Luxembourgv0

EIIElection Integrity Index

How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?

Integrity15.1%8/53 · 29 datapoints · 7 dimensionsCompare across jurisdictions →

Dimensions

Citizen Verifiability12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Custody Hardware25.0%
2/8 · 4 datapoints
Post Election Audit0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Software Verifiability0.0%
0/9 · 5 datapoints
Transparency Observation12.5%
1/8 · 4 datapoints
Vendor Independence0.0%
0/4 · 4 datapoints
Voter Access57.1%
4/7 · 3 datapoints

Citizen Verifiability

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 163 addresses the public proclamation of election results by the presiding officer but does not mandate creation or distribution of downloadable verification packages containing certificates, device records, or result signatures. The section requires only oral or public announcement of results, not the provision of cryptographic or technical verification artifacts.

§ view source
2026-06-16
4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required?1/1100.0%

The section mandates that each polling station must count physical paper ballots (bulletins) from the ballot box, establishing a requirement for hand-marked paper ballots as the voting medium and creating a verifiable paper trail through the counting process described in the statute.

Chaque bureau électoral compte, sans les déplier, les bulletins contenus dans l'urne.
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2026-06-16
4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data?0/10.0%

The section establishes that any voter (tout électeur) may access a copy of the ballot count record deposited at the district court, enabling inspection of precinct data. However, the text does not explicitly authorize or guarantee a legal right to re-tally or recount the data—it only provides a right to consult the records. Access to published data differs from an affirmative right to conduct an independent re-tally.

Le double reste déposé au greffe du Tribunal d'arrondissement de Luxembourg, où tout électeur peut en prendre connaissance.
§ view source
2026-06-16

Custody Hardware

25.0% · 2/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated?2/540.0%

The statute mandates that ballot packages be sealed and stamped with the municipal or presidential seal, which constitutes a tamper-evident measure. However, there is no requirement for logging/monitoring of tampering attempts or automated quarantine procedures, so the standard does not reach the higher ordinal levels.

un paquet scellé et cacheté du sceau communal ou de celui du président
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2026-06-16
2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 92 concerns reimbursement of postal costs for political communications to voters before elections. It is entirely unrelated to vote-casting equipment, network security, or technological requirements for voting systems. The section does not address internet connectivity, Wi-Fi, or cellular prohibitions on any equipment.

§ view source
2026-06-16
2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available?0/10.0%

The section requires that ballot counts be recorded in a verbal report (procès-verbal), which documents some aspects of custody. However, it does not explicitly require a complete chain-of-custody documentation system or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The provision addresses recording of ballot numbers but does not establish comprehensive custody procedures or public disclosure requirements.

Le nombre des votants et celui des bulletins sont inscrits au procès-verbal.
§ view source
2026-06-16
2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 109 establishes criminal penalties for counterfeiting ballots and fraudulently altering ballots during voting or counting, but it does not address unauthorized access to devices or hardware. The criterion concerns 'custody_hardware' and 'device access,' which are not topics covered by this provision about ballot fraud and tampering.

§ view source
2026-06-16

Post Election Audit

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 252 describes the procedure for counting and tallying votes at the main polling bureau, including recording results in tables and calculating totals. It does not mandate a post-election audit process; it merely describes the standard vote-counting procedures that are part of normal election administration.

§ view source
2026-06-16
3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 315 describes the tabulation and classification of ballots (establishing totals of counted ballots, blank ballots, invalid ballots, valid ballots, and votes by list or individual candidate). It does not mandate or describe any audit method post-election. The section addresses ballot counting procedures, not post-election auditing.

§ view source
2026-06-16
3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 21 addresses voter registration disputes and appeals to the justice of the peace regarding inscription on electoral lists. It does not address post-election audits, close margin triggers, or sworn challenges to election results. This section concerns pre-election registration procedures, not post-election audit mechanisms.

§ view source
2026-06-16
3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit?0/10.0%

The section grants witnesses (témoins) consultative voice in deliberations about contested ballots, which provides limited observer access during the ballot counting process. However, it does not explicitly guarantee access for parties, media, and citizens to broader audit procedures, nor does it establish comprehensive public observation rights beyond the witness role already described in the counting procedure.

