Certification process codified

Чл. 213а codifies state ownership of machine-voting equipment with multi-agency certification by the Ministry of Electronic Governance + Bulgarian Standardization Institute + Bulgarian Metrology Institute, with party/observer/Academy access to source code under CEC-set procedure, and 20-business-day certification window.

“Техническите устройства за машинно гласуване са държавна собственост”

Cal. Elec. Code § 19212 codifies the full certification process: source-code escrow within 10 business days, state-approved testing agency (§ 19220), reexamination authority (§ 19231), and pre-use certification requirement (§ 19202). The most thoroughly codified voting-equipment certification regime among scored jurisdictions.

The statute codifies the certification process by specifying the evaluator (secretary of state), the criteria for examination (compliance with sections 1-5-615 and 1-5-616), the mandatory timeline (120 days), and provision for expert appointment and written reports. The process is further detailed in modification provisions (§1-5-618) with explicit timelines and review thresholds. Professional expertise requirements and conflict-of-interest prohibitions reinforce institutional rigor.

Del. Code tit. 15, § 5620A establishes detailed statutory criteria for logic and accuracy testing: specific technical requirements (proper programming, election definition, device functionality), testing timeline (immediately after maintenance/programming, publicly before use), notice requirements (7 days minimum), evaluator composition (election officials, party representatives, candidates), and recordkeeping with public inspection rights. The section mandates the State Election Commissioner promulgate rules to implement these criteria, thus codifying the certification process in statute with enforceable standards.

“The State Election Commissioner, in consultation with the Department offices, shall promulgate rules relating to logic and accuracy testing of mail ballot tabulating machines. (b) Rules promulgated under this section must ensure all of the following: (1) All machines are thoroughly tested immediately following maintenance and programming to determine all of the following: a. The voting system is properly programmed. b. The election is correctly defined on the voting system. c. All of the voting system input, output, and communication devices are working properly. (2) Any machine deemed unsatisfactory is recoded, repaired, or replaced and must be retested. (3) Machines are publicly tested before use to ascertain that they will correctly count votes cast for all offices and all measures in the upcoming election. (4) Public notice of public tests is given at least 7 days before the tests being conducted. (5) The resetting and sealing of each publicly-tested machine is witnessed by the election officials, representatives of the political parties, and any candidates or candidate representatives who is in attendance. (6) Each publicly-tested machine is secured following the test in a state of readiness until the day of the election. (7) Records are kept of all pre-election testing of each mail ballot tabulating machine which shall be present and available for inspection and reference during public pre-election testing of that machine by any person in attendance during the testing.”

Estonia's voting technology is the state-run electronic voting system; § 48⁷ codifies its pre-voting certification process — a risk assessment, an audit of the applied security measures, technical penetration testing and a risk-treatment plan — and § 48² assigns the State Electoral Office to organise an independent information-systems-auditor review before each election.

“audit of the applied security measures;”

§ 101.5605 codifies the equipment-certification process by the Department of State. § 101.5607 (4917) governs code-and-documentation deposit at DoS. Strong codification.

“The Department of State shall publicly examine all makes of electronic or electromechanical voting systems submitted to it and determine whether the systems comply with the requirements of s. 101.5606 .”

§ 21-2-324 codifies state board examination/approval of voting machines with expert appointment. § 21-2-379.6 codifies maintenance. § 21-2-368 codifies optical scanning review. § 21-2-379.2 codifies DRE review. § 21-2-379.24 codifies BMD review with revocation/penalty for vendor breach. Comprehensive certification framework.

The statute codifies the certification process with explicit criteria (compliance with chapter requirements, public examination, testing by an independent lab), a designated evaluator (secretary of state), and a defined timeline (within 30 days for filing the determination). It further specifies requirements for submission (UECA guidelines documentation), public procedures (public examination, copies sent upon request), and decertification standards (periodic review against NIST/UECA guidelines with public hearing).

10 ILCS 5/24C-16 codifies the DRE certification process: State Board approves systems that meet functional requirements (§ 24C-11), federal voting-system standards (FEC/EAC), independent-testing-authority results, and Board rules. § 24A-16 codifies analogous approval for optical-scan equipment.

