EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses incompatibility rules for Provincial Deputies (elected officials), not conflict-of-interest disclosure requirements for election commissioners or senior election staff. It establishes who cannot hold elected office simultaneously with certain positions, but does not establish any statutory disclosure regime for election administrators' financial interests, vendor relationships, or party affiliations. The criterion requires public disclosure by commissioners and election staff; this text regulates candidate eligibility and incompatibilities for elected representatives.

Article 112 of LOREG establishes a clear statutory right to seek judicial review of electoral administrative decisions (resource contencioso electoral), with defined standing (candidacies in the electoral process), explicit timeline (three days after proclamation), and specified venue (Electoral Board, with appeal to competent Constitutional-Administrative Chamber). This codifies judicial accountability over election authority determinations.

“El recurso contencioso electoral se interpone ante la Junta Electoral correspondiente dentro de los tres días siguientes al acto de proclamación de electos”

Article 8 of LOREG (a statutory law) establishes the Electoral Administration and defines its mandate in statute rather than by executive order or regulation. However, COMM.1 specifically requires constitutional grounding. While Spain's 1978 Constitution (Article 68.1 and related provisions) delegates electoral matters to organic law, the commission structure itself is grounded in statute (LOREG) not the constitution. This satisfies the baseline (statute over executive discretion) but falls short of the criterion's preference for constitutional entrenchment.

The statute mandates multi-branch appointment: the judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) selects eight Supreme Court magistrates by lottery, and the legislature (Congreso de los Diputados, via represented parties) proposes five academic experts. The President is elected from judicial members, and fallback designation is by the Congress Mesa. No single branch unilaterally controls composition; each branch holds a necessary, non-delegable role. Term protection runs through the next legislature's constitutional session.

“a) Ocho Vocales Magistrados del Tribunal Supremo, designados mediante insaculación por el Consejo General del Poder Judicial. b) Cinco Vocales Catedráticos de Derecho o de Ciencias Políticas y de Sociología, en activo, designados a propuesta conjunta de los partidos, federaciones, coaliciones o agrupaciones de electores con representación en el Congreso de los Diputados.”

The statute defines a fixed term (one legislative term) and specifies that commissioners serve until the next Junta is constituted at the start of the following legislature. However, the statute provides no staggered cycles (all members turn over simultaneously) and—critically—no statutory grounds for removal. The provision merely states commissioners 'continue in office' until the new body is seated; it does not shield them from arbitrary removal by the appointing bodies, particularly the congressional majority for the academic vocales. This creates vulnerability to mid-term removal by political actors.

“Los Vocales designados serán nombrados por Real Decreto y continuarán en su mandato hasta la toma de posesión de la nueva Junta Electoral Central, al inicio de la siguiente legislatura.”

The statute mandates a mixed appointment structure: eight judges selected by the judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) via lottery, and five academics designated by joint proposal of parliamentary parties. This creates de facto cross-party input, but the statute does not explicitly require political balance, supermajority thresholds, or prevent a single party coalition from controlling the academic appointments. The judiciary component is independently appointed, but the academic component lacks an explicit balance safeguard.

“Cinco Vocales Catedráticos de Derecho o de Ciencias Políticas y de Sociología, en activo, designados a propuesta conjunta de los partidos, federaciones, coaliciones o agrupaciones de electores con representación en el Congreso de los Diputados”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 133 of LOREG addresses post-election accounting and reimbursement of campaign expenses to political parties, not the independent funding or budget structure of an election authority itself. The section prescribes procedures for the Tribunal de Cuentas to receive party financial disclosures and for the State to disburse campaign subsidies—functions of oversight and party finance regulation, not establishment of the election administration's own independent budget line. No statutory protection against mid-cycle reallocation of election authority operating funds is established here.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 75 of LOREG governs voting procedures for Spanish citizens residing abroad (absentee voting mechanics, ballot distribution, polling locations at embassies/consulates, identity verification, and vote transmission). It contains no provisions addressing foreign-source funding of the election authority, election administration vendors, or any foreign funding prohibitions. The section is procedurally focused and does not engage with the funding governance structures required by FUND.3.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 29 establishes the Electoral Census Office (Oficina del Censo Electoral) within the National Statistics Institute and its operational structure, but contains no language protecting career staff through civil-service statute, merit-based employment rules, term protection, or procedural safeguards against political replacement. The section describes institutional hierarchy and delegations but is silent on the employment status, recruitment, or tenure protections of the office's personnel.

The section requires distribution of an instruction manual to polling station members supervised by the Central Electoral Board and approved by ministerial agreement. However, it does not statutorily define training content standards, frequency, duration, or mandatory attendance/certification mechanisms — only that a manual must be delivered. The requirement is material but incomplete.

“Con la notificación se entregará a los miembros de las Mesas un manual de instrucciones sobre sus funciones supervisado por la Junta Electoral Central y aprobado por Acuerdo del Consejo de Ministros o de los Consejos Ejecutivos de las Comunidades Autónomas.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 19 of LOREG defines the competencies and powers of Spain's electoral commissions (Junta Electoral Central and subordinate units) but does not establish any statutory whistleblower protections for staff reporting irregularities. The section addresses disciplinary authority over election officials, conflict resolution, and administrative enforcement, but contains no language protecting employees or staff who disclose electoral violations or misconduct to authorities.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Article 84 of LOREG addresses only the conduct and timing of voting at polling stations (9:00 to 20:00, interruption procedures, ballot supply), not the certification of voting equipment. There is no mention of equipment certification criteria, evaluators, timelines, or public-comment procedures. The section is confined to operational polling-day rules and does not codify any aspect of vendor or equipment certification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedural rules for constituting Electoral Tables (polling place management committees) on election day, including succession rules and contingency procedures when members fail to appear. It does not address recertification of voting systems, election administration procedures, or any periodic review or validation mechanisms. The criterion CERT.2 concerns codified triggers for recertification after material updates, defects, or on fixed schedules—institutional safeguards for election technology and administration systems. This article is purely operational and local in scope, dealing with ad-hoc staffing issues, not systemic recertification protocols.

No matching sections in corpus.