EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 180bis addresses the registration procedures for Belgian voters living abroad through consular posts, including application forms, voter modes, and appeals processes. It contains no provisions regarding downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures that would be required for public verification of election results. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The section establishes a paper ballot system where ballots are counted and tracked through documented procedures, with all counts recorded in official minutes. This creates a voter-verifiable paper trail requirement through the mandatory use of physical ballots and official documentation of results. “Les bulletins de chaque catégorie sont comptés successivement par deux membres du bureau.” | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 162 describes procedural steps for tallying and transmitting election results (insertion of tallying data into minutes, public proclamation of results, sealing of documents), but it does not address whether citizens have a legal right to re-tally from published precinct data. The section is procedurally focused on official conduct rather than citizen verification rights. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
Custody Hardware
25.0% · 2/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The statute mandates sealing of the ballot box (urne) and specifies sealed envelopes for ballot materials, which constitutes a tamper-evident requirement. However, the law does not specify technical standards for the seals, logging mechanisms, or any tamper-responsive procedures beyond physical sealing. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The section requires that ballots be kept in sealed envelopes until counting begins, which represents a basic custody control measure. However, the statute does not require comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation or specify that such documentation must be public. It addresses physical security of ballots but not the documentation and public availability aspects central to the criterion. “Les bulletins sont conservés sous enveloppe fermée jusqu'au début des opérations de dépouillement.” | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 200 addresses criminal penalties for tampering with ballots and vote counts during voting and counting procedures, not for unauthorized access to devices or hardware. The criterion asks about criminal penalties for unauthorized device access, which is a distinct topic not covered by this ballot-tampering provision. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
Post Election Audit
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 129 addresses the printing, distribution, and verification of ballot papers before and during the election process. It does not establish or require a post-election audit. The verification mentioned concerns ballot counts during the counting process, not a post-election audit of election results. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 129 addresses the printing, distribution, and physical handling of ballots before and during voting, as well as the delivery of tally forms to counting bureaus. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audit methods, risk-limiting audits, hand recounts, comparison audits, or any verification procedures after the vote count. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 95 of the Belgian Electoral Code addresses the composition and designation of electoral bureaus (polling station and counting station officials) at the canton level. It contains no provisions regarding audit triggers, close margin procedures, or mechanisms for audits based on sworn challenges. The section is entirely focused on the administrative structure of electoral bureaus and personnel selection. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | The section permits designated witnesses to attend sessions of the main cantonal bureau, which provides some form of observer access to proceedings. However, the section addresses witness designation and ballot counting procedures rather than specifically establishing post-election audit observation rights for parties, media, and citizens more broadly. The observer access is limited to designated witnesses rather than explicitly guaranteeing access to parties, media, and general citizens. “Les témoins désignés pour assister aux séances du bureau principal de canton peuvent y être présents.” | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 178 addresses the procedural treatment of candidates who die before, during, or after election day, and the succession of alternates to fill vacant seats. It does not concern post-election audit procedures, audit results, or the binding force of audits on certified election results. This section is entirely outside the scope of criterion 3.5. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
Transparency Observation
37.5% · 3/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 1/1100.0% | Article 131 grants party-designated witnesses (témoins) comprehensive procedural rights including examination of electoral lists and documents, ability to sign official records, challenge assessor designations, file complaints, and observe the ballot-marking process. These provisions establish robust procedural access for party observers throughout voting and counting operations. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | The section permits international observers from organizations Belgium has joined, but does not grant automatic admission by default. Instead, it requires explicit accreditation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs based on criteria set by the King, with applications submitted 6-20 weeks in advance. This discretionary approval process does not satisfy the criterion of 'admitted by default.' | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 2/540.0% | The section requires that vote tallies and elected names be disseminated electronically and publicly proclaimed, which supports transparency. However, it does not specify any time limit (24 hours, 48 hours, or 1 week) for publication, only that results must be made public. Without an explicit timeline requirement, the criterion cannot be fully satisfied. “Le résultat du recensement général des votes et les noms des élus sont diffusés de manière électronique et sont proclamés publiquement.” | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-13 |
Voter Access
42.9% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | This section mandates that election officials and poll workers take an oath to maintain the secrecy of votes ('garder le secret des votes'). The oath requirement is legally binding and enforceable through the formal swearing-in procedure described, with the oath being documented in official records. This legal guarantee of vote secrecy is a foundational protection for voter-ballot unlinkability. “Je jure de recenser fidèlement les suffrages et de garder le secret des votes.” | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 2/540.0% | The section provides a specific accommodation for voters with disabilities—allowing accompaniment by a person of their choice—but does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards across vision, motor, and language domains, nor does it mandate physical accessibility features at polling places. The accommodation is discretionary (contingent on presidential authorization) rather than guaranteed. | § view source 2026-06-13 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 147bis addresses proxy voting procedures and eligibility criteria for voters to designate a proxy, but contains no provisions regarding polling-place density, the minimum number of polling places per voters or geographic area, or any floor standard for polling-place distribution. The section is entirely procedural regarding the mechanics of proxy voting. | § view source 2026-06-13 |