“The State Board of Elections shall approve all Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems that fulfill the functional requirements provided by Section 24C-11 of this Code, the mandatory requirements of the federal voting system standards”

Iowa Code § 52.5 codifies the certification process in statute by requiring the state commissioner to adopt rules governing testing and examination, prescribing methods and performance standards, establishing federal compliance benchmarks, and defining recertification and decertification procedures. The statute explicitly mandates timeline requirements (seven days for notification), identifies evaluators (board of examiners), and requires documented reports on system capacity, accuracy, and mechanical fitness before approval.

KRS 117.379 codifies the voting-system certification process: any person or corporation owning, manufacturing, or selling a voting system or e-poll book may request examination by the State Board of Elections on a $500 deposit and an accredited test report, and KRS 117.125 sets the detailed specifications a system must meet for approval. The criteria, the evaluator (State Board), and the examination procedure are codified.

Maryland law codifies the voting-equipment certification process by statute, requiring the State Board to adopt regulations and establishing explicit statutory criteria (accuracy, ballot secrecy, security, voter-verifiable paper records, independent testing by EAC-approved labs, federal performance standards, and public interest). The statute further mandates public demonstration and accessibility evaluation before selection, and requires local board testing with political-party observation before each election—all statutory requirements that structure the certification and oversight framework.

“The State Board shall adopt regulations for the review, certification, and decertification of voting systems.”

The statute codifies the certification process: it designates the Board of State Canvassers as the evaluator, requires accreditation by an independent testing authority, mandates a field test, sets application fees, and provides for disapproval. Public-comment period is not specified, but criteria, evaluator, and procedure are codified.

§ 206.57 codifies examination of new voting systems by the Secretary of State (compliance, accuracy, durability). § 206.83 codifies pre-election testing. § 206.805 codifies state voting-system contracts with certification requirements. § 206.81 codifies experimental-use authorization. § 206.82 codifies program preparation. Comprehensive certification framework codified.

Montana codifies voting-system certification — § 13-17-101 and § 13-17-103 set approval and required specifications, § 13-17-212 requires the election administrator to publicly test and certify each system within 30 days before an election, and § 13-17-211 directs the Secretary of State to adopt uniform procedural rules.

“the election administrator shall publicly test and certify that the system is performing properly”

The section codifies a certification process requiring the Kiesraad to have ballot-counting software specifications tested by an expert and independent body, with public disclosure of both the specification and test results. It further delegates detailed implementation rules to statutory regulation (algemene maatregel van bestuur), establishing statutory oversight of software reliability, security, and design. This satisfies the structural requirement that certification criteria and evaluators be grounded in law rather than administrative discretion.

“De Kiesraad laat de specificatie toetsen door een deskundige en onafhankelijke instantie, en maakt de specificatie en de uitkomst van de toets op een algemeen toegankelijke wijze elektronisch openbaar.”

NRS § 293B.1045 codifies the voting equipment certification process in statute, specifying mandatory approval requirements, application procedures, independent examiner qualifications, required examination components, approval criteria, a 120-day timeline, cost allocation, and conflict-of-interest safeguards. The statute establishes clear procedural standards rather than delegating discretion to executive regulations alone.

§ 1-9-14 comprehensively codifies the certification process in statute: criteria (Election Code requirements and federal VVSG standards), evaluators (independent testing laboratories qualified to evaluate systems), timeline (applications by June 1 of odd-numbered years; 21-day public comment period; 30-day appeal/correction periods; 30-day certification decision deadline), and public accountability (written reports filed and posted online, public comment solicitation, voting system certification committee recommendation process). All procedural steps and substantive standards are established by statute, not administrative discretion.

§ 7-201 codifies state board examination and approval of voting machines/systems. § 7-202 codifies machine-design requirements (locks, protective counters, voter-verifiable audit record, BMD accessibility). § 7-206 codifies pre-election testing. § 7-200 codifies adoption/use procedure. Comprehensive certification framework codified.

§ 16.1-06-15 codifies mandatory pre-election testing of voting systems with sealed retention of testing materials. § 16.1-06-11 codifies that voting systems must be 'approved and certified for procurement and use in the state by the secretary of state.' § 16.1-15-09 codifies returns/audit of voting systems. § 16.1-15-02 codifies canvass-report procedure. Comprehensive certification framework codified.

