Ballot secrecy guarantee

The section explicitly guarantees that every voter has a right to vote a secret ballot and mandates that the ballot 'shall be kept secret and inviolate,' which directly addresses the legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. The statutory language is mandatory ('shall') and establishes an enforceable right.

“Every voter in Alabama shall have the right to vote a secret ballot, and that ballot shall be kept secret and inviolate.”

The statute mandates that voters place their marked ballots in a secrecy sleeve before placing that sleeve in an outer envelope bearing the voter's certificate. This structural requirement—separating the ballot from voter identification—legally guarantees ballot secrecy by ensuring the ballot itself remains unlinked to the voter's identity, while the voter's certificate remains on the outer envelope only.

This article explicitly establishes a legal right for voters to maintain the secrecy of their vote, which is the core guarantee of ballot secrecy. The statute creates an enforceable right that protects voter-ballot unlinkability by preventing others from knowing how an individual voted.

“El elector tiene derecho a guardar el secreto del voto.”

The statute mandates that no voting machine shall be approved unless it ensures voter secrecy during the act of voting. This directly addresses the legal guarantee of ballot secrecy, which is enforceable through the machine approval process outlined in the statute.

“It will ensure secrecy to the voter in the act of voting”

Article 6 of the Electoral Code declares 'Voting shall be held by secret ballot. Secrecy of voting shall not only be the right, but also the responsibility of an elector. Control over the free expression of will of an elector shall be prohibited.' Reinforced by Constitution Article 7 (constitutional secret-ballot principle), Article 57 (voting room must protect secrecy), Article 1 (foundational principles).

This section creates a legally enforceable prohibition on disclosing information that would link an elector's identity to their vote, with criminal penalties (6 months imprisonment or 10 penalty units). The prohibition explicitly covers the core requirement of voter–ballot unlinkability by forbidding communication 'in a manner that is likely to enable the identification of the elector' in relation to their vote.

“A person who is, or has been, an officer or a scrutineer shall not either directly or indirectly, divulge or communicate any information with respect to the vote of an elector acquired by him or her in the performance of functions, or in the exercise of powers, under this Act or the regulations in a manner that is likely to enable the identification of the elector.”

The section explicitly mandates that voters must destroy defective ballots in front of the election authority and take them away 'for the purpose of safeguarding ballot secrecy' (zwecks Wahrung des Wahlgeheimnisses). This demonstrates a legal guarantee that ballot secrecy is protected by preventing any linkage between voter identity and specific ballot papers. Additionally, section (4) requires ballots to be placed in an envelope before being deposited in the urn, further ensuring secrecy.

“Der Wähler hat den ihm zuerst ausgehändigten amtlichen Stimmzettel vor der Wahlbehörde durch Zerreißen unbrauchbar zu machen und zwecks Wahrung des Wahlgeheimnisses mit sich zu nehmen.”

Article 3 codifies foundational principles including secret ballot. Article 9 (in v0 cands) explicitly codifies 'Secret ballot' as a basic principle. Article 50 codifies voting hours/procedures protecting secrecy. Article 151 codifies secret ballot for Council of Republic recall. Reinforced by Constitution Article 38 (constitutional secret ballot). Comprehensive secret-ballot mandate.

This section mandates that election officials and poll workers take an oath to maintain the secrecy of votes ('garder le secret des votes'). The oath requirement is legally binding and enforceable through the formal swearing-in procedure described, with the oath being documented in official records. This legal guarantee of vote secrecy is a foundational protection for voter-ballot unlinkability.

“Je jure de recenser fidèlement les suffrages et de garder le secret des votes.”

The statute explicitly guarantees ballot secrecy (sigilo do voto) through legally mandated measures, which is the foundation for voter-ballot unlinkability. The provision ensures that votes remain secret and unlinked to individual voters through procedural safeguards.

“O sigilo do voto é assegurado”

The section explicitly guarantees secret ballot voting (тайно гласуване) as a fundamental principle governing all elections. This legal requirement directly ensures voter-ballot unlinkability by mandating that voting must be conducted in secret, making it impossible to link individual voters to their specific ballots.

“с тайно гласуване”

Cal. Const. Art. II § 7 declares 'Voting shall be secret' as constitutional principle. Reinforced by § 18562.5 (misdemeanor for observing-and-disclosing during vote-by-mail processing), § 15281 (results-posting carve-out 'to protect a person's right to cast a secret ballot'), and § 19283 (remote vote-by-mail standards must preserve voter secrecy).

