Audit access

Article 23 mandates that political parties place supporting documentation at the disposal of federal electoral courts, creating a statutory basis for audit access. The section also requires annual financial statements (balance sheet and income/expense account) signed by party president, treasurer, and certified public accountant, with technical certification from the professional accounting council. These provisions establish a routine statutory cycle (annual, within 90 days of fiscal year end) and explicit obligation to provide audit-relevant records to electoral authorities, satisfying the audit-access requirement.

Section § 4(2)–(5) establishes a mandatory post-election audit regime: parties must file campaign-expenditure reports within six months; the Court of Audit (Rechnungshof) reviews all reports submitted by parties receiving state funding; an auditor (Wirtschaftsprüfer) must verify the report according to defined procedures (§ 8–9); and the audit findings are published. This constitutes a routine statutory audit cycle covering all qualifying campaign committees.

“Der Rechnungshof hat den Wahlwerbungsbericht ohne vorherige Kontrolle mit dem Hinweis auf eine noch anhängige Prüfung unverzüglich auf seiner Website zu veröffentlichen. Nach Abschluss der Prüfung des Wahlwerbungsberichts ist der Hinweis auf die anhängige Prüfung zu entfernen.”

Чл. 170 codifies the Audit Office's mandatory verification framework: bank-transfer requirement for amounts over 1000 BGN, donor-income correspondence audit for donations over 1000 BGN, direct electronic access to NRA and other agency databases, statutory cooperation duties. Comprehensive audit-access regime.

“Финансирането на приходите и разходите, свързани с предизборната кампания, на стойност над 1000 лв., се извършва по банков път”

The statute establishes a mandatory audit requirement by assigning the State Audit Office (Državni ured za reviziju) responsibility for auditing political parties and candidates. The audit obligation is statutory and routine (not discretionary), operating within a defined legal framework and international audit standards. This satisfies the procedural requirement for mandatory audit access to campaign-committee records.

“Državni ured za reviziju obavlja reviziju političkih stranaka, nezavisnih zastupnika i članova predstavničkih tijela jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave izabranih s liste grupe birača te provodi i druge poslove iz svoje nadležnosti. Državni ured za reviziju obavlja reviziju na temelju ovoga Zakona na način kako je to propisano zakonom kojim se uređuje rad Državnog ureda za reviziju i međunarodnim revizorskim standardima.”

§ 12¹⁰ empowers the Political Party Funding Supervision Committee to demand that a political party, election coalition or single candidate undergo a special audit — the auditor drawn by lot from the register of certified auditors — and § 12⁹ makes the annual-report audit mandatory for state-funded parties.

“the political party funding supervision committee has the right to demand that a political party, an election coalition or a single candidate undergo a special audit.”

§ 106.22 + § 106.24 give the Division of Elections and Florida Elections Commission statutory audit access to campaign-finance records.

Section § 23a establishes a mandatory statutory audit framework whereby the Bundestag President reviews campaign-finance reports (Rechenschaftsberichte) for formal and substantive correctness. The statute mandates auditor access to party records and explicitly requires parties to grant full access and inspection rights to auditors appointed by the Bundestag President when triggered by concrete evidence of inaccuracies. This creates a clear, statutorily-grounded audit-access requirement with defined procedures, not merely administrative discretion.

“Die Partei hat dem vom Präsidenten des Deutschen Bundestages bestellten Wirtschaftsprüfer Zugang und Einsicht in die zur Prüfung erforderlichen Unterlagen und Belege zu gewähren.”

Ν. 3023/2002 Άρθρο 21 vests audit access to party + candidate finances in the Επιτροπή Ελέγχου — independent oversight with statutory powers.

“Ο έλεγχος των οικονομικών κομμάτων και συνασπι- σμών και των υποψήφιων βουλευτών”

The statute mandates that political organizations submit audited accounts annually to the State Auditor before November 1st, establishing a routine audit cycle under statutory obligation. The requirement that accounts be 'audited' (árituðum af endurskoðendum) and reviewed by the State Auditor (Ríkisendurskoðandi) satisfies the mandatory audit criterion.

“Stjórnmálasamtök skulu fyrir 1. nóvember ár hvert skila ríkisendurskoðanda reikningum sínum fyrir síðastliðið ár, sbr. 8. gr., árituðum af endurskoðendum. Ríkisendurskoðandi skal í kjölfarið, eins fljótt og unnt er, birta ársreikning stjórnmálasamtaka.”

The section establishes a mandatory statutory duty ('shall make') for the election division and county election boards to conduct audits and field investigations of campaign reports and statements. This creates a clear, codified audit-access requirement that supports the traceability of campaign-committee records, even though the statute does not specify the frequency, sampling method, or triggering threshold with granular detail.