§ 10-3 codifies criteria for approving ballots (public stamp, election identifier, party clearly indicated, etc.). § 10-4 codifies authority over envelope/doubtful ballots. § 10-2 codifies vote-approval procedure when ballot is in envelope. § 5-9 codifies authority to approve candidate lists. Comprehensive certification framework for ballots / candidate lists.

ORC 3506.05 codifies the voting-equipment certification regime: SoS appoints a Board of Voting Systems Examiners; all voting machines, marking devices, tabulating equipment, software, electronic pollbooks, and voter registration systems require SoS certification before purchase, lease, or use. Evaluators + scope defined.

“have been certified by the secretary of state”

§ 1105-A codifies SoS examination/approval of electronic voting systems with three-examiner board, written reports, public reexamination on petition of 10+ electors, and federal-testing-authority prerequisite. Statutory framework: criteria, evaluators, timeline, fee.

“may request the Secretary of the Commonwealth to examine such system”

The statute clearly codifies the certification process: the State Election Commission is the evaluator, certification must meet Federal Election Assistance Commission standards, and the executive director must attest to a formal report. Additional specific requirements are mandated, including field testing (subsection E), source-code escrow (subsection F), vendor disclosure of contracts and prior approvals (subsections C and D), and decertification procedures (subsection H). The criteria, evaluators, and procedural steps are all statutorily defined.

“Before any kind of voting system, including an electronic voting system, is used at an election, it must be approved by the State Election Commission, which shall examine the voting system and make and file in the commission's office a report, attested to by the signature of the commission's executive director, stating whether, in the commission's opinion, the kind of voting system examined may be accurately and efficiently used by electors at elections, as provided by law. A voting system may not be approved for use in the State unless certified by a testing laboratory accredited by the Federal Election Assistance Commission as meeting or exceeding the minimum requirements of the latest federal voting system standards and guidelines.”

§ 12-17B-2 codifies State Board of Elections certification: 'Each system shall fulfill the requirements for election assistance commission standards certification and be approved by the State Board of Elections prior to distribution and use in this state.' § 12-17B-17 codifies rule-making. § 12-17B-3 codifies governing body adoption authority. § 12-17B-13 codifies tabulating procedure + canvass-board certification. Comprehensive certification framework codified.

§ 122.031 codifies that a voting system may not be used until approved by the secretary of state; § 122.032-122.033 codify the approval requirements; § 122.035 codifies the examiner panel (four appointed by the secretary of state, two by the attorney general, with pecuniary-interest disqualification); § 129.021 codifies acceptance testing including hash validation; and § 129.023 codifies the public logic-and-accuracy test. The voting-equipment certification process — criteria, evaluators, timeline, and public test — is comprehensively codified.

52 USC § 20971 codifies EAC testing/certification of voting-system hardware/software by accredited labs (NIST recommendation + EAC approval). Comprehensive certification framework.

“The Commission shall provide for the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software”

§ 2493 codifies voting-equipment certification: the Secretary of State adopts rules governing the use and selection of vote tabulators, and 'all municipalities that have voted to use a vote tabulator shall use a uniform vote tabulator approved by the Secretary of State.' Approval by the Secretary of State is the codified certification gate.

“All municipalities that have voted to use a vote tabulator shall use a uniform vote tabulator approved by the Secretary of State.”

RCW 29A.04.611 expressly grants the Secretary of State authority to promulgate rules governing voting-system testing, independent evaluations, and certification (subsections 4, 5, and 31). This provides a clear statutory mandate for codification of the certification process, including evaluator standards and procedures. The statute establishes that certification criteria and procedures must be set by rule under chapter 34.05 RCW (the State Administrative Procedure Act), which requires public notice and comment.

Wis. Stat. § 5.91 codifies the commission-certification regime: 'No ballot, voting device, automatic tabulating equipment, or related equipment and materials to be used in an electronic voting system may be utilized in this state unless it is certified by the commission.' § 5.84 codifies testing requirements. § 5.87 codifies tabulating procedures + equipment requirements.

The section codifies certification criteria (Federal Election Commission standards, paper-ballot requirement) and establishes that evaluation and testing must occur before certification, but does not codify specific evaluator qualifications, timelines for evaluation/certification decisions, or public-comment periods. The statute permits the committee to employ experts and use independent testing authority certification, but leaves the mechanics of the evaluation process to administrative discretion.

