EAIElectoral Access Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section provided states only '(Repealed)' and contains no substantive text establishing or describing any election administration body, its independence, appointment structure, term lengths, or political composition. There is no statutory language to evaluate against the criterion.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a legislative declaration establishing the purpose of high school voter registration procedures. It does not address minimum age or residency requirements for voting, nor does it reference the state constitution. The section merely encourages registration of eligible electors without defining what makes someone eligible. To satisfy the criterion, the statute would need to either set age and residency requirements in constitutional text or explicitly reference them as constitutionally grounded; this section does neither.

The section provides clear statutory codification of a disqualification criterion (felony conviction) and an enumerated notification and cancellation procedure. However, it lacks a statutorily-defined restoration procedure—it only states that registration 'shall remain canceled until the offender reregisters to vote,' without specifying when reregistration is permissible, what documentation is required, or whether rights are restored automatically upon sentence completion or pardon. The dual-scholar test would note that the disqualification mechanism is transparent but the restoration pathway is left undefined.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs watcher eligibility and procedures at polling places and central count facilities — it does not address voter identification requirements at any point in the voting process. The criterion asks whether ID requirements (or their absence) are set in statute; this section contains no such provisions.

The statute exhaustively enumerates the acceptable forms of identifying information for mail registration: Colorado driver's license, state ID card issued by the department of revenue, or the last four digits of social security number. The provision also addresses those without a social security number by directing the secretary of state to assign a registration number. This is a statutory enumeration with no discretion left to administrators regarding which ID forms are acceptable.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 1-45-112 addresses municipal clerk duties regarding campaign finance disclosure and record retention. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding voter identification requirements, free state-issued ID programs, or any identification-related procedures. This section is entirely outside the scope of the ID.3 criterion.

The statute explicitly provides a defined cure procedure for voters without ID: they may cast a provisional ballot under article 8.5. The procedure is set in statute and enumerated (provisional ballot mechanism), meeting the procedural-clarity standard. While article 8.5 itself would contain the detailed mechanics, this section establishes the statutory cure pathway unambiguously.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly and exhaustively sets the registration deadline by type of election: fifteenth day prior through election day for general elections, and eighth day prior through election day for other elections. The cutoff dates are statutorily enumerated, not delegated to administrative discretion, and subsection (3.5) further clarifies that applications must be processed per statute §1-2-508(3), anchoring the procedure in law rather than regulation.

This section enumerates change-of-address methods (mail, in-person, online) with statutory specificity and clear procedures. However, the criterion asks for enumeration of *initial registration methods* (in-person, mail, online, motor-voter, automatic, same-day), and this section addresses only address *changes*, not the full registration pathway. The statute does not exhaustively enumerate the initial registration methods available in Colorado.

The statute explicitly defines a cure procedure for signatures that fail verification: a candidate may submit a sworn statement from the elector plus identification within five days of notification. The procedure is statutory (not left to administrative discretion), enumerated (specifying exact documents required and timeline), and accompanied by notification requirements and a defined timeline for cure.

The statute explicitly grants voters a statutory right to challenge a registration removal by appealing to district court within three days, with defined procedures for filing, notice, and hearing. The criterion asks whether the voter's right to challenge a rejected or removed registration is codified in statute—not the challenger's right to initiate challenges, but the registrant's right to contest removal. This section provides exactly that: a clear statutory appeal mechanism with enumerated steps (verified petition, notice to other party, hearing within 3–5 days) and a defined review standard (competent legal evidence only; residence at registered address must be proven).

C.R.S. § 1-2-605 defines roll-maintenance criteria entirely within statute. It specifies triggers for inactivity marking (undeliverable mail, undeliverable mail ballot) and cancellation (inactivity + two consecutive general elections without voting or response), and provides a cure mechanism (confirmation card return, voting, or address update restores active status). All criteria are enumerated and mandatory ("shall"), not delegated to regulatory discretion. This satisfies the criterion at the highest level: statutory specification with defined procedures.

