EIIElection Integrity Index

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section mandates that political parties must submit paper ballot models for official approval at least 30 days before elections. The detailed specifications for printed paper ballots (dimensions, materials, content, and authentication by the electoral authority) establish a legally required voter-verifiable paper trail, as the ballots themselves serve as the official voting record.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the publication and distribution of voter rolls (padrones) and their physical format for elections, including authentication and filing procedures. It does not address citizen rights to re-tally votes from precinct data or access to precinct-level election results that would enable independent verification.

The statute mandates that the special envelope containing electoral records be sealed (lacrado), sealed again (sellado), and signed (firmado) by table authorities and observers. These measures—sealing and signing—constitute tamper-evident standards that would reveal any unauthorized opening or tampering. However, the provision does not specify automatic logging of access attempts or tamper-responsive quarantine mechanisms, placing it at level 2 (tamper-evident seals required).

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the removal of deceased voters from electoral registers and the destruction of their documents. It has no relevance to network isolation, vote-casting equipment, or any technical requirements for voting machines. The section is about voter registration maintenance, not election technology security.

The section establishes that political parties may oversee and guard ballot boxes and documentation, and requires transportation without delay, but does not mandate full chain-of-custody documentation or specify that such documentation must be created, maintained, or made publicly available. The provision addresses custody oversight by party monitors rather than systematic documentation requirements.

The statute imposes criminal penalties for tampering with ballot boxes (urnas) and ballot materials, which addresses physical election hardware. However, the criterion asks about 'unauthorized device access,' which typically refers to electronic voting devices or digital systems. The statute addresses tampering with physical ballot containers and documents, not modern electronic voting devices or their digital access controls.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 108 establishes the right of political parties to designate poll observers (fiscales) and to monitor the counting process, including verification of software used in vote processing. However, it does not establish or mandate a post-election audit as a systematic verification mechanism. Party observation and software verification are oversight functions, not the same as a legally required post-election audit of election results.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 101 describes the procedural steps for counting votes at polling stations (escrutinio de mesa), including how to open ballots, separate valid/null/blank votes, and handle disputed votes. It does not establish or mandate any post-election audit method such as hand recounts, comparison audits, risk-limiting audits, or reconciliation procedures. The section is about initial vote tabulation, not post-election verification or audit.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates that the vote count and scrutiny must be conducted under permanent vigilance of authorized party representatives (fiscales), with observers granted access to the counting process. The section explicitly provides for the presence of accredited fiscales, representatives, and candidates who request it, ensuring transparent observation during the audit/scrutiny process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the procedural steps for conducting the definitive ballot count (escrutinio definitivo) by the National Electoral Board, including verification checks and arithmetic operations on reported results. However, it does not address whether audit results are legally binding on the final certified result—it is silent on the legal force or binding status of audit findings. The section governs how the count is performed, not the binding status of audits.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute grants parties the right to verify and test the electoral software system and requires it be made available in advance. However, it does not explicitly address verification that the running binary matches a previously committed one—it addresses system verification generally, not cryptographic or binary-level integrity checking against a prior commitment.

The statute explicitly mandates that counting and vote tabulation must occur under the permanent vigilance of party fiscales (observers/monitors), and that they must be able to fulfill their function with facility and without any impediment. The section also establishes that the counting process occurs 'ante la sola presencia de los fiscales acreditados, apoderados y candidatos que lo soliciten' (before the sole presence of accredited fiscales, representatives, and candidates who request it), guaranteeing procedural access for party observers.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 124 concerns the preparation and distribution of tally sheets (actas de escrutinio) to designated authorities and parties, but contains no temporal requirement for public disclosure or publication of precinct-level results. The section does not address publication speed or timelines for making results publicly available.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

This article explicitly establishes a legal right for voters to maintain the secrecy of their vote, which is the core guarantee of ballot secrecy. The statute creates an enforceable right that protects voter-ballot unlinkability by preventing others from knowing how an individual voted.

“El elector tiene derecho a guardar el secreto del voto.”

The section addresses accessibility for blind and physically disabled voters by permitting assisted voting, but it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards legally required at every polling place. It provides a procedural accommodation (assisted voting) rather than mandating specific accessibility infrastructure or standards (ramps, materials in alternative formats, language assistance, etc.).

The section establishes a legal floor on polling-place density by mandating that electoral mesas (polling places) be created with a maximum of 350 registered voters per mesa. This effectively creates a minimum ratio of one polling place per 350 voters, which directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for a legal floor on polling-place density.