KRS 121.120 codifies mandatory and random audit access: the Registry must 'conduct random audits of receipts and expenditures' of committees (subsection 1(j)) and of candidates for local and district office (subsection 4(j)), and must 'conduct audits of receipts and expenditures of all candidates or slates of candidates running for statewide office' (subsection 4(k)). Statutory audit of campaign-committee records codified.

§ 11 of the Law on Financing of Political Organisations mandates an audit — a party whose fund turnover exceeds 10 minimum monthly wages must have its financial and economic activities audited by a sworn auditor, whose opinion is attached to the annual statement submitted to the CPCB.

“financial and economic activities of such political organisation (party) for the relevant year shall be audited by a sworn auditor”

The section establishes a statutory mandate for the commission to conduct random field investigations and audits of campaign statements and activity reports, satisfying the core requirement for mandatory audit access under statute. The language is clear and creates an affirmative duty; however, the section does not specify the frequency, sample methodology, or thresholds that would trigger audits, leaving some procedural details to administrative discretion.

Article 30(4) mandates that each subsidiary organization of a political party commission an audit by an accountant, who must examine whether the submitted overview complies with statutory requirements and issue a written verification statement regarding its faithfulness. This establishes a mandatory audit procedure grounded in statute, satisfying the criterion for audit access and routine auditing of campaign-committee records.

“De neveninstelling geeft opdracht tot onderzoek van het overzicht aan een accountant. De accountant onderzoekt of het overzicht voldoet aan de bij of krachtens de wet gestelde voorschriften en geeft de uitslag van zijn onderzoek weer in een schriftelijke verklaring omtrent de getrouwheid van het overzicht.”

This section establishes a mandatory, random-sample audit procedure grounded in statute. The secretary of state is required to examine at least 10% of all reports filed annually, with explicit timing requirements (at least 40 days after general election, 10 days after April reports in non-election years). The audit includes investigation of discrepancies and cross-reference capability across reporting individuals. This satisfies TRACE.2 by codifying a routine audit cycle with defined scope and methodology.

Article 24.3-4 establishes that the independent audit entity (ECFP) has the power and duty to conduct inspections and mandatory audits ('auditorias obrigatórias') of campaign accounts by statute. The section explicitly grounds both discretionary audits and mandatory audits in law, assigns them to a defined independent body, and contemplates routine audit cycles ('demais atos inspetivos'), satisfying the procedural requirement for statutory audit access.

Finance Law Article 35 grants the State Audit Institution (Државна ревизорска институција) statutory audit access: its annual audit program must include political subjects with parliamentary representation. Article 36 (4665) supplements with annual tax-control program covering donors. Article 31 (4660) requires party-internal control structure.

“Програм ревизије Државне ревизорске институције сваке године обухвата одговарајући број политичких субјеката који имају представнике у Народној скупштини.”

Article 134 establishes a mandatory statutory audit regime: the Tribunal de Cuentas (Court of Audit) is required by law to pronounce on the regularity of electoral accounts within 200 days after elections. This is a routine cycle audit triggered automatically by election completion, not discretionary. The statute also grants the Tribunal explicit authority to request clarifications and supplementary documents from entities obligated to file, establishing audit access rights.

“Dentro de los doscientos días posteriores a las elecciones, el Tribunal de cuentas se pronuncia, en el ejercicio de su función fiscalizadora, sobre la regularidad de las contabilidades electorales”

The statute establishes mandatory, statutorily-defined audit triggers: gubernatorial candidates receiving ≥10% of votes, ~4% random sample of general assembly candidates, and one candidate each from supreme court/appeals courts per election cycle. These are clear, enforceable procedures with specified record-retention requirements (2 years) and penalties for non-compliance (Class 2 offense). The statute also explicitly requires retention of checks, bank statements, and vendor receipts and defines the scope and timing of audits.

“Each gubernatorial candidate and that candidate's committees that receive at least ten percent (10%) of the vote at the general election shall be audited; Each candidate for the general assembly and such candidate's committees shall be subject to an audit by the registry on a random selection of districts in an election. Districts shall be randomly drawn until a total of approximately four percent (4%) of all candidates for the general assembly have been selected.”

Law 2820 Article 74 mandates AYM (Constitutional Court) audit of party finances with Sayıştay (Court of Accounts) assistance per Article 75. Comprehensive routine audit of all parties' final-accounts is statutorily required — not random sampling but full-coverage annual audit.

“Siyasi partilerin mali denetimi Anayasa Mahkemesince yapılır.”

