this section provides only statutory grounding, not constitutional grounding, which would be the higher standard (scoring 2).

“Tijela za provedbu izbora zastupnika u Sabor su: Državno izborno povjerenstvo, izborna povjerenstva izbornih jedinica, općinska i gradska izborna povjerenstva i birački odbori.”

The National Electoral Committee is established, and its mandate set, by statute — §§ 8–12 of the Riigikogu Election Act, with § 10 codifying its formation — not by the Constitution. Level 1: statutory grounding.

“The National Electoral Committee comprises the following members:”

Election Code Article 8 codifies election-commission rules of operation (statute-level). Article 7 (in EAI ADMIN.1 cands) establishes the CEC as an independent administrative body. Constitution Article 66 (referenced but not surfaced) provides constitutional grounding. Statutory level present; constitutional level partial.

ΠΔ 26/2012 Άρθρο 82 codifies elector check-in at per-precinct εφορευτικές επιτροπές. Greek admin is decentralized: per-precinct commissions (§ 58) + Ministry of Interior (§ 9) — no central permanent election commission.

The section establishes that Valgnævnet (Election Board) leads the election and assigns it specific statutory duties (maintaining election records, publishing election dates, managing candidate registration). However, the text does not state whether Valgnævnet's existence and core mandate originate in the constitution or statute alone. The presence of detailed statutory powers suggests statutory grounding, but constitutional status cannot be determined from this excerpt alone.

“§ 8. Valget ledes af Valgnævnet.”

10 ILCS 5/1A-13 references and regulates State Board of Elections employees; the canonical grounding section is 10 ILCS 5/1A-1 ('A State Board of Elections is hereby established'), but only § 1A-13 was FTS-surfaced for this query. The Constitution Article III § 5 also establishes the State Board.

“No employee of the State Board of Elections including its executive director and assistant executive director shall engage in any partisan political activity”

Latvia's election commissions are established by statute — § 1 of the Election Commissions Law creates the city/municipality commissions and the Central Election Commission Law constitutes the CEC; the Constitution does not establish the election administration. Level 1: statutory grounding.

“each city and municipality shall establish from its voters respectively the city election commission or municipality election commission”

Lithuania's election commissions are established by statute — the Central Electoral Commission Law (§ 1), the Seimas Election Law (§ 12 formation), and the municipal/polling commissions (§ 22-23) — with Article 67 of the Constitution implicitly grounding the CEC. Statute; level 1.

“The chairman or a member of a municipal electoral committee, an electoral committee of a polling district may be removed from his office in the committee”

The section confirms the Commission's existence and mandate are grounded in article 60 of the Constitution, which satisfies the constitutional requirement. However, the criterion asks whether *this section* (art. 7 of Cap. 354) provides that grounding, when in fact it merely references and operationalizes a constitutional commission. The statutory text alone does not establish the commission—it delegates to constitutional authority—yielding a score of 1 (statute with constitutional reference) rather than 2 (constitution itself).

The section grounds the INE's mandate for organizing judicial elections in statute (LGIPE art. 503), establishing clear legal authority and core responsibility. However, COMM.1 asks whether the commission's existence and core mandate are set in the CONSTITUTION rather than statute alone; this section provides only statutory grounding, not constitutional grounding. To satisfy the higher bar (score 2), the text would need to cite constitutional provisions establishing the INE itself.

§ 204B.20 codifies the precinct election board (election judges + head election judge with assigned duties). § 204B.23 codifies vacancy-filling among election judges. § 204C.31 (not in FTS top-5) codifies county canvassing boards. § 208.05 codifies the State Canvassing Board. § 203B.121 codifies ballot boards. Multi-tier commission structure codified, though distributed across chapters.

The section establishes the Central Electoral Commission's existence and core mandate (organizing and conducting elections and referenda) in statutory law (the Electoral Code), satisfying the minimum threshold for institutional grounding. However, the criterion specifically asks whether this grounding is constitutional rather than statutory alone. This text is from the Electoral Code statute, not the constitution, so it scores 1 rather than 2. The statute provides clear legal foundation, but constitutional-level protection would provide stronger institutional entrenchment.