“The committee shall invite any vendor or company interested in selling an electronic vote counting system in Alabama to submit its equipment for examination. The vote counting system shall be certified after a satisfactory evaluation and testing has been performed to determine that the equipment meets the requirements of this article and performance and test standards for electronic voting systems issued by the Federal Election Commission.”

The section codifies a testing and certification timeline and procedural requirements (preaudited ballots, error detection, sealed ballots), but critical elements are missing: the actual certification criteria for acceptance/rejection are undefined, and the statute explicitly delegates specification of timing, procedures, and certification standards to the secretary of state's discretion via the procedures manual. A.R.S. § 16-452, not this statute alone, governs the substantive certification framework. The statute therefore provides only partial codification—testing procedures are statutory, but certification criteria and evaluator qualifications remain administratively determined.

“Within the period of time before the election day prescribed by the secretary of state in the instructions and procedures manual adopted pursuant to section 16-452, the board of supervisors or other election officer in charge, or for an election involving state or federal candidates, the secretary of state, shall have the automatic tabulating equipment and programs tested to ascertain that the equipment and programs will correctly count the votes cast for all offices and on all measures.”

The statute codifies that a State Board of Election Commissioners shall examine machines and file a report, and establishes a basic approval standard (compliance with § 7-5-504 and safe use conditions). However, the statute does not codify key procedural elements: no timeline for examination is specified, no public-comment period is mandated, no evaluation methodology or criteria beyond reference to another statute are detailed, and the role of the Secretary of State (who may select machines) creates potential conflict-of-interest since the state board must report to that office. The framework is statutorily grounded but skeletal.

The section codifies a security-assessment requirement for computer systems and mandates an independent, government-accredited assessor (Australian Signals Directorate), which addresses evaluators and some procedural elements. However, the statute does not codify certification criteria, a public-comment period, or a detailed timeline beyond 'before the next Senate election.' The accreditation standard and risk-assessment methodology are delegated to external bodies rather than specified in statute, leaving gaps in full codification of the certification process.

“The Electoral Commissioner must arrange for an independent person or body (the accredited assessor ) accredited by the Australian Signals Directorate to conduct a risk assessment (a security risk assessment ) of the security of the computer systems (including the systems for scanning ballot papers and counting votes) used to scrutinise the votes in a Senate election for a particular State or Territory in compliance with section 273A.”

The statute codifies that the Secretary of State must examine tabulators and apply defined criteria (meeting section 9-242 requirements, usability at elections, compliance with electronic voting standards). However, the section lacks statutory codification of key procedural elements: no mandatory timeline for examination and approval, no public-comment period, no detailed evaluation methodology, and the Secretary retains broad discretion ("in the Secretary's opinion"). The delegation to regulations ("may adopt regulations") and to university partners (subsection b) for standard-development suggests further proceduralization occurs outside the statute itself, reducing statutory completeness.

“The Secretary of the State shall examine the tabulator and determine whether, in the Secretary's opinion, the kind of tabulator so examined (1) meets the requirements of section 9-242 , (2) can be used at elections, primaries and referenda held pursuant to this title, and (3) complies with applicable standards for electronic voting tabulators.”

§ 87 codifies the verification count (äänten tarkastuslaskenta): 'on the day after the election at 09:00 the constituency committee must begin verifying the ballots cast on election day and the tallies of the polling committees,' deciding which ballots count for candidates and which are invalid. § 88 codifies the summing of candidate vote totals. § 89 codifies the result-calculation method. Voting-system certification is not codified (Finland uses hand-counted paper ballots, no equipment); these provisions codify the result-verification process instead.

The statute delegates certification authority to the Interior Ministry and mandates regulatory detail on approval criteria, procedures, testing protocols, and public testing (Erprobung). However, the delegation to executive regulation without Bundesrat consent, combined with absence of statutory specification of independent evaluators, timeline requirements, or formal public-comment procedures, leaves critical procedural safeguards to discretionary rulemaking rather than codified statute. The framework is partially codified but structurally vulnerable to unilateral executive control.

