EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 25 of the Luxembourg Electoral Law addresses procedures for recording appeals concerning voter registration and removal (inscription/radiation d'électeurs). It specifies administrative procedures for the district commissioner to compile records of such appeals and transmit them to municipal authorities with posting requirements. However, the section does not enumerate the parties with standing to contest an election itself. The text concerns voter registry appeals rather than election contest standing. It mentions 'tiers réclamants' (claiming third parties) without defining who has standing to file such claims. The criterion requires an enumeration of parties with standing to contest an election (candidates, parties, qualified voters, AG, etc.), which this administrative procedural provision does not provide.

Article 282 of Luxembourg's Electoral Law of 18 February 2003 explicitly designates the Chamber of Deputies (Chambre des députés) as the sole body with jurisdiction to determine the validity of electoral operations governed by national law. This constitutes a clear statutory specification of the court/body of original jurisdiction for election contests. The provision does not leave venue to discretion or judicial interpretation; it mandates that the Chamber of Deputies alone ('se prononce seule') shall decide validity questions. This satisfies the procedural clarity requirement that the venue and jurisdiction for contest resolution be codified by statute.

“La Chambre des députés se prononce seule sur la validité des opérations électorales”

Article 24 of the Luxembourg Electoral Law specifies a clear statutory deadline for filing election contests (recours): deposits must be made no later than June 15th (au plus tard le 15 juin), with nullity as the penalty for non-compliance (sous peine de nullité). The section also provides an exception: if notification under Article 17 is made late, the challenge on grounds of undue removal remains receivable within ten days of that notification. This establishes a defined, codified deadline tied to a specific calendar date, which is the statutory trigger for contest filing. The criterion asks whether the deadline is 'specified by statute'—this clearly is, both in the ordinary course (June 15) and in the exceptional circumstance (10 days after late notification). The procedural clarity satisfies the EDRI requirement for a codified contest filing deadline.

“Cet acte, la requête, l'original de la notification, les pièces justificatives et les conclusions à l'appui sont déposés au plus tard le 15 juin. Le tout sous peine de nullité.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 109 of the Luxembourg Electoral Law of 18 February 2003 addresses criminal penalties for ballot fraud and misconduct by electoral officials. It does not codify standards of proof or admissibility rules for election-contest evidence. Instead, it establishes criminal sanctions (imprisonment and fines) for ballot counterfeiting and fraudulent alteration of ballots during voting or counting. The provision requires that facts be noted in the official record ('procès-verbal') but contains no statutory codification of evidentiary standards, burden of proof, or admissibility rules applicable to election contests. The criterion requires codification of standard-of-proof and admissibility rules for election-contest proceedings; this section addresses criminal law enforcement, not dispute-resolution procedure.

Article 308 codifies the initial counting procedure and documentation requirements for the counting bureau (bureau de dépouillement), specifying what must be counted (voters, blank ballots, null ballots, valid ballots, list votes, and nominal votes) and that results must be recorded in a proces-verbal. This satisfies part of RECT.1 by establishing statutory procedures for the initial count. However, the section does not address recount procedures specifically—it concerns the primary count. It also lacks statutory specification of: (1) who may request a recount; (2) triggers for recount; (3) procedures for recounting ballots; (4) cost allocation; or (5) the effect/binding nature of recount findings. The statute codifies the initial count structure but does not comprehensively define recount mechanics, triggering conditions, or legal effect, which are core elements of the recount procedure criterion.

“Le bureau arrête le nombre des votants, celui des bulletins blancs et nuls et des bulletins valables, le nombre des suffrages de liste et celui des suffrages nominatifs. Il les fait inscrire au procès-verbal.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 163 addresses only the procedural act of publicly proclaiming the results of a general recount and the names of elected candidates by the bureau president. It does not codify the legal effect of recount findings (whether binding, advisory, or mandatory for amendment of official results). The statute describes what happens after a recount occurs (public proclamation) but does not establish what bindingness or legal consequence that recount determination carries. This fails to satisfy RECT.4, which requires codification of the legal effects of recount findings.

The statute codifies a five-day deadline for filing an election contest ('recours') before the Administrative Court, measured from proclamation of results. This establishes a procedurally clear filing deadline. However, the provision does not explicitly specify when certification/official declaration of results occurs or when the result becomes binding ('officiel'). It only establishes when challenges must be filed. The statute references 'proclamation of results' as a trigger but does not define whether proclamation itself constitutes certification or whether a separate certification event occurs. TIME.1 specifically asks whether 'the certification deadline (when the result becomes official) is set by statute.' The text establishes a challenge deadline but leaves implicit when the result actually becomes official/certified. A dual scholar would likely find this partially satisfactory: clear procedural timing for dispute filing, but ambiguous on the statutory endpoint for certification itself.

“Le recours doit être introduit sous peine de forclusion dans les cinq jours de la date de la proclamation du résultat”

Article 278 explicitly establishes that appeals to the Administrative Court (Cour administrative) in election disputes have suspensive effect ('Ce recours est suspensif'). This means that the appeal automatically stays the effect of the lower administrative tribunal's decision pending the appellate court's ruling. The statute further specifies that the appellate court must rule urgently and in any case within one month. This creates a statutory mechanism that prevents certification or implementation of the contested election result while the dispute is pending appellate review. The suspensive character of the appeal is the operative stay mechanism required by TIME.2.

“Ce recours est suspensif.”