“SEC. 7. Voting shall be secret.”

This section establishes a legal duty to maintain vote secrecy and includes multiple prohibitions against disclosing how any individual voted, preventing the linkage between voters and their ballot choices. The restrictions on obtaining, displaying, or communicating information about how specific ballots were marked directly guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability.

“Every person present at a polling station or at the counting of the votes shall maintain the secrecy of the vote.”

The statute explicitly mandates secret ballot voting (无记名投票), which is the foundational legal guarantee for voter-ballot unlinkability. This establishes that votes are cast without identifying information and cannot be linked back to individual voters. The requirement is enforceable as a statutory obligation on election administration.

The statute explicitly requires that electromechanical voting systems provide for voting in secrecy as a mandatory certification requirement. This directly guarantees voter-ballot unlinkability by ensuring that votes cannot be linked to individual voters.

“Provides for voting in secrecy”

The section explicitly guarantees the freedom of voter choice and the secrecy of voting, establishing that ballot secrecy is legally guaranteed. The provision also prohibits anyone from requiring voters to disclose their voting choice and protects voters from accountability based on their voting decision, which reinforces voter-ballot unlinkability and enforceability.

“Jamči se sloboda opredjeljenja birača i tajnost njihova glasovanja.”

The statute explicitly requires that electronic voting systems must secure voter secrecy in the act of voting, which is the core requirement for ballot secrecy and voter-ballot unlinkability. Additionally, subsection (b) mandates side curtains and front shields to prevent any person from seeing how a voter votes, providing enforceable mechanisms to implement this guarantee.

“Secure to the voter secrecy in the act of voting for or against as many questions as may be submitted.”

Ballot secrecy is constitutionally guaranteed (§ 60, § 156: 'Voting shall be secret') and § 48⁶ extends it in detail to electronic voting — vote encryption, separation of personal data from the vote before counting, and a guarantee that a re-voting voter cannot prove which vote counted (coercion resistance).

“Electronic voting must be organised in such a manner that the principle of secrecy of the vote is respected at every stage of the voting process, including after the electronic vote has been annulled.”

§ 51 codifies that the ballot form 'must safeguard the preservation of ballot secrecy' (vaalisalaisuuden säilyminen). § 72 codifies polling-place order rules. § 86 codifies that ballots are dropped into the urn 'preserving ballot secrecy' (vaalisalaisuus säilyttäen). § 112 codifies the secret member-ballot for candidate selection. The Constitution of Finland § 25 enshrines the secret ballot. Comprehensive ballot-secrecy mandate codified.

§ 101.64 + § 101.6103 codify ballot secrecy via the secrecy-envelope-plus-mailing-envelope regime for absentee voting. Florida Constitution Art VI § 1 also guarantees secret ballot.

“The supervisor shall enclose with each vote-by-mail ballot two envelopes: a secrecy envelope, into which the absent elector shall enclose his or her marked ballot”

The statute mandates that voters must vote in isolation within a designated booth specifically designed to shield their ballot from public view, and that voters themselves place their ballot in the envelope without external handling. This architecture legally guarantees the unlinkability between voter identity and ballot choice, as the physical isolation and process prevent anyone from observing which ballot an individual voter selects.

“Sans quitter la salle du scrutin, il doit se rendre isolément dans la partie de la salle aménagée pour le soustraire aux regards pendant qu'il met son bulletin dans l'enveloppe”

Election Code Article 3 declares 'universal, equal, and direct suffrage, by secret ballot' as foundational principles. Article 94 reinforces for presidential elections ('on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, by secret ballot'). Article 165 same for mayoral elections. Constitution Article 24 (electoral right) constitutionally enshrines secret ballot. Article 40 of Constitution requires Parliamentary chairperson elected by secret ballot. Comprehensive secret-ballot mandate.

“Basic principles for holding elections, referenda, and plebiscites in Georgia shall be:”

§ 21-2-379.1(6) codifies that DRE voting systems must 'permit voting in absolute secrecy so that no person can see or know for whom any other elector has voted or is voting'. § 21-2-365 codifies parallel for optical scan. § 21-2-322 codifies general voting machine secrecy. § 21-2-373 codifies write-in vote secrecy. § 21-2-579 makes ballot-disclosure intent a misdemeanor. Comprehensive secret-ballot mandate.

