Audit method

Cal. Elec. Code § 19204.5 codifies the RISK-LIMITING AUDIT (RLA) method: SoS may not certify voting systems incapable of ballot-level comparison RLA. CA was the first US state to operationalize RLAs (SB 360, 2018). Combined with the longstanding 1% manual tally (Div 15) and § 15302 reconciliation, CA scores ordinal level 4 (risk-limiting audit). Level 5 ('RLA + reconciliation') would require explicit codified reconciliation between the two — present but separate.

The section requires certification courses to include instruction in risk-limiting audits, demonstrating that Colorado recognizes and mandates training on this audit method. However, the section does not directly mandate that risk-limiting audits must be performed—it only requires that election officials receive certification training on this method. The statute establishes RLA as a required knowledge area rather than an operational requirement.

“Risk-limiting audits”

The statute mandates that post-election audits be conducted using statistical principles designed to limit risk of incorrect outcomes, with a pre-established risk limit. This describes a risk-limiting audit (RLA) methodology. The section also requires visual examination of original paper ballots and review of chain of custody documentation, but does not explicitly mandate reconciliation with cast vote records or other ballot comparison elements.

“Post-election audits must be conducted on the basis of statistical principles designed to limit the risk that certified election returns may produce an incorrect outcome. The risk limit must be established by the Secretary of State prior to each eligible election.”

The statute mandates that each county clerk conduct a risk-limiting audit (RLA) of election results in accordance with Secretary of State regulations. The definition provided confirms the audit uses statistical principles and methods designed to limit the risk of certifying an incorrect outcome, which corresponds to the ordinal level 4 in the scoring rubric.

“risk-limiting audit”

New Mexico's voting system check mandates a risk-limiting audit (RLA) mechanism. The statute explicitly requires a statistical process designed to detect faulty tabulators with at least 90% probability if they would alter the election outcome, and includes cascading sample expansion with error-rate thresholds (90% of winning margin) that trigger full recounts. This matches the risk-limiting audit standard for score 4.

The section mandates that county clerks must conduct either a hand count or a risk-limiting audit at each election, with detailed specifications for risk-limiting audits. The statute establishes risk-limiting audit as an available and regulated method, meeting the ordinal level 4 requirement for a risk-limiting audit framework.

Rhode Island General Laws § 17-19-37.4 mandates risk-limiting audits (RLA) as the audit method for presidential preference primary and general elections beginning in 2020. The statute provides a detailed definition of RLA and requires its implementation by the state board in conjunction with local boards. This satisfies the criterion at level 4 on the ordinal scale.

“Commencing in 2020, the state board, in conjunction with local boards, must conduct risk-limiting audits after the presidential preference primary and general elections in accordance with the requirements in this section.”

§ 127.302 codifies a genuine statutory risk-limiting audit: the general custodian must participate in an RLA of selected statewide races, and § 127.303(b) requires rules that, 'using widely accepted statistical methods,' set the number or percentage of paper records counted. § 129.003(c) makes the RLA determinative of the official record. Plus the universal § 127.201 1% hand-count audit. A true RLA codified (ordinal 4/5 — RLA covers selected statewide races rather than the entire ballot).

Virginia Code § 24.2-671.2 explicitly mandates risk-limiting audits (RLA) as the audit method. The statute defines RLA in detail, prescribes procedures for conducting them, and requires the State Board to conduct RLAs in specific election years and cycles. This directly satisfies the criterion for a risk-limiting audit audit method.

Washington mandates post-election audits using at minimum one of four specified methods, including risk-limiting audits (score 4), comparison audits (score 3), and other approaches. However, the statute does not mandate risk-limiting audit + reconciliation together; it permits counties to choose among alternative methods. The risk-limiting audit option represents the highest audit standard available, but the law's flexibility to select from multiple methods prevents a score of 5 (which would require RLA + reconciliation as a unified mandate).

“the county auditor shall conduct an audit of duplicated ballots in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, and an audit using at minimum one of the following methods”

§ 101.591 enumerates the audit method (manual or automated independent), random selection of races and precincts, and post-certification timing. Not a true RLA (no statistical risk-limit), but specific procedural method codified — ordinal 3/5.

