Judicial review of administrative decisions

Article 71 bis codifies judicial review of specific administrative decisions by the Dirección Nacional Electoral regarding public-fund distribution and electoral advertising allocation. The statute clearly defines standing (political groupings), timeline (48 hours to file; 72 hours to transmit), and venue (Cámara Nacional Electoral as appellate tribunal). This satisfies the structural requirement for accountability through judicially-reviewable administrative action.

Section 355 codifies a statutory right to petition the High Court to dispute elections or returns, specifying standing (candidates and qualified voters), timeline (40 days post-return of writ), and venue (High Court Registry). This establishes a clear judicial-review mechanism for election administration outcomes with defined procedural safeguards.

“be filed in the Registry of the High Court within 40 days after: (i) if the polling day for the election in dispute is not the polling day for any other election—the return of the writ for the election”

Cal. Elec. Code § 16462 codifies judicial review of election outcomes: affidavit must be filed with the superior-court clerk within 5 days after the official canvass; § 16442, § 16521 codify service and citation procedures. Standing, timeline, and venue (county superior court) all statutory.

The statute explicitly codifies the right to judicial review of election-commission decisions on voter-roll disputes, specifies standing (aggrieved complainants), defines timeline (5 days before election day for filing; judgment before election day), and establishes venue (人民法院, the people's court) with final authority. This satisfies the structural requirement for codified judicial accountability of administrative election decisions.

Section 1-11-213(2) codifies judicial review of district court decisions arising from election contests, establishing appellate review as a statutory right. The section further establishes standing (by definition of 'contestor' as an eligible elector), timeline (within ten days of official survey), and venue (district court of the political subdivision), all grounded in statute rather than administrative discretion. This satisfies the accountability dimension by creating a clear statutory framework for judicial oversight of election administration disputes.

The statute codifies a clear right to judicial review of election-official decisions and ballot-count disputes, establishes standing ('any person' claiming to be aggrieved), defines venue (Superior Court), and sets a specific timeline (30 days post-referendum for complaints after the event, with expedited hearing requirements of 3–5 days for notice and hearing). The statute further mandates notice to the Secretary of State and State Elections Enforcement Commission, ensuring transparency and multi-party participation in judicial proceedings.

This section establishes a clear statutory right to judicial review of State Election Commission decisions before the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, with explicitly defined standing (complainant), venue (Constitutional Court), and timeline (48 hours from receipt of the disputed decision). The codified procedure satisfies the core accountability criterion.

“Protiv rješenja Državnoga izbornog povjerenstva podnositelj prigovora ima pravo podnijeti žalbu Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske. Žalba se podnosi Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske putem Državnoga izbornog povjerenstva, u roku od 48 sati računajući od isteka dana kada je primljeno pobijano rješenje.”

The statute establishes that the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic has jurisdiction over proceedings related to election administration matters (specifically regarding candidate registration and mandate termination). This codifies judicial review as a statutory right with defined venue (the highest administrative court), creating a clear accountability mechanism for election-authority decisions.

“K řízení podle § 57 je příslušný Nejvyšší správní soud České republiky.”

§ 88 codifies that 'every voter may complain about Folketing elections. Complaints shall be addressed to the Folketing and sent to the Minister.' § 103 codifies parallel for referendums. § 104 codifies retention of materials. Comprehensive judicial-review (via Folketinget) framework codified.

Judicial review of election-administration decisions is codified — § 25 of the Riigikogu Election Act gives a right of complaint to the administrative court of the voter's residence against a secretary's act, with a 24-hour forwarding rule and a three-working-day decision deadline; the complaint chapters route challenges to National Electoral Committee decisions to the Supreme Court.

“Where a rural municipality or city secretary dismisses an application specified in subsection 2 of this section, the applicant may file a complaint with an administrative court of their residence against the act of the rural municipality or city secretary.”

