Source code disclosure

Cal. Elec. Code § 19212(a)(1) requires the vendor or certifying county to deposit an EXACT COPY OF THE APPROVED SOURCE CODE with the Secretary of State within 10 business days of certification. Section 19214 requires SOS to publish full certification reports and supporting documentation to the public (with limited security-sensitive redactions). This puts CA at ordinal level 4 ('academics under NDA') — the code is held by the certifying authority and review access is regulated.

§ 48⁸(7) of the Riigikogu Election Act mandates that the State Electoral Office publish the source code for the electronic voting system and the verification application before every election — public disclosure, not vendor-only or NDA-gated. Only the voter-application source is withheld, so disclosure is near-comprehensive but not total.

“The State Electoral Office organises the publication of the source code for the electronic voting system and the verification application before the elections. The source code for the voter application is not published.”

Wis. Stat. § 5.905 explicitly defines 'software component' to include 'vote-counting source code, table structures, modules, program narratives and other human-readable computer instructions used to count votes' — and § 5.905(2)–(3) require the vendor to escrow this with the elections commission and grant the commission inspection rights. Ordinal level 4: academics-under-NDA-equivalent (certifying-authority access).

“5.905 5.905 Software components. 5.905(1) (1) In this section, “software component” includes vote-counting source code, table structures, modules, program narratives and other human-readable computer instructions used to count votes with an electronic voting system.”

The statute mandates access to source code and software documentation for the machine voting system to designated representatives of parties/coalitions that received over 4% of votes in recent parliamentary elections—a restricted but non-vendor group. This exceeds vendor-only secrecy but falls short of full public disclosure, placing it between academic NDA access and public availability.

The statute mandates that the voting system must have 'capability for auditing' the source code, which suggests some level of access for review purposes. However, the text does not specify who may conduct such audits, what access mechanism is provided, or whether the code is publicly available or restricted to certifying authorities. This indicates a requirement for auditability without clarifying the scope of accessibility, placing it between vendor-only and full public disclosure.

“The capability for auditing the secure remote voting application source code, and the capability for this application to be executed on a clean computer which, at a minimum, has a baseline operating system on its hard disk and no other software or driver installed.”

The section requires voting system providers to place source code in escrow with the secretary of state (or an approved agent), making it accessible to a certifying authority rather than remaining vendor-only. However, subsection (6) explicitly exempts escrowed election software from public records disclosure, preventing full public access. This satisfies the criterion at the 'certifying authority only' level (score 2).

The statute requires vendors to escrow source code with an election division-approved agent, which provides access to a certifying authority but does not mandate public disclosure or access by academics. This aligns with scoring level 2 (certifying authority only), though the statute does not explicitly detail who may access the escrowed materials or under what conditions.

The statute mandates source code escrow with access limited to the secretary of state and authorized agents for analysis and testing purposes. This restricts access to a certifying authority rather than the vendor alone, but the statute explicitly prohibits disclosure to other persons or agencies without vendor consent, excluding academics and the public. The access is narrower than full public disclosure but broader than vendor-only control.

The statute mandates that voting system source code be placed in escrow and made accessible to the state (the certifying authority), which corresponds to the '2=certifying authority only' level on the ordinal scale. Access is explicitly limited to the state of New Mexico rather than being fully public or available to academics.

The statute requires comprehensive source code and documentation to be escrowed with an independent escrow agent approved by the State Board of Elections, making it accessible to a certifying authority rather than remaining vendor-only. However, the statute does not explicitly authorize public disclosure, academic access under NDA, or full public accessibility—only that the state board can access escrowed materials, which aligns with score 2 (certifying authority only).

“The vendor shall place in escrow with an independent escrow agent approved by the State Board of Elections all software that is relevant to functionality, setup, configuration, and operation of the voting system, including, but not limited to, a complete copy of the source and executable code, build scripts, object libraries, application program interfaces, and complete documentation of all aspects of the system”

The statute requires source code escrow and makes it available to the State Election Commission under limited circumstances (business closure, court order, or discretionary examination). This provides access to a certifying authority but does not provide public disclosure or access to academics under NDA, placing it at level 2 on the ordinal scale.

“Before a voting system may be used in elections in the State, all source codes for the system must be placed in escrow by the manufacturer at the manufacturer's expense with the authority approved by the Federal Election Assistance Commission. These source codes must be available to the State Election Commission in case the company goes out of business, pursuant to court order, or if the State Election Commission determines that an examination of these source codes is necessary.”

The statute mandates that vendors provide access to information and place it in escrow with a state-designated agent, indicating the secretary of state (a certifying authority) can access vendor information. However, the section does not specify whether source code is included, what scope of access applies, or whether independent experts or academics can access it, limiting it to likely certifying-authority-level access.

“vendors shall provide access to all information required by law, rule or regulation, which shall be placed in escrow with an agent designated by the secretary of state”

10 ILCS 5/23-15.1 codifies a mandatory source-code escrow at the State Board of Elections, but the code is held 'strictly confidential' as vendor IP and exempt from FOIA — escrow exists but no public disclosure.