“the county canvassing board or the local board responsible for certifying the election shall conduct a manual audit or an automated, independent audit”

§ 21-2-498 codifies risk-limiting audits (RLA) with statutory definitions of 'risk limit' and 'incorrect outcome'. Ordinal level 3: risk-limiting audit codified by name with statistical-methods requirement — among the strongest audit-method codifications in the US.

““Risk-limiting audit” means an audit protocol that makes use of statistical methods and is designed to limit to acceptable levels the risk of certifying a preliminary election outcome that constitutes an incorrect outcome.”

KRS 117.383(8) codifies the audit method: a hand-to-eye audit in which a randomly selected scanner and race in every county are hand-counted by two poll workers of different parties, the two independent tallies must match (repeated until they do), the hand totals are compared to the machine register tape, and any discrepancy triggers an election investigation that broadens until resolved, with findings reported to the Attorney General and Secretary of State. A detailed mandatory randomized hand-count audit codified — robust, though not a statistical risk-limiting audit (ordinal 3/5).

The statute mandates a comparison audit method where paper ballots are processed by audit equipment and compared against the results of the device being audited. This is a comparison audit (score 3) rather than a risk-limiting audit or RLA with reconciliation, as it does not employ statistical risk-limiting methodologies to determine sample sizes based on risk limits.

“The paper ballots for each device audited shall be processed by the audit equipment, and the results shall be compared with the results from the specific device being audited.”

The statute mandates that boards conduct an audit using one of three approved protocols: risk-limiting audit, percentage-based audit, or another protocol approved by the secretary of state. However, the statute does not mandate a single specific method; instead it permits either the board to choose among the protocols or the secretary of state to select which protocol applies. Since risk-limiting audit is an available option (level 4) but not required, and percentage-based audit is also available (level 2), the overall mandate falls between these methods. The statute does not mandate RLA + reconciliation (level 5).

§ 2493(a)(3) codifies the audit method: the Secretary of State conducts a random post-election audit by opening the ballot bags and counting 'in the same manner as ballots are counted under sections 2581 through 2588' — a hand count — then publicly announcing the audit results alongside the original return, and referring possible fraud to the Attorney General. A mandatory random hand-count audit method codified (ordinal 3/5 — not a statistical risk-limiting audit).

Alabama Code § 17-16-20 mandates a recount when margins are 0.5% or less, involving machine counting with hand recount of discrepancies. This constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount triggered by a narrow margin threshold, not a risk-limiting audit or comparison audit approach. The statute applies only to close elections, not as a statewide post-election audit method.

“The recount shall consist of reading the ballots through the counter. Any ballot that was counted in the original election, but is rejected by the counter in the recount, shall be counted by hand.”

This section mandates a fixed-percentage hand recount (5% of precincts) for court-ordered recounts in legislative, statewide and federal candidate races, which corresponds to the ordinal level 2 (fixed-% hand recount). However, this applies only to recounts ordered by courts in contested elections, not as a general post-election audit requirement, limiting its scope to a partial satisfaction of the audit method criterion.

“the county chairpersons of the political parties entitled to continued representation on the ballot or the chairperson's designee shall select at random without the use of a computer five percent of the precincts for the recounted race for a hand count”

The statute mandates use of a voter-verified paper audit trail but does not specify the statistical methodology or sample-size approach. This appears to be a hand-count verification method based on paper records, corresponding to a fixed or predetermined approach rather than a risk-limiting or comparison audit design. The statute requires audits but lacks the probabilistic framework characteristic of RLAs or the detailed comparison protocols of structured comparison audits.

“Conduct the audit by using the voter-verified paper audit trail”

Article 50 codifies the recount method as a manual hand-recount of paper ballots (Armenia's voting is paper-only). Ordinal level 2: fixed-mechanism hand recount, not an RLA or comparison audit (those concepts presuppose electronic counting).

Article 83 + 89 + 79 codify hand-count + protocol verification through the commission hierarchy (precinct → district → regional → Central). Article 141 covers recall voting. Ordinal level 2: fixed-mechanism hand recount codified.

The section mandates a sample-based audit method (votação paralela—parallel voting) to verify electronic ballot box functioning on election day, which constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount/verification approach. However, the statute does not specify the exact percentage sampled, the procedures for reconciliation, or risk-limiting audit methodology, limiting it to a basic auditing mechanism rather than a comprehensive post-election audit framework.