§ 101 codifies the right of appeal and grounds: 'the right of appeal belongs to anyone whose interest or right the decision infringes, and to every person who was a candidate and every party and joint list that filed a candidate application, on the ground that the decision is unlawful' — plus any eligible voter in the constituency may appeal on the ground that the election was conducted improperly. § 102 codifies that the appeal is made to the competent regional administrative court (lääninoikeus) within 14 days and must be handled urgently. § 105 codifies onward appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court. Comprehensive judicial-review framework codified.

“Valitusoikeus on sillä, jonka etua tai oikeutta päätös loukkaa, sekä jokaisella vaaleissa ehdokkaana olleella henkilöllä ja ehdokashakemuksen antaneella puolueella ja yhteislistalla sillä perusteella, että päätös on lainvastainen.”

§ 21-2-33.2 codifies extraordinary relief — hearings, suspension and reinstatement of superintendents, litigation procedure. § 21-2-543 / § 21-2-543.1 / § 21-2-544 codify special-election judicial procedures. § 21-2-172 codifies political-body conventions with judicial review.

§ 18(4a) BWahlG codifies the right to judicial review of Federal Electoral Commission decisions that prevent parties/groups from submitting nominations. The statute explicitly defines standing (parties or associations affected), timeline (four days after announcement), and venue (Federal Constitutional Court). This provides clear, statutorily-grounded accountability for administrative determinations affecting ballot access.

“Gegen eine Feststellung nach Absatz 4, die sie an der Einreichung von Wahlvorschlägen hindert, kann eine Partei oder Vereinigung binnen vier Tagen nach Bekanntgabe Beschwerde zum Bundesverfassungsgericht erheben.”

This section codifies a clear right to judicial review of an election-authority (secretary of state) administrative decision, with standing (any citizen), timeline (10 days), and venue (district court of Ada County for statewide measures) explicitly defined. It establishes a statutory accountability mechanism for challenging improper refusal to file petitions.

“If the secretary of state shall refuse to accept and file any petition for the initiative or for the referendum with the requisite number of signatures of qualified electors thereto attached, any citizen may apply, within ten (10) days after such refusal to the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel him to do so.”

10 ILCS 5/9-22 codifies that judicial review of State Board hearings/orders proceeds under the Illinois Administrative Review Law, directly in the Appellate Court (not Circuit), with a 7-day filing deadline. Strong statutory grounding for judicial review of Board decisions.

“judicial review, which shall be governed by the provisions of the Administrative Review Law”

This section establishes a clear, codified right to judicial review of election authority decisions (the referendum certificate) through the High Court. It defines standing (the Director of Public Prosecutions or registered/eligible voters), timeline (application within seven days of publication), venue (High Court), and substantive grounds for review (section 43 matters materially affecting the referendum result), satisfying all elements of the criterion.

§ 54 of the Saeima Election Law codifies judicial review of election decisions — applications go to the Regional Administrative Court or the Supreme Court Senate, examined at first instance by a three-judge panel within seven days (30 for seat redistribution); CPCB campaign-finance decisions are appealable to the District Administrative Court (§ 29 Pre-election Campaign Law).

“the application shall be submitted to the Regional Administrative Court”

§ 28 of the Referendum Law (and § 20 of the Seimas Election Law) codifies appeals against electoral-committee decisions — to higher-level committees and ultimately to the courts; § 74 codifies complaints against Central Electoral Committee decisions on referendum results.

The section explicitly codifies the right to seek judicial review of State Board of Election Supervisors decisions removing or suspending a registrar, specifying both trial de novo and appellate procedures by cross-reference to state administrative procedure statutes. Standing (registrar subject to removal), mechanism (trial de novo and appeal), and legal basis are all statutorily defined, satisfying the criterion for judicial accountability of election administrative action.

The section establishes a statutory right to judicial review of election administration decisions (voter registration errors) by codifying: (1) standing (any person wrongly inscribed, omitted, or struck from rolls), (2) venue (territorial justice of the peace), and (3) timelines (recourse to municipal college by May 10; notice requirements; supplementary revision provisions). This creates clear, judicially enforceable accountability for administrative action.

