ECIElection Campaign-Finance Index

The statute explicitly codifies a contribution limit framework by setting a numerical ceiling (one thousand UFIR) for individual voter expenditures in support of candidates, with statutory exceptions for legal and accounting services. The limit is defined directly in the law, not delegated to administrative discretion.

The statute does recognize and codify independent expenditures by electors supporting candidates without reimbursement, establishing a spending limit (1,000 UFIR) and exemption from accounting requirements. However, the provision lacks enumeration of critical procedural details: no definition of what constitutes permissible independent spending, no distinction between different types of independent expenditures, no disclosure or record-retention requirements, no penalty schedule for violations, and no enforcement mechanism. The exemption from accounting ('não sujeitos a contabilização') creates ambiguity about audit and verification procedures.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates disclosure of monetary resources received within 72 hours and requires donor identification (names, CPF/CNPJ, and amounts) in final accounting. However, the section does not explicitly establish a minimum threshold amount above which disclosure becomes mandatory. § 6o exempts small in-kind contributions (up to R$ 4,000 per cedent) from accounting requirements, but this is an exemption, not a threshold definition for mandatory disclosure. The statute imposes disclosure obligations but lacks a clear, enumerated threshold for when the duty to disclose attaches.

The statute explicitly enumerates the post-election filing deadline: candidates and committees must submit account statements to the Electoral Justice within thirty days after the election. A separate deadline for runoff elections (twenty days after the second round) is also statutorily specified. The filing schedule is codified with precise temporal markers rather than left to administrative discretion.

The statute requires disclosure of contributor names (nomes dos doadores) and donation amounts in final accounting reports, but does not mandate disclosure of address, occupation, or employer information. This satisfies the name-only threshold (score 1) rather than full identity disclosure (score 2).

The statute explicitly mandates that parties, coalitions, and candidates must disclose campaign finance information on a website created by the Electoral Justice within a defined timeframe (72 hours for monetary receipts; September 15 for comprehensive reports). This establishes both the requirement for public online accessibility and specific statutory deadlines, satisfying the procedural clarity requirement.

The section provides a clearly codified civil penalty schedule with a specified monetary range (R$ 5,000–30,000) for violations of the prohibition on use, donation, or cession of electronic customer databases. However, it does not establish any criminal penalties or grades, only civil (administrative) sanctions; thus it scores partial on the criterion, meeting only the civil component.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of the Brazilian Constitution addresses the powers of the National Congress, including oversight of the Executive, appointment of tribunal members, and approval of nuclear activities. It contains no provisions regarding campaign-finance enforcement, the independence of any election commission or campaign-finance regulator, multi-branch appointment procedures for such bodies, or protections from in-cycle political control. The criterion requires procedural clarity on enforcement-body independence; this section is entirely silent on campaign finance and electoral enforcement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 14 of the Brazilian Constitution addresses voting rights, eligibility, ineligibility, and the impugnment of electoral mandates, but contains no provision establishing a private right of action for campaign-finance violations. § 10 permits impugnment of a mandate for abuse of economic power, corruption, or fraud, but this is a post-election remedy focused on mandate validity, not a statutory mechanism for private parties to enforce campaign-finance rules prospectively or to obtain damages. The section delegates regulation of ineligibility and electoral protection to complementary law (§ 9) but does not itself codify campaign-finance enforcement procedures or private standing.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute directly prohibits foreign entities and foreign governments as contributors (Item I), establishing a clear statutory ban on direct foreign-source funding. However, the section does not address indirect or pass-through channels—such as foreign nationals acting through domestic intermediaries, foreign-controlled domestic entities, or corporate-ownership tracing mechanisms. Only the direct foreign-source prohibition is codified; the statutory framework lacks enumeration of verification procedures, ownership-transparency requirements, or tracing rules for detecting indirect foreign influence.

“entidade ou governo estrangeiro”

No matching sections in corpus.

Art. 34, Item IV explicitly requires political parties to retain documentation supporting their account statements for a period of no less than five years. This is a clear statutory mandate establishing both the obligation and the duration, meeting the core requirement for records-retention procedure.

The section establishes a statutory obligation for parties, committees, and candidates to file accounts at campaign's end and remit financial balances to party treasury. However, it does not specify mandatory audit procedures (random sampling, threshold-triggered review, or routine audit cycles), audit frequency, audit authority, or audit-access standards. The requirement is for accounting submission, not for independent verification or audit access.