“It shall permit voting in absolute secrecy so that no person can see or know for whom any other elector has voted or is voting”

The section mandates that voters mark and fold their ballots in the voting booth in a way that makes their vote unrecognizable, and further prohibits photography/filming in the booth and requires poll workers to refrain from disclosing voter information in ways that could be overheard. These provisions legally guarantee and enforce voter-ballot unlinkability through procedural safeguards.

“Der Wähler begibt sich in die Wahlkabine, kennzeichnet dort seinen Stimmzettel und faltet ihn dort in der Weise, dass seine Stimmabgabe nicht erkennbar ist.”

Sύνταγμα Άρθρο 51 § 3 establishes secret ballot constitutionally. ΠΔ 26/2012 Άρθρο 113 codifies criminal penalty (≤2 years imprisonment) for any attempt to learn how a voter voted. Άρθρο 83 codifies the operational procedure for voter secrecy (separate enclosed space, sealed envelope, judicial monogram). Comprehensive secrecy guarantee.

“Όποιος με οποιοδήποτε τρόπο επιχειρεί ή πετυχαίνει να λάβει γνώση, είτε ο ίδιος, είτε τρίτος, τι ψήφισε ο εκλογέας τιμωρείται με φυλάκιση μέχρι δύο χρόνια”

The statute explicitly mandates that ballot secrecy ('valghandlingens hemmelighed') must be ensured ('sikret') and protected as a condition for any deviations from electoral procedures. This establishes a legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability that the Electoral Board must maintain and enforce.

“valghandlingens hemmelighed og kontrol med valgets gennemførelse i det hele fortsat er sikret”

The section mandates that voters must place their marked ballot in a secrecy envelope or sleeve before placing it in the return identification envelope, which is a structural mechanism that ensures the ballot itself is separated from the voter's identification information. This physical separation is legally required and enforceable through the instruction that ballots must comply with these procedures to be valid.

“Inserting the marked ballot in the secrecy envelope or secrecy sleeve; (3) Inserting the secrecy envelope or secrecy sleeve with the marked ballot in the return identification envelope”

The section explicitly mandates that municipal council representatives 'shall be elected by secret ballot,' which establishes a legal guarantee of ballot secrecy and thus voter-ballot unlinkability. This is an enforceable statutory requirement with no exceptions noted.

“Representatives on municipal councils shall be elected by secret ballot in general elections”

The section explicitly guarantees the absolute secrecy of all ballots in accordance with the Idaho Constitution, and further specifies that unique identifiers assigned to ballots are 'never associated with the identity of the voter,' thereby ensuring voter-ballot unlinkability. This dual protection—constitutional guarantee and statutory design of non-identifying ballot marking—satisfies the criterion.

Illinois Constitution Article III § 4 codifies the secrecy-of-voting guarantee at the highest tier. 10 ILCS 5/17-8 implements via voting-booth design (3-sided + curtain, screened from observation). § 17-14 protects assistance-mode secrecy.

“insure secrecy of voting and the integrity of the election process”

The statute directly mandates that ballot card voting systems must enable voters to cast votes in secrecy, which establishes voter–ballot unlinkability as a legal requirement enforceable through the system's design specifications.

This section explicitly mandates that the special precinct election board preserve ballot secrecy, which is a legal guarantee. The section further details procedures designed to maintain voter-ballot unlinkability, including requirements to intermingle ballots, remove them from affidavit envelopes without examination, and prevent unauthorized persons from obtaining information about the count. These provisions establish an enforceable legal obligation to maintain ballot secrecy.

Section 161 creates a legal obligation on persons present at various stages of voting (ballot issuance, voting, counting) to maintain ballot secrecy. This requirement directly supports voter-ballot unlinkability by ensuring that those with access to voting materials are legally bound to preserve the secret nature of ballots, making it enforceable through breach of statutory duty.

“shall maintain and aid in maintaining the secrecy of the ballot”

The section explicitly mandates that elections of the President, deputies, akims, and other officials shall be held 'by secret ballot,' which is the primary legal mechanism that guarantees voter–ballot unlinkability and prevents the linking of a voter's identity to their ballot choice. This directly satisfies the criterion for ballot secrecy as a legally enforceable principle.

“by secret ballot”

KRS 117.125(1) bars approval of any voting system that does not 'ensure secrecy to the voter in the act of voting so that no person can see or know for whom any other voter has voted or is voting,' except for voters requiring assistance. KRS 118.025(1) requires that voting in all primaries and elections be 'by secret paper ballot.' Ballot secrecy is guaranteed.