The section mandates a hand recount (judicial recount) but only in a narrow circumstance when the margin is less than 1/1000 of votes cast. This is a triggered recount rather than a systematic fixed-percentage audit of all elections, and does not implement a comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or reconciliation approach. It represents a partial audit method that is margin-based rather than fixed-percentage.

“If the difference between the number of votes cast for the candidate with the most votes and the number cast for any other candidate is less than 1/1000 of the votes cast, the returning officer shall make a request to a judge for a recount”

Connecticut law mandates a manual audit (hand recount) of a fixed percentage (not less than 5%) of voting districts. This is a fixed-percentage hand recount audit method, which corresponds to scoring level 2 under the ordinal scale. The statute does not require risk-limiting audits or comparison audits.

“the registrars of voters shall conduct a manual audit, or an electronic audit authorized under section 9-320g , of the votes recorded in not less than five per cent of the voting districts in the state, district or municipality”

The statute mandates hand counting of paper ballots and comparison to electronic totals, which constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount method. The section requires audits of randomly selected voting devices and election districts rather than a more sophisticated risk-limiting approach.

“counting by hand the votes on each paper ballot from a voting device and comparing the paper ballot totals to the totals kept by the voting device electronically”

§ 72 codifies the FINTÆLLING — final recount conducted by valgbestyrelsen the day after voting, PUBLIC. § 73 codifies that this recount is a NEW count of every cast ballot by polling district. § 68 codifies the polling-station preliminary count, also public. § 52 codifies pre-count ballot reconciliation. Ordinal level 2: 100% manual count by hand at the polling station + 100% manual recount by district commission — stronger than fixed-percentage audit.

Estonia mandates a security/process audit — penetration testing and a security-measures audit before voting (§ 48⁷) plus a process-and-data audit including a second counting of electronic votes (§ 48⁸). This is a process and integrity audit rather than a fixed-percentage hand recount or a margin-driven risk-limiting audit, so it maps to the lower-middle of the ordinal.

“Before electronic voting begins, the following is carried out with regard to the electronic voting system:”

§ 87 codifies the tarkastuslaskenta — a full manual re-examination of every cast ballot the day after the election, determining anew which ballots count for which candidate and which are invalid. § 78 codifies the preliminary manual count at the polling station, conducted without interruption. § 86 codifies advance-vote counting. Ordinal level 2: 100% manual count + 100% manual check-count — stronger than fixed-percentage audit (not a margin-driven RLA).

The section addresses recounting of ballot papers (Nachzählung von Stimmzetteln) and requires public notification of recounts, which represents a hand recount audit mechanism. However, it does not mandate a fixed percentage or automatic recount threshold—recounts appear to occur only when concerns about regularity arise (§76 Abs. 1), making this discretionary rather than a mandatory fixed-percentage audit.

“Im Falle einer Nachzählung von Stimmzetteln macht der Kreiswahlleiter die Nachzählung durch Aushang am oder im Eingang des Sitzungsgebäudes bekannt.”

Hawaii mandates a recount of all votes when the margin between candidates or on ballot questions is equal to or less than 100 votes or 0.5% of total votes cast, whichever is lesser. This is a fixed-percentage threshold-based hand recount triggered by close margins, fitting the ordinal level 2 (fixed-% hand recount) on the scoring scale.

“The chief election officer, or the clerk in the case of a county election, shall conduct a recount of all votes cast for any office or ballot question in any election if the official tabulation of all of the returns for that office or question reveals that the difference in: (1) The number of votes cast for a candidate apparently qualified for the general election ballot or elected to office and the number of votes cast for the closest apparently defeated opponent; or (2) The number of votes cast in the affirmative for the ballot question and the number of votes cast in the negative for the ballot question, including when applicable, the tabulation of blank votes, is equal to or less than one hundred votes or one-half of one per cent of the total number of votes cast for the contest, whichever is lesser.”

The statute mandates a hand recount of selected ballots (fixed-percentage method, capped at 5% of precincts) combined with comparison to reported results. This satisfies a basic fixed-percentage hand recount requirement but does not constitute a risk-limiting audit or RLA with reconciliation, which would require statistical methods tied to a specific risk limit.

