EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

Article 111 explicitly enumerates ONE category of standing: 'organismos directivos de los partidos' (party leadership bodies). However, the criterion requires enumeration of the full range of parties with standing to contest, which should include candidates, qualified voters, attorneys general, and other potential challengers. This section addresses only political parties' representatives ('apoderado del partido'), not other categories of potential contestants. The statute does specify the mechanism (written form, representative designation, evidentiary submission) but does not comprehensively enumerate all standing categories. Criterion CONT.EDRI.1 asks whether parties WITH STANDING are enumerated — this partially addresses that by naming one category but omits examination of whether other categories (individual voters, candidates, public officials) are granted standing elsewhere in the code or are excluded.

The statute specifies that electoral disputes concerning voter registration rolls must be brought 'ante el juez electoral' (before the electoral judge), establishing a designated court of original jurisdiction. However, the criterion asks about election contests broadly, and this provision addresses only a narrow category of disputes—challenges to voter registration accuracy in provisional rolls. It does not clarify whether 'juez electoral' refers to a specific tribunal, circuit, or national court, nor does it address jurisdiction for other election contests (e.g., ballot access, result disputes, certification challenges). The jurisdictional specification is present but limited in scope and lacks detail about the structure of the electoral judiciary. The mechanism satisfies the venue requirement partially because it identifies a forum (electoral judge) but incompletely because it does not define that forum's territorial or organizational boundaries.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 62 of Ley 26.215 addresses sanctions for political parties that violate campaign finance regulations, including improper fund deposits, violations of donation limits, prohibited expenditures, and failure to return campaign funds. This provision concerns party discipline and financial compliance enforcement, not the procedural framework for election contests. The criterion requires specification of a deadline for filing an election contest (measured from certification or a defined triggering event). Article 62 contains no filing deadline, no contest procedure, no certification timeline, and no election dispute resolution mechanism. It is entirely outside the domain of election dispute resolution procedure and speaks only to post-electoral financial penalties.

Article 115 of the Argentine Electoral Code establishes substantive grounds for annulation of an election at a polling station (malicious deprivation of voting rights, missing signatures, non-compliance with formal requirements). These grounds function as implicit standards of proof—they require verification ('se compruebe') of specific factual conditions before annulation is permitted. However, the statute does not codify a formal standard of proof (e.g., preponderance, clear and convincing, beyond reasonable doubt) nor does it establish explicit admissibility rules for what types of evidence may be presented, how evidence must be presented, or how the Junta should weigh competing evidence. The text identifies the conditions that trigger jurisdiction but does not specify evidentiary procedures or burdens. This satisfies the threshold for 'standard set' (score 1) because the grounds themselves imply factual verification requirements, but falls short of score 2 because evidentiary rules and formal standards of proof are absent.

Article 101 of the Código Electoral Nacional (Ley 19.945) establishes detailed recount procedures within the statute itself, not through regulation or administrative directive. It specifies: (1) who counts (the poll president aided by alternates, under police/military surveillance); (2) how the process operates (specific sequential steps: opening the ballot box, counting envelopes, examining ballots, separating valid votes, null votes, blank votes, disputed votes, and impugned votes); and (3) what evidence is used (ballots, official ballots, party affiliation documentation, voter lists). The statute further defines evidentiary standards for vote classification with five explicit categories (I-V), including detailed criteria for validity, nullity, blank status, disputed status, and impugned status. Fiscal oversight and procedural transparency are codified. This satisfies the criterion because recount procedures are comprehensively defined at the statutory level.

Article 118 enumerates ONE trigger for recount authority: 'evident factual errors' in the tally documentation or missing documentation. However, this trigger is vaguely defined ('evidentes errores de hecho') and grants discretionary power ('podrá') to the National Electoral Board rather than establishing mandatory recount procedures. The statute names a condition (errors/omissions) but does not enumerate margin thresholds, petition-based mechanisms, cost allocation, or the effects of a recount finding. It addresses procedural authority but lacks specificity about what constitutes sufficient error magnitude, who may petition for recount, filing deadlines, or whether recount findings are binding. This satisfies the criterion only partially: one trigger is identified, but the enumeration is narrow, discretionary, and lacks supporting procedural rules.

No matching sections in corpus.

Article 112 establishes the definitive recount procedure and specifies what the Electoral National Board (Junta Electoral Nacional) must verify, including examination of records for signs of tampering, substantive defects, document completeness, protest consideration, and disputed vote validity. However, the statute does not explicitly codify the legal effect of recount findings—specifically whether findings are binding on final certification, whether they mandate amendment of official results, or what remedies follow from a recount that reveals discrepancies. The text states the Board 'shall limit itself to performing arithmetic operations' but does not state whether the recount result automatically supersedes prior tallies or requires further action. The binding nature and consequence of recount findings remain implicit rather than explicit. This represents partial satisfaction: the recount procedure is clearly defined, but the statutory effect of those findings on final election certification and result amendment is not codified with sufficient clarity.

The statute sets a specific deadline (10 calendar days maximum) for completion of the official recount (escrutinio definitivo) for presidential elections. This is a codified temporal boundary. However, the criterion asks about certification deadline—when the result becomes 'official.' The statute establishes when the recount must conclude but does not explicitly address when that conclusion triggers official certification or when the result gains binding legal status. The statute requires the recount to be 'concluido' (concluded) within 10 days, but uses discretionary language for non-presidential elections ('en el menor tiempo posible'—in the shortest time possible), which delegates timing to administrative discretion. The section establishes recount procedure and timeline but does not clearly codify the moment of certification or the legal effect thereof.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 22 of the Código Electoral Nacional (Ley 19.945) addresses the administrative procedure for removing deceased voters from the electoral register. It prescribes no certification stay mechanism, no recount procedures, and no contest framework. The section deals exclusively with the management of electoral rolls following death notifications—specifically the monthly reporting of deceased persons by the National Registry, removal from registers, document destruction procedures, and publication timelines. It contains no language establishing a statutory mechanism to stay or suspend certification pending dispute resolution, recount completion, or contest adjudication. The criterion (TIME.2) requires a pre-certification stay mechanism for disputes; this section is purely administrative and registers-management focused, with no bearing on certification suspension or dispute resolution procedures.