Montana has no single election commission — elections are administered by the Secretary of State and elected county election administrators, with statutory absentee election boards and county recount boards established by Title 13. The framework is statutory; level 1.

“In a partisan election, each absentee election board or the authorized election officials who are appointed must consist of two members, one from each of the two political parties”

§ 16.1-15-20 codifies that the county canvassing board may subpoena members of the election board — statutory powers of the canvassing body. § 16.1-15-04 codifies canvass-report procedure. § 16.1-05-04 codifies election-board duties. § 16.1-15-15 / § 16.1-15-33 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codify county and state canvassing-board statutory creation. Comprehensive multi-tier commission grounding codified.

ORC 3517.14 creates the Ohio Election Integrity Commission in statute — 5 members, fixed terms, statutory composition. Grounding is statutory, not constitutional.

“There is in the office of the secretary of state the Ohio election integrity commission, consisting of the following five members”

The section establishes the Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza's (State Electoral Commission's) mandate and role in statutory law (the Electoral Code), satisfying the requirement that the commission's existence and core mandate be set in law rather than by executive order. However, COMM.1 specifically asks whether this is grounded in the constitution rather than statute alone. This section is statute-only; constitutional grounding would be required to score 2.

Article 20 codifies the multi-tier commission system in statute: CEC, subject commissions, municipal commissions, territorial, precinct. Article 28 codifies organization. Article 24 codifies municipal-formation commission powers. Statute-level grounding (Constitution Article 81 references CEC for presidential elections but not surfaced).

Local Elections Law Article 11 statutorily grounds the election commission and polling boards as the organs for conducting elections. They are 'autonomous and independent' per the same article. Constitution Article 151 (4397) parallels for the High Judicial Council. The Republic Election Commission is statutorily grounded in MP Election Law (Articles 33–34).

“Органи за спровођење избора су изборна комисија јединице локалне самоуправе (у даљем тексту: изборна комисија) и бирачки одбори.”

§ 12-15-3 codifies distribution of precinct officials among parties (superintendent from majority party). § 12-18-23 codifies precinct-board ballot return procedure. § 12-15-1.3 codifies precinct assistant duties. § 12-1-5 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies the State Board of Elections. Commission structure codified but multi-tier statutory grounding is split across chapters.

Article 8 of LOREG (a statutory law) establishes the Electoral Administration and defines its mandate in statute rather than by executive order or regulation. However, COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding. While Spain's 1978 Constitution (Article 68.1 and related provisions) delegates electoral matters to organic law, the commission structure itself is grounded in statute (LOREG) not the constitution. This satisfies the baseline (statute over executive discretion) but falls short of the criterion's preference for constitutional entrenchment.

§ 51.002 codifies that 'a county election board is established in each county' for the general election, with a defined composition (county judge, county clerk, voter registrar, sheriff, and the county chair of each primary-nominating party). § 31.032 establishes the county election commission and § 31.153 the joint elections commission. The election-administration bodies are firmly grounded in statute (the Election Code) — but in statute alone, not in the Texas Constitution, so the constitutional-grounding criterion is only partially met.

“A county election board is established in each county”

Law 298 Article 10 codifies the 3-tier YSK hierarchy in STATUTE: 'In Ankara one Supreme Election Council, in each electoral district one provincial election board, in each district one district election board, and one ballot-box committee for each ballot box.' Note: full constitutional grounding exists in Anayasa Article 79 but was not surfaced by FTS for this datapoint — scoring at the statutory level.

52 USC § 30106 codifies the FEC: 6 voting members appointed by President with Senate advice/consent, 6-year staggered terms, party-balance rule (no more than 3 of same party). Statutory grounding (not constitutional).