“The postelection audit shall include, at a minimum, a hand recount of the ballots subject to the audit and a comparison to the results reported by the county for any precincts, days, batches, legislative districts, and tabulation machines selected for audit.”

The statute mandates that the secretary of state may conduct procedure audits of elections, but it does not specify the audit method (hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, etc.). The statute grants discretion to define the scope without prescribing a particular methodology, making it a general audit requirement without a defined method meeting the scoring rubric.

“a procedure audit of an election to be conducted”

Iowa Code § 50.51 mandates hand counting of ballots in selected precincts, which constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount method. However, the statute allows the hand count to be 'of less than all ballots cast, in accordance with rules adopted by the state commissioner,' meaning the specific percentage is determined by rule rather than statute and may vary. This is a hand recount approach but lacks the more robust audit methodologies (comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or RLA with reconciliation) contemplated by the scoring scale.

The statute mandates a manual audit and tally of votes in a fixed percentage (1%) of precincts, which constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount method. This is explicitly required before county board certification and applies to all elections.

“the county election officer shall conduct a manual audit or tally of each vote cast, regardless of the method of voting, in 1% of all precincts”

The section mandates a recount mechanism, but it is discretionary (triggered only by written request) rather than a systematic fixed-percentage hand recount. It does not establish a mandatory audit protocol, risk-limiting audit, or comparison audit framework. The recount is limited to a single instance and appears to be a remedial measure rather than a structured post-election audit.

“The precinct election commission (territorial election commission for the election of deputies of the Senate), at the request of an authorized representative submitted in writing, shall conduct a recount of votes only once within the period established by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article.”

The section mandates reconciliation of ballot paper accounts with actual vote counts in each box, which constitutes a form of hand recount verification. However, it does not specify the scope (e.g., whether all boxes or only a percentage), the statistical methodology, or risk-limiting audit parameters. This is a basic reconciliation requirement rather than a systematic audit method as defined in the scoring scale.

“the Commission shall immediately proceed to reconcile the Ballot Paper Account of each box delivered by the Assistant Commissioners with the actual number of votes in that box”

The statute mandates a fixed-percentage hand recount audit following each statewide general election. Subsection (d) specifies that the manual audit must cover at least 2% of precincts statewide and at least 1% of votes by category from the previous comparable general election, which constitutes a fixed-percentage manual audit rather than a risk-limiting or comparison audit methodology.

“a manual audit of voter–verifiable paper records in accordance with subsection (d) of this section”

Massachusetts mandates a hand-counted audit of votes in a fixed percentage of precincts (3% rounded up) following presidential general elections. This is a fixed-percentage hand recount method, which corresponds to ordinal level 2 on the scoring scale.

“Each precinct selected pursuant to subsection (c) shall conduct a hand-counted audit of votes cast on the day of election”

The statute mandates a random recount (recuento aleatorio) of up to 10% of ballot packages determined by a statistical method when vote margins between winning and second-place formulas are within one percentage point. This constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount audit method.

The section mandates that recounts must be conducted but does not specify the audit method (hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, etc.). The statute requires recounts to be fair, impartial, and uniform, but refers to sections 878-894 for the actual method details, which are not provided in this section.

The section requires DRE systems to produce a permanent paper record available for recounts, which enables manual auditing. However, it does not mandate any specific audit method (e.g., fixed-percentage hand recount, comparison audit, or risk-limiting audit). It only requires the capability and availability of paper records for potential recounts, without specifying when or how audits must be conducted. This supports manual recounts but does not establish a mandatory audit protocol.

The statute mandates a recount, which is defined as a hand count of all votes. This is a fixed-method hand recount triggered when a candidate loses by less than one percent (or one-half of one percent for state-level contests). However, this is triggered only upon contestant request in close races, not as a routine post-election audit procedure, and it is a full manual recount rather than a risk-limiting or comparison audit methodology.

“For purposes of this section, "recount" means one additional counting of all votes counted for the office or on the question with respect to which the recount is requested.”

§ 13-17-503 sets a fixed-percentage hand audit — at least 10% of precincts per county — manually counted and compared to the vote-counting-machine totals under § 13-17-506, escalating to more precincts on a discrepancy (§ 13-17-507). A fixed-percentage hand recount, not a risk-limiting audit. Level 2.