“Ensure secrecy to the voter in the act of voting so that no person can see or know for whom any other voter has voted or is voting”

Ballot secrecy is constitutionally guaranteed — Article 6 of the Satversme requires the Saeima to be elected 'by secret ballot' — and § 28 of the Election Commissions Law requires polling premises to be equipped for a secret ballot; the voter seals the ballot envelope alone in a booth (§ 24 EP).

“and by secret ballot based on proportional”

§ 5 of the Seimas Election Law (and § 6, § 2 of the Referendum Law) guarantees the secret ballot — voters vote in person and by secret ballot, and voting by proxy is prohibited.

“Voters shall vote in person and by secret ballot.”

The statute explicitly guarantees that no one is obligated to reveal the secret of their vote under any circumstances, including judicial proceedings and parliamentary inquiries. This directly establishes a legally enforceable guarantee of ballot secrecy that prevents the linking of voters to their ballots.

“Nul n'est tenu de révéler le secret de son vote, à quelque réquisition que ce soit, même dans le cadre d'une instruction ou contestation judiciaire ou d'une enquête parlementaire.”

The statute explicitly guarantees that voting is secret ('secret'), which is the legal foundation for voter-ballot unlinkability. The provision that votes cannot be exercised by proxy or correspondence further reinforces the personal and secret nature of the ballot, preventing any mechanism that could link a voter to their specific ballot choice.

“Le vote est personnel et secret.”

The statute explicitly requires that voting systems must 'protect the secrecy of the ballot' as a mandatory certification standard. This legal requirement directly addresses ballot secrecy and voter–ballot unlinkability, making it a binding enforceable standard that voting systems must meet to be certified and used in Maryland.

“protect the secrecy of the ballot”

The statute explicitly mandates that electronic voting systems must guarantee secret suffrage (sufragio libre y en secreto), which is the legal foundation for voter-ballot unlinkability. This requirement ensures that votes cannot be linked to individual voters, preventing coercion and preserving ballot secrecy.

“Evitar la coacción del voto, garantizando el sufragio libre y en secreto;”

§ 204C.17 codifies voting secrecy: 'a voter shall not reveal to anyone in the polling place the name of any candidate for whom the voter intends to vote or has' voted. § 204C.18 codifies that election judges 'shall make no entry or notation… showing the political party to which a voter belongs or for which political party the voter voted.' § 206.80(1) codifies that electronic voting systems must permit every voter to vote in secret. Comprehensive ballot-secrecy mandate codified.

“Except as authorized by section 204C.15, a voter shall not reveal to anyone in the polling place the name of any candidate for whom the voter intends to vote or has”

The statute explicitly requires that voting machines permit voting in absolute secrecy, which establishes a legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. This is an enforceable requirement for all voting machines used in Missouri.

“Permits voting in absolute secrecy”

The statute legally mandates structural arrangements that guarantee ballot secrecy by requiring voters to use secret ballot booths before depositing ballots, making voter-ballot unlinkability a physically enforced requirement. The section also explicitly assigns the electoral bureau responsibility for 'secrecy of voters' expression,' establishing an enforceable duty to maintain this protection.

§ 13-1-102 guarantees the secret ballot — 'All elections shall be by secret ballot' — reinforced by Article IV, section 1 of the Montana Constitution, and § 13-17-103(1)(a) requires every voting system to let an elector vote in secrecy.

“All elections shall be by secret ballot.”

The statute explicitly mandates that polling stations ('stemlokaal') are arranged in such a way that ballot secrecy ('stemgeheim') is guaranteed ('gewaarborgd'). This directly establishes a legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability by requiring institutional design that prevents disclosure of how individuals voted.

“Het stemlokaal is zodanig ingericht dat het stemgeheim is gewaarborgd.”

The statute directly requires that mail ballots be kept secret through a clerk-developed procedure, establishing an enforceable legal guarantee of ballot secrecy. This obligation to maintain ballot secrecy is a core mechanism for protecting voter-ballot unlinkability.

§ 8-300 codifies privacy-booth procedure: 'only two voters at a time for each ballot scanner, ballot marking device, or privacy booth.' § 7-202(e) codifies private and independent vote verification. § 8-312 codifies voter retiring alone to cast ballot. Ballot secrecy is structurally codified throughout Article 8.