“There is established a commission to be known as the Federal Election Commission”

Wis. Stat. § 5.025 defines 'commission' as the elections commission. § 5.05 codifies the commission's powers and duties as statewide elections administrator. Statute-level grounding (Wisconsin Elections Commission established by Wis. Stat. § 15.61, not in surfaced corpus, with constitutional grounding for the SoS being inapplicable since WI moved from SoS to standalone commission in 2015).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Fair Ballot Commission is created by statute (Code of Alabama § 17-6-81), not by constitution. While the section provides clear statutory grounding for the commission's existence and core mandate (fair and accurate explanation of ballot measures), it does not meet the criterion's requirement that the commission be established in the constitution rather than statute alone.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses decision-making procedures for an election board but does not establish the board's existence, core mandate, or constitutional grounding. It presupposes the board already exists and merely prescribes majority-rule voting. No language here grounds the commission in the constitution or even statute; it is a procedural rule that assumes institutional scaffolding already in place elsewhere. COMM.1 requires constitutional (or at minimum statutory) establishment of the commission itself—not procedural details about how it votes.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 24 of Ley 26.215 addresses disclosure and audit procedures for political party finances, not the establishment or constitutional grounding of an election commission. The section assigns roles to a federal electoral judge and the Electoral Chamber's audit body but does not establish the commission's existence, core mandate, or constitutional basis. This is a statutory administrative provision for financial oversight, not a constitutional or statutory charter of institutional independence for an election commission.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The commission's existence and core mandate are set by statute (A.R.S. § 16-955), not by constitution. While Arizona's voters approved Prop. 105 in 1998 (noted in the caution), this section itself is codified statutory law, not constitutional text. The criterion asks whether the commission is grounded in the constitution rather than statute alone; this section provides only statutory grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section creates and defines the Ethics Commission by statute (Ark. Code § 7-6-217), establishing its composition, appointment structure, and core authority. However, the criterion specifically requires constitutional grounding rather than statute alone. This commission is statutory in origin, not constitutional, so it scores 1 (statute) rather than 2 (constitution).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Commission is established by statute (the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) rather than by the Constitution. While this provides strong statutory grounding (scoring 1 on the ordinal scale), the criterion explicitly asks whether the commission's existence is set in the Constitution rather than statute alone. Australia's Constitution does not establish the AEC; it is a creature of statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Bundeswahlbehörde's existence and core mandate are grounded in statute (the NRWO of 1992) rather than in the Austrian constitution. The criterion asks whether the election commission is set in the constitution; this section establishes it by statutory law alone, which scores lower on the ordinal scale (1 rather than 2).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the establishment and notification of ballot-counting bureaus (bureaux de dépouillement) — operational polling mechanics — not the creation or mandate of an election commission. Belgium's election commission (Commission Électorale Fédérale or similar body) would be governed elsewhere in the Electoral Code or Belgian Constitution. This excerpt contains no language establishing a commission's statutory existence or constitutional grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 17 of the Electoral Code (Lei nº 4.737/1965) is a statute, not a constitutional provision. It establishes the Superior Electoral Court's internal governance structure (president, vice-president, and general ombudsman elected from among its members), but does not establish the election commission's existence or core mandate at the constitutional level. The section addresses leadership selection and the ombudsman's functions within an already-established institution, rather than grounding the commission itself in constitutional text. To satisfy COMM.1 at score=2, the election commission's fundamental existence and mandate would need to be set by Brazil's Constitution, not by statute alone.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Чл. 341 codifies regional commission database creation; not commission grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural mechanics of voter-roll publication and dispute resolution by the 村民选举委员会 (village election committee), but does not establish the committee's existence, authority, or mandate in constitutional text. The PRC 村组织法 is statutory law; the section assumes the committee exists but provides no evidence of constitutional grounding. The criterion requires constitutional rather than statutory-only establishment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign contribution restrictions for state agencies and political subdivisions; it does not establish, authorize, or ground the existence of an election commission or its mandate. The criterion requires constitutional or statutory establishment of the commission itself. This section is a standalone campaign finance limitation and falls outside the scope of commission structural analysis.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs polling place hours and locations for primary elections. It contains no provision whatsoever regarding the existence, structure, mandate, or constitutional grounding of an election commission. The section is purely operational/procedural and does not address the institutional framework through which election administration occurs.