“Toute personne indûment inscrite, omise ou rayée, peut exercer un recours devant le juge de paix territorialement compétent.”

Article 202 codifies the right to judicial review by establishing clear standing (voters, candidates, observers), defined venue (Haute Cour Constitutionnelle or Tribunal administratif depending on election type), and procedural timelines (from day after voting until publication of provisional results for operational challenges; specified deadlines for result contests). Article 203 further details multiple modalities for submitting review requests. The statutory framework satisfies all elements of COI.2: codified right, standing, timeline, and venue are all statutorily grounded.

This section provides explicit statutory codification of judicial review rights for apportionment decisions, grants original jurisdiction to the state's highest court, defines standing broadly to 'any citizen or group of citizens,' establishes a clear timeline (60 days for court apportionment if legislature fails), and designates venue (Supreme Judicial Court). The mechanism satisfies the accountability dimension by ensuring independent judicial oversight of election-authority reapportionment actions.

“The Supreme Judicial Court has original jurisdiction to hear any challenge to an apportionment law enacted by the Legislature, as registered by any citizen or group of citizens.”

The statute codifies the right to judicial review of voter-registration eligibility determinations with clear standing (aggrieved individual or registered voter), explicit venue (Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County), and a defined timeline (no later than the third Tuesday before the next election). This provides robust accountability for election-authority administrative decisions in the voter-registration context.

“Any final determination regarding the eligibility of an individual to register to vote or remain registered to vote is subject to judicial review. (i) 1. A petition for judicial review shall be filed with the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. 2. The petition may be brought at any time, except that it may not be later than the third Tuesday preceding the next succeeding election.”

The section explicitly codifies a right to judicial review of all director decisions under the Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 30A), grants standing to 'any interested person,' and incorporates by reference a detailed statutory framework (chapter 30A) that defines procedures, timelines, and venue. This provides clear statutory grounding for judicial accountability of the election finance administrator.

“All acts, decisions and rulings of the director shall be subject to judicial review under the provisions of chapter thirty A upon the application of any interested person.”

This section codifies a statutory right to seek judicial review (recurso de revisión) of three categories of election-authority administrative action: Regional Electoral Court sentences, cautionary measures by the electoral institute, and dismissal agreements. It specifies venue (the Superior Electoral Court), standing (parties affected by the decisions listed), and clear timelines (3 days for sentences, 48 hours for cautionary measures), all calculated from notification. This satisfies COI.2 on all structural elements.

The section codifies judicial review with defined standing (aggrieved candidate who would have won but for error), venue (Michigan Supreme Court with original and exclusive jurisdiction), and timeline (48-hour filing deadline, ruling by day before electors convene).

§ 204D.22 codifies the writ of election for filling vacancies (judicial-process mechanism). § 211C.07 codifies the Governor's writ of election for recalls. § 204D.17 codifies special-election procedures for legislative vacancies. § 209 series codifies judicial contest review. Judicial-review framework codified.

This section provides a comprehensive, statutorily-codified right to judicial review of election-official decisions. It explicitly defines standing ('any party aggrieved'), timeline ('no later than fifteen (15) days'), and venue ('circuit court of the county in which the election officials...sits'). The provision further specifies the standard of review (de novo) and appellate procedure, establishing a clear structural mechanism for judicial accountability of election administration decisions.

The statute explicitly codifies the right to judicial review of election-authority determinations on ballot petitions, with clear standing (any registered voter), defined timelines (within ten days of refusal or determination), specified remedies (writ of mandamus, court-ordered reversal), and venue (circuit court of Cole County for Secretary of State, county where election authority is located otherwise). This satisfies all structural elements of COI.2.