“Das Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat wird ermächtigt, durch Rechtsverordnung, die nicht der Zustimmung des Bundesrates bedarf, nähere Bestimmungen zu erlassen über 1. die Voraussetzungen für die amtliche Zulassung der Bauart von Wahlgeräten sowie für die Rücknahme und den Widerruf der Zulassung, 2. das Verfahren für die amtliche Zulassung der Bauart, 3. das Verfahren für die Prüfung eines Wahlgerätes auf die der amtlich zugelassenen Bauart entsprechende Ausführung, 4. die öffentliche Erprobung eines Wahlgerätes vor seiner Verwendung”

The section requires that the digital system be 'approved by the Electoral Board' (Valgnævnet), establishing a supervisory role for an oversight body. However, the statute does not codify the criteria, evaluator qualifications, timeline, public-comment procedures, or other procedural safeguards for certification. Only the fact of approval is mandated, not the process.

“Den digitale løsning skal være godkendt af Valgnævnet.”

The statute codifies that the Minister shall issue regulations covering security certification and hardware requirements for electronic registers, delegating specific criteria-setting to secondary regulation after receiving proposals from the National Electoral Commission. However, the section does not codify the certification process itself (evaluators, timeline, public-comment procedure), leaving those details to ministerial discretion rather than statutory specification. This creates a gap between statutory authorization and enforceable procedural safeguards.

The section codifies the basic certification process: it requires tests by an independent laboratory accredited under 52 U.S.C. 20971, designates an evaluator under IC 3-11-16, and specifies that approval expires per section 19(a). However, it does not codify criteria (beyond referencing external HAVA standards), does not establish a timeline for commission decisions, and contains no provision for public comment. The structure is statutorily grounded but incomplete relative to the full scope of CERT.1.

The statute establishes a certification process triggered by vendor request and specifies the Secretary of State as evaluator, cost-sharing mechanism, and review procedures (notice, hearing, approval/denial options). However, it does not codify certification criteria, explicit timelines, or mandatory public-comment periods—leaving significant discretion to the Secretary of State ('may require,' 'deems appropriate'). The process is statutorily grounded but incomplete.

“Any person, firm or corporation desiring to sell any kind or make of electronic or electromechanical voting system or electronic poll book to political subdivisions in Kansas may in writing request the secretary of state to examine the kind or make of the system which it desires to sell and shall accompany the request with a certified check in the sum of $250 payable to the secretary of state to be used to defray a portion of the costs of such examination”

The statute codifies criteria (compliance with standards under R.S. 18:1353 and EAC voluntary guidelines), evaluators (secretary of state plus 3–5 independent experts), and the approval mechanism. However, the text does not establish a binding timeline for examination, a mandatory public-comment period, or transparency provisions beyond making the EAC certificate a public record. The lack of procedural deadlines and notice-and-comment requirements means that certification processes remain substantially within the secretary of state's discretion.

The statute delegates the core certification process to regulatory promulgation by the state secretary, rather than codifying it directly in statute. While § 33I(a)–(c) establish that the secretary examines equipment and approves it, the actual criteria, evaluator qualifications, timeline, and public-comment procedures are explicitly deferred to future regulation. This creates structural dependence on administrative discretion rather than statutory codification of the certification framework.

“The state secretary shall promulgate regulations for the certification process, standards, including security, and use of electronic poll books at a polling place or early voting location.”

The statute codifies the Secretary of State's authority to approve voting equipment and requires rules under the Administrative Procedure Act (ch. 536), providing structural safeguards against arbitrary approval. However, the section does not codify the certification criteria themselves (evaluators, timeline, or public-comment procedures) in statute—those details are delegated to agency rulemaking. While subsection (2) specifies technical standards for equipment approval, the certification *process* (evaluators, timeline, public-comment period) is not codified in this section.

The section codifies vendor regulatory authority and compliance obligations (designating agents, permitting inspections, testing protocols, liability for miscounts), but does not establish a formal certification process with defined criteria, evaluators, public-comment procedures, or timelines for initial equipment approval. The Ballot Law Commission is granted rulemaking authority over testing and device use, but this statute does not codify the certification criteria, timeline, or public process itself—only vendor accountability after deployment.

“III. Any company, partnership, proprietorship, or other person, wherever located, which supplies, maintains, or programs electronic ballot counting devices which are used in elections in New Hampshire is subject to regulation by this state. IV. Each person described in paragraph III shall designate, in writing, an agent for service of all process, including, but not limited to summonses, writs, orders, petitions, and subpoenas, and shall agree in writing that the attorney general, in conjunction with any election investigation, may inspect its records, machines or other devices, and premises.”