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the procedural mechanics of result certification by the State Electoral Commission (Státní volební komise) and the Czech Statistical Office, not the statutory grounding or constitutional establishment of the commission itself. The section presupposes the commission's existence but provides no information about whether its establishment, mandate, or authority derive from the constitution or statute. To evaluate COMM.1, one would need to examine the section(s) that explicitly create and authorize the State Electoral Commission — likely elsewhere in Law 275/2012 or in the Czech Constitution — which are not provided here.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 301 establishes the appointment, term, and compensation of the State Election Commissioner by statutory law (Delaware Code), not constitutional provision. The criterion COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding to score 2; statutory grounding alone scores 1. This section provides only statutory grounding and therefore does not satisfy the constitutional requirement implied by the criterion question.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the election commission's existence and core mandate (oversight of each election, composition with judicial and administrative magistrates) by statute (Code électoral), not by constitutional provision. The statutory grounding satisfies a baseline institutional framework, but COMM.1 specifically asks whether grounding is constitutional rather than statutory alone, making this a score of 1 rather than 2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is found in the BWahlG (Federal Electoral Act), which is federal statute, not the German Constitution. While the electoral commission structure is statutorily grounded—satisfying the basic requirement for statutory law rather than pure executive discretion—the criterion explicitly asks whether the mandate is set in the CONSTITUTION rather than statute alone. § 9 BWahlG provides statutory scaffolding for election administration bodies, but does not anchor them in Germany's constitutional framework (the Grundgesetz). Therefore, the structural grounding is statutory (score 1) rather than constitutional (score 2).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section (§ 11-7.5) grounds the elections commission's duties in statute (Hawaii Revised Statutes), not the state constitution. The section specifies enumerated duties but does not establish that the commission's existence or core mandate derives from constitutional text; rather, it legislates the commission's operational responsibilities under statutory authority. A score of 1 (statute-based) is appropriate, not 2 (constitution-based), which would require explicit constitutional grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The commission's existence and mandate are grounded in statute (Elections Act No. 112/2021), not the constitution. While statutory grounding satisfies a baseline standard of legal durability over administrative discretion, COMM.1 asks specifically whether grounding is constitutional. The section provides statute-level establishment (score 1) but does not demonstrate constitutional embedding (score 2).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 34-2412 does not establish an election commission at all. It prescribes only the composition of precinct-level election boards (election judge and clerks) for voting-machine precincts. The section is silent on any executive commission, its charter, or constitutional grounding. COMM.1 requires constitutional (or at minimum statutory) establishment of the election commission's existence and core mandate; this section addresses only local precinct staffing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes the election commission by statute (Ind. Code Title 3, art. 6) rather than by constitution. While statutory grounding provides clear legal authority, the criterion specifically asks whether the commission's existence and core mandate are set in the constitution, which earns a score of 1 (statute) rather than 2 (constitution). The institutional structure is legally grounded but not at the constitutional level.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The redistricting advisory commission is grounded in statute (Iowa Code ch. 42), not the Iowa Constitution, satisfying the ordinal score of 1 rather than the constitutional grounding that would yield 2. The statutory text establishes the commission's existence and core mandate clearly, but COMM.1 asks specifically whether grounding is constitutional rather than statutory alone.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Electoral Reform Act 2022 is ordinary statutory law, not constitutional law. Section 8(1) establishes the commission by statute and delegates its mandate to functions 'conferred on it by this Act,' satisfying the statutory baseline (score 1) but not the constitutional grounding required for score 2. The section provides clear statutory authority but lacks the superior constitutional entrenchment that would insulate the commission from ordinary legislative repeal or amendment.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the composition and appointment of precinct-level election boards, not a central election commission. The statute vests appointment authority in the county election officer (an executive appointee), with no constitutional grounding for the commission itself. While election board structure is set by statute rather than executive discretion, COMM.1 specifically asks whether the commission's existence and core mandate are rooted in the constitution—not merely statute. Kansas election administration is grounded in statute (K.S.A. ch. 25) alone.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The State Board of Elections is established and mandated by statute — KRS 117.015 — not by the Kentucky Constitution. The FTS query surfaced precinct-boundary and offense-prosecution provisions rather than the establishing section, and the constitutional-grounding criterion is not met.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Voting System Commission is created by statute (La. R.S. 18:1362.1), not by constitution. The statute provides clear grounding and a defined mandate, satisfying the statutory floor but not the constitutional requirement specified in COMM.1. The section scores 1 (statute) rather than 2 (constitution) because constitutional grounding is not evident.