“If the secretary of state or the election authority refuses to file a petition for the formation of a new party or the nomination of an independent candidate or refuses to issue a statement setting forth such person's determination within the time prescribed, any registered voter may apply, within ten days after the refusal, to the circuit court for a writ of mandamus to compel such person to file the petition or issue the statement. Within ten days after the secretary of state or the election authority issues a statement setting forth such person's determination, any registered voter may apply to the circuit court to compel the secretary of state or the election authority to reverse such person's determination.”

The section codifies a statutory right to judicial review of election-authority decisions with explicit venue allocation (district courts for lower bodies, Court of Appeal for the Central Electoral Commission) and a defined appellate ladder. It establishes clear standing (any party may appeal actions/inactions/decisions) and procedural framework by reference to the Administrative Code and Code of Civil Procedure, satisfying the core institutional accountability requirement.

The statute codifies a clear, statutory right to judicial review with defined standing (any resident), timeline (ten days after refusal), venue (district court of Lancaster County), and remedy (writ of mandamus). It further provides that appeals may be taken to the Court of Appeals within ten days, establishing a complete judicial-review framework for Secretary of State decisions on ballot measures.

“any resident may apply, within ten days after such refusal, to the district court of Lancaster County for a writ of mandamus”

This section establishes a statutory right to seek judicial review of specific election-authority decisions (those issued under articles G2, G4, and I4 in provincial elections) before a defined appellate body (the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State). It codifies both standing (against the specified decisions) and venue (the Council of State's administrative division), satisfying the core structural requirement of COI.2.

“Tegen een beschikking op grond van de artikelen G 2 , G 4 of I 4 die wordt genomen in het kader van de verkiezing van de leden van provinciale staten, kan uitsluitend beroep worden ingesteld bij de Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State.”

The statute explicitly codifies the right to judicial review of the county clerk's and board's certification decisions, specifies the venue (district court), defines the timeline (hearing within 3 days of filing), and grants standing by allowing any petitioner's committee to challenge an adverse determination. This is a clear statutory accountability mechanism that satisfies COI.2.

The statute codifies a right to judicial review of a board of recount's decisions with all four required elements clearly defined: standing ('any person aggrieved'), timeline ('within 5 days thereafter'), venue ('superior court for the county in which such town is located'), and scope ('jurisdiction in equity to hear and determine'). This provides clear statutory protection against arbitrary administrative action in the recount context.

“Any person aggrieved by a ruling of the board of recount with respect to any ballot may, within 5 days thereafter, appeal to the superior court for the county in which such town is located; and such court shall have jurisdiction in equity to hear and determine the question presented.”

§ 15-138 codifies judicial review of village-election matters. § 3-104 codifies enforcement-power judicial review. § 16-* (Article 16) codifies judicial-proceeding venue (supreme/county court), standing, and remedies for board-of-elections decisions.

The section explicitly codifies the right to seek judicial review of State Board of Elections decisions via administrative appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 150B (the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act). It defines standing (the assessed violator), timeline (30 days), and procedural mechanism (contested case petition). This provides clear statutory accountability for the Board's enforcement decisions.

“The notice of assessment shall be served by any means authorized under G.S. 1A-1 , Rule 4, and shall direct the violator either to pay the assessment or to contest the assessment within 30 days by filing a petition for a contested case under Article 3 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.”

§ 16-8 codifies complaint-handling procedure in the body receiving the complaint, with referral to the National Election Board (riksvalgstyret) if not resolved. § 16-7 codifies complaint form/content. § 16-5 codifies standing for validity-decision complaints. § 16-12 (not in FTS top-5 for this datapoint) codifies Supreme Court (Høyesterett) review of Storting validity decisions. Comprehensive judicial-review framework codified.

Article 394 § 4 codifies the right to seek judicial review by explicitly granting standing (to the person filing a protest, the election commissioner, and the chair or deputy chair of the relevant election commission), defining the timeline (7 days from delivery), and specifying venue (appellate court). This creates a clear, statutorily-grounded accountability mechanism for election authority decisions.