§ 16.1-13-23 codifies that 'upon receipt of a ballot within the provided secrecy sleeve, the elector, without leaving the polling place, shall retire alone to one of the voting booths or compartments to prepare the elector's ballot' — voter must retire alone, ballot in secrecy sleeve. § 16.1-07-12 codifies absentee secrecy. § 16.1-06-14 codifies voting-system secrecy requirements. § 16.1-13-29 codifies booth-screening requirement.

“the elector, without leaving the polling place, shall retire alone to one of the voting booths or compartments to prepare the elector's ballot”

The section explicitly mandates secret ballot voting (비밀 투표) as a principle for elections at all levels of sovereignty organs. This directly guarantees the unlinkability between voters and their ballots, which is the core requirement of ballot secrecy.

§ 6-9(1) codifies that 'the voter shall, shielded and unseen, choose ballot, make any changes and fold the ballot, so that it is not visible what the voter has voted' (Velgeren skal avskjermet og usett velge stemmeseddel...). § 21-3 codifies confidentiality (taushetsplikt) for any person who through election duties learns how a voter voted. § 1-1 codifies the foundational secret-ballot principle. Comprehensive ballot-secrecy mandate.

“Velgeren skal avskjermet og usett velge stemmeseddel, gjøre eventuelle endringer og brette sammen stemmeseddelen, slik at det ikke er synlig hva velgeren har stemt.”

The section explicitly mandates that marking devices must permit and require voting in 'absolute secrecy' and be constructed so that no person can see or know for whom another elector has voted. This legal requirement for ballot secrecy is enforceable through the board of voting systems examiners' approval and the secretary of state's certification process, ensuring voter-ballot unlinkability is guaranteed at the statutory level.

The statute explicitly mandates that ballot marking arrangements 'shall ensure' the elector may mark with 'absolute secrecy,' which is a legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. The use of mandatory language ('shall') makes this enforceable.

Section 1107(i) explicitly mandates that voting machines must 'permit and require voting in absolute secrecy' and be constructed so that no person can see or know how any other elector has voted. This directly guarantees voter–ballot unlinkability by requiring physical and operational separation of the voter from any record linkable to their vote, enforced through machine design requirements.

The section explicitly states that Senate elections are conducted in secret voting (głosowaniu tajnym), which legally guarantees voter-ballot unlinkability by requiring that the voting process itself be secret. This is a direct statutory mandate of ballot secrecy.

“odbywają się w głosowaniu tajnym”

The statute explicitly prohibits coercion to reveal one's vote under any pretense and further restricts disclosure of voting choices within and around polling places. This establishes a legal guarantee of ballot secrecy that protects voter-ballot unlinkability by making it illegal to force or discover how a voter voted.

“Ninguém pode ser, sob qualquer pretexto, obrigado a revelar o seu voto.”

The section explicitly guarantees that votes cast in elections are secret (votul este secret). This legal guarantee of ballot secrecy establishes the fundamental legal protection for voter–ballot unlinkability, making it enforceable as a statutory requirement.

“Votul exercitat în cadrul alegerilor este secret.”

Article 7 explicitly codifies: 'Voting at elections and referenda shall be by secret balloting, which shall exclude any control over expression of a citizen's will.' Article 3(1) reinforces ('A citizen of the Russian Federation shall participate in elections on the basis of the universal, equal and direct electoral right by secret balloting'). Constitutionally grounded in Constitution Article 81 (presidential) and Article 32 (general suffrage).

MP Election Law Article 55 ('Voter may vote only once during election. Voting is secret.') is the statutory secrecy clause. Article 58 (4510) operationalizes it ('a separate booth must be provided'); Article 69 (4521) imposes a duty on polling board members 'da u potpunosti bude obezbeđena tajnost glasanja'. Local Elections Law Article 17 (4584) and MP Election Law Article 37 (4489) impose secrecy as a polling-board duty.

“Бирач у току одржавања избора може гласати само једанпут. Гласање је тајно.”

The section explicitly mandates that voting secrecy must be preserved when assistance is provided to voters, establishing a legal guarantee that even voters receiving assistance (e.g., those unable to read or with physical disabilities) maintain ballot secrecy. This ensures voter-ballot unlinkability is enforceable in the context of assisted voting.

“The secrecy of voting contemplated in section 38 must be preserved in the application of illis section.”

Article 86(1) of LOREG provides an explicit constitutional-level statutory guarantee that voting is secret ('El voto es secreto'). This establishes voter–ballot unlinkability as a mandatory legal principle. Section 2 further reinforces this by requiring voters to use a voting booth (cabina) where they select their ballot papers privately, and section 3 ensures the President announces only the voter's name before depositing the sealed envelope, preventing linkage between voter identity and ballot content.

