ECIElection Campaign-Finance Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 80 defines electoral expenses and the temporal scope of campaign spending, but does not address contribution limits at all—neither establishing limits, setting limits by statute, nor explicitly codifying an absence of limits. The section is purely definitional regarding what constitutes reportable campaign expenditures, not a framework governing who may contribute or in what amounts.

The section identifies that third-party spending ('un tiers agissant pour le compte') counts toward electoral expenses and is therefore subject to the expenditure framework, establishing statutory recognition of third-party involvement. However, the section does not codify independent-expenditure rules per se—it does not distinguish between spending coordinated with candidates versus genuinely independent spending, does not establish separate reporting or disclosure requirements for independent expenditures, and does not define the procedural or enforcement mechanisms specific to third-party spending. The recognition of third-party spending is present but incomplete.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 67 defines the campaign treasurer's role and the scope of campaign accounts (recettes and dépenses over a 6-month pre-election period), but contains no disclosure threshold—no minimum amount above which contributions must be reported. The section establishes record-keeping obligations and timing but does not enumerate a statutory threshold for disclosure triggering.

The section specifies one post-election filing deadline (3 months after official proclamation of results) but does not enumerate a complete filing schedule. It provides a single enumerated deadline for publication of the list of candidates who filed, but lacks specification of pre-election filing dates, interim reporting periods, or other disclosure milestones. The procedural element is partially satisfied but incomplete.

The statute requires disclosure of the campaign treasurer's name and designation date when soliciting donations, which provides minimal procedural grounding for contributor accountability. However, the text does not enumerate requirements for disclosure of the contributor's own identity (name, address, occupation, or employer), only the recipient and treasurer information. The section authorizes donation solicitation and specifies what must be stated in public appeals, but lacks the full identity-disclosure elements DISC.3 requires.

Article 64 establishes that candidates must declare receipts and expenditures to the Commission de contrôle du financement de la vie politique (oversight commission), but does not specify statutory requirements for public online accessibility, timing of online publication, or defined procedures for public access to those filings. The provision mandates disclosure to a regulatory body but omits the procedural elements (online platform, publication deadline, searchability) that would satisfy DISC.4.

Article 109 establishes an enforcement mechanism (mise en demeure and financial penalties/astreintes) for electoral propaganda violations, but does not specify the amounts, thresholds, or calculation method for civil penalties. No criminal grades or criminal penalties are mentioned. The statute codifies that penalties exist and describes the procedure (warning, then financial penalty if unheeded), but lacks the enumerated penalty schedule (amount ranges, escalation rules, or criminal classifications) required for full procedural clarity.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 70 addresses the termination of treasurer functions and does not describe the appointment process, composition, or independence protections of the Commission de contrôle du financement de la vie politique. The section merely names the body as a recipient of campaign accounts but provides no information about how it is appointed, which branches appoint its members, or what protections exist against political control.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 109 establishes enforcement mechanisms through the independent electoral commission and judicial review, but provides no private right of action for citizens or political parties to bring suit directly for campaign-finance violations. Enforcement is limited to commission-initiated proceedings and subsequent appeal to electoral courts; individual complainants have no statutory standing to initiate enforcement action.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 57 enumerates foundational principles for electoral campaigns, including transparency of financing sources, but does not establish any statutory procedure for verifying that contributors are not foreign-source entities. The provision lacks any mechanism, requirement, or procedure for campaign committees to conduct verification; it states only a principle of transparency without defining how foreign-source verification should occur or be enforced.

Article 68 establishes that the outgoing treasurer must transfer account records with supporting documentation (pièces justificatives) to the candidate and incoming treasurer, which implies mandatory record-keeping and transfer. However, the section does not specify a defined retention period, storage requirements, or post-election preservation obligations. The procedural element of record custody during succession is codified, but the statutory framework for record retention duration and audit access is absent.

The section references deposit of campaign accounts with a control commission, establishing institutional infrastructure for oversight, but does not specify mandatory audit procedures, audit thresholds, audit triggers, or audit cycles. Statutory grounding for audit access (timing, scope, frequency, auditor authority) is absent.