Article 118.º establishes a codified statutory framework for judicial review: it specifies the competent court (Tribunal Constitucional), the timeline for filing (24 hours from posting of official notice), and the venue (Constitutional Court). The section further defines procedural details (notification of parties, response deadline, final decision timeline) and identifies the relevant administrative body subject to review (Comissão Nacional de Eleições). This satisfies all elements of COI.2.

“O recurso é interposto no prazo de vinte e quatro horas, a contar da afixação do edital a que se refere o artigo 112.º, perante o Tribunal Constitucional.”

Section 30(4)–(5) codifies a statutory right to judicial review of election-authority decisions with clear standing (objector or nominated party), defined timeline (not later than relevant date in election timetable), and designated venue (Electoral Court). The mechanism applies to Commission determinations on candidate objections, establishing a concrete accountability pathway.

The section codifies a clear judicial review mechanism for state board election decisions, specifying venue (South Carolina Supreme Court), procedure (petition for writ of certiorari), standard of review (record-based), and priority treatment. Standing is implicit in the earlier provision that candidates in the protested race have notice and right to be heard, and the timeline is specified by the appellate procedure itself (certiorari review). All core elements of COI.2 are statutorily established.

“Appeals from decisions of the state board shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court on petition for a writ of certiorari only based on the record of the state board hearing and shall be granted first priority of consideration by the Court.”

§ 12-21-50 codifies issuance of writ of certiorari for judicial review of recount decisions. § 12-21-49 codifies petition form and contents. § 12-21-51 codifies service. Comprehensive judicial review of administrative recount decisions codified.

Article 112 of LOREG establishes a clear statutory right to seek judicial review of electoral administrative decisions (resource contencioso electoral), with defined standing (candidacies in the electoral process), explicit timeline (three days after proclamation), and specified venue (Electoral Board, with appeal to competent Constitutional-Administrative Chamber). This codifies judicial accountability over election authority determinations.

“El recurso contencioso electoral se interpone ante la Junta Electoral correspondiente dentro de los tres días siguientes al acto de proclamación de electos”

15 kap. 5 § codifies judicial review by the Valprövningsnämnden of results-establishment decisions. 15 kap. 4 § codifies standing. 15 kap. 6 § codifies submission. 15 kap. 7 § codifies misdirected-appeal acceptance. 15 kap. 8 § codifies public notice of appeals. Comprehensive judicial-review framework codified.

§ 273.061 codifies judicial review of election-authority conduct: the Supreme Court or a court of appeals 'may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election,' regardless of whether the responsible person is a public officer. § 273.063 codifies venue in the courts of appeals, § 31.130 codifies suit against an election officer, and § 31.005 codifies secretary-of-state enforcement through injunction/mandamus via the attorney general. Standing, timeline and venue codified.

“may issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election”

52 USC § 30110 codifies FECA judicial review with enumerated standing (FEC, political party, any voter eligible for President), venue (district court → certify to Court of Appeals en banc), and procedure (immediate certification).

“The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President may institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment”

RCW 29A.04.550(3) codifies a statutory right to judicial review of election-authority certification decisions, with the scope and procedures grounded in the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (chapter 34.05 RCW). The section establishes standing (the petitioner/appealing party), timeline (within twenty days to appeal to the board; judicial review follows board denial), and venue (court review under the APA framework). This provides clear statutory accountability for election-authority decisions.

“Judicial review of certification decisions will be as prescribed under RCW 34.05.510 through 34.05.598, but is limited to the review of board decisions denying certification.”

The statute codifies multiple avenues for judicial review (mandamus, prohibition, certiorari) with explicit standing (any officer subject to Chapter 3 duties; boards of canvassers), defined timeline (circuit court within 15 days; Supreme Court within 10 days for special session, issues determined within 5 days), and venue (circuit courts initially, Supreme Court of Appeals for review). This provides clear statutory accountability mechanisms for election-authority decisions.

