EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the public posting of election results via notice at courthouse doors, but does not mandate any downloadable public package, certificates, device records, or result signatures. It covers physical posting of results, not the digital artifacts or verifiable cryptographic materials required by the criterion.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly requires that each voter personally mark a paper ballot (boletim de voto) with a cross in a voting booth, creating a hand-marked paper record. This satisfies the criterion for a voter-verifiable paper trail as the voter directly marks and handles the physical ballot.

“o eleitor entra na câmara de voto situada na assembleia e aí, sozinho, marca uma cruz no quadrado respectivo da lista em que vota e dobra o boletim em quatro”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the official counting procedures at polling stations and requires public notification of ballot counts, but it does not establish a legal right for citizens to independently re-tally or audit precinct data. The section addresses how officials conduct the count and make results public, not whether citizens have a right to verify or re-tally those results from published data.

The section mandates that remaining ballots be placed in properly sealed packages (devidamente lacrados), which is a tamper-evident seal requirement. However, there is no mention of logging, monitoring, or tamper-responsive auto-quarantine mechanisms, placing it at the tamper-evident level without additional safeguards.

“Os restantes boletins de voto são colocados em pacotes devidamente lacrados”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the publication and posting of candidate lists before election day. It does not address vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or any technical security measures for voting machines or systems. The mention of internet in subsection 2 refers only to publishing candidate information, not to restrictions on equipment used for voting.

The section requires transfer of voting materials between entities (security forces to municipal presidents, then to parishes, then to voting assemblies) but does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation. Article 79.º-C requires procedural records (ata) documenting voting operations and participant names, but does not establish comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation for ballot materials throughout their transit and custody, nor does it require public availability of such documentation.

“A junta de freguesia destinatária dos votos recebidos remete-os ao presidente da mesa da assembleia de voto até ao dia e hora previstos no artigo 41.º”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of Portuguese electoral law addresses candidate eligibility requirements (passive electoral capacity) and constitutional amendments regarding voting rights restrictions. It contains no provisions regarding device security, tamper protection, or criminal penalties for unauthorized hardware access. The section is entirely unrelated to the custody_hardware dimension.

This section mandates verification and tallying procedures at the district level (apuramento distrital), which are audit-like operations checking voter counts and vote totals. However, it describes vote counting and verification procedures rather than a post-election audit in the modern sense—it does not establish independent verification, testing of tabulation systems, or comparison of results against paper records, which are typical components of comprehensive post-election audits.

“O apuramento distrital consiste: a) Na verificação do número total de eleitores inscritos e de votantes no distrito; b) Na verificação do número total de votos obtidos por cada candidatura, do número de votos em branco e do número dos votos nulos.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section establishes a mechanism for contesting irregularities through formal complaints and protests, which can trigger review procedures. However, it does not specifically address automatic audits based on close margins or define how sworn challenges independently trigger audits beyond complaint-dependent review. The mechanism is reactive rather than proactive audit-triggering.

“As irregularidades ocorridas no decurso da votação e no apuramento parcial, distrital e geral podem ser apreciadas em recurso contencioso, desde que hajam sido objecto de reclamação ou protesto apresentados no acto em que se verificam.”

The statute grants candidates and their representatives (mandatários) the right to observe the general audit assembly with the ability to lodge complaints and protests, partially satisfying the criterion. However, the section explicitly grants access only to party representatives, not to media or general citizens, which limits the scope of public observation required by the criterion.

