EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. 94 concerns candidate registration procedures and documentation requirements (party delegation authorization, convention minutes, voter certification, party affiliation proof, criminal record clearance, asset declarations). It does not address conflict-of-interest disclosure by election commissioners or senior election staff. The section contains no provisions requiring commissioners or election officials to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or other potential conflicts to the public.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 17 of the Electoral Code (Lei nº 4.737/1965) is a statute, not a constitutional provision. It establishes the Superior Electoral Court's internal governance structure (president, vice-president, and general ombudsman elected from among its members), but does not establish the election commission's existence or core mandate at the constitutional level. The section addresses leadership selection and the ombudsman's functions within an already-established institution, rather than grounding the commission itself in constitutional text. To satisfy COMM.1 at score=2, the election commission's fundamental existence and mandate would need to be set by Brazil's Constitution, not by statute alone.

The statute mandates a multi-branch composition: three and two judges are elected (by the judiciary itself) from the Supreme Court and Federal Court of Appeals respectively, while two additional members are nominated by the President but selected from a list of six candidates pre-screened by the Supreme Court. This structure prevents unilateral control by any single branch—the President cannot appoint arbitrary candidates and must choose from judicially-vetted candidates. The judiciary controls 5 of 7 seats directly or indirectly, creating genuine structural independence from executive discretion.

This section establishes fixed three-year terms for six citizen-commissioners with an explicit prohibition on reappointment (vedada a recondução), providing clear statutory term protection. The terms are defined in the constitution itself, creating a strong structural safeguard against arbitrary removal or indefinite tenure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 112 addresses party representation substitutes (suplentes) but contains no language establishing statutory requirements for political balance, multi-party composition, supermajority confirmation, or judicial appointment of any commission. It does not establish or govern commission composition requirements.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance rules for individual donors and candidates (donation limits, receipt requirements, and contribution channels). It does not address the institutional budget, funding structure, or fiscal independence of the election authority itself. FUND.1 requires a separate statutory line item for the election authority's operations protected from mid-cycle reallocation; this section regulates private campaign contributions, not public election administration funding.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 215 of the Brazilian Constitution addresses cultural rights and the National Plan of Culture. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding election administration, electoral infrastructure, budget cycles, or electoral funding. This section is entirely outside the domain of election administration governance and therefore cannot satisfy FUND.2, which requires multi-year funding cycles for election infrastructure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 374 addresses only vacation accrual and leave provisions for electoral tribunal members, judges, and requisitioned public servants. It contains no protections for career staff merit-based appointment, tenure security, professional development, or insulation from political removal. The section does not establish or reference civil-service protections or career pathways.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 59 establishes technical requirements for electronic voting systems, including audit mechanisms, digital signatures, and printed vote verification. However, it contains no statutory requirement for training of election officials or poll workers, nor does it specify training content or frequency. The section addresses voter training infrastructure (§ 7º/8º mentions urnas eletrônicas destinadas a treinamento for voters), but does not impose mandatory training obligations on officials or staff.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 342 of the Brazilian Electoral Code addresses criminal penalties for the Public Ministry's failure to prosecute or execute sentences, not whistleblower protections for election staff. The section imposes duties on prosecutors but contains no statutory framework protecting staff who report election irregularities from retaliation or establishing safe channels for disclosure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.