EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section pertains to proposition information pamphlets for initiative and referendum petitions, addressing the preparation and publication of voter arguments and fiscal/legal impact statements. It does not concern election verification artifacts, device records, certificates, or result signatures. The criterion asks about downloadable public packages for post-election verification, which is entirely outside the scope of this statute section about pre-election voter information materials. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly requires voting equipment to produce a permanent paper record that must be available for voter inspection before leaving the polling place and available as an official record for recounts. This directly satisfies the voter-verifiable paper trail requirement, ensuring voters can verify their selections were recorded correctly. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs retention, public inspection, and complaint procedures for campaign financial statements, not precinct-level election data or citizen re-tally rights. It addresses transparency of candidate and political committee finances, not the underlying vote tallies or voting records that would enable citizens to independently verify election results. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Custody Hardware
50.0% · 4/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 2/540.0% | The section requires ballots to be placed in a sealed container, which constitutes a tamper-evident measure. However, it does not specify logging of seal integrity, monitoring for tampering, or any responsive auto-quarantine mechanisms, so it does not meet the higher standards on the ordinal scale. “place a copy of the forms described in Subsection (3)(a) and the voted ballots in a sealed container” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly mandates that voting equipment must not be capable of wireless communication, with the exception only for electronic pollbooks or official registers. This directly prohibits internet, Wi-Fi, and cellular connectivity on vote-casting equipment, satisfying the network isolation mandate. “ensure that the voting equipment is not capable of wireless communication” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires documentation of chain of custody for mechanical ballots and voting devices, but does not mandate that such documentation be publicly available. The requirement is procedural and discretionary (procedures are 'developed by the election officer'), and there is no explicit requirement for public access to custody records. “ensure that security procedures, developed by the election officer, are followed to document chain of custody and to prevent unauthorized access” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly criminalizes tampering with voting devices and equipment, and prescribes a third degree felony penalty for violation. This directly addresses unauthorized access and modification of election hardware. “It is unlawful for any person to intentionally or knowingly damage, modify, steal, tamper with, or destroy a voting device, voting equipment, or an automated voting system.” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Post Election Audit
22.2% · 2/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 0/10.0% | This section requires the lieutenant governor to study and report on post-election audit methods, but does not mandate that a post-election audit be conducted for every election. It addresses audit procedures and improvements rather than establishing a requirement that audits occur. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 2/540.0% | The section requires the lieutenant governor to study post-election audit methods, including risk-limiting audits, and report recommendations. However, it does not mandate any specific audit method—it only directs a study and evaluation. No audit method is actually required to be implemented. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses redistricting standards and requirements, specifically defining technical terms and methodologies for analyzing redistricting plans for partisan bias. It does not address post-election audits, audit triggers, close margins, or sworn challenges. The section is entirely focused on the redistricting process itself, not election auditing mechanisms. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses withdrawal of candidacy and notification procedures to candidates and voters. It contains no provisions regarding post-election audits, observer access, media presence, or citizen participation in audit processes. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion of public observation of audits. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses criminal convictions and forfeiture of office for violations of Utah's election law, not post-election audits or audit results. It contains no language regarding audit procedures, audit findings, or the binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses conflict of interest disclosure requirements for candidates filing for office in Utah. It has no connection to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The statute governs candidate financial disclosures, not election technology or software. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses only the physical printing requirements for machine-counted ballots (size, arrangement, ink, paper stock). It does not address publication, signing, or pre-election disclosure of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules. The criterion requires signed and published election definitions before polls open, which is a completely different requirement not covered here. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires software validation procedures and database access logging, but neither provision grants a right to verify that the running binary matches a committed binary. Software validation rules and access records do not address the core element of post-election verification of actual running code against a known committed version. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | The statute provides that counting center proceedings are public and may be observed by interested persons, which grants general observational access. However, it does not specifically address party observers or civil-society observers, nor does it define their procedural rights, access levels, or standing—all elements typically required for 'full procedural access.' The language is permissive ('may be observed') rather than mandating specific observer rights. “Proceedings at the counting center are public and may be observed by interested persons.” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns voter registration audits conducted by the lieutenant governor, not the publication of election results. It addresses verification of voter eligibility and accuracy of registration records, which is entirely unrelated to the timing requirements for publishing precinct-level election results. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section requires election officers to create a log of adjudication-related information (Subsection 4) and a final election results database, but does not mandate that such logs be public, signed, or append-only. The statute specifies data retention and capture requirements but contains no provisions establishing public access, cryptographic signing, or immutability constraints characteristic of append-only logs. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses security of election equipment, record-keeping of service work, and access restrictions to equipment. It does not address whether multiple certified vendors are permitted to operate in the same election or any aspect of vendor certification or vendor diversity. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses local voter information pamphlet requirements, including notice procedures, written arguments for and against ballot propositions, and rebuttal processes. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, or technical specifications for voting systems. The section is entirely focused on voter communication and ballot measure procedures, not vendor independence or protocol standards. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains only definitions used in election-related statutes. It does not address vendor contracts, contract duration, or any procurement or vendor management requirements. The section is about defining terms such as 'age range,' 'candidate for public office,' 'mailed ballot report,' and similar administrative definitions, which are unrelated to vendor contracting practices. | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-06-02 |
Voter Access
28.6% · 2/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 0/10.0% | The section requires voting systems to protect ballot secrecy, but this is a performance standard for equipment certification rather than a guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability or an enforceable legal right. The statute mandates that voting equipment meet this criterion during testing, but does not establish a legally enforceable guarantee that voters cannot be linked to their ballots through operational procedures or other means. “protects the secrecy of a voter's ballot” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 2/540.0% | The statute requires that the Voting Equipment Selection Committee include members with knowledge and experience in 'access for persons with disabilities' and that new voting equipment systems comply with requirements for mechanical ballots. However, the section does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards that are legally required at every polling place, nor does it mandate specific vision, motor, or language accessibility requirements. It addresses equipment selection criteria rather than polling place accessibility mandates. “access for persons with disabilities” | § view source 2026-06-02 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the combination of voting precincts and polling-place location relative to combined precincts, but does not establish any legal floor or minimum standard for polling-place density per voter population or geographic area. It merely permits municipalities to combine precincts and specifies where polling places may be located relative to combined boundaries. | § view source 2026-06-02 |