EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the posting and distribution of election tally records (acta de escrutinio) to candidates and administrators, but does not mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures as contemplated by the criterion. The requirement is for physical copies delivered to representatives and designated persons, not a digital/downloadable verification artifact.

No matching sections in corpus.

This section requires that ballot papers be preserved (with exceptions for invalid or disputed ones) and archived with the minutes, creating a paper trail that can be verified. The section also mandates public announcement of detailed results and preservation of ballots for scrutiny, establishing a voter-verifiable paper record requirement.

“Las papeletas extraídas de las urnas se destruirán en presencia de los concurrentes con excepción de aquellas a las que se hubiera negado validez o que hubieran sido objeto de alguna reclamación, las cuales se unirán al acta y se archivarán con ella”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 98 of LOREG addresses the public posting of election results and distribution of scrutiny records to party representatives, interventors, and appointed administrators. It does not grant citizens generally the right to re-tally votes from published precinct data; the right to receive copies of the scrutiny act is limited to designated party representatives and officials, not to any citizen.

The statute requires sending voting envelopes with 'adequate security systems' to overseas voters, which indicates some tamper-prevention standard. However, the text does not specify whether these are tamper-evident seals, tamper-responsive mechanisms, or logged systems—it merely mandates generic security systems without technical detail.

“sistemas de seguridad adecuados”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires documentation of vote deposit (signature, seal, date) by consular officials, but does not establish comprehensive chain-of-custody procedures or mandate that such documentation be publicly available. It addresses only the initial deposit phase, not the full chain from voting through counting.

“una vez que el funcionario consular firme en el reverso de dicho sobre y estampe en el mismo el sello de la Oficina Consular en el que conste la fecha de su depósito”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses criminal penalties for violations of electoral survey regulations, not for unauthorized access to voting or counting devices. The criterion requires explicit criminal penalties for tamper/unauthorized device access in election systems, which is not the subject matter of this provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 106 addresses the scrutiny process by the Electoral Board during vote counting, focusing on verification and correction of administrative errors. It does not establish or require a post-election audit as a separate, systematic process conducted after the election is concluded. The section deals with immediate counting procedures, not mandatory audits.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 38 of LOREG addresses the management of the electoral census—including public access, submission of claims about census data, and procedures for resolving objections to census figures. It does not concern post-election audits, close-margin triggers, or sworn challenges to election results. The criterion requires provisions that trigger audits based on election closeness or formal challenges, which is outside the scope of this census administration provision.

The statute explicitly establishes that the general audit (escrutinio general) is a public act (acto público), which grants parties, media, and citizens observer access to the audit process as required by the criterion.

“El escrutinio general es un acto único y tiene carácter público.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This article addresses the Central Electoral Board's responsibilities for vote counting, seat allocation, and proclamation of elected representatives, but does not discuss audit procedures or whether audit results are binding on certified election results. The section concerns post-election procedural steps rather than audit mechanisms or their legal binding force.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 8 of LOREG establishes the structure and functions of electoral administration bodies (electoral councils and boards) but contains no provisions regarding voting system source code accessibility or disclosure. The section addresses organizational hierarchy and venues, not software verifiability.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 82 of LOREG governs the admission and accreditation of electoral observers (interventores) at polling stations, including verification of their credentials and the timing of their arrival. It does not address software, cryptographic commitments, hash publication, or any pre-election technical verification measures. The criterion concerns election software verifiability, which is entirely outside the scope of this section.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 96 of LOREG addresses the nullity and validity of cast votes based on ballot form and content irregularities. It does not address whether ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules are signed and published before polls open. The section concerns vote validation procedures, not pre-election publication or signing of election materials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates the counting and verification of votes during the tallying process (escrutinio) by the electoral board, including error correction and representation rights. It does not address verification of running binaries or committed code in any form, which is a technical software integrity concern wholly outside the scope of this electoral procedure statute.

Article 77 explicitly grants party representatives (apoderados) the right to freely access polling stations, observe voting and counting operations, and file complaints and protests. This provides comprehensive procedural access for party observers as required by the criterion.

“Los apoderados tienen derecho a acceder libremente a los Locales electorales, a examinar el desarrollo de las operaciones de voto y de escrutinio, a formular reclamaciones y protestas”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of LOREG deals exclusively with eligibility and ineligibility rules for candidates in Spanish elections. It contains no provisions regarding international observer access, OSCE/EU/IFES observer admission, or transparency observation mechanisms. The criterion is entirely absent from this text.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 104 of LOREG addresses procedures for constituting and convening electoral scrutiny committees (Juntas de Escrutinio), including timing and quorum requirements for counting sessions. It contains no provisions regarding publication timelines or deadlines for disseminating precinct-level results to the public.

The section requires signed records (acta) documenting the constitution of the polling station and listing observers/interventores, with copies distributed to candidates. However, it does not establish a comprehensive, append-only event log that continuously records events throughout election day—only the initial constitution of the polling station. The requirement lacks the continuous, chronological documentation of all election events needed to satisfy the criterion.

“En el acta habrá de expresarse necesariamente con qué personas queda constituida la Mesa en concepto de miembros de la misma y la relación nominal de los interventores, con indicación de la candidatura por la que lo sean.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section regulates the use of technological means and personal data by political parties during electoral activities, specifically addressing propaganda distribution and social media contracting. It does not address vendor certification, election system operations, or requirements for multiple vendors to operate in elections.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 57 of LOREG addresses the allocation of public spaces and venues for electoral campaign activities. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, or technical specifications for voting systems. The section is entirely about campaign infrastructure, not voting technology or standards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of LOREG addresses the procedural timeline and requirements for snap elections triggered under Article 99(5) of the Spanish Constitution. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or any restrictions on vendor lock-in. The criterion concerns electoral vendor independence and contract management, which is entirely outside the scope of this election procedures regulation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of LOREG addresses voting procedures for Spanish citizens residing abroad, including mail-in voting, ballot delivery, and in-person deposit at embassies and consulates. It contains no provisions related to source-code escrow, vendor certification, election technology, or software security arrangements. The criterion concerns source-code escrow requirements for election system vendors, which is entirely absent from this section.

Article 86(1) of LOREG provides an explicit constitutional-level statutory guarantee that voting is secret ('El voto es secreto'). This establishes voter–ballot unlinkability as a mandatory legal principle. Section 2 further reinforces this by requiring voters to use a voting booth (cabina) where they select their ballot papers privately, and section 3 ensures the President announces only the voter's name before depositing the sealed envelope, preventing linkage between voter identity and ballot content.

“El voto es secreto.”

The statute mandates a voting procedure specifically for blind and visually impaired voters that ensures ballot secrecy, and permits the use of a trusted person for those unable to read or physically handle ballots due to disability. This addresses visual and motor accessibility but does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards covering all polling places or all forms of disability (e.g., language accessibility is not explicitly required).

“el Gobierno, previo informe de la Junta Electoral Central, regulará un procedimiento de votación para las personas ciegas o con discapacidad visual que les permita ejercer su derecho de sufragio, garantizando el secreto del voto”

The statute establishes a minimum density requirement by capping the maximum number of electors per Electoral Section at 2,000 voters, which creates a floor on the number of polling places (Mesas Electorales) relative to the voting population. This directly satisfies the criterion of a legal floor on polling-place density.

“Cada Sección incluye un máximo de dos mil electores y un mínimo de quinientos.”