The statute codifies that the State Board must certify voting systems and establishes specific standards (paper-ballot backup, federal compliance, vendor bonds, escrow access, etc.), satisfying the core requirement of statutory codification of certification criteria. However, the section explicitly delegates 'procedures' and key operational details ('as set by the State Board of Elections') to administrative rulemaking rather than statute, leaving evaluators, specific timelines, and public-comment procedures to regulatory discretion rather than statutory codification. This partial approach provides statutory guardrails but lacks complete codification of the certification process itself.

“Only voting systems that have been certified by the State Board of Elections in accordance with the procedures set forth by the State Board of Elections and subject to the standards set forth in this section and that have not been subsequently decertified shall be permitted for use in elections in this State.”

The statute codifies a timeline (30 days) and approval/rejection authority, making the process partially statutory. However, the section lacks codified evaluation criteria (delegating them to ORS 246.560), does not establish a public-comment period, and grants the Secretary of State broad discretion in examination methods and expert selection. The statute does not specify which regulatory standards or performance benchmarks apply, leaving substantive certification criteria to reference statutes rather than explicit procedural specification here.

9 kap. 1 § codifies polling-station vote-reception rules. 11 kap. 2 § codifies count-order. 14 kap. 1a § codifies mandate-distribution by central election authority. 7 kap. 15 § codifies central-authority handling of postal-vote envelopes. Voting-system certification is not codified (Sweden uses no electronic equipment); these provisions cover ballot-paper + envelope certification instead.

The statute establishes that scanners must be certified by the federal Election Assistance Commission and meet voluntary voting systems guidelines, and requires independent expert review. However, the section delegates the detailed mechanics—criteria specificity, evaluator selection process, testing timeline, and public-comment procedures—to rulemaking by the state coordinator of elections ('shall enact necessary rules and regulations'). The codified layer confirms certification and testing requirements exist, but the statutory text does not itself codify evaluator credentials, timeline deadlines, or public-comment periods.

“Shall be certified pursuant to § 2-9-110 and shall have been certified by the election assistance commission as having met the applicable voluntary voting systems guidelines. In addition, the precinct-based optical scanners shall be tested to ensure the scanners operate in accordance with the guidelines; and Shall, with all relevant documentation, be made available by their vendors, at the request of the state election commission or the secretary of state for review by an independent expert, selected by the state election commission or the secretary of state, to ensure the functionality and security of its systems.”

Art. IV-205 codifies CEC powers including preparation and conduct of local elections. Art. II-86 codifies parallel for presidential. Art. I-61 codifies material and technical support. Voting-system certification is not codified (paper-only regime) — these provisions cover commission and ballot-paper certification rather than voting equipment.

The statute codifies certification criteria (accuracy, reliability, access controls, fraud detection, ballot secrecy) and designates the lieutenant governor as the certifying authority, but does not codify evaluators (beyond allowing deference to EAC-accredited labs), timeline, or public-comment procedures. The criteria are partially specified; the process structure is incomplete.

The section codifies a certification process with clear timelines (one week before count, retesting before official count), specified evaluators (county commission), public notice requirements, and detailed test procedures. However, the section does not codify evaluation criteria for certifying the equipment, does not establish a public-comment period on certification, and grants the county commission broad discretion in determining what constitutes 'free from error.' The institutional structure satisfies timeliness and transparency (notice and public observation) but lacks codified technical standards and a deliberative approval mechanism beyond county-commission sign-off.

“The tabulating equipment to be used in the election shall be immediately certified by the county commission to be free from error as determined by the test.”

The statute establishes that the director has approval authority and references Federal EAC certification as a consideration, but it delegates the substantive certification criteria to the Federal Election Commission rather than codifying them in Alaska statute. The statute provides minimal procedural structure (no codified timeline, no explicit public-comment requirement, no independent evaluators beyond the director, and no standards beyond deference to federal criteria and AS 15.15.032(c)). This is a framework provision, not a complete codification of the certification process.