“A mandamus shall lie from the Supreme Court of Appeals, or any one of the judges thereof in vacation, returnable before court, to compel any officer herein to do and perform legally any duty required of him or her. In an election of a member of the House of Delegates and state senator, a writ of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition shall lie from the Supreme Court of Appeals, or a judge thereof in vacation, returnable before the court, to correct any error of law and review and correct the proceedings of any circuit court, or the judge thereof in vacation, or any board of canvassers.”

Wis. Stat. § 5.08 codifies the petition-for-enforcement mechanism: 'any elector may file a verified petition alleging such facts as are within his or her knowledge to indicate that an election official has failed or is failing to comply with any law.' § 5.07 codifies the AG/DA action-to-compel-compliance authority. § 5.06 compliance review. Standing + venue codified.

The statute codifies a right to judicial review with clear standing ('any person aggrieved'), defined venue ('superior court'), and implicit timeline context (the 40-day window). However, the criterion asks for standing, timeline, AND venue to be defined. The section provides standing and venue clearly but does not establish a general procedural timeline for filing the review action—only a postponement rule if review occurs within 40 days before the election. This is a partial satisfaction of the accountability structure.

“Any person aggrieved by a determination of precinct boundaries by the director may bring a civil action to have the determination reviewed in the superior court.”

The section acknowledges judicial review as a remedy against civil penalties ('does not timely seek judicial review') and establishes that commission orders can be filed with superior court for enforcement. However, the statute does not codify the substantive right to judicial review, define standing, establish a timeline for seeking review, or specify venue—it only presupposes judicial review exists elsewhere in statute. This is a procedural reference rather than a complete codification of judicial-review rights.

“If the commission imposes a civil penalty on a person and that person does not timely seek judicial review, the commission may file a certified copy of its order requiring payment of the civil penalty with the clerk of the superior court in any county of this state.”

The section establishes a codified right to lodge reclamations (complaints) against election-authority decisions, with a defined timeline (4 days from filing, concluded before the 7th day before election) and a procedural requirement for public hearing. However, it does not specify standing (who may lodge reclamations), venue for appeal if the local authority denies the complaint, or the right to subsequent judicial review beyond the municipal level. The provision creates administrative accountability at the local level but does not clearly establish access to courts or define the scope of judicial review.

The section confirms that electoral disputes can be brought before administrative courts and the Conseil d'État, establishing venue and removing a procedural barrier (mandatory lawyer requirement). However, the text does not codify standing, timeline requirements, or substantive standards for judicial review. While it evidences a judicial-review mechanism, it lacks the full statutory framework needed to satisfy COI.2 completely.

“Les recours en matière électorale devant les tribunaux administratifs et le Conseil d'Etat sont jugés sans l'intervention obligatoire d'un avocat au Conseil d'Etat.”

The section establishes a statutory right to challenge election validity with defined timeline (7 days post-election) and standing (voters and candidates), and creates an administrative review mechanism (valgbestyrelsen forwards to Valgnævnet). However, it does not specify judicial review—the process appears to end with Valgnævnet's administrative decision. The criterion requires codification of access to courts, with venue and appellate pathway defined; this section addresses only internal administrative appeal, not judicial recourse.

The section establishes a statutory appeal mechanism (the Election Appeal Committee) with defined standing and subject matter (Article 22, paragraph 2 lists seven categories of appealable decisions), and it expressly permits appeal of Committee decisions to courts of law. However, the text does not codify timelines, venue, or the scope of judicial review; it merely references 'this Act' for deadlines and does not specify which court has jurisdiction or the standard of review. The framework is partially structural but incomplete on critical judicial-review elements.

The statute codifies a right to judicial review by express reference to chapter 17A (Iowa's Administrative Procedure Act), providing a clear mechanism for accountability. However, this section provides only skeletal authorization; the actual definition of standing, timeline, and venue provisions depends entirely on external reference to chapter 17A rather than codification within the election-specific statute. The criterion asks whether these procedural elements are 'defined'—which requires checking whether ch. 17A itself provides them. Section 68B.33 does not independently define these elements, making compliance dependent on the referenced statute's content.