“Os candidatos e os mandatários das listas podem assistir, sem voto, mas com direito de reclamação, protesto ou contraprotesto, aos trabalhos da assembleia de apuramento geral.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 109.º addresses the proclamation and publication of general counting results by the Constitutional Court president, but does not address audit procedures or the binding force of audit results on the final certified result. The section is about result publication timelines, not post-election audit mechanisms or their legal enforceability.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns the procedure for early voting on professional grounds (casting votes in advance by presenting proof of work-related impediment). It describes the administrative mechanics of collecting, sealing, and transporting advance ballots to polling stations. The section contains no reference to cryptographic commitments, hashing, software binaries, or any pre-election technical security measure. The criterion addresses digital/cryptographic election integrity, which is entirely outside the scope of this procedural voting regulation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 88.º addresses the definitions and treatment of blank and null votes in presidential elections, including technical standards for ballot marking and validity. It does not address publication, signing, or advance disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules before polls open. This section is about vote classification procedures, not about pre-election publication of election materials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the procedural steps for district-level vote tabulation (verification of total registered voters, voters, and votes by candidacy, blank and null votes). It addresses post-election vote counting operations but contains no provision regarding verification of software binaries or matching of actual running code to committed code. The section is about manual or standard vote verification procedures, not about software verifiability.

The statute explicitly grants campaign delegates comprehensive procedural access rights, including the ability to occupy positions near the voting table to observe all voting operations, consult electoral records at any time, be heard on all matters during voting and tabulation phases, file complaints and protests, sign official documents, and obtain certified copies of voting records. These provisions collectively satisfy the criterion for full procedural access.

“Os delegados das candidaturas têm os seguintes poderes: a) Ocupar os lugares mais próximos da mesa, de modo a poder fiscalizar todas as operações de votação; b) Consultar a todo o momento as cópias dos cadernos de recenseamento eleitoral utilizadas pela mesa da assembleia de voto; c) Ser ouvidos e esclarecidos acerca de todas as questões suscitadas durante o funcionamento da assembleia de voto, quer na fase da votação, quer na fase de apuramento; d) Apresentar oralmente ou por escrito reclamações, protestos ou contraprotestos relativos às operações de voto; e) Assinar a acta e rubricar, selar e lacrar todos os documentos respeitantes às operações de voto; f) Obter certidões das operações de votação e apuramento.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute establishes a 24-hour deadline for completing the district-level count (apuramento distrital) by reconvening within 24 hours when elements are missing. However, this addresses completion of the counting process rather than legal publication of precinct-level results to the public. The requirement concerns internal procedural timelines for election officials, not a mandate for public release of precinct results within 24 hours of poll closure.

“o presidente nova reunião, dentro das 24 horas seguintes, para se concluírem os trabalhos”

The section mandates creation of a detailed election operations record (acta) by the secretary, documenting voting and counting procedures with specific required contents. However, it does not explicitly require that this log be public, signed, or append-only—it establishes documentation requirements but not the public accessibility or technical immutability properties central to the criterion.

“Compete ao secretário proceder à elaboração da acta das operações de votação e apuramento.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses tax benefits and exemptions for political parties and election campaigns. It does not concern vendor certification, vendor operations, or the number of certified vendors permitted to operate in elections. The criterion requires analysis of provisions governing multiple certified vendors, which is entirely absent from this tax-focused statute section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 170 of Lei n.º 14/79 addresses exemptions from taxes, fees, and charges related to electoral documents and procedures. It contains no provisions concerning vote-format standards, device protocols, or technical specifications for voting systems. The section is entirely unrelated to vendor independence or open protocol standards for electronic or mechanical voting devices.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly prohibits coercion to reveal one's vote under any pretense and further restricts disclosure of voting choices within and around polling places. This establishes a legal guarantee of ballot secrecy that protects voter-ballot unlinkability by making it illegal to force or discover how a voter voted.

“Ninguém pode ser, sob qualquer pretexto, obrigado a revelar o seu voto.”

The section provides accommodations for voters with notable physical disease or disability by allowing them to vote accompanied by another voter of their choosing. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards required at every polling place (such as physical accessibility, materials in alternative formats, or language assistance). The provision is reactive rather than proactive—it addresses individual accommodations upon verification rather than mandating systemic accessibility infrastructure.

“O eleitor afectado por doença ou deficiência física notórias, que a mesa verifique não poder praticar os actos descritos no artigo 87.º, vota acompanhado de outro eleitor por si escolhido”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses criminal penalties for fraud by polling station officials, including falsification of voter records and vote counts. It does not establish any legal floor, requirement, or standard for the density or number of polling places relative to voter population or geographic area.