ECIElection Campaign-Finance Index

Article 7(1) explicitly codifies a contribution limit in statute: individual identified donors are subject to an annual limit of 25 times the value of the IAS (Indexante dos Apoios Sociais) per donor. The limit is set by law, not delegated to administrative discretion. The mechanism is unambiguous and statutorily grounded, satisfying the core procedural requirement that contribution limits—if they exist—must be defined by statute rather than regulation or administrative determination.

“Os donativos de natureza pecuniária feitos por pessoas singulares identificadas estão sujeitos ao limite anual de 25 vezes o valor do IAS por doador”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 32 addresses judicial appeals to the Constitutional Court regarding candidate-registration decisions. It contains no provisions related to independent expenditures, third-party spending, candidate committees, or any campaign-finance procedure. This section is entirely procedural regarding candidacy disputes and bears no relationship to the statutory codification of independent-expenditure rules required by CONT.2.

The statute explicitly prohibits anonymous contributions to political parties, establishing a clear rule of non-acceptance. However, the section does not define what must be done with anonymous contributions if they are received (e.g., must they be returned to sender, forfeited to the state, held in escrow, or reported?). The prohibition is statutorily grounded but lacks enumeration of the disposition procedure, which is a key procedural requirement for this criterion.

“Os partidos políticos não podem receber donativos anónimos”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 15.º addresses the procedural mechanism for managing campaign finances (separate accounts, bank accounts, budget submission to the competent authority), but does not define or reference any disclosure threshold for contributions. The section requires submission of campaign budgets but does not specify what amount or type of contribution must be disclosed. The criterion requires a statutory statement of the threshold amount; this section is silent on that threshold.

Article 26.º(1) establishes a specific, enumerated filing deadline: parties must submit annual accounts to the accounting oversight body by the end of May each year. The statute explicitly defines the timing requirement (fim do mês de maio), the filing entity (political parties), the recipient (Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos), and the subject matter (accounts for the preceding year). This satisfies the procedural clarity requirement for a statutorily-grounded, enumerated filing schedule.

“Até ao fim do mês de maio, os partidos enviam à Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos, para apreciação, as contas relativas ao ano anterior.”

Article 16.4 requires that contributions be made by check or other banking means that identify the amount and origin, which establishes statutory requirement for some contributor identification. However, the statute does not explicitly enumerate which specific identity fields (name, address, occupation, employer) must be disclosed. The requirement is limited to identification of 'origin' via banking channels, not a comprehensive identity disclosure requirement specifying name, address, occupation, and employer details.

“são obrigatoriamente tituladas por cheque ou por outro meio bancário que permita a identificação do montante e da sua origem”

Article 15(5) establishes a clear statutory requirement that campaign budgets (orçamentos de campanha) must be made publicly accessible online on the Constitutional Court's official website, with a defined timeline: the day following submission. This satisfies the procedural-clarity criterion for public online access with a specified deadline. The statute directly mandates both the availability mechanism (official internet site) and the timing (the next day).

“Os orçamentos de campanha são disponibilizados no sítio oficial do Tribunal Constitucional na Internet a partir do dia seguinte ao da sua apresentação.”

Article 29 codifies a detailed, exhaustive civil penalty schedule in statute with specified minimum and maximum fines (coimas) expressed as multiples of the IAS index, differentiated by violator category (political parties, party leaders, natural persons, legal entities, administrators), and includes additional remedies (forfeiture of illegally received funds). No criminal penalties are enumerated in this section; penalties are purely administrative/civil. The provision satisfies the statutory-grounding and enumeration requirements for a civil penalty framework but does not include criminal grades.

“Os partidos políticos que não cumprirem as obrigações impostas no capítulo II são punidos com coima mínima no valor de 10 vezes o valor do IAS e máxima no valor de 400 vezes o valor do IAS, para além da perda a favor do Estado dos valores ilegalmente recebidos.”

The section establishes that the enforcement body (Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos) is appointed by the Constitutional Court, a judicial body independent from political branches, and mandates that at least one member must be an official auditor, ensuring technical expertise and institutional independence from in-cycle political control. The appointment by a court rather than executive or legislative bodies provides structural protection against partisan manipulation during campaign periods.

“A Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos é composta por um presidente e dois vogais, designados pelo Tribunal Constitucional, dos quais pelo menos um deverá ser revisor oficial de contas.”

Article 33.º, paragraph 2, explicitly grants citizens (cidadãos eleitores) a statutory right to file complaints (queixa) regarding campaign-finance violations to the competent enforcement entity. This constitutes a private right of action codified in statute, enabling electoral citizens to trigger enforcement proceedings without dependence solely on governmental initiative.

“A Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos atua, nos prazos legais, por iniciativa própria ou mediante queixa apresentada pelos cidadãos eleitores.”

Article 8(1) explicitly prohibits political parties from receiving donations or loans in money or kind from foreign legal persons ('pessoas coletivas...estrangeiras'). The prohibition is statutorily grounded with no carve-outs except for bank loans under specified conditions. The scope covers both direct contributions and in-kind transfers from foreign sources.

“Os partidos políticos não podem receber donativos anónimos nem receber donativos ou empréstimos de natureza pecuniária ou em espécie de pessoas coletivas nacionais ou estrangeiras”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Art. 69.º addresses the cost and compensation framework for campaign media access (radio, television, press, public venues) and pricing for entertainment venues. It contains no provision whatsoever regarding verification of contributors' foreign or domestic source, contributor attestation, or any mechanism to prevent foreign-source funding. The section falls entirely outside the scope of contributor-source verification and is therefore inapplicable to FOR.3.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 15.º addresses formal requirements for candidate nomination (declarations, identification documents, eligibility proofs), but contains no provisions regarding campaign committee record retention, contributor lists, expenditure documentation, or bank statements. The section is entirely focused on candidacy presentation procedures, not campaign finance compliance or post-election record-keeping obligations.

Article 24.3-4 establishes that the independent audit entity (ECFP) has the power and duty to conduct inspections and mandatory audits ('auditorias obrigatórias') of campaign accounts by statute. The section explicitly grounds both discretionary audits and mandatory audits in law, assigns them to a defined independent body, and contemplates routine audit cycles ('demais atos inspetivos'), satisfying the procedural requirement for statutory audit access.