The section codifies a statutory right to judicial review with standing ('any person aggrieved') and cross-references the Kansas Judicial Review Act for timeline and venue procedures. However, the criterion requires that timeline and venue be defined 'in' this section or explicitly incorporated by reference with sufficient detail to satisfy the dual-scholar test of institutional independence. The vague cross-reference to an external statute ('in accordance with the provisions of the Kansas judicial review act') leaves open whether substantive or narrow review applies to election commission decisions, whether expedited timelines exist, and whether the external act's procedures are adequate to the election context. A stronger provision would specify election-specific review procedures or explicitly exempt election decisions from limitations in the general administrative review statute.

“Any person aggrieved by any order of the commission pursuant to this act may appeal such order in accordance with the provisions of the Kansas judicial review act.”

Montana provides judicial review of election matters — Chapter 36 election contests are heard in district court and the Administrative Procedure Act governs challenges to the Secretary of State's rules — but the surfaced provision (a district-court injunction against improper nominations) does not itself codify a general judicial-review right with standing, timeline and venue for election-authority decisions.

The section codifies judicial review via mandamus and specifies venue (district court, court of appeals, supreme court) with a clear duty to entertain applications. However, it defines standing only implicitly ('applicant for recount or recheck') and lacks an explicit timeline or deadline for filing. The scope is also narrow—limited to recounts/rechecks and failures to perform mandatory acts—rather than comprehensive review of election-authority discretionary decisions. While it satisfies the structural requirement for codified judicial review with venue, the absence of explicit standing, timeline, and breadth of reviewable decisions prevents a full 'yes.'

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 17-15-5 is a ministerial duty statute requiring the judge of probate to publish notice of elections. It does not establish a right to judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it define standing, timeline, or venue for challenges to election administration. The section addresses notification procedures only, not accountability mechanisms or judicial review pathways.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a citizen complaint mechanism and investigation process for the Arkansas Ethics Commission, addressing internal administrative accountability for ethics violations. However, it does not codify a right to seek judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it define standing, timeline, or venue for such review. The section addresses complaints against individuals for ethics violations, not judicial review of election administration decisions by the commission itself.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

Section 37 of the NRWO addresses voter registry procedures (enrollment, posting, corrections, complaints) but does not explicitly codify the right to seek judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it define standing, timeline, or venue for judicial challenges. While the section mentions 'Beschwerden' (complaints) and references the WEviG (election law amendment act), it does not provide sufficient statutory detail about judicial review mechanisms. Clarification would require examination of other statutory sections or the WEviG itself.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

Section 510.1(2)(d.1) confirms that information must be disclosed during judicial review proceedings, which presupposes a right to seek judicial review of election-authority decisions. However, this section does not itself codify the right to seek judicial review, define standing, establish timelines, or specify venue — it merely addresses information disclosure in such proceedings. The substantive procedural framework for judicial review derives from common law and general administrative procedure statutes (e.g., the Federal Courts Act), not from this provision.

“information that is required to be disclosed in the course of an application for judicial review in respect of a decision taken under this Act”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns notice procedures for special elections and contains no codification of judicial review rights, standing, timelines, or venue for challenging election-authority decisions. It is purely procedural with respect to public notice, not an accountability mechanism.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 100.161 — filling Senate vacancy. Not judicial review of admin decisions.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Σύνταγμα Άρθρο 54 is the meta-reference 'electoral system defined by law'; not a judicial-review provision.

No matching sections in corpus.

This section establishes a certification mechanism for judicial determinations in election contests but does not itself codify the right to seek judicial review, define standing, establish timelines, or specify venue for challenges to election-authority decisions. It presupposes that judicial review already exists (by reference to 'section 17') but does not provide the structural codification of those procedural safeguards that the criterion requires.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The surfaced candidates concern writs and proclamations for special elections (KRS 118.720-118.770) and precinct-boundary maintenance, not a codified right of judicial review of election-authority decisions. Kentucky's judicial review of election disputes runs through the Circuit Court contest/recount provisions of KRS Chapter 120 (scored under EDRI).