The section establishes a statutory obligation for parties, committees, and candidates to file accounts at campaign's end and remit financial balances to party treasury. However, it does not specify mandatory audit procedures (random sampling, threshold-triggered review, or routine audit cycles), audit frequency, audit authority, or audit-access standards. The requirement is for accounting submission, not for independent verification or audit access.

Section 366 establishes record-retention requirements for contributions (both receipted contributions over $20 and anonymous contributions under $20), which is a necessary precondition for audit access. However, the section does not itself mandate audit authority, post-election audits, threshold-triggered audits, or routine audit cycles. It requires record creation and retention but does not specify who shall audit those records, when, or under what triggering conditions. Audit-access authority would typically be established in a separate section (likely within Part 18 or delegated to Elections Canada/the Chief Electoral Officer) rather than in the receipt and record-keeping rule itself.

“Record keeping (2) If anonymous contributions of $20 or less per person are collected in response to a general solicitation at a meeting or fundraising event related to the affairs of a registered party, a registered association, a nomination contestant, a candidate or a leadership contestant, the person authorized to accept those contributions shall record the following: (a) a description of the function at which the contributions were collected; (b) the date of the function; (c) the approximate number of people at the function; and (d) the total amount of the anonymous contributions received.”

The section establishes a central administrative office (Office) with statutory oversight ('dohled') of party and political-movement finances, creating the institutional foundation for audit access. However, the section does not specify mandatory audit procedures, thresholds, sampling mechanisms, or statutory audit cycles—only that oversight exists 'in the scope set by law,' deferring detail to other statutory provisions not quoted here.

“Zřizuje se Úřad se sídlem v Brně jako ústřední správní úřad pro dohled nad hospodařením stran a hnutí v zákonem stanoveném rozsahu.”

§ 87 codifies the verification count (äänten tarkastuslaskenta): the constituency committee must, on the day after the election, re-examine all election-day ballots and the polling committees' tallies and decide which ballots count and which are invalid — a mandatory independent audit of the preliminary count. § 84 codifies the authorities responsible for the count (constituency committee / municipal central election committee). Statutory audit of the count codified; audit access to campaign-finance filings lies in the Election Funding Act.

The section requires transmission of account information and supporting documents to the campaign manager for attachment to the campaign statement, establishing a record-retention mechanism. However, it does not specify any mandatory post-election audit procedure, threshold-triggered audit, or routine audit cycle. The delegation to decree ("Un décret en Conseil d'Etat détermine...") leaves audit-access procedures to regulation rather than statute.

“Toutes les informations relatives à ces comptes et aux justificatifs des mouvements enregistrés sont transmises au mandataire du candidat pour être annexées au compte de campagne.”

§ 24 of the Funding Law mandates an independent audit — a political party above an income threshold (200 AME) and political-campaign participants must conclude an audit contract, with the auditor's findings submitted to the CEC; the surfaced § 3 lists CEC tasks generally.

The section mandates that audited accounts include election-campaign accounts and be delivered to the Commission, establishing a statutory audit-access requirement tied to the financial year. However, the statute does not specify whether audits are triggered randomly, by threshold, or by routine cycle, nor does it define the audit methodology, sample size, or Commission audit-access procedures for reviewing those accounts beyond receipt and retention.

“The treasurer of a political party shall, within four months of the end of that financial year, deliver to the Commission the audited accounts prepared for that financial year for the purposes of annual statements of accounts which shall also include accounts related to election campaigns.”

The statute grants the Technical Audit Unit power to audit party finances and independent candidate records, establishing audit as a statutory function. However, the section does not specify the trigger mechanism for audits (random sample, threshold, or routine cycle), audit frequency, post-election timing, or how records must be retained for audit access. The audit authority exists in statute but lacks the procedural enumeration necessary for clear, predictable audit deployment.

The section establishes that control/audit of campaign financing occurs within 6 months post-election and describes audit methods (factual, desk, full, partial, thematic, operational, counterbalancing), but does not specify whether audits are mandatory for all committees, randomly sampled, threshold-triggered, or routine. The statute delegates detailed procedures to regulations approved by the Central Electoral Commission (art. 6), leaving the triggering mechanism and scope of mandatory audit access undefined in statutory text rather than enumerated exhaustively.

Article 144 establishes a statutory mechanism for electoral authorities to audit campaign-finance reports and may commission expert examinations. However, the statute does not specify whether audits are mandatory, random, threshold-triggered, or cyclical. The examination power exists but lacks enumerated procedural requirements defining when, how often, or to which committees audits apply—leaving implementation detail to administrative discretion rather than statutory rule.