“at least 10% of the precincts in each county or a minimum of two precincts in each county, whichever is greater”

The section establishes that representative bodies may decide to conduct a new recount of ballots, which constitutes a manual recount audit method. However, it is discretionary (via 'kan besluiten') rather than mandatory, and no specific percentage or risk-limiting framework is prescribed, making it closer to a basic hand recount than a structured audit method.

“kan het vertegenwoordigend orgaan ten behoeve van het onderzoek, bedoeld in artikel V 4, eerste lid , besluiten tot een nieuwe opneming van de stembiljetten”

§ 9-211 mandates a fixed 3% random sample of voting machines/systems, manual audit of voter-verifiable audit records, with discrepancy thresholds that escalate. § 9-208 codifies recanvass procedure. § 16-113 codifies court-ordered manual audit on petition. Ordinal level 2: fixed-percentage manual audit (not risk-limiting; NY does not codify a margin-driven RLA).

“the board of elections or a bipartisan committee appointed by such board shall audit the voter verifiable audit records from three percent of voting machines or systems within the jurisdiction of such board.”

The statute mandates hand-to-eye recounts (manual visual inspection) for certain ballot items when margin thresholds are met, which corresponds to a fixed-percentage hand recount method. However, this is a recount triggered by candidate demand within narrow margins, not a comprehensive post-election audit system. The audit method is limited in scope and does not encompass risk-limiting audits or comparison audits.

“Hand-to-eye recounts shall also be ordered as provided by G.S. 163-182.7 A.”

§ 10-8(1) codifies that 'the first counting of ballots shall be done manually' (Den første opptellingen av stemmesedler skal skje manuelt). § 10-11(2) codifies that the second count may be either manual or machine ('Valgstyret bestemmer selv om den andre opptellingen skal skje manuelt eller maskinelt'). § 10-5(1) codifies double-counting of every ballot. Ordinal level 2: full hand count of 100% of ballots required (stronger than fixed-percentage audit; not risk-limiting by name).

“Den første opptellingen av stemmesedler skal skje manuelt.”

The section mandates a post-election audit using a fixed percentage (at least 2% of votes cast or 2,000 votes, whichever is lesser) hand recount with manual, mechanical, or electronic devices different from those used in the election. This is a fixed-percentage recount method, corresponding to score level 2.

Article 68 codifies the vote-counting method as open, transparent hand-counting at the precinct level. Article 69 codifies protocol-aggregation up the commission hierarchy. Article 77 enables cancellation of voting results upon discovered violations. Ordinal level 2: fixed-mechanism hand recount through commission hierarchy.

This section mandates recounts, which is a form of hand recount, when vote margins fall within one percent. However, the recount is triggered only when margins are extremely close (≤1%), not applied as a fixed percentage of all elections. This is a narrow, margin-based recount requirement rather than a systematic audit method covering all elections.

“the committee or board charged by law with canvassing such votes shall order a recount of such votes to be made forthwith”

11 kap. 5 § codifies that 'a cast ballot envelope may only be opened after it has been removed from a ballot urn for counting under the provisions of this chapter or chapter 12.' 12 kap. 6 § codifies that the municipal commission keeps a protocol of its count. 11 kap. 1 § (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies that the preliminary count is public and uninterrupted. Ordinal level 2: 100% manual count by hand at the polling station, then 100% manual review by municipal commission, then 100% manual final count by county administrative board — stronger than fixed-percentage audit.

The statute mandates a complete recount of all ballots in contested elections, which constitutes a fixed-percentage (100%) hand recount option. However, it does not mandate hand recounts universally—it only requires them in specific dispute circumstances, and even then permits the discretion to use automated tabulators instead. The statute does not establish a comprehensive post-election audit method, risk-limiting audit, or comparison audit framework.

“Any recount ordered by this section shall be a complete recount of all ballots cast in such election.”

This section mandates a permanent paper record with manual audit capacity and that the paper record must be available as an official record for any recount, which supports basic hand-count auditing capability. However, the statute does not specify the audit method (e.g., fixed percentage, comparison audit, or risk-limiting audit), leaving the actual audit protocol undefined.

“The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity for such system.”