“The director may approve a voting machine or vote tally system for use in an election in the state upon consideration of factors relevant to the administration of state elections, including whether the Federal Election Commission has certified the voting machine or vote tally system to be in compliance with the voting system standards approved by the Federal Election Commission as required by 42 U.S.C. 15481(a)(5) (Help America Vote Act of 2002).”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses distribution of voter rolls (padrones de electores) to electoral bodies, political parties, and ministries—a record-keeping and access matter. It contains no codified process for voting-equipment certification, evaluators, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The section is entirely outside the scope of vendor oversight or equipment certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 60 codifies seal samples and 'technical equipment' approval by CEC — but the technical equipment is biometric voter-ID terminals, not voting machines. Armenia uses paper ballots and has no voting-equipment certification regime.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 10a BPräsWG addresses procedural rules for voter identification, ballot handling, and the use of electronic voting registers at polling stations. It contains no provision whatsoever regarding voting-equipment certification, evaluators, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment processes. The section is silent on vendor oversight and the certification infrastructure required by CERT.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 104 covers Council of Republic election voting organization. Article 48 covers election expenses. Paper-ballot regime — no voting-equipment certification process exists.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 179/1 establishes a notification and consultation mechanism between the minister and a College of Experts regarding malfunctions in voting systems and electronic vote transmission, but it does not codify a certification process. The provision addresses post-election dysfunction reporting and expert collaboration, not pre-election equipment certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment procedures required by CERT.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section § 28 of Law 62/2003 addresses EU citizen voter registration for European Parliament elections. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding voting-equipment certification, evaluators, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The section is procedurally focused on how non-Czech EU citizens register to vote, not on election administration infrastructure or equipment oversight.

§ 12 codifies new-party registration. § 11a codifies party-name approval by Valgnævnet. § 13 codifies party-name approval criteria. § 37 codifies candidate-list notification deadline. § 89 codifies Folketinget validity decisions. Voting-system certification is not codified (paper-only regime); these provisions cover party/candidate certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the operational mechanics of electronic voting (opening times, key distribution, ballot-box verification) and contains no language regarding certification of voting equipment, evaluator credentials, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. It does not codify any certification process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Election Code Article 14 codifies CEC powers (ballot oversight, electoral-legislation uniform application). Paper-ballot regime — no voting-equipment certification process exists.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

The statute requires inspection, audit, and testing but delegates the actual criteria, evaluator qualifications, timeline, and public-comment procedures entirely to administrative rules adopted by the chief election officer. This is not codification in statute; it is statutory authorization for executive rulemaking. The certification process lacks statutory grounding of the key procedural elements (who qualifies as 'qualified observers,' what standards apply, public participation).

“The electronic voting system is subject to inspection, audit, and experimental testing, by qualified observers, before and after the election, pursuant to administrative rules adopted by the chief election officer under chapter 91”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section mandates certification of electronic-voting equipment but delegates all substantive criteria, evaluators, timeline, and public-comment procedures to external legislation ('in compliance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan') without codifying them in the Electoral Law itself. The section does not establish a statutory framework for the certification process—only a requirement that certification occur elsewhere.

“The software and hardware means to be used in the electronic electoral system shall be certificated in compliance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Latvia votes on paper with no voting machines or electronic systems; there is no voting-equipment certification process to codify.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Lithuania votes on paper at polling stations with no voting-machine system, so there is no voting-equipment certification process to codify; the surfaced § 3 lists the Central Electoral Commission's general tasks.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 96 addresses campaign conduct restrictions during the period immediately before an election (prohibiting distribution of materials, electronic propaganda, and automated calls). It contains no provisions regarding voting-equipment certification, evaluators, timelines, public-comment procedures, or vendor oversight. This section is wholly unrelated to the CERT.1 criterion.

The section establishes that machines must be approved by the Secretary of State and Attorney General, but does not codify the certification process itself (criteria, evaluators, timeline, or public-comment procedures). The statute delegates substantive standard-setting to administrative discretion rather than mandating specific statutory or regulatory procedures.

“It must be of an identical type approved by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 84 of LGSMIME addresses judicial review and notification procedures for electoral rights protection cases, not voting-equipment certification. It contains no codification of certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment periods for voting equipment. The section falls entirely outside the scope of CERT.1.