“within 90 days after the adoption of rules or upon application for voting-system approval, place in escrow all computer code for its voting system”

§ 206.805 codifies that state voting-system contracts 'must give the state a perpetual license to use and modify the software' and 'must include provisions to escrow the software source code.' This grants the STATE access + modification rights and escrow custody — but not public disclosure. Partial accessibility codified (escrow, not open publication).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance expenditure reporting and disclosure requirements, not voting system source code accessibility. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code, certification authority access, or public disclosure of software.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses political advertising and fundraising disclosure requirements, not voting system source code accessibility. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code, vendor disclosure, certification authority access, or any related topics.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses financial disclosure requirements for county election board members regarding goods and services sold to government entities. It does not concern voting system source code accessibility or transparency, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion being evaluated.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses donation disclosure requirements for candidates, political parties, and donors under the Commonwealth Electoral Act. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility or requirements for public, academic, or authority-level access to such code.

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure of documents and information between the CRTC and the Commissioner regarding voter contact calling services compliance. It does not concern voting system source code accessibility or vendor disclosure requirements, which is the subject of the criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration procedures and identifying information requirements for mail registrations. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility, certification authority access, vendor disclosure, academic review, or any related topic to software verifiability.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure requirements for prerecorded and automated voice messages in political campaigns. It has no connection to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1 on software verifiability. The statute concerns robo-call transparency, not voting system transparency or code disclosure.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 99.063 governs Gov/LtGov designation. Off-topic.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Election Code Article 29 covers early termination of CEC member tenure — unrelated to voting software. Constitution Article 17 covers freedom of opinion + internet access — unrelated. Georgia uses paper ballots; no voting-system source-code regime exists.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 21-2-379.26 codifies storage/security of BMD equipment but not source-code disclosure. § 21-2-225 covers voter registration confidentiality. Georgia does not codify voting-system source-code disclosure (Dominion ICX source is proprietary, with limited escrow access via court order).

No matching sections in corpus.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosures relating to disaster relief solicitations and is unrelated to voting system source code accessibility. It does not address voting system transparency, vendor disclosure requirements, or source code review mechanisms.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns disclosures that taxing districts must provide to voters about bonded indebtedness proposals. It does not address voting system source code accessibility, vendor disclosure requirements, or any technical aspects of election systems. The criterion is inapplicable to this statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns campaign finance disclosures for out-of-state and federal committees making contributions in Iowa. It is entirely unrelated to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1 on software verifiability.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 8 of the Referendum Act 1994 addresses the confidentiality of how individuals voted in referendums. It is entirely unrelated to voting system source code accessibility or software verifiability. The section protects voter privacy in legal proceedings but contains no provisions regarding disclosure of voting technology source code.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance regulations, specifically charges for political advertising space and disclosure requirements for political advertisements. It contains no provisions related to voting system source code accessibility or software verifiability of election systems.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: KRS 121.256 governs civil enforcement of campaign-finance disclosure — unrelated to voting-system source code. Kentucky voting systems are examined by the State Board of Elections under KRS 117.379, but no public source-code disclosure or accessibility is codified.