“El voto es secreto.”

8 kap. 1 § codifies that 'at a polling station there shall be an appropriate number of separated places (voting screens) where voters can vote WITHOUT INSIGHT' (utan insyn). 7 kap. 3 § codifies that 'each voter shall be ALONE behind a voting screen and themselves prepare their votes.' 8 kap. 2 § codifies that ballots be available at a separated place where voters take them 'each for themselves without insight.' Comprehensive ballot-secrecy mandate codified.

“På ett röstmottagningsställe skall det finnas ett lämpligt antal avskilda platser (valskärmar) där väljarna kan rösta utan insyn.”

§ 122.001(a)(1) bars use of any voting system that does not 'preserve the secrecy of the ballot,' and § 1.0015 declares the legislative intent to 'protect the secrecy of the ballot.' § 61.012 requires accessible voting stations that provide a practical means to cast a secret ballot; § 31.014(a-1) references the secret-ballot right under Art. VI § 4 of the Texas Constitution. Ballot secrecy guaranteed.

“preserves the secrecy of the ballot”

Law 298 Article 2 declares 'Vote is given secretly' as a foundational principle. Reinforced by Anayasa Article 67 (constitutional principle of secret ballot + open count), Law 298 Article 76 (closed voting booth specifications: must not be visible from outside), Law 2820 Articles 21, 27, 37 (internal party elections also by secret ballot).

“Oy gizli verilir.”

Art. I-16 codifies secret voting + prohibits any form of control over voter expression. Art. I-17 codifies personal voting (no proxy, no transfer). Art. I-9 (not surfaced for this datapoint) codifies secret-ballot principle. Reinforced by criminal provisions in the Criminal Code (separate instrument). Strong codified ballot-secrecy mandate.

“Voting in elections in Ukraine shall be secret. Any form of control over the content of the expression of a voter’s will, establishing or disclosing the content of a voter’s will with regard to a particular voter shall be prohibited.”

The statute explicitly makes it unlawful to hinder, intimidate, or interfere with a voter in casting a secret ballot, and provides enforcement mechanisms through arrest and jail commitment. This directly guarantees the legal protection of ballot secrecy and voter–ballot unlinkability by establishing criminal penalties for violations.

“It shall be unlawful for any person to hinder, intimidate, or interfere with any qualified voter so as to prevent the voter from casting a secret ballot.”

The statute explicitly guarantees 'absolute secrecy of the vote' and prohibits requiring voters to disclose their political choices. This establishes a legal protection for voter-ballot unlinkability by ensuring votes cannot be traced to individual voters and voters cannot be compelled to reveal how they voted.

“The right of absolute secrecy of the vote. No voter may be required to disclose political faith or adherence in order to vote”

The statute guarantees the right to a private voting booth where the voter marks the ballot alone, which is a core mechanism for ensuring voter-ballot unlinkability. The statute further requires removal of ballot stubs and use of secrecy envelopes/sleeves, preventing identification of ballots with voters. These provisions together create a legal framework that guarantees and enforces ballot secrecy.

“The voter shall enter the voting booth alone and there mark the ballot”

Wis. Stat. § 5.91 codifies that voting devices/ballots must be certified by the commission. Wisconsin's ballot secrecy is constitutionally grounded in Wis. Const. Art. III § 3 (right to secret ballot) and statutorily reinforced through Ch. 6 + § 5.79 (voter instruction within enclosed voting booth) — though those specific articles weren't FTS-surfaced for this datapoint.

The statute explicitly requires that every electronic voting system adopted for use in Wyoming 'Provide for voting in secrecy,' which is a direct legal mandate that voter-ballot unlinkability be maintained. This is a clear, enforceable requirement embedded in the statutory capabilities that systems must meet.

“Provide for voting in secrecy”

The section requires voting booths designed to enable marking ballots in secrecy, which addresses physical ballot secrecy during voting. However, it does not establish voter–ballot unlinkability (the voter's identity remaining unconnected to the ballot cast), which is the specific requirement of the criterion. The statute mandates secrecy during marking but does not guarantee or address the enforceable separation of voter identity from ballot in the broader election administration process.

“The voting booths shall be durably constructed and shall be of sufficient size and so designed as to enable the voter to mark the voter's ballot in secrecy.”