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 19:27-6 addresses the procedural rules for filling congressional vacancies (timing of special primaries and elections, writ requirements), but contains no codified right to judicial review of election-authority decisions, no standing provisions, no timeline for review, and no venue specification. The section is purely procedural for vacancy management, not a structure for accountability mechanisms.

§ 16.1-13-08.1 codifies special-election filling-of-vacancy procedure. Judicial review of administrative decisions exists generally under NDCC 28-32 (Administrative Agencies Practice Act, separate title) and § 16.1-16 (Recounts/Contests). Not directly codified in the FTS-surfaced sections.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORC 3521.03 codifies special-election procedure for filling U.S. House vacancies; not a general judicial-review provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 26-12-101 governs the procedural mechanics of filling congressional vacancies (writs of election, timing, concurrent elections) and does not address judicial review of election-authority decisions, standing, timelines, or venue for challenging administrative determinations. The section contains no accountability mechanism for judicial oversight of administrative actions.

The section codifies venue and forum for judicial review of ballot-title and explanatory-statement determinations, satisfying those elements. However, it does not codify standing (who may petition for review), timeline for filing, or the standard of review—critical safeguards for meaningful judicial accountability. The criterion requires all four elements to satisfy; the statute provides only partial structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 1514 codifies conversion of registration records to SURE; not judicial review.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedural mechanics of holding special elections to fill U.S. Senate vacancies (issuance of writs, timing requirements). It contains no provision establishing a right to judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it define standing, timeline, or venue for such review. The section is procedurally administrative and does not codify accountability mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

This section provides a narrow right to judicial review (mandamus) but only in one specific context: county election commissions challenging county legislative bodies' failure to maintain comparable appropriations. The section does not codify a general right to seek judicial review of election-authority decisions more broadly, does not clearly define standing, timeline, or venue for judicial challenge of administrative decisions by election officials or the state election coordinator, and the judicial review mechanism contemplated (administrative law judge hearing before the secretary of state) is internal administrative process, not independent court review. The criterion requires codified judicial review of election-authority decisions with defined procedural safeguards.

“the county election commission of any county receiving state payments under this section which so reduces election appropriations shall also be authorized to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the county legislative body to comply with the provisions of this subsection (c).”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 79 establishes YSK with a FINALITY clause: 'Yüksek Seçim Kurulunun kararları aleyhine başka bir mercie başvurulamaz' (YSK decisions cannot be appealed to any other authority). Although Anayasa Article 125 (5247) opens judicial review for OTHER administrative acts, YSK acts are constitutionally exempted — a structural gap on judicial review of the election authority's decisions.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns only the disqualification criteria for judges constituting an election court in England and Wales—specifically, modifying the residential qualification for court membership. It does not establish, codify, or define any right to seek judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it address standing, timeline, or venue for such review. The section is procedurally limited to court composition and does not satisfy COI.2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines technical redistricting standards and analytical tests (ensemble analysis, partisan bias tests, mean-median difference tests) but contains no provisions regarding judicial review of election-authority decisions, standing, timelines, or venue. It is a substantive redistricting methodology statute, not an accountability or judicial-review provision.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 24.2-216 governs the procedural mechanics of filling legislative vacancies (issuance of writs, timing, resignation revocability) and does not establish any right to judicial review of election-authority decisions, nor does it define standing, timeline, or venue for such review. The section is entirely about vacancy-filling procedure, not accountability mechanisms for election administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section explicitly precludes judicial review of election contests involving the president, vice-president, or presidential electors, stating determinations are 'final and conclusive and is not subject to judicial review.' This directly contradicts COI.2, which requires codified judicial review of election-authority decisions. The section does not establish a statutory framework enabling such review; rather, it statutorily forecloses it.