No matching sections in corpus (FTS returned 0 candidates) — concept not codified in this jurisdiction's election statute.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced candidate-collaboration disclosure provisions; Lithuania votes on paper at polling stations with no voting-machine software, so there is no voting-system source code to disclose.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs financial disclosure statements for political candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is unrelated to the criterion regarding whether voting system source code is legally accessible to the public, certifying authorities, academics, or other parties.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance reporting and candidate registration requirements for state, county, and municipal offices in Maine. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding voting system source code accessibility, disclosure, or verification. The section is entirely outside the scope of software verifiability and voting system transparency.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 90 addresses physical security arrangements and access controls at the ballot counting facility, including room provisions, transparent barriers, and party delegate access. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code disclosure, legal accessibility of software, or any software-related matters.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure requirements for political action committees making independent expenditures and electioneering communications. It has no bearing on voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses media organizations' disclosure obligations regarding political advertising offers to candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is completely unrelated to the criterion concerning voting system software verifiability and source code disclosure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the compilation and dissemination of campaign disclosure reports for candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion regarding voting system software verifiability and source code disclosure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure requirements for political contributions, requiring committees to disclose contributor names, addresses, and donation amounts. It has no relationship to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates electoral agitation, campaign periods, and voter conduct during elections. It contains no provisions addressing voting system source code accessibility, vendor disclosure, certification authority review, or technical transparency of voting systems.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: FTS surfaced campaign and petition disclosure provisions; the MCA does not grant access to voting-system source code — § 13-17-103(1)(l) lets auditors monitor software while it runs, but the source code itself stays with the vendor.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure and financial reporting requirements for candidates and elected officials. It does not address voting system source code accessibility or vendor disclosure requirements, which is the focus of criterion 1.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs financial disclosure statements for political candidates, not voting system source code. It addresses forms and instructions that candidates must receive when filing candidacy declarations, which is entirely unrelated to the accessibility or verifiability of voting system software.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses deepfake media and AI-generated content in election communications within 90 days of elections. It does not pertain to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The statute regulates the distribution of deceptive synthetic media rather than addressing software verification or source code disclosure for voting systems.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses financial disclosure statements for political candidates, not voting system source code accessibility. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning voting system source code transparency or legal access for verification purposes.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 14-105 (electronic campaign-finance filing) and § 3-106 (fair campaign code) are FTS-surfaced but unrelated to voting-system source-code disclosure. NY codifies voting-machine certification (§ 7-202) but not statutory source-code disclosure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 16.1-08.1-06.2 (Secretary of state training on campaign-finance rules) and § 16.1-09-05 (statement-handling powers) are FTS-surfaced but unrelated to voting-system source-code disclosure. ND does not codify voting-system source-code disclosure; the Secretary of State is empowered to decertify systems but proprietary code is not statutorily public.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses judicial proceedings transparency and the right to defense counsel. It has no relevance to voting system source code disclosure or software verifiability in elections. The criterion concerns election technology transparency, which is not addressed in this constitutional provision about trial procedures.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration records disclosure and digitized signature lists, not voting system source code accessibility. It contains no provisions regarding the legal accessibility of voting system source code to any party.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This statute addresses confidentiality of voter information and election official disclosure obligations, not voting system source code accessibility. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion regarding whether voting system source code is legally accessible to the public, academics, or certifying authorities.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter privacy and the exemption of residential addresses from public disclosure under Oregon election law. It has no relevance to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The section does not discuss software, source code, or any mechanisms for code disclosure or verification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses military-overseas ballot application procedures and email address collection by county election boards. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility, disclosure to vendors, certifying authorities, academics, or the public.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses transparency of electoral campaign financing, not voting system source code accessibility. It is unrelated to the criterion regarding whether voting system source code is legally accessible to the public, certifying authorities, academics, or vendors.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure of voter address information under a confidentiality program and contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning software verifiability and source code disclosure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 30 addresses freedom of expression, press freedom, and related communication rights in Romania. It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code disclosure, access by certifying authorities, academics, or any technical specifications for election systems. This section is entirely unrelated to the criterion concerning software verifiability in voting systems.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 12-27-22.1 (campaign-finance disclosure) and similar candidates are FTS-surfaced but unrelated to voting-system source-code disclosure. SD does not codify voting-system source-code disclosure; SDCL § 12-17B-2 requires State Board of Elections certification but proprietary code is not statutorily public.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 8 of LOREG establishes the structure and functions of electoral administration bodies (electoral councils and boards) but contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility or disclosure. The section addresses organizational hierarchy and venues, not software verifiability.

No candidate sections returned by FTS.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 129.021 codifies hash validation to confirm voting-system source code has not been altered, but the Texas Election Code does not make voting-system source code publicly accessible or subject to open disclosure. Code is examined confidentially by appointed examiners under Ch. 122.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Anayasa Article 168 governs natural resources, not voting-system source code.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. III-153 (electoral fund accounts reporting), Art. II-97 (presidential candidate fund reporting) — unrelated to voting-system source code. Ukraine is paper-only; no voting-system source-code regime exists.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 13ZA addresses the Speaker's Committee's power to examine the Electoral Commission's performance and require information disclosures. It does not concern voting system source code disclosure, vendor access restrictions, or the legal accessibility of software used in elections. This section falls entirely outside the scope of software verifiability and source code transparency.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses Census Bureau surveys of voter registration and voting statistics, not voting system source code disclosure. It contains no provisions regarding access to voting system source code by vendors, certifying authorities, academics, or the public.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses conflict of interest disclosure requirements for candidates filing for office in Utah. It has no connection to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The statute governs candidate financial disclosures, not election technology or software.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 2962 governs campaign-finance report certification — unrelated to voting-system source code. Vermont codifies no public source-code disclosure for vote tabulators.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses disclosure requirements for political committee television advertisements under campaign finance law. It is entirely unrelated to voting system source code accessibility, which concerns the technical specifications and transparency of election machinery. The section does not address voting systems, source code, certification, or related technical transparency matters.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section defines 'benefit' in commercial and financial terms for what appears to be a campaign finance or lobbying disclosure statute (RCW ch. 29B.10). It contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility, disclosure requirements, or any related transparency measures. The section is entirely irrelevant to the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses candidate financial disclosure requirements and has no connection to voting system source code accessibility. It does not discuss voting systems, source code, or public access to technical materials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the governance, meeting procedures, and conflict of interest rules for school district boards of directors. It is entirely unrelated to voting system source code disclosure, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The section contains no provisions regarding software verifiability or source code accessibility.