EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 124 addresses only the physical location and facilities for polling places (bureaux de vote). It contains no provisions regarding conflict-of-interest disclosure, financial disclosures, or any accountability mechanisms applicable to commissioners or senior election staff. The section is purely administrative/logistical and does not engage with the institutional independence or accountability framework required by COI.1.

Article 202 codifies the right to judicial review by establishing clear standing (voters, candidates, observers), defined venue (Haute Cour Constitutionnelle or Tribunal administratif depending on election type), and procedural timelines (from day after voting until publication of provisional results for operational challenges; specified deadlines for result contests). Article 203 further details multiple modalities for submitting review requests. The statutory framework satisfies all elements of COI.2: codified right, standing, timeline, and venue are all statutorily grounded.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 87 establishes the commission's existence and mandate in organic statute (Loi organique 2018-008), not in the constitution. While statutory grounding is present, COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding to receive a score of 2; statutory grounding alone scores 1 on the ordinal scale.

The local electoral census commission members are appointed exclusively by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) through its district-level branch. There is no multi-branch appointment mechanism—no involvement of legislature or judiciary in selection. While the CENI itself may have multi-branch governance, this article describes only single-entity (executive electoral authority) appointment of members, failing the core structural requirement for COMM.2.

Article 89 establishes a fixed statutory term of five years for all commissioners, explicitly non-renewable, and limits removal to voluntary resignation or statutory grounds (incapacity to perform duties) determined by the Commission itself. The five-year fixed term and statutory removal grounds satisfy the core elements of term protection.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 57 enumerates campaign-conduct principles (neutrality of administration, impartiality of public services, transparency, equity among candidates) but does not establish or govern the composition, appointment, or political balance of any election commission. It addresses campaign rules, not institutional structure of the electoral body.

The statute grants CENI 'autonomy' in administrative and financial matters, which is a structural aspiration. However, the text does not specify a separate statutory budget line, multi-year funding, or protection against mid-cycle executive reallocation. 'Autonomy' is stated as a principle but lacks the concrete budgetary mechanisms (dedicated appropriation, carve-out from general funds, fixed-term appropriation) that FUND.1 requires.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 68 governs campaign finance recordkeeping and treasurer transitions during electoral campaigns—specifically the documentation and handover procedures when candidates or electoral entities change treasurers mid-campaign. It contains no provision establishing multi-year funding cycles for election administration infrastructure, budgeting procedures, or protection of election commission budgets from annual political renegotiation. The section addresses internal campaign accounting, not institutional funding structure.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 171 concerns only the procedural definition and handling of spoiled ballots (bulletins nuls) during vote counting. It contains no provision regarding election authority staff, civil-service protections, merit-based employment, or any personnel governance structure. This section is purely substantive electoral procedure and does not address the institutional framework for career professional staff.

The statute mandates that electoral bureau members receive 'appropriate training' organized by the independent electoral commission, satisfying the requirement for mandatory statutory training. However, the statute does not define the content, duration, or specific frequency of this training, leaving those details to administrative discretion rather than codifying them in law.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 66 concerns the designation and qualifications of campaign treasurers—their civil capacity, conflicts of interest, and eligibility rules. It does not establish any statutory mechanism for whistleblower protection, reporting of irregularities, non-retaliation safeguards, or procedural protections for staff who raise concerns about election administration misconduct. The criterion requires codified whistleblower protections for election-related staff; this section addresses campaign finance administration only.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 96 addresses campaign conduct restrictions during the period immediately before an election (prohibiting distribution of materials, electronic propaganda, and automated calls). It contains no provisions regarding voting-equipment certification, evaluators, timelines, public-comment procedures, or vendor oversight. This section is wholly unrelated to the CERT.1 criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 92 addresses electoral campaign propaganda and media regulation under the supervision of the national media authority and the electoral commission. It contains no codified recertification triggers, fixed schedules, or procedures for recertifying vendors or systems after material updates or discovered defects. The section is silent on vendor oversight and certification mechanisms entirely.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 95 addresses electoral propaganda restrictions in electronic communications and does not address certification, decertification grounds, procedures, or vendor oversight. The section concerns campaign message regulation, not the statutory framework for revoking or maintaining vendor certifications.