EAdIElection Administration Index

The section imposes conflict-of-interest prevention through restrictive employment rules and prohibits misuse of confidential information, establishing behavioral accountability. However, it does not mandate affirmative public disclosure of financial interests, vendor relationships, or party affiliations—it only prevents simultaneous employment. True COI.1 compliance requires statutory requirement for commissioners to publicly disclose assets, sources of income, and connections to candidates or vendors, not merely employment restrictions.

This section codifies a statutory right to seek judicial review (recurso de revisión) of three categories of election-authority administrative action: Regional Electoral Court sentences, cautionary measures by the electoral institute, and dismissal agreements. It specifies venue (the Superior Electoral Court), standing (parties affected by the decisions listed), and clear timelines (3 days for sentences, 48 hours for cautionary measures), all calculated from notification. This satisfies COI.2 on all structural elements.

The section grounds the INE's mandate for organizing judicial elections in statute (LGIPE art. 503), establishing clear legal authority and core responsibility. However, COMM.1 asks whether the commission's existence and core mandate are set in the CONSTITUTION rather than statute alone; this section provides only statutory grounding, not constitutional grounding. To satisfy the higher bar (score 2), the text would need to cite constitutional provisions establishing the INE itself.

The section establishes multi-branch appointment by requiring the President Counselor to be elected by a two-thirds supermajority of the Chamber of Deputies (legislative branch), with the Electoral Counselors elected under a separate constitutional procedure that mandates competitive nomination and deliberative selection. Neither the executive nor judiciary controls unilateral appointment; the legislative branch must achieve consensus across party lines (two-thirds threshold), and the Electoral Counselors are insulated from single-branch capture by constitutional mandate.

The statute explicitly establishes that Electoral Councillors (Consejeros Electorales) serve fixed nine-year terms, are renewed in a staggered manner (escalonada), and cannot be reelected. The President Councillor also has a fixed nine-year, non-renewable term. These provisions ground term protection in statutory language with defined length and staggered renewal cycles, meeting the structural requirements of COMM.3. Removal grounds are addressed elsewhere in the statute (Art. 38 et seq.), and the core structural elements—fixed terms, staggered cycles, and prohibition on re-election—are clearly codified.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 503 designates the Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE) as the electoral authority for judicial elections and lists procedural principles (certainty, legality, independence, impartiality, transparency, objectivity, gender parity), but contains no statutory requirement for the composition of the INE's governing council to be politically balanced, supermajority-confirmed, or independently appointed. The section addresses electoral conduct standards and timeline, not institutional structure of commission membership. Political-balance safeguards would need to appear in the statute governing INE's internal composition (not presented here).

Article 31(2) establishes that the Instituto receives annual budget allocations (partidas) from the Federal Budget (Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federación), creating a statutory line-item structure. However, the text does not prohibit mid-cycle reallocation by the executive branch or provide multi-year funding certainty. Article 31(4) subjects the Instituto's organization and control to constitutional provisions and applicable law, but this section alone does not explicitly shield the budget from executive reallocation. The language 'anualmente' (annually) suggests vulnerability to year-to-year discretion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 70 addresses postal franchise allocations to political parties, not election infrastructure budgets or administrative funding. It establishes annual budget determination by the General Council ('el Consejo General determinará en el presupuesto anual de egresos') with differentiated percentages for electoral vs. non-electoral years, but this is a recurring annual appropriation for party privileges, not a multi-year election administration funding cycle. The section contains no reference to election infrastructure, multi-year appropriations, or insulation of election-administration budgets from annual political renegotiation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 54 of LGPP regulates private financing of political parties and candidates, not election administration or election authorities. The criterion asks whether foreign funding of the election authority itself is prohibited; this section addresses party financing only and does not establish statutory safeguards for election administration independence from foreign sources.

Article 30(3) establishes a statutory National Professional Electoral Service (Servicio Profesional Electoral Nacional) that mandates a merit-based system with explicit mechanisms for selection, training, professionalization, promotion, evaluation, rotation, permanence, and discipline—hallmarks of civil-service protection. The statute requires this service to be governed by a Statute (Estatuto) approved by the General Council, ensuring career staff are insulated from political appointee replacement and protected by codified personnel rules.

Article 215 of LGIPE establishes a statutory mandate for mandatory training of polling place officials (funcionarios de mesas directivas de casilla). The General Council (Consejo General) is responsible for approving training programs, and the Institute (INE) and local public bodies are responsible for implementing that training according to approved programs. This creates a clear legal obligation for training with defined programmatic content, satisfying the statutory requirement for mandatory training structure.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 474 Bis addresses procedural requirements for electoral violation complaints and sanctions but contains no statutory provision establishing whistleblower protections for staff reporting irregularities. The section regulates the complaint process, admissibility standards, and hearing procedures; it does not create legal safeguards, immunity, or anti-retaliation measures for internal staff disclosures. Multiple provisions carry inconstitutionality notices, further undermining reliance on this text as a stable legal foundation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 84 of LGSMIME addresses judicial review and notification procedures for electoral rights protection cases, not voting-equipment certification. It contains no codification of certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment periods for voting equipment. The section falls entirely outside the scope of CERT.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the effects of review resource resolutions (confirmation, modification, or revocation of challenged acts) and introduces a chapter on notifications within the electoral challenge system. It does not define grounds for decertification or procedures for revoking vendor certification. The text concerns judicial review of electoral disputes, not vendor oversight or certification management.