The statute prohibits acts that invade or interfere with voting secrecy and imposes criminal penalties, demonstrating legal protection and enforceability. However, it does not affirmatively guarantee or establish ballot secrecy procedures; it only penalizes violations. The criterion asks whether voter–ballot unlinkability is 'legally guaranteed,' which requires a positive mandate, not merely prohibitions against interference.

“does any act which invades or interferes with the secrecy of the voting or causes the same to be invaded or interfered with, shall be guilty of a class D felony”

The section mandates secret voting (tajným hlasováním) as a constitutional principle but does not establish enforceable mechanisms, procedures, or legal remedies to guarantee or enforce voter–ballot unlinkability. It states the principle without addressing implementation, audit procedures, or enforcement.

“tajným hlasováním”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

The statute mandates voting 'in absolute secrecy' and requires paper records of votes, which are foundational to ballot secrecy. However, the section does not explicitly address voter–ballot unlinkability (the principle that cast ballots cannot be linked back to individual voters), which is a distinct legal guarantee from simple voting secrecy. The paper record requirement could actually create linkability risks if records are not properly managed, though the statute does not directly address this.

“shall provide for voting in absolute secrecy, except as to persons who request assistance due to temporary illness or disability or a lack of proficiency in reading the English language”

The statute requires confidentiality efforts but does not guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability. The phrase 'as confidential as practicable' is a permissive standard that allows exceptions and does not legally guarantee that ballots cannot be linked to voters, particularly in electronic transmission and facsimile scenarios where a voter's name and contact information are used to deliver materials.

The statute permits secret ballots but does not legally guarantee or mandate their use—it merely allows caucuses to 'order' voting by secret ballot as an option. The first voting method (checking names on a list) does not protect ballot secrecy. Since ballot secrecy is discretionary rather than guaranteed and enforceable, the criterion is not satisfied.

“The caucus may order voting to be done by secret ballot which may be printed, or written on plain paper.”

The section imposes criminal penalties on Assistant Commissioners for revealing how a voter voted, which protects ballot secrecy against disclosure by officials. However, it does not affirmatively guarantee the structural mechanisms that ensure voter–ballot unlinkability (such as ballot design, separation of voter identity from ballots, or procedures preventing ballot traceability). It addresses only post-voting disclosure rather than the legal guarantee of the system itself.

“Every Assistant Commissioner who shall reveal the manner of voting of any voter when such manner of voting shall have come to his knowledge in the course of the exercise of his functions under this Act shall be guilty of an offence”

While the statute requires provisional ballots to be grouped in a manner that 'allows for the secrecy of the ballot to the greatest extent possible,' this falls short of a strict guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. The language is aspirational rather than mandatory, and the statute permits identification of provisional voters by name, address, date of birth, and provisional voter number for status-checking purposes. Additionally, subsection (j) explicitly allows the state secretary to discuss ballot disposition with the provisional voter themselves, which implies the system maintains some form of linkage between voter identity and ballot for administrative purposes. A true guarantee of unlinkability would prohibit any such linkage.

“grouped with other ballots in a manner that allows for the secrecy of the ballot to the greatest extent possible”

The section requires use of a secrecy sleeve to conceal votes from observation, which is a procedural mechanism intended to protect ballot secrecy. However, this addresses visual concealment during the voting process, not voter–ballot unlinkability in the sense of preventing the linkage of a voter's identity to their specific ballot or votes cast, which is the core meaning of the criterion. The statute does not establish mechanisms to prevent election officials or systems from linking votes back to individual voters.

The section requires electronic voting systems to provide for voting in secrecy when used with voting booths, which addresses ballot secrecy. However, it does not establish voter-ballot unlinkability as a distinct guarantee or specify enforcement mechanisms to prevent linkage of votes to individual voters. The requirement is conditional on booth usage and does not comprehensively address the technological or procedural unlinkability that modern voter-ballot unlinkability guarantees typically entail.

“Provide for voting in secrecy when used with voting booths”

The statute mandates provision of 'secrecy sleeves' as equipment, which is a physical mechanism intended to protect ballot secrecy. However, the section merely requires election officials to provide these materials—it does not explicitly guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability as a legal right, nor does it establish enforceability mechanisms or substantive protections for ballot secrecy beyond requiring equipment availability. The criterion asks for a legal guarantee and enforceability of unlinkability, which this section does not establish.

“secrecy sleeves”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates political contributions and donor disclosure requirements. It does not address ballot secrecy, voter-ballot unlinkability, or the mechanisms that protect the secrecy of individual voter choices. The criterion concerns the confidentiality of voting itself, which is a separate topic from campaign finance restrictions.