The section requires the lieutenant governor to study post-election audit methods, including risk-limiting audits, and report recommendations. However, it does not mandate any specific audit method—it only directs a study and evaluation. No audit method is actually required to be implemented.

The statute mandates a fixed-percentage hand recount audit: at least 3% of precincts must have their voter-verified paper ballots manually counted during the canvass. This satisfies the fixed-% hand recount category (score 2), but does not meet the higher standards of comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or RLA with reconciliation. The audit is limited to a predetermined percentage rather than risk-based.

“During the canvass, at least three percent of the precincts are to be chosen at random and the voter-verified paper ballots are to be counted manually.”

Wis. Stat. § 9.01 codifies the recount method: recount petitioner may request recount conducted manually (hand count) or by means of the voting system. § 9.01(1)(b) sets margin-based recount-cost rules. § 5.90 governs electronic-system recounts. Ordinal level 2: fixed-mechanism hand recount option codified.

10 ILCS 5/24C-15.1 codifies discovery recount + audit procedures: DRE equipment tested, official ballots audited, redundant count available on request. Method codified but no risk-limiting / RLA standard.

§ 204C.36 codifies publicly-funded recounts for county/municipal/school offices at margins <0.25% (single-seat). § 204C.35 codifies federal/state/judicial recounts at <0.25-0.5% margins. § 206.88 codifies SoS partial recounts to verify accuracy. § 204C.361 codifies uniform recount rules adopted by SoS. Ordinal level 1: manual recount triggered by margin (not risk-limiting; the separate § 206.89 post-election review is a fixed-precinct audit).

§ 16.1-16-01 codifies the recount method: triggered automatically at narrow margins (0.5% general / 1% primary / 0.25% measures), with manual recount of paper ballots under guidelines established by the Secretary of State. § 16.1-15-04 codifies the canvass report. § 16.1-15-23 codifies canvass publication. Ordinal level 1: manual recount triggered by margin (not risk-limiting; not fixed-percentage post-tabulation audit).

§ 12-21-10 codifies the recount method — county recount board reviews ballots. § 12-21-29 codifies sealed-ballot opening for recount. § 12-21-32 codifies certification. § 12-21-35 codifies certification to canvassing board. § 12-21-16 codifies automatic tie-vote recount. Statutory recount method codified — ordinal level 1: manual recount triggered by margin/tie (no risk-limiting; no fixed-percentage post-tabulation audit).

