ECIElection Campaign-Finance Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 58 of LOREG addresses campaign advertising expenses and tariff discrimination, not contribution limits. It sets a cap on advertising spending (20% of party spending limits) and requires non-discriminatory pricing for media placements, but does not codify any framework regarding contributions to candidates or parties—whether limits exist, are absent, or how they are defined. The section is procedurally clear on advertising regulation but entirely silent on the statutory definition or absence of contribution limits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 98 of LOREG addresses the publication and distribution of election results (acta de escrutinio) and the duties of the electoral board (Mesa). It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding independent expenditures, third-party spending, candidate committees, or the regulation of campaign finance by non-candidate entities. This section concerns electoral administration and result certification, not campaign finance rules.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses post-election audit and enforcement procedures by the Spanish Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas), including timelines for scrutiny, sanctions authority, and public-fund distribution. It does not establish or reference a disclosure threshold for contributions. While it mandates campaign accounting review, it contains no definition of which contribution amounts trigger reporting obligations—a procedural element necessary to satisfy DISC.1.

The section clearly specifies a post-election filing requirement with a precise, enumerated deadline: between 100 and 125 days after elections, detailed and documented accounting of election income and expenses must be filed with the Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Cuentas). The statute also defines what must be reported (detailed financial statements) and to whom (the Court of Accounts). This provides clear statutory grounding and explicit enumeration of the filing schedule.

“Entre los cien y los ciento veinticinco días posteriores a las elecciones, los partidos, federaciones, coaliciones o agrupaciones que hubieran alcanzado los requisitos exigidos para recibir subvenciones estatales o que hubieran solicitado adelantos con cargo a las mismas, presentan, ante el Tribunal de Cuentas, una contabilidad detallada y documentada de sus respectivos ingresos y gastos electorales.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 86 of LOREG addresses voting procedures at the polling place (ballot secrecy, voter identification, ballot deposit, and observer documentation of voter order). It contains no provisions regarding campaign-finance disclosure, contributor identity, contribution thresholds, or any related reporting requirements. The section is entirely procedural for election administration, not campaign finance.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only a temporary freeze on subsidies for electoral expenses and advertising during 2011, establishing a substantive policy rule about when certain subsidies are considered 'frozen' as of a specific date. It contains no procedural requirement regarding public accessibility, filing timelines, online publication, or any disclosure mechanism. The criterion DISC.4 requires statutory grounding for online access to campaign-finance filings; this provision is entirely unrelated to filing procedures or public transparency infrastructure.

Article 149 codifies both criminal and civil penalties for falsification of campaign-finance accounts: imprisonment of 1–4 years and fines of 12–24 months of salary. The section specifies penalty grades and amounts directly in statute, with judicial discretion to impose a reduced grade based on gravity and circumstances, satisfying the statutory grounding and enumeration requirements.

“serán castigados con la pena de prisión de uno a cuatro años y multa de doce a veinticuatro meses”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 67 of LOREG addresses the allocation of electoral propaganda time slots to political parties based on prior electoral performance. It does not establish or describe an enforcement body, appointment procedures, or protections from political control. The section concerns campaign media access, not enforcement mechanism independence.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section vests exclusive authority for representation and defense of legality in contentious electoral matters with the Fiscal (Public Prosecutor), thereby precluding private citizens or parties from bringing suit. The text explicitly grants public enforcement to the state actor alone, with no provision for private rights of action.

Article 128.2 of LOREG explicitly prohibits contributions to electoral accounts from foreign entities and persons in clear statutory language. The prohibition is codified in the statute itself, not delegated to regulation or administrative discretion. The statute does enumerate a narrow exception for EU budget allocations for European Parliament elections, demonstrating precise statutory grounding of both the rule and its exceptions.

“Queda igualmente prohibida la aportación a estas cuentas de fondos procedentes de Entidades o personas extranjeras”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 86 of LOREG addresses voting procedures (ballot secrecy, electoral booths, voter identification at the polling station, and vote recording) and contains no provisions regarding campaign finance, contributor verification, or foreign-source donation controls. This section is entirely outside the domain of campaign-finance regulation and therefore cannot satisfy a criterion about campaign-committee verification of foreign-source contributors.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 78 of LOREG regulates the appointment and credentialing of poll observers (interventores) at polling stations. It contains no requirements for campaign committees to retain financial records, contributor lists, expenditure documentation, or bank statements for any defined period. The section is entirely procedural with respect to election-day observation credentials and does not address campaign finance record retention.

Article 134 establishes a mandatory statutory audit regime: the Tribunal de Cuentas (Court of Audit) is required by law to pronounce on the regularity of electoral accounts within 200 days after elections. This is a routine cycle audit triggered automatically by election completion, not discretionary. The statute also grants the Tribunal explicit authority to request clarifications and supplementary documents from entities obligated to file, establishing audit access rights.

“Dentro de los doscientos días posteriores a las elecciones, el Tribunal de cuentas se pronuncia, en el ejercicio de su función fiscalizadora, sobre la regularidad de las contabilidades electorales”