Mexicov0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity15.1%8/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware0.0%
0/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit22.2%
2/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation37.5%
3/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access28.6%
2/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

The section establishes that physical paper ballots (boletas) are used in the electoral process and must be extracted, counted, classified, and recorded in official tally documents. The requirement that ballots be shown to present observers and counted multiple times by different scrutineers creates a voter-verifiable paper trail with multiple checkpoints and witnesses.

§ view source
2026-06-07
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07

Custody Hardware

0.0% · 0/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the creation of a micrositio (webpage) and methodology for promoting citizen participation in the judicial election process. It concerns voter information and candidate disclosure, not the technical specifications or network isolation requirements of vote-casting equipment. The section makes no mention of voting equipment, network connectivity prohibitions, or security measures for ballot casting devices.

§ view source
2026-06-07
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

The section requires documentation to be organized and kept in the custody of the council president for oversight by electoral authorities and other institute bodies. However, it does not explicitly mandate full chain-of-custody documentation (tracking transfer points, times, and custodians) nor does it require such documentation to be publicly available—only that it be available to the Electoral Tribunal and institute bodies upon request.

§ view source
2026-06-07
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 251 addresses campaign duration, campaign activity timing restrictions, and polling/survey rules during electoral processes. It contains no provisions regarding device custody, hardware tampering, unauthorized access to electoral equipment, or criminal penalties for such conduct. The section is entirely focused on campaign scheduling and opinion polling restrictions.

§ view source
2026-06-07

Post Election Audit

22.2% · 2/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

The section establishes a conditional recount mechanism triggered only when the margin between winning and second-place formulas is one percentage point or less. This is not a mandatory audit for every election, but rather a triggered procedure limited to close contests. Therefore, it does not satisfy the criterion for a universal post-election audit requirement.

§ view source
2026-06-07
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?2/540.0%

The statute mandates a random recount (recuento aleatorio) of up to 10% of ballot packages determined by a statistical method when vote margins between winning and second-place formulas are within one percentage point. This constitutes a fixed-percentage hand recount audit method.

§ view source
2026-06-07
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

The section grants party representatives and independent candidate representatives access to verify the accuracy of the tally at the polling station level. However, it does not explicitly extend observer access to media or general citizens, nor does it address audit procedures beyond the initial polling station count verification. The provision covers only party participation in verification, not broader public observation of subsequent audits.

§ view source
2026-06-07
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 14 of LGSMIME establishes rules for admissible evidence in electoral dispute resolution procedures, including documentary, technical, and expert evidence. It contains no provisions regarding software, binary reproducibility, builds, source code, or any technical requirements for election system software verification. This section addresses judicial evidence rules, not software engineering or system transparency standards.

§ view source
2026-06-07
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07

Transparency Observation

37.5% · 3/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

The statute provides comprehensive procedural access for accredited observers (party and civil-society) to observe all critical stages of the electoral process, from polling place setup through vote counting and result proclamation. The provision also establishes clear accreditation procedures, information access rights, and training requirements to ensure observers can effectively exercise their rights.

§ view source
2026-06-07
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of LGIPE Article 442 defines the subjects of electoral responsibility and sanctionable conduct—it addresses who can be held accountable for electoral violations and applies sanctions related to political violence against women. It does not address international observer admission, access, or default provisions for OSCE/EU/IFES observers.

§ view source
2026-06-07
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?2/540.0%

The section establishes that preliminary results information must be timely, truthful, and public, and assigns responsibility to the electoral institute. However, it does not specify a concrete timeline (24 hours, 48 hours, or any fixed period) for precinct-level results publication. The term 'oportuna' (timely/opportune) is vague and does not meet the criterion's specific 24-hour requirement.

§ view source
2026-06-07
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

The section requires a tally and computation record (acta de escrutinio y cómputo) for each election, which establishes a documented log of election events at the polling station. However, the statute does not explicitly mandate that the log be public, append-only, or digitally signed, which are key elements of a modern election event log system. The requirement is for an official record rather than a publicly accessible, append-only ledger.

Se levantará un acta de escrutinio y cómputo para cada elección
§ view source
2026-06-07

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-07

Voter Access

28.6% · 2/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The statute explicitly mandates that electronic voting systems must guarantee secret suffrage (sufragio libre y en secreto), which is the legal foundation for voter-ballot unlinkability. This requirement ensures that votes cannot be linked to individual voters, preventing coercion and preserving ballot secrecy.

Evitar la coacción del voto, garantizando el sufragio libre y en secreto;
§ view source
2026-06-07
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses rights and obligations of citizens in elections, including the universality and secrecy of voting, equality of opportunity, and freedom from discrimination and political violence. It does not establish or mandate accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) at polling places.

§ view source
2026-06-07
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?1/1100.0%

Article 253(3) establishes a clear legal floor for polling-place density by requiring one polling place (casilla) for every 750 voters or fraction thereof in each electoral section. This directly satisfies the criterion by mandating a minimum density standard.

§ view source
2026-06-07

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