Audit triggers beyond mandatory

The statute mandates a discrepancy recanvass when specific conditions are met, including when the margin of victory is less than the discrepancy multiplied by the total voting districts. This triggers an additional audit mechanism beyond the mandatory baseline 5% audit, satisfying the criterion for audits triggered by close margins.

“the Secretary of the State shall order a discrepancy recanvass of the returns of an election or primary for any office if a discrepancy, as defined in subsection (o) of this section, exists where the margin of victory in the race for such office is less than the amount of the discrepancy multiplied by the total number of voting districts where such race appeared on the ballot”

§ 90 codifies that 'Folketinget decides to what extent and in what manner omvalg (re-election) shall be held.' § 72 codifies the mandatory fintælling. § 22 codifies error-correction procedure. § 71 codifies result-reporting chain. § 4 codifies disqualification triggers. Comprehensive escalation framework codified.

KRS 120.157 codifies an automatic-recount trigger beyond the mandatory audit: in any regular or special election for the General Assembly, Congress, or a statewide constitutional office, 'a recount of the vote shall be required when a candidate is defeated by a margin of not more than one-half of one percent (0.5%) of the votes cast.' A margin-based audit/recount trigger is codified.

§ 16.1-16-01 codifies discrepancy/close-margin triggers: 0.5% margin auto-recount for general elections, 1% for primary, 0.25% for measures. Demand-recount available at margins between 1% and 2% (primary). Comprehensive trigger-based recount framework codified.

§ 12-21-10 codifies that 'a candidate… is defeated, according to the official returns, by a margin not exceeding two percent of the total vote cast' may petition for a complete recount. § 12-21-16 codifies automatic tie-vote recount. Statutory close-margin trigger explicitly codified.

§ 17-1 codifies that a re-election shall be held if the Storting, Supreme Court, or National Election Board declares an election invalid. § 17-2 codifies acting representatives during a re-election. Triggers for re-election (the strongest 'beyond mandatory' remedy) codified.

15 kap. 7 § codifies that appeals received by the decision-maker that arrive at the Valprövningsnämnden within the appeal period shall be taken up for review even if the original filing was misrouted — escalation procedure. 15 kap. 5 § codifies appeal of results-establishment decisions to the Valprövningsnämnden. Triggers for review of the canvass beyond the mandatory triple count codified through the appeals framework.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: A.R.S. § 16-602 establishes a mandatory hand count audit for all countywide elections involving electronic voting machines, but it does not provide for additional audits triggered by close margins or sworn challenges. The statute specifies a fixed random selection method (at least two percent of precincts) that applies regardless of election outcome margins or challenges. There is no provision in this section for escalated or supplementary audits based on vote closeness or formal objections.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the procedure for announcing election results and the Constitutional Court's authority to hear challenges to the election decision within four weeks, but it does not describe triggering additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The provision concerns legal remedies and court procedures, not audit mechanisms.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 95 of the Belgian Electoral Code addresses the composition and designation of electoral bureaus (polling station and counting station officials) at the canton level. It contains no provisions regarding audit triggers, close margin procedures, or mechanisms for audits based on sworn challenges. The section is entirely focused on the administrative structure of electoral bureaus and personnel selection.

This section establishes a mechanism for challenges (impugnações) to be presented during vote counting and decided by the Electoral Board, but it does not specifically trigger additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The provision addresses challenge procedures and appeals rather than audit-triggering mechanisms based on electoral margins or affidavits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the complaint procedure for sectional election commissions abroad, allowing challenges to be submitted to the Central Election Commission with expedited resolution. It does not address audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges as contemplated by criterion 3.3 on post-election audits.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses certification of election results, preparation of official abstracts, and tie-vote resolution, but does not establish triggers for additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The statute is about result compilation and certification, not audit initiation criteria.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 100 addresses the complaint and appeal procedures to the Constitutional Court regarding decisions by the State Electoral Commission, with specific timeframes for filing and deciding appeals. It does not establish or trigger additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges; it merely provides a dispute resolution mechanism for existing State Electoral Commission decisions.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute requires the Department to promulgate regulations that may include thresholds triggering additional actions based on audit discrepancies, but it does not itself establish or mandate additional audits triggered by close margins or sworn challenges. The law mandates only fixed, routine audits of randomly selected districts/devices and delegates the design of any discrepancy-triggered procedures to future regulations, leaving the actual trigger mechanisms undefined in the statutory text.