The section requires voters to certify that they marked and sealed the ballot in secret, and requires ballot assistance providers to maintain secrecy. However, it does not establish unlinkability between voter identity and ballot: the certificate itself requires the voter's name and address, and the ballot is returned in an inner envelope bearing this identifying certificate. This design inherently links the voter to the ballot contents, failing the unlinkability guarantee that true ballot secrecy requires.

“I MARKED AND SEALED THIS BALLOT AND CERTIFICATE IN SECRET.”

The section declares that securing ballot secrecy is a purpose of the Election Code, but a statement of purpose does not establish a legally enforceable guarantee or mechanism. The criterion requires that voter–ballot unlinkability be legally guaranteed and enforceable; this section only identifies an aspirational goal without providing substantive legal protections, procedures, or enforcement mechanisms.

“It is the purpose of the Election Code [Chapter 1 NMSA 1978] to secure the secrecy of the ballot”

The section mandates physical private spaces for voters to mark ballots in secrecy, which addresses the infrastructure for ballot secrecy. However, it does not establish legal guarantees or enforcement mechanisms for voter–ballot unlinkability (preventing the linkage of specific votes to specific voters), which is the core requirement of the criterion. The provision ensures privacy during marking but does not guarantee that ballots remain unlinked to voter identity through the entire electoral process.

“A sufficient number of private spaces for all voters to mark their official ballots in secrecy”

This section permits the use of secrecy folders to conceal votes but does not legally guarantee or enforce ballot-voter unlinkability as a mandatory system requirement. The language 'may insert' indicates optional use rather than a binding guarantee, and the statute does not establish enforceable safeguards against ballot linkage to voter identity.

The section expresses an intent to safeguard mail ballot voters from 'invasion of privacy,' which is conceptually related to ballot secrecy. However, it is a statement of legislative purpose and construction principles rather than an enforceable legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. It does not establish specific procedures, mechanisms, or requirements that would legally guarantee and make enforceable the secrecy of the ballot itself.

“by assuring that the procedures set forth in this chapter controlling the application and balloting processes are strictly enforced, and by safeguarding the mail ballot voter from harassment, intimidation, and invasion of privacy”

The section mandates folding and preservation of ballot secrecy during the curbside voting process, but it does not guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability. The process involves managers observing the voter outside the vehicle and handling the ballot afterward, which creates opportunities for the ballot to be linked to the voter. The statute protects the physical secrecy of the ballot (keeping its contents hidden) but does not enforce the separation between voter identity and ballot identity that would be required for true voter-ballot unlinkability.

“After the voter has voted his ballot, he must fold it so that the secrecy of the ballot is preserved and return it to the managers waiting outside the vehicle.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

While the statute guarantees that voters may mark their ballots in 'complete secrecy and privacy,' it does not ensure voter-ballot unlinkability. The statute explicitly requires judges to compare ballot numbers on stubs with ballot applications and to file applications and stubs in order received, creating a linkage between voter identity and ballot number that undermines unlinkability. The secrecy protects the voting location and marking process but not the anonymity of the completed ballot.

“The voter shall then go to a place where the voter may mark the ballot in complete secrecy and privacy”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section amends provisions regarding free delivery of election addresses to candidates in the Greater London Authority, specifically extending those provisions to persons with anonymous entries in voter registers. It does not address ballot secrecy, voter–ballot unlinkability, or any mechanism to guarantee or enforce the secrecy of voting. The section is about electoral communication logistics, not ballot confidentiality.

The section acknowledges the right to cast a secret ballot as an issue to be studied and considered, but it does not establish or guarantee voter-ballot unlinkability itself. This is a study directive about best practices, not an enforceable legal requirement implementing ballot secrecy protections for military and overseas voters.

“the right of such voters to cast a secret ballot”

The section requires voting systems to protect ballot secrecy, but this is a performance standard for equipment certification rather than a guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability or an enforceable legal right. The statute mandates that voting equipment meet this criterion during testing, but does not establish a legally enforceable guarantee that voters cannot be linked to their ballots through operational procedures or other means.

“protects the secrecy of a voter's ballot”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2587 ('Rules for counting votes') governs voter-intent determination, not ballot secrecy. Vermont guarantees ballot secrecy through the Australian-ballot system and § 2504 (voting booths that let a voter mark a ballot 'without having his or her choices observed by any other person'), but that provision was not surfaced for this datapoint.