Art. IV-254 codifies the territorial commission's continuous meeting to verify precinct protocols, with discrepancy-driven recount of precinct results. Art. III-179 reinforces for MP elections. This functions as a paper-based canvass verification rather than a separate fixed-percentage or risk-limiting audit. Ordinal level 1: hand-verification of precinct totals against territorial sum.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a table of contents listing article headings and section numbers for election recounts, with most sections marked as repealed. It does not describe any actual audit method, mandate, procedure, or requirement. The section provides no substantive content about what audit method is mandated.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 101 describes the procedural steps for counting votes at polling stations (escrutinio de mesa), including how to open ballots, separate valid/null/blank votes, and handle disputed votes. It does not establish or mandate any post-election audit method such as hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures. The section is about initial vote tabulation, not post-election verification or audit.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 274 describes the scrutiny and counting procedures for House of Representatives elections, including how ballot boxes are opened, votes counted, and results reported. It does not establish or mandate any post-election audit method, fixed-percentage hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures. The section is procedurally focused on the initial and fresh scrutiny of votes rather than post-election verification or auditing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 121 addresses procedures for partial repeat elections (Wiederholungswahl) and the handling of mail-in ballots during such elections. It does not contain any provisions mandating an audit method for post-election verification or ballot counting procedures. The section is procedurally focused on when preliminary results may be announced and when mail-in votes are counted, not on audit requirements.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 129 addresses the printing, distribution, and physical handling of ballots before and during voting, as well as the delivery of tally forms to counting bureaus. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audit methods, risk-limiting audits, hand recounts, comparison audits, or any verification procedures after the vote count.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 385 addresses the allocation of European Parliament mandates to parties and coalitions using the Hare-Niemeyer method. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audit procedures or audit methods of any kind. This section is entirely about mandate distribution and does not address election auditing.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the vote counting procedures performed by district election commissions, including the division and summing of ballots and preferential votes. It does not address audit methods, risk-limiting audits, hand recounts, or any post-election verification procedures. The section is about initial vote tabulation, not post-election auditing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the French Electoral Code addresses criminal penalties for ballot fraud and tampering by election officials, not audit methods. It does not mandate or describe any post-election audit procedure, whether hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or reconciliation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Vote-counting procedure (Art 67-71) is part of the canvass, not a separate audit. No risk-limiting or fixed-percentage audit method codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Σύνταγμα Άρθρο 54 (meta).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses in-person recounting of votes on election day to verify the initial count, which is a procedural verification step rather than a post-election audit method. It does not mandate any of the audit methods specified in the scoring rule (fixed-% hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or RLA with reconciliation).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the logistics and timing of vote counting in constituencies and municipalities, but contains no information about post-election audits, audit methods, hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or any verification procedures after counting.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 115 addresses the timing and continuity of vote counting by the returning officer. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit methods, hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures. The section is entirely procedural regarding when counting occurs, not what auditing mechanisms are mandated.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The only audits surfaced are the financial audit of party accounts (§ 11) and general State Audit Office activity; no vote-tally audit method (fixed-percentage recount, comparison or risk-limiting audit) is codified for the count.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Lithuania has no codified vote-counting audit method — the polling-district committee hand-counts paper ballots and signs the vote-counting record (§ 75, § 77, § 82); the surfaced § 24 mandates audit of party finances, not vote tabulation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the recount procedure following a judicial order in a contested election, not a post-election audit method. It does not mandate any audit method (fixed-%, comparison, risk-limiting, or otherwise) as part of a systematic post-election auditing process. The recount procedure here is reactive and discretionary, triggered by litigation, not a proactive audit requirement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 315 describes the tabulation and classification of ballots (establishing totals of counted ballots, blank ballots, invalid ballots, valid ballots, and votes by list or individual candidate). It does not mandate or describe any audit method post-election. The section addresses ballot counting procedures, not post-election auditing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 162 addresses the rights of observers and candidates to monitor voting and ballot-counting operations, and their ability to file objections or complaints. It does not establish or mandate any audit method for post-election verification. The criterion concerns post-election audit procedures, which is a distinct topic from election observation and complaint mechanisms.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 77 addresses the organisation and physical arrangement of polling station premises, voter flow, accessibility, and supervision of voting operations. It does not contain any provisions regarding post-election audit methods or procedures. The section is entirely focused on pre-election and election-day logistics rather than post-election audit mechanisms.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for resolving tie votes through lot drawings and legislative selection following recounts, not audit methods. It does not mandate or describe any audit methodology (hand recount percentages, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures). The section is about tie-breaking, not post-election auditing.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses door-to-door voter registration canvassing and funding allocation for presidential elections. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, audit methods, hand recounts, comparison audits, or risk-limiting audits. The section is entirely outside the scope of the audit method criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section authorizes post-election audits and permits ballot boxes to be returned for that purpose, but it does not specify what audit method is mandated. The actual audit method is deferred to 'Section 1 of this act,' which is not included in the provided text. Without seeing that referenced section, the audit methodology cannot be determined from this section alone.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 21 governs the allocation of parliamentary mandates using the d'Hondt method and procedures for preparing electoral documents (process records and certificates). It does not address post-election audits or any audit methodology. The section is substantively about mandate distribution, not election verification or auditing.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 48 concerns objections to sorting irregularities and section 49 concerns objections to counting inaccuracies, with provisions for recounts at a counting officer's discretion. Neither section mandates any specific audit method for post-election verification. The recount authority in section 49(3) is discretionary and triggered by objections, not a systematic post-election audit requirement.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Law 298 Article 33 governs voter-register reconstruction — not audit method.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recount procedures available upon candidate request, not a mandated post-election audit method. It does not establish any systematic audit methodology such as hand recounts, comparison audits, or risk-limiting audits as part of the election process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recount procedures triggered by candidate request or irregularity concerns, not post-election audits. It describes which precincts are recounted and timing requirements, but does not mandate any audit method (hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, or reconciliation). The statute governs recounts in response to specific challenges, not systematic post-election audits.