“The Department shall promulgate regulations to govern the procedure to be used if an audit reveals a discrepancy, including all of the following: (1) The thresholds that trigger the Department or others to take a specific action.”

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 106.33 election campaign financing eligibility. Off-topic for audit triggers.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the timing and location for receiving candidacy declarations for National Assembly elections. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, close margin triggers, or sworn challenges. The content is entirely procedural regarding candidate filing and is unrelated to the criterion.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Σύνταγμα Άρθρο 54 (meta).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 57 addresses procedures for declaring elections invalid and ordering new elections when significant errors have occurred, and for correcting voter lists. It does not establish mechanisms for triggering additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges; it only permits the Election Board (Valgnævnet) to invalidate an election if major errors are found. The provision is about election annulment and remedial procedures, not audit triggers.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the certification process and requires comparison of canvass results, audit records, and manual audit results, but does not establish triggers for additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. It references existing audit procedures and mandatory recounts under section 11-158, but does not itself create additional audit triggers beyond those already mandated.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute provides for discretionary additional audits based on findings from mandatory audits, but does not establish automatic triggers for audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The discretionary authority does not satisfy a criterion requiring trigger mechanisms, as it depends on secretary of state determination rather than objective thresholds.

“The secretary of state may order additional postelection audits, without regard to the election or precinct limitations provided in subsection (1) of this section, if he determines that such action is warranted by the findings of the audits ordered pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.”

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

The section allows for manual recounts of ballot cards when a petition is filed, which can be triggered by challenges. However, it does not establish automatic audit triggers based on close margins or other objective thresholds—it requires an affirmative petition/challenge request rather than triggering audits independently. The mechanism is petition-driven rather than margin-based.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 43.67 addresses the process for nominees to be placed on the ballot, including requirements for write-in candidates to file affidavits of candidacy. It contains no provisions relating to post-election audits, close margin triggers, or sworn challenges that would initiate additional audits. The section is entirely about pre-election ballot access, not post-election audit procedures.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 21 addresses voter registration disputes and appeals to the justice of the peace regarding inscription on electoral lists. It does not address post-election audits, close margin triggers, or sworn challenges to election results. This section concerns pre-election registration procedures, not post-election audit mechanisms.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 169 describes the mechanical procedures for ballot counting and verification at electoral bureaus, including how ballots are opened, counted, and results recorded. It does not address audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges that would activate additional audits beyond mandatory processes.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section provides for examination of objections regarding ballot box seals prior to opening, but this is a pre-audit integrity check rather than a post-election audit triggered by close margins or sworn challenges. It does not establish mechanisms for triggering additional audits based on close election results or sworn challenges after voting concludes.

“Any objection raised by the party delegates or their substitutes as to the integrity of such seals shall be examined by the Commission whose decision thereon shall be final and not subject to appeal.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 12-108 addresses duplicate ballot creation, preservation, and recount procedures, but does not establish any audit triggers based on close margins or sworn challenges. The section only specifies methods for conducting recounts after a petitioner has already initiated one, without triggering additional audits on its own.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Montana's random-sample audit is triggered by the federal-election calendar (mandatory) or a county board's request for nonfederal elections (§ 13-17-510); close margins trigger a recount rather than an additional audit, and there is no sworn-challenge audit trigger.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

While the statute does trigger additional audits (a second sample, and potentially a full hand recount) based on error rate thresholds, this is not a trigger based on close margins per se—rather, it is based on discovered discrepancies during the initial audit. The statute requires mandatory audits for all federal offices and certain statewide offices regardless of margin (subject to a 15% threshold exemption), but the escalation to additional audits is reactive to audit findings, not proactive to close margins or sworn challenges.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recounts and recount procedures triggered by candidate demands or board discretion, not additional audits triggered by close margins or sworn challenges. Recounts are a separate post-election process from audits. The section does not establish audit triggers beyond mandatory recounts.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute establishes recount triggers based on close margins for ballot issues (sections B and C), which are procedurally similar to audits. However, the section addresses recounts initiated by candidates and voters through petitions with deposit requirements, not automatic audits triggered by election officials. The criterion asks about audits triggered beyond mandatory audits, and this section focuses on discretionary recounts requested by interested parties rather than system-level post-election audits.