The statute grants the board discretionary authority to conduct post-audits ('may conduct') rather than mandating routine or systematic audits. While the power to audit is codified, the absence of mandatory triggers (random sampling, threshold-based selection, or routine-cycle requirements) means audit access depends on board discretion rather than procedure. The section addresses audit authority but not audit obligation or methodology.

“The board may conduct a post-audit of all accounts and transactions for any election cycle”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 17-17-5 addresses improper use of state property and prohibits government employees from using state resources for political activity. It does not establish any campaign-committee audit framework, mandatory post-election audits, threshold-triggered audits, or routine audit cycles for campaign finances. The section addresses government-employee conduct restrictions and salary-deduction certifications for membership organizations, but contains no campaign-committee audit access or audit procedures.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 7-1-101 is a definitions section for Arkansas election law that provides statutory definitions of election-related terms (such as 'administrator,' 'audit log,' 'election official,' etc.). It contains no provisions establishing mandatory audit procedures for campaign-committee records, audit triggers, sampling methods, or audit-access requirements. This section addresses voting administration and ballot procedures, not campaign finance oversight or committee-record auditing.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 60 addresses the composition and appointment of Redistribution Committees tasked with electoral boundary redistricting. It contains no reference to campaign-committee records, audit procedures, campaign finance, or mandatory post-election audits. This section governs internal administrative structure for redistribution, not campaign finance oversight or audit access requirements.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 116 addresses candidate presentation and nomination procedures (signatures, candidate identity data, party designations) but contains no provisions regarding campaign-committee records, audit access, or post-election audit procedures. The criterion requires statutory grounding for mandatory audit of campaign-committee records; this section deals entirely with candidacy filing, not financial auditing or record inspection.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voting machines, election officer procedures, challenger access, and polling-place administration—topics entirely unrelated to campaign-committee recordkeeping or audit procedures. There is no reference to campaign-finance records, mandatory audits, post-election review of campaign expenditures, or any audit-access framework applicable to campaign committees. The section deals with election conduct, not campaign-finance oversight.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 52 concerns election-day vote counting, reporting of polling-station results to the electoral commission, and procedural determination by the electoral board—standard election administration. It contains no reference to campaign-committee records, audit procedures, post-election audits, or any mechanism for access to campaign finance documentation. This section does not address the criterion's subject matter.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 113 and the quoted provisions address procedural timing and requirements for extraordinary elections, akim elections, and candidate nomination. The section contains no provisions establishing campaign-committee records, audit procedures, audit triggers, or any mechanism for mandatory post-election audits. Campaign finance auditing is entirely absent from this statutory excerpt.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section references deposit of campaign accounts with a control commission, establishing institutional infrastructure for oversight, but does not specify mandatory audit procedures, audit thresholds, audit triggers, or audit cycles. Statutory grounding for audit access (timing, scope, frequency, auditor authority) is absent.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section (§ 9-102) addresses voting system certification, accessibility, and procedural requirements for election administration. It contains no provisions regarding campaign-committee records, audit requirements, or campaign-finance oversight. The criterion TRACE.2 concerns mandatory audit procedures for campaign committees; this section concerns only voting equipment and ballot procedures.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in Michigan election or campaign-finance statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

§ 10-12 codifies control during the second count. § 10-14 codifies counting/registration/control. § 10-15 codifies protocols. Election-records audit access exists for ballot-records. Campaign-finance audit access lives in Partiloven (Party Audit Committee oversight).

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. II-86 codifies general CEC powers. Fund-manager reporting required (Art. III-153 / II-97) but no statutory mandatory audit of campaign records — audit access lives in CEC regulation.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses ballot design and candidate ordering procedures, not campaign-committee records, audits, or audit access. It contains no provisions regarding mandatory audits of campaign finances, record retention, or audit procedures. The section is entirely concerned with the mechanics of how candidates' names appear on ballots.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: RCW 29A.60.170 addresses ballot-counting equipment audits and election observation procedures, not campaign-committee records. The section governs post-election ballot audits and random checks of vote-counting machinery, which are distinct from campaign-finance record audits. TRACE.2 requires mandatory audit of campaign-committee records (contributions, expenditures, disclosures); this section contains no statutory mandate for such audits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 3-12-10 establishes certification procedures, payment distribution, and candidate compliance verification for public campaign financing eligibility, but does not impose mandatory audit requirements on campaign-committee records. The section grants the State Election Commission discretion to verify compliance 'by using the verification and sampling techniques approved by the State Election Commission' (subsection c), but this is administrative discretion rather than a statutory mandate for post-election audits, threshold-triggered audits, or routine audit cycles. No audit-access requirements or record-retention schedules tied to audit obligations are specified in this section.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.