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedural duties of polling-place officials (assessor, secretary, bureau president) and reporting to local judges, not the existence or mandate of a national election commission. It contains no reference to constitutional or statutory grounding of any election commission's authority, composition, or mandate. The section is purely procedural.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 87 establishes the commission's existence and mandate in organic statute (Loi organique 2018-008), not in the constitution. While statutory grounding is present, COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding to receive a score of 2; statutory grounding alone scores 1 on the ordinal scale.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section merely defines 'Commission' by reference to its establishment in Title 5, section 12004-G(33), which is a statute, not a constitution. The section does not establish the commission itself or ground it in constitutional authority; it only provides a definitional cross-reference. Since COMM.1 requires constitutional grounding (scoring 2) versus statutory grounding (scoring 1) versus executive discretion (scoring 0), and this section evidences only statutory authority, the score is 1 (statute). However, the section itself satisfies 'no' because it does not meet the criterion's threshold of constitutional grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses certification of elected individuals by the State Board but does not establish the commission's constitutional grounding. The reference to 'State Board' implies statutory creation, but this section alone does not establish whether the commission exists under constitution or statute. Without constitutional text, the structure defaults to statutory grounding (score 1), not constitutional (score 2).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides only definitional language about election-related terms and organizational units (e.g., 'board of election commissioners or election commission'). It establishes no constitutional grounding for the commission itself—it merely references commissions that may exist under other law. The section assumes commissions exist but does not establish their existence, powers, or mandate. Constitutional grounding would require the commission to be established in the Massachusetts Constitution; this statute alone does not satisfy that criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns penalties for obstructing election challengers; it does not address the existence or mandate of an election commission.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes technical requirements for direct-record electronic (DRE) voting systems and does not address the election commission's existence, mandate, or governance structure at all. It contains no reference to constitutional or statutory grounding of a commission, and is therefore wholly irrelevant to COMM.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 115.013 is a definitional section that establishes terminology for election administration purposes. It contains no provisions regarding the election commission's existence, structure, appointment, mandate, or constitutional grounding. It does not address whether the commission is created by constitution, statute, regulation, or executive order. This section is silent on the institutional framework required by COMM.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses conflicts of interest and prohibited activities for appointed commission members, but contains no language establishing the commission's existence, authority, or core mandate. It presupposes a commission already created by other law (likely statute or constitution) and regulates only the personal conduct of its members. The section does not ground the commission itself in constitutional or statutory authority.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Kieswet (Electoral Law) Article A 3 establishes the Kiesraad's (Electoral Council) mandate and core functions in statute rather than in the Dutch Constitution. The section provides statutory grounding for the commission's existence and tasks, satisfying the statutory requirement (score 1), but does not demonstrate constitutional-level grounding (which would score 2). The criterion asks specifically whether the mandate is set in the constitution; this section sets it in statute alone.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: NRS § 293.4685 addresses specific duties of the Secretary of State regarding voter registration reporting and HAVA compliance, not the establishment or constitutional grounding of an election commission. It contains no language establishing a commission, defining its mandate, or providing constitutional authority. Nevada's election administration is vested in the Secretary of State and county/city clerks by statute, not in a dedicated independent commission with constitutional grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The redistricting commission is grounded in statute (N.H. Rev. Stat. § 662-A:4), not in the New Hampshire Constitution. The section establishes clear statutory authority for the commission's existence, membership, appointment process, and core mandate (redistricting), but COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding. Statutory grounding alone scores 1 under the ordinal scale (0=executive, 1=statute, 2=constitution).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The commission is grounded in statute (N.J. Rev. Stat. § 19:44A-5), not in the New Jersey Constitution. The statutory text establishes the commission's creation, composition, appointment process, and term structure, but the criterion requires constitutional grounding. Statutory creation scores 1 on the ordinal scale, not 2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the administrative assignment of precinct-level election board members by the county clerk. It contains no provision regarding the existence, mandate, or constitutional grounding of a state-level election commission. The section is a procedural rule about staff deployment, not a structural definition of the commission itself.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the ministerial duty of the election board chairman to issue certificates of election after municipal elections have been officially determined. It contains no language establishing the existence, composition, appointment mechanism, or core mandate of the election commission itself. The section presupposes a county board of elections (referenced in G.S. 163-182.5 and other statutes) but does not ground that institution in constitutional or statutory authority; it merely assigns one procedural task to the chairman.