The statute mandates hand counts based on margin thresholds (less than 1%, 1-2%, or 2%+ of total votes cast), which are triggered automatically by vote totals rather than by sworn challenges or discretionary triggers beyond the mandatory audit framework. The law establishes margin-based audit triggers but does not provide for additional audits triggered by sworn challenges or other mechanisms beyond the systematic margin-based requirements already in place.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Polish Electoral Code governs the filing of election validity protests (protests against election validity) based on crimes or procedural violations, and establishes who may file such protests. It does not address audit triggers, close margin thresholds, or the conditions under which additional audits beyond mandatory procedures are activated.

The section establishes a mechanism for contesting irregularities through formal complaints and protests, which can trigger review procedures. However, it does not specifically address automatic audits based on close margins or define how sworn challenges independently trigger audits beyond complaint-dependent review. The mechanism is reactive rather than proactive audit-triggering.

“As irregularidades ocorridas no decurso da votação e no apuramento parcial, distrital e geral podem ser apreciadas em recurso contencioso, desde que hajam sido objecto de reclamação ou protesto apresentados no acto em que se verificam.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recount eligibility for write-in candidates, not audit triggers. It establishes vote thresholds for when a write-in candidate may request a recount, but does not trigger additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. Recounts and audits are distinct processes; recount eligibility provisions do not satisfy a criterion about audit triggers.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 37 addresses removal of deceased voters from electoral registers. It contains no provisions regarding audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges to election results. This section is entirely focused on voter registration procedures and is unrelated to post-election audits.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates recounts when vote margins are within one percent, which triggers additional scrutiny on close margins. However, the criterion asks whether law triggers additional audits on close margins OR sworn challenges. This section addresses only close-margin triggers (recounts), not sworn-challenge triggers, and a recount is not necessarily an audit under standard election integrity terminology. The statute does not address audit triggers based on sworn challenges.

“Whenever the difference between the number of votes received by a candidate who has been declared nominated for an office in a primary election or who has been declared elected to an office in a general election and the number of votes received by any other candidate or candidate not declared so nominated or elected or whenever the difference between the number of votes received by a candidate who received the least number of votes to qualify for a runoff election and a candidate or candidates who did not so qualify shall be not more than one percent of the total votes which were cast for such office therein, the committee or board charged by law with canvassing such votes shall order a recount of such votes to be made forthwith”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 38 of LOREG addresses the management of the electoral census—including public access, submission of claims about census data, and procedures for resolving objections to census figures. It does not concern post-election audits, close-margin triggers, or sworn challenges to election results. The criterion requires provisions that trigger audits based on election closeness or formal challenges, which is outside the scope of this census administration provision.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 73 is tax law — unrelated.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30111 addresses the FEC's administrative duties regarding forms, filing systems, public records, and discretionary audits of political committees. It does not establish audit triggers based on election close margins or sworn challenges to election results. The audits described concern campaign finance compliance, not post-election outcome verification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses redistricting standards and requirements, specifically defining technical terms and methodologies for analyzing redistricting plans for partisan bias. It does not address post-election audits, audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges. The section is entirely focused on the redistricting process itself, not election auditing mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates recounts based on close vote margins (a form of audit trigger), but the criterion asks about audits 'beyond mandatory' triggers—implying discretionary or additional audits triggered by circumstances like sworn challenges. This section establishes mandatory recounts by margin thresholds alone, with no provision for audits triggered by sworn challenges or other non-margin-based mechanisms. The statute does not address audit triggers beyond the automatic margin-based recount requirement.

“If the official canvass of all of the returns for any office at any primary or election reveals that the difference in the number of votes cast for a candidate apparently qualified for the general election ballot or elected to any office, and the number of votes cast for the closest apparently defeated opponent is less than two thousand votes and also less than one-half of one percent of the total number of votes cast for both candidates, the county canvassing board shall conduct a recount of all votes cast on that position.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.