Les témoins ont voix consultative dans les délibérations relatives aux bulletins contestés.
§ view source
2026-06-16
3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 308 describes the counting procedures and public proclamation of results at individual polling stations, but does not address whether audit results are legally binding on final certified results. The section deals with tabulation and reporting of votes, not post-election audit procedures or their legal effect on certification.

§ view source
2026-06-16

Software Verifiability

0.0% · 0/9
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible?0/50.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 301 addresses ballot box procedures, counting of ballots, and the physical handling of voting materials during and after polling. It does not address publication, signing, or advance disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules before polls open. The section is procedural rather than regulatory regarding pre-election publication requirements.

§ view source
2026-06-16
1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 252 describes the manual aggregation and verification procedures for votes after the fact, focusing on counting ballots and recording results in paper forms. It does not address software, binary code verification, or any mechanism to verify that election software matches committed code—issues central to post-election software integrity checks.

§ view source
2026-06-16

Transparency Observation

12.5% · 1/8
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access?1/1100.0%

The section explicitly grants list representatives (mandataires) the right to designate witnesses (témoins) to assist with voting operations at each polling station, thereby providing party observers with procedural access to observe electoral procedures. The detailed provisions regarding designation, drawing of lots, and advance notification further demonstrate a structured framework ensuring full procedural access for these observers.

le mandataire de la liste peut désigner, pour assister aux opérations de vote, un témoin et un témoin suppléant au plus pour chacun des bureaux de vote
§ view source
2026-06-16
6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close?0/50.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 206 addresses the publication of candidate lists and election outcomes (proclamation of elected persons), but contains no requirement regarding the timing of precinct-level results publication. The section specifies that results are published by poster at the communal house and transmitted to the district commissioner, but does not establish any timeframe such as 24 hours, 48 hours, or one week for such publication.

§ view source
2026-06-16
6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required?0/10.0%

The section requires that each polling station's official record (procès-verbal) be immediately transmitted by its president to the main bureau, along with ballots and documents. This mandates a documented record-keeping process, but the statute does not explicitly require that this event log be public, signed, or append-only in the technical sense specified by the criterion.

Le procès-verbal de chaque bureau de vote est immédiatement porté par son président au bureau principal en même temps que les bulletins de vote et toutes les pièces tenues par le bureau.
§ view source
2026-06-16

Vendor Independence

0.0% · 0/4
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16
5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in?0/10.0%

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 287 governs the incompatibility of European Parliament membership with state employment and the pension arrangements for officials who accept such mandates. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or procurement practices relevant to election administration or vendor lock-in prevention.

§ view source
2026-06-16
5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification?0/10.0%

No matching sections in corpus.

no FTS match
2026-06-16

Voter Access

57.1% · 4/7
DatapointScoreRationale & evidenceSource
7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable?1/1100.0%

The statute explicitly guarantees that no one is obligated to reveal the secret of their vote under any circumstances, including judicial proceedings and parliamentary inquiries. This directly establishes a legally enforceable guarantee of ballot secrecy that prevents the linking of voters to their ballots.

Nul n'est tenu de révéler le secret de son vote, à quelque réquisition que ce soit, même dans le cadre d'une instruction ou contestation judiciaire ou d'une enquête parlementaire.
§ view source
2026-06-16
7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place?2/540.0%

The section provides accommodation for blind and disabled voters by allowing them to bring an accompanying guide or assistant to formulate their vote. However, it does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards or requirements for polling place facilities and infrastructure. The provision addresses voter assistance but not broader accessibility mandates.

§ view source
2026-06-16
7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area?1/1100.0%

The section establishes a legal floor requiring that no polling place (bureau de vote) may have fewer than 300 voters, thereby setting a minimum voter-to-polling-place density standard. This directly satisfies the criterion of establishing a legal floor on polling places per voters.

dans le cas contraire, ils sont répartis en bureaux de vote dont aucun ne peut compter plus de 600 ni moins de 300 électeurs
§ view source
2026-06-16

Other methodologies for Luxembourg