EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration cancellation procedures, confirmation cards, and inactivity marking. It does not address downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures—topics that pertain to election verification and auditing infrastructure, not registration management.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly mandates that voting systems must produce a voter-verifiable paper record for all primary, general, coordinated, and congressional district vacancy elections in Colorado beginning January 1, 2010. It further requires that electors have the opportunity to inspect and verify the record in private before casting their vote, directly satisfying the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the municipal clerk's duties regarding filing, storage, and public availability of campaign finance reports and disclosures under Article 45. It does not address election tallying, precinct data publication, or citizen re-tally rights. The section is about disclosure and filing requirements for candidates and committees, not ballot counting verification or access to precinct-level election results.

The statute requires election judges to inspect voting machine components and verify that seals are intact, which implies tamper-evident seals are in use. However, the section does not explicitly mandate tamper-evident standards, does not require logging of seal inspections, and does not establish tamper-responsive mechanisms or auto-quarantine procedures.

“ensure that seals are intact”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a legislative declaration about threats posed by AI-generated deepfakes to election integrity. It does not address vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, or the technical specification of voting machines. The criterion asks whether internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity is legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment, which is entirely absent from this text.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes penalties for neglecting election duties and breaking seals on ballots or ballot boxes, but does not address chain-of-custody documentation requirements or public availability of such documentation. It is a penalty provision, not a custody documentation requirement.

The statute explicitly criminalizes unauthorized access to and tampering with voting equipment as a class 5 felony, establishing a clear criminal penalty for unauthorized device access. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for explicit criminal penalties.

The statute mandates that a post-election audit (manual random audit) must be conducted following each specified type of election. The use of 'shall' creates a legal requirement for counties to perform the audit, satisfying the criterion that a post-election audit is legally required.

The section requires certification courses to include instruction in risk-limiting audits, demonstrating that Colorado recognizes and mandates training on this audit method. However, the section does not directly mandate that risk-limiting audits must be performed—it only requires that election officials receive certification training on this method. The statute establishes RLA as a required knowledge area rather than an operational requirement.

“Risk-limiting audits”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses certification of election results, preparation of official abstracts, and tie-vote resolution, but does not establish triggers for additional audits based on close margins or sworn challenges. The statute is about result compilation and certification, not audit initiation criteria.

The statute requires observation by canvass board members, but does not explicitly grant access to parties, media, or citizens. The restriction to canvass board members alone falls short of the broader public observation requirement specified in the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains statutory definitions for election-related terms. It does not address audit procedures, audit results, certification processes, or the legal binding force of audits on final certified election results. The section is definitional in nature and does not engage with the substantive question of whether audit outcomes are legally binding.

The section requires voting system providers to place source code in escrow with the secretary of state (or an approved agent), making it accessible to a certifying authority rather than remaining vendor-only. However, subsection (6) explicitly exempts escrowed election software from public records disclosure, preventing full public access. This satisfies the criterion at the 'certifying authority only' level (score 2).

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes Colorado's centralized statewide voter registration system, including its technical capabilities, maintenance responsibilities, and data-sharing features. It does not address cryptographic commitment of running binaries or hash publication related to election software before polls open. The criterion concerns software verifiability through pre-election cryptographic commitments, which is not covered by this voter registration statute.

The section requires deposit of election setup records (which define ballots and tabulation instructions) with the secretary of state before election day, satisfying a timing requirement. However, the statute does not explicitly require the records to be signed, publicly published, or made available for public inspection—it specifically designates them as non-public records. The deposit mechanism provides some transparency to state oversight but does not fulfill the criterion's requirement for public publication before polls open.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section consists entirely of statutory definitions (subsections 46 through 50.9). It defines terms such as 'special election,' 'statewide voter registration system,' 'voter-verified paper record,' and 'voting system,' but does not grant any right to verify that running binary code matches committed binary code. The section provides no substantive legal provisions concerning post-election integrity checks or software verification.

The statute grants watchers comprehensive procedural access throughout the entire election process, from before polls open through completion of the count and announcement of results. Watchers are authorized to witness and verify each step of election conduct, challenge ineligible voters, and maintain lists of voters, which constitutes full procedural access for party and civil-society observers.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses precinct boundary changes, creation, and polling place modifications for nonpartisan elections. It does not address the publication timeline or requirements for precinct-level election results following an election. The criterion concerns results publication speed, which is an entirely different topic from precinct administration and boundary management.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section permits federally accredited laboratories to test and qualify voting systems, and the secretary of state may certify systems for use by political subdivisions. However, the statute does not explicitly address whether multiple vendors can operate simultaneously in the same election—it only addresses the certification process for systems generally. The section is procedurally permissive but does not affirmatively guarantee multi-vendor capability within a single election.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: C.R.S. § 1-40-124 addresses publication requirements for constitutional amendments and ballot measures in legal newspapers. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, vendor independence, or open technical standards for voting systems. This section is entirely about public notice and ballot measure dissemination, not voting technology specifications.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses firearm regulations at polling locations and drop boxes under the 'Vote Without Fear Act.' It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration caps, or any measures to prevent vendor lock-in. The criterion concerns election vendor independence and contract terms, which is entirely unrelated to the subject matter of this statute.

The statute explicitly requires voting system providers to place election software in escrow with the secretary of state (or an approved independent escrow agent) as a condition of certification. This directly satisfies the criterion's requirement for source-code escrow with the state as a certification condition.

The statute explicitly requires that electromechanical voting systems provide for voting in secrecy as a mandatory certification requirement. This directly guarantees voter-ballot unlinkability by ensuring that votes cannot be linked to individual voters.

“Provides for voting in secrecy”

The statute mandates full compliance with ADA accessibility standards at all polling locations and explicitly prohibits barriers to disabled voters. This requirement is comprehensive, covering vision, motor, and other disabilities under the ADA framework. The provision is universal except for specified emergency exemptions.

The section establishes mandatory minimum numbers of voter service and polling centers tied to elector counts and time periods before/on election day. These requirements create a legal floor for polling-place density based on active electors, satisfying the criterion for a polling-place density floor.