The statute requires that notice be sent to the person's address before any removal occurs (subsection 3), and establishes a cure mechanism: if the notice is returned as undeliverable within 20 days, the registration is canceled, but if returned after 20 days, it is merely marked inactive rather than canceled. The notice itself provides an opportunity to decline or correct registration (subsection 3(a) and (b) with postage-paid return forms). This satisfies the requirement of statutory notice and cure period before removal.

The statute mandates confidentiality of SSNs and requires development of 'appropriate security measures,' but does not codify specific technical requirements (encryption standards, access logs, audit trails) or a defined breach notification procedure. The obligation to develop measures is delegated to county clerk discretion rather than enumerated in statute.

The statute explicitly codifies two exhaustive, measurable thresholds that trigger the duty to provide multilingual ballot access: either 2,000 English-limited citizens speaking a shared minority language, or 2.5% of the county population meeting that criterion. Both thresholds are defined with reference to specific census data sources. The Secretary of State's role is purely ministerial—to determine which counties meet these statutory criteria and notify them. No administrative discretion exists; the trigger is bright-line and statutory.

The statute explicitly grants electors with disabilities, literacy issues, or English-language difficulties the right to receive assistance and specifies that this assistance may come from an election judge or a person of the elector's own choosing. The qualifications and conduct requirements for non-judge assistants are also codified in statute through the voter assistance self-affirmation form requirement, providing clear enumeration of the procedural rules.

The statute delegates to the Secretary of State the authority to 'establish procedures' for accessible voting but does not enumerate the specific procedures in statute itself. While ballot secrecy protection is mentioned ('independently and privately'), the core procedural requirements—what forms of assistance are available, how they are requested, how they are delivered, and the specific safeguards—are left to administrative discretion rather than codified in statute. A dual-scholar test would find this lacks statutory enumeration of the procedure itself, even though the statute addresses the topic.

The statute sets specific opening and closing hours (7 a.m. to 7 p.m.) for all polling locations in binding statutory language. These hours are not delegated to local administrative discretion; they apply uniformly statewide. The statute also enumerates defined grounds for judicial extension (inclement weather, equipment failure, technological problems, voter suppression activities, shortage of supplies, or exigent circumstance) and limits such extensions to six additional hours, providing clear procedural guardrails.

The statute codifies a registration deadline for mail-in ballot receipt (eighth day before election) but does not address the full mail-in voting procedure. Critical elements are missing from this section: application procedures for mail-in ballots themselves, return methods (mail, drop box, in-person), signature verification standards, and cure procedures for rejected ballots. Section 1-7.5-107 is referenced but not included here. A complete procedural evaluation would require review of the entire mail-in voting framework across multiple statutes.

The section statutorily codifies key elements of absentee (mail ballot) voting: eligibility (all active registered electors receive ballots), application (requesting a ballot at designated locations), timing of mailing (eighteenth to twenty-second days before election), return locations (county clerk offices or designated locations), and the window for return (through final day of voting). All framework elements are set by statute rather than left to administrative discretion.

The statute establishes the early voting period with explicit statutory grounding (15 days before election through election day) and enumerates location requirements with specific numerical thresholds tied to county elector population. The rule is set by statute, not left to administrative discretion, though day-to-day operational details may be managed by county clerks. The procedural clarity satisfies the dual-scholar test: both liberal and conservative scholars would recognize this as a clear statutory framework regardless of whether they favor more or fewer voting centers.

This section addresses only drop-box operating hours, not the procedural elements required by the criterion: placement, security, and chain-of-custody procedures are not enumerated here. While drop-boxes are permitted and hours are statutorily defined, the three core procedural topics (placement, security, chain-of-custody) are either absent from this section or referenced to other statutory provisions not included in the text for evaluation.

This section establishes a statutory procedure for notifying a challenged provisional ballot voter—a cure/appeal element—but it does not codify the right to cast a provisional ballot, enumerate the grounds for challenges, specify how challenges are adjudicated, or detail what remedy follows notification. The section delegates critical adjudication mechanics to 'rules of the secretary of state' (administrative discretion), and the statute notes that provisional ballot procedures were repealed (1-9-301 to 1-9-306), leaving the foundational right and core procedures undefined in statute.