The statute codifies a mandatory pre-election and post-election testing protocol with public notice, multi-party witnessing, and specific test procedures (pre-audited ballots, overvote detection). However, this section addresses *local operational testing* of equipment before use, not the upstream *vendor certification process* (criteria for equipment approval, evaluator qualifications, timeline for state-level certification, public-comment period for new equipment). The criterion CERT.1 asks whether the certification process itself—the gatekeeping by which equipment is deemed eligible for use—is codified; this section ensures tested equipment works correctly, but does not establish the statutory framework by which vendors' equipment is initially certified for sale or deployment in Mississippi.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 58 governs financial reporting and campaign-finance disclosure requirements for electoral competitors and initiative groups. It does not address voting-equipment certification, evaluators, testing criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. This section is orthogonal to vendor oversight or equipment certification.

The statute delegates approval authority to the Secretary of State and permits rulemaking but does not codify certification criteria, evaluators, timeline, or public-comment procedures in statute itself. The certification process is authorized but left to administrative discretion via future regulations, failing the core requirement that the process be 'codified in statute or regulation' with specificity.

“Any new voting or counting system shall be approved by the Secretary of State prior to use by an election commissioner or county clerk. The Secretary of State may adopt and promulgate rules and regulations to establish different procedures and locations for voting and counting votes pursuant to the use of any new voting or counting system.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 19:61-5 establishes a free-access information system for voters regarding mail-in and overseas ballot status. It does not address voting-equipment certification, evaluators, timelines, public-comment procedures, or any vendor oversight mechanism. The section is entirely focused on ballot-status transparency, not equipment certification process.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs voter registration methods (federal postcard applications and write-in absentee ballot declarations) and does not address voting-equipment certification processes, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment periods. It falls entirely outside the scope of CERT.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section grants the State Electoral Commission (PKW) authority to set technical conditions for postal voting through resolution, but it does not codify a voting-equipment certification process. The provision addresses procedural rules for handling mail ballots and ballot security, not equipment certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment procedures. No statutory framework for equipment testing, approval, or oversight is present in this text.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 79.º-C concerns the procedural mechanics of in-person advance mobile voting (ballot distribution, voter registration, envelope procedures, vote transport). It contains no statutory codification of voting-equipment certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The section addresses operational voting logistics, not the institutional framework for certifying election equipment.

The section grants the Secretary of State authority over voting-system specifications and approval, but does not codify certification criteria, evaluator qualifications, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The statute delegates approval authority but leaves the substantive certification process to administrative discretion rather than statutory mandate.

“the office of the secretary of state shall have the authority to submit and approve the specifications used by the department of administration in procuring voting systems, voting system-related services, and accessible voting equipment on behalf of the state”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Article 68 covers vote-counting (which uses ballots tabulated open hand-count or via KOIB scanners). Article 65 covers early voting. Article 21 establishes CEC powers. Voting-equipment certification is delegated to CEC regulations under Article 74 (GAS Vybory system) — not codified in the surfaced statutory corpus with explicit certification standards.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 84 of LOREG addresses only the conduct and timing of voting at polling stations (9:00 to 20:00, interruption procedures, ballot supply), not the certification of voting equipment. There is no mention of equipment certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The section is confined to operational polling-day rules and does not codify any aspect of vendor or equipment certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Turkey uses paper ballots only — no voting-equipment certification regime exists. Candidates surface ballot-box sealing (Madde 77), tamper penalties (Madde 164), overseas board duties (20/A), voter-ID requirements (Madde 87), counting procedure (Madde 100) — none are equipment certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section RPA 1983 s. 36A establishes Welsh Ministers' authority to make rules for conducting local elections in Wales, specifying ballot requirements and voting systems, but contains no reference to voting-equipment certification, evaluator qualification, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The section addresses electoral conduct rules, not vendor or equipment oversight.

The section codifies final testing requirements and mandates sworn duties, but does not establish a comprehensive certification process with defined criteria, evaluator qualifications, public-comment periods, or a formal approval timeline. It addresses custodian competence and testing presence, not the broader certification framework required by CERT.1.

“The final testing of the equipment prior to each election shall be done in the presence of an electoral board member, a representative of the electoral board, or the general registrar.”

The section codifies a pre-election testing and certification procedure for voting machines, specifying the county clerk's role, the testing methodology, and documentation requirements. However, it does not establish codified criteria for equipment approval, does not designate independent evaluators or third-party certification bodies, does not require a public-comment period, and does not address vendor oversight or post-certification accountability mechanisms. This is a machine-preparation protocol, not a vendor-accountability certification process.