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 26-8-113 addresses recount procedures and the appointment of candidate agents, not the establishment or constitutional grounding of an election commission. It contains no language creating, authorizing, or defining the mandate of an election commission. This section falls outside the scope of COMM.1, which evaluates whether an election commission's existence and core mandate are constitutionally (rather than statutorily) established.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 3508 (UOCAVA) codifies unvoted-ballot transmission deadlines; not commission grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes an election commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) and related assembly procedures grounded in statutory law (Lei n.º 14/79), not the Portuguese Constitution. The text specifies the composition, appointment procedures, and operational mandate for counting and tabulating votes abroad, all set by statute rather than constitutional provision. The criterion COMM.1 asks whether grounding is constitutional rather than statutory alone; this section provides only statutory grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The commission is statutorily created (satisfying basic grounding), but this is a temporary study commission with a specific 2013 reporting deadline and defined sunset purpose, not a permanent election administration body. The criterion asks whether the election commission's existence and core mandate are set constitutionally; this section establishes statutory grounding only, and moreover does not establish a standing election administration commission but rather an ad hoc advisory study group.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. 70 codifies post-election ballot retention/destruction; not commission grounding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 15 of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 addresses procedural objections to the voters' roll and assigns decision-making authority to 'the Commission,' but this section does not establish the commission's existence, mandate, or constitutional grounding. The section presupposes the commission exists and operates under the Electoral Commission Act (referenced in subsection 5), but contains no language setting the commission's constitutional status. To satisfy COMM.1, the criterion requires evidence that the commission's existence and core mandate are grounded in the constitution itself, not merely statute. This section is purely procedural and does not meet that threshold.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section establishes the election commission's existence and core mandate in statute (S.C. Code § 7-5-10), not in the South Carolina Constitution. While statutory grounding is superior to executive discretion, COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding to score 2; statutory grounding alone scores 1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses conflict-of-interest prohibitions and vendor conduct restrictions regarding election officials, but contains no language establishing or grounding the existence, structure, or mandate of any election commission. It presupposes commissions exist but does not satisfy COMM.1, which requires constitutional grounding of the commission itself. The section is regulatory in nature (prohibiting conduct), not structural.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The Electoral Commission is grounded in statute (PPERA 2000), not in the UK Constitution. While the statutory grounding is clear and codified, the criterion specifically requires constitutional grounding to score 2. The UK has no written constitution; grounding in primary legislation (statute) satisfies a score of 1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The commission is created by statute (UCA § 20A-20-201), not by constitutional provision. While this satisfies the threshold for statutory grounding, COMM.1 specifically asks whether the commission is grounded in the *constitution* rather than statute alone. Utah's redistricting commission is established legislatively, scoring 1 (statute) rather than 2 (constitution).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Vermont has no election commission. Elections are administered by the Secretary of State — a constitutional officer — and by each town's board of civil authority, a statutory body. § 2154 charges the Secretary with the statewide voter checklist, but no commission is established, and the constitutional-grounding criterion for a commission is not applicable.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses forfeiture of public office upon felony conviction and has no bearing on the existence, mandate, or constitutional/statutory grounding of an election commission. It is a criminal-law provision governing disqualification from any office, not a structural provision for electoral administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The commission's existence and mandate are grounded in statute (RCW 29B.20.010), not the Washington State Constitution. This satisfies the threshold of statutory grounding (score 1), but does not meet the constitutional requirement for score 2. The section establishes the commission by legislative enactment rather than constitutional provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes poll-level boards of election officials through statutory language only, not constitutional provision. It codifies their composition (team structure, party balance) and appointment process (county commission notification to party committees), providing clear statutory authority. However, COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding to score 2; statute alone scores 1. The section provides no constitutional basis for the commission structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section does not address the election commission's existence, mandate, or institutional structure at all. It contains only technical procedural requirements for judges to set voting machine counters to zero before voting. It is entirely disconnected from COMM.1, which concerns constitutional or statutory grounding of the commission itself.