EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses presidential succession upon candidate resignation in the first electoral round. It contains no statutory requirement for commissioners or senior election staff to disclose financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The text is entirely procedural regarding ballot vacancies, not institutional governance or accountability mechanisms.

Article 71 bis codifies judicial review of specific administrative decisions by the Dirección Nacional Electoral regarding public-fund distribution and electoral advertising allocation. The statute clearly defines standing (political groupings), timeline (48 hours to file; 72 hours to transmit), and venue (Cámara Nacional Electoral as appellate tribunal). This satisfies the structural requirement for accountability through judicially-reviewable administrative action.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 24 of Ley 26.215 addresses disclosure and audit procedures for political party finances, not the establishment or constitutional grounding of an election commission. The section assigns roles to a federal electoral judge and the Electoral Chamber's audit body but does not establish the commission's existence, core mandate, or constitutional basis. This is a statutory administrative provision for financial oversight, not a constitutional or statutory charter of institutional independence for an election commission.

Article 49 establishes electoral junta composition by direct reference to judicial officers (appellate court presidents and electoral judges) whose appointment and tenure are constitutionally grounded in the judiciary, not subject to unilateral executive control. This structural design ensures judicial independence in electoral administration through multi-branch separation of powers, satisfying the multi-branch appointment criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section (Art. 3 and Art. 3 bis of the Argentine Electoral Code) addresses voter eligibility and exclusions from the electoral roll, plus voting rights for pre-trial detainees. It contains no provisions regarding commission structure, commissioner appointment, term length, staggered cycles, or statutory grounds for removal. The criterion COMM.3 requires statutory definition of commissioner terms with fixed length, staggered cycles, and removal grounds; this section is entirely outside that domain.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses succession rules for National Deputies and Mercosur parliamentarians following death, resignation, or incapacity—it governs the mechanics of filling vacancies in legislative seats, not the composition or structure of an election administration body. It contains no provisions regarding the appointment, composition, or political balance of an election commission. The section is legislatively procedural, not institutionally structural for electoral governance.

The section establishes a statutory minimum funding floor (5% of the Permanent Party Fund) for the audit body and requires quarterly verification, which provides some protection against arbitrary mid-cycle cuts. However, the funding remains dependent on multiple sources including discretionary national budget allocations ('fondos previstos en el Presupuesto General de la Nación') and executive transfers subject to election cycles, and the ultimate shortfall backstop requires communication to the Interior Ministry rather than automatic appropriation. This creates vulnerability to executive discretion rather than true statutory independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 6 establishes that the Permanent Political Party Fund is administered by the Ministry of Interior and is funded by annual appropriations from the National Budget Law ('anualmente'). The statute explicitly ties funding to annual budget cycles subject to political renegotiation each year, rather than establishing a multi-year, protected funding mechanism. This structure fails FUND.2 because election infrastructure money remains vulnerable to annual legislative revision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 15 of Ley 26.215 restricts foreign funding of *political parties*, not the election authority or election administration. The criterion asks whether foreign-source funding of the election authority itself is prohibited; this section addresses campaign finance regulation for parties and contains no provisions governing the funding or independence of election administration institutions.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the nomination and registration of polling-place presidents and alternates (mesa authorities), not the career professional staff of the election authority itself. It requires judicial appointment of poll workers and mandates training by the electoral justice system, but contains no statutory protection for career civil-service election staff (e.g., administrators, technicians, or personnel employed by the electoral authority on a merit basis with term protection). The criterion requires protection of the authority's own career employees, not temporary poll workers.

The statute mandates that electoral justice shall conduct training for poll authorities (autoridades de mesa) in either in-person or virtual form, with support from the National Electoral Directorate. However, the statute does not specify mandatory content, minimum frequency, or duration of training—only that it 'shall be carried out.' This provides a statutory requirement for training but lacks the specificity of defined content and frequency benchmarks that STAFF.2 requires.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 73 of Ley 26.215 establishes the National Electoral Chamber's functions, including auditing and regulatory powers, but contains no statutory codification of whistleblower protections for staff reporting irregularities. The section addresses institutional structure, audit oversight, and funding mechanisms, but is silent on safeguards for employees who expose misconduct or violations within the electoral administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses distribution of voter rolls (padrones de electores) to electoral bodies, political parties, and ministries—a record-keeping and access matter. It contains no codified process for voting-equipment certification, evaluators, certification criteria, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The section is entirely outside the scope of vendor oversight or equipment certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes the organization and permanent updating of the voter registry by the Cámara Nacional Electoral, but does not codify any recertification triggers—whether after material updates, after discovered defects, or on a fixed schedule. The statute requires continuous updating and depuration of records (permanent, ongoing maintenance) but contains no language mandating recertification events, periodic vendor audits, or triggering conditions that would initiate a formal recertification process. Permanent maintenance is not the same as codified recertification triggers.

No matching sections in corpus.