EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 87 addresses observer access to vote counting and the delivery of tally sheets (boletins) to parties, but does not mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, or result signatures. The section focuses on in-person verification by party representatives rather than public digital artifacts. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The section explicitly requires 'official ballots' (cédulas oficiais) as a mandatory component of election materials. Official ballots constitute a paper-based voter-verifiable record, as they are hand-marked by voters and provide a tangible, verifiable paper trail of the vote cast. “cédulas oficiais” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section addresses disclosure of financial, budgetary, and fiscal information by government entities in electronic format for public access and traceability, but does not address voting precinct data, election tallying, or citizen rights to recount or verify election results. This is fiscal transparency law, not electoral procedure law, and is therefore irrelevant to the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Custody Hardware
25.0% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The statute requires that ballot boxes be sealed (lacrada) before delivery to the electoral judge, which establishes a basic tamper-evident requirement through physical sealing. However, the text does not specify tamper-responsive systems, logging of seal integrity, or automated quarantine procedures. “esta fechada, lacrada e entregue ao juiz eleitoral” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 36-A addresses early election campaign regulations and what activities are not considered early electoral propaganda. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, hardware isolation, or cybersecurity measures. The section is entirely focused on permissible political communications before official campaign periods. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Brazilian Constitution addresses maritime and transport regulations, including the organization of air, water, and land transport, national shipowner requirements, and cabotage rules. It contains no provisions regarding chain-of-custody documentation or public availability of such documentation. The section is entirely unrelated to election integrity or custody procedures. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Brazilian Electoral Code outlines the jurisdiction and powers of electoral tribunals regarding registration of political parties and candidates, conflicts between electoral judges, and various electoral disputes. It contains no provisions regarding criminal penalties for unauthorized device access or tamper-related offenses. The section is entirely unrelated to the custody or security of election hardware. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Post Election Audit
22.2% · 2/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | The section requires an audit of electronic voting machines on election day through parallel voting, but this is limited to a sample basis (por amostragem) and focuses on machine functionality verification rather than a comprehensive post-election audit of results. A mandatory audit requirement typically implies systematic verification after all voting is complete, not just sampling on election day. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | The section mandates a sample-based audit method (votação paralela—parallel voting) to verify electronic ballot box functioning on election day, which constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount/verification approach. However, the statute does not specify the exact percentage sampled, the procedures for reconciliation, or risk-limiting audit methodology, limiting it to a basic auditing mechanism rather than a comprehensive post-election audit framework. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | This section establishes a mechanism for challenges (impugnações) to be presented during vote counting and decided by the Electoral Board, but it does not specifically trigger additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The provision addresses challenge procedures and appeals rather than audit-triggering mechanisms based on electoral margins or affidavits. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This constitutional section addresses public health actions and services, establishing that health matters are of public relevance and can be regulated and controlled by public authorities. It contains no provisions regarding election audits, observer access, or electoral processes, and is therefore entirely irrelevant to the criterion concerning public observation of post-election audits. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the retention of campaign account documentation by candidates and parties for 180 days after diplomation. It does not concern audit results, their legal force, or binding effect on certified election results. The criterion requires binding force of audit results on final certified results, which is outside the scope of this provision. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Software Verifiability
11.1% · 1/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 59 of Brazil's Electoral Law addresses electronic voting procedures, vote printing, verification mechanisms, and digital signatures, but does not establish any requirement for pre-election cryptographic commitment or publication of binary hashes before polls open. The section focuses on ballot casting, vote recording, and post-election verification procedures rather than pre-election software security measures. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 68 addresses the posting of polling station ballots (boletim de urna) after voting and the distribution of copies to party representatives. It does not address pre-election publication of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules, nor does it address digital signing or verification of election materials before polls open. The section concerns post-voting ballot documentation, not pre-election publication of election definition materials. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly grants parties and coalitions the right to verify that the programs loaded into electronic voting machines are identical to those that were previously sealed in a public session. This is a direct post-election integrity check mechanism that ensures the actual running binary matches the committed one before the machines are sealed for use on election day. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | The section grants party candidates, delegates, and party observers (fiscais de partido) the right to obtain certified copies of electoral communications, which provides some procedural access. However, the provision is limited to post-election access to documentation and does not address full procedural access to observe voting processes themselves or other real-time election procedures. It does not mention civil-society observers at all. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section enumerates the original and appellate jurisdiction of Brazil's Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal), covering constitutional review, crimes of responsibility, writs, and various disputes. It contains no provisions concerning international observer access, OSCE/EU/IFES observer admission, or electoral observation. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 47 of the Brazilian Electoral Law regulates the scheduling and allocation of free broadcast time for electoral propaganda on radio and television during elections. It contains no provisions regarding the publication timeline for precinct-level election results. This section addresses media access and campaign communication, not result transparency or reporting deadlines. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires electronic voting machines to print a record of each vote and deposit it in a sealed location, which provides some audit capability. However, the section does not establish that this log is public, signed, or append-only in the cryptographic sense required by criterion 6.4. The statute addresses voter verification and physical record creation but not the public and signed event log infrastructure contemplated by the criterion. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Brazilian Constitution lists economic principles (national sovereignty, private property, social function of property, and free competition) and does not address election administration, voting systems, vendors, or election technology. It is wholly unrelated to the criterion regarding multi-vendor capability in elections. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns paid electoral advertising in print media and internet reproduction of newspapers. It is entirely unrelated to vote-format standards, device protocols, or voting technology standards, which is what the criterion addresses. The section regulates campaign communication, not voting system technical specifications. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Brazilian Constitution enumerates workers' rights related to wages, working hours, leave, discrimination protections, and other labor-related guarantees. It does not address vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or prevention of perpetual lock-in. The section is entirely focused on employee rights and has no relevance to the election integrity criterion about vendor contract duration. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
Voter Access
42.9% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly guarantees ballot secrecy (sigilo do voto) through legally mandated measures, which is the foundation for voter-ballot unlinkability. The provision ensures that votes remain secret and unlinked to individual voters through procedural safeguards. “O sigilo do voto é assegurado” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 2/540.0% | The statute mandates that Regional Electoral Courts issue instructions to judges to ensure accessibility for voters with disabilities and reduced mobility, including surroundings and transportation access. However, this is a directive to issue guidance rather than a direct requirement that all polling places meet specific accessibility standards, and it does not explicitly address vision, motor, or language accessibility requirements at every location. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 59 governs the electronic voting system, vote tallying procedures, and verification mechanisms for electronic ballot boxes. It does not address polling place density, the number of polling places, or requirements relating to polling place distribution per voters or geographic area. | § view source 2026-06-02 |