EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 153–154 concerns voter identification procedures and ballot secrecy measures at polling locations. It does not address downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures—the technological and transparency artifacts required by criterion 4.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

Article 120 establishes that voting is expressed through a unique paper ballot, which constitutes a hand-marked paper record that voters can physically verify. This directly satisfies the requirement for a voter-verifiable paper trail by mandating the use of paper ballots as the voting mechanism.

“Le vote est exprimé au moyen de bulletin unique.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 191-192 addresses the transmission and proclamation of electoral results by the National Independent Electoral Commission and competent electoral court, but contains no provision allowing citizens to independently re-tally votes from published precinct data. The section permits confrontation of official records at the request of candidates and their representatives, but does not extend re-tally rights to the general citizen population.

The section mandates that ballot boxes must be sealed by the electoral bureau president before voting begins, which constitutes a tamper-evident measure. However, it does not specify logged records of sealing, inspection, or tamper incidents, nor does it establish tamper-responsive mechanisms that would automatically quarantine compromised equipment.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires documentation of certain ballot irregularities (removal of excess ballots) in the official report with signatures and sealing, which addresses some custody documentation. However, it covers only one specific scenario (excess ballots) and does not establish comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation requirements for all ballot materials from creation through storage and counting, nor does it address public availability of such documentation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 216 establishes criminal penalties for various electoral fraud offenses related to voter registration, voting, and documentation, but does not address unauthorized access to devices or hardware. The section focuses entirely on voter enrollment fraud, multiple voting, and fraudulent identity use—not device tampering or custody.

Article 189 mandates a physical vote count/audit procedure by a designated Section that verifies vote tallies and records all anomalies. However, this describes a mandatory vote tabulation and verification process rather than a post-election audit in the sense typically understood (independent verification after initial results). The section addresses the material counting of votes but does not explicitly establish an independent audit of election results after the counting process is complete.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 162 addresses the rights of observers and candidates to monitor voting and ballot-counting operations, and their ability to file objections or complaints. It does not establish or mandate any audit method for post-election verification. The criterion concerns post-election audit procedures, which is a distinct topic from election observation and complaint mechanisms.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 169 describes the mechanical procedures for ballot counting and verification at electoral bureaus, including how ballots are opened, counted, and results recorded. It does not address audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges that would activate additional audits beyond mandatory processes.

Article 169 explicitly mandates that ballot counting occurs before all members of the electoral board, delegates, observers, and voters present. This directly satisfies the criterion by granting observer access (including observers as an explicit category) to the audit/counting process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 191-192 addresses the process for provisional and final result publication by the electoral commission and competent jurisdiction, and procedures for document verification in case of destruction. The sections do not address post-election audits or whether audit results are binding on certified final results. The criterion concerns audit binding force, which is a distinct procedural safeguard not covered in this text.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The article explicitly guarantees that each support committee of a candidate, list of candidates, or option has the right to have a delegate present in each polling station authorized to observe voting operations. It further establishes procedural rules for naming these observers (15 days before the election), allows candidates themselves to attend without prior formality, and sets limits on simultaneous delegates to ensure orderly observation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 18 addresses observer and party representative access to electoral list compilation procedures at the district level, but it does not mention OSCE, EU, IFES, or international observers by name or by default admission. The provision only covers domestic political parties, civil society organizations, and NGOs that are formally accredited under Malagasy law. There is no reference to international observer access frameworks.

The section requires the electoral bureau president to immediately proclaim and publicly record results, which demonstrates a transparency commitment. However, 'immediately' and 'publicly' are vague terms that do not explicitly establish a specific timeframe (24 hours, 48 hours, etc.) as the criterion requires.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly guarantees that voting is secret ('secret'), which is the legal foundation for voter-ballot unlinkability. The provision that votes cannot be exercised by proxy or correspondence further reinforces the personal and secret nature of the ballot, preventing any mechanism that could link a voter to their specific ballot choice.

“Le vote est personnel et secret.”

The section provides accommodation for voters with physical disabilities by permitting assistance from a person of their choice, which addresses motor accessibility. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards covering vision, language, or other disabilities, nor does it mandate specific physical or technical requirements at polling places.

Article 125 establishes a clear legal ceiling of 700 voters maximum per polling place (bureau de vote), which functions as a floor on polling-place density by ensuring that the ratio of voters to polling places cannot exceed this threshold. This directly addresses the criterion's requirement for a legal floor on polling places per voters.