EAIElectoral Access Index

The statute explicitly creates the commission, establishes its independence from executive control, and enumerates a multi-branch appointment structure with balanced political composition (majority and minority party representation across both legislative chambers plus the governor). The appointments are statutorily mandated with clear deadlines and procedural fallbacks in Subsection (4) when appointments are not timely made. No administrative discretion is left regarding structure or composition.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration record disclosure status and at-risk voter designation procedures. It does not address minimum age or residency requirements for voting eligibility, which are the subject matter of criterion ELIG.1. The section is entirely procedural regarding registration record classification and notification, not foundational voting eligibility.

The section establishes in statute that conviction of an election offense results in forfeiture of voting rights and explicitly references defined statutory restoration procedures (Sections 20A-2-101.3 and 20A-2-101.5). The disqualification criterion (conviction under the title) is enumerated in statute, and the cure/restoration path is anchored to specific statutory sections rather than left to administrative discretion.

“Any individual convicted of any offense under this title forfeits the right to vote at any election unless the right to vote is restored as provided in Section 20A-2-101.3 or 20A-2-101.5.”

The statute codifies a clear, exhaustive procedure for restoration of voting rights post-felony conviction with three enumerated triggers: probation sentence, parole grant, or completion of incarceration. These are objective, legally-defined conditions that operate automatically upon occurrence, requiring no discretionary assessment or separate application process. The restoration is statutory, not administrative.

The statute explicitly requires identification in the signature-gathering process for initiatives, referenda, and candidate qualification. The requirement is set directly in statute (UCA § 20A-21-201(6)(a)) and specifies acceptable ID forms (driver license or state identification card). A fallback provision for other valid voter identification is also statutorily enumerated in subsection (6)(b), providing clear statutory grounding rather than leaving the requirement to administrative discretion.

The statute enumerates a primary ID requirement (driver license or state ID) in Subsection (6)(a), which satisfies enumeration at the statutory level. However, Subsection (6)(b) permits a fallback to 'other valid voter identification' without defining what forms qualify as 'valid voter identification,' leaving that determination to implicit administrative discretion or reference to external regulations. This creates a gap in exhaustive enumeration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section is a definitions provision for judicial campaign finance disclosure requirements. It contains no content regarding voter identification, ID requirements, or alternative ID procedures. The criterion addresses whether free state-issued ID is available to voters lacking identification; this section does not touch on voter eligibility, identification procedures, or any electoral access matter.

The statute defines an enumerated cure procedure for voters without valid ID at the polls: the poll worker records the fact in the official register, and the county clerk may verify identity and residence through alternative means (subsection 1(b)(ii)(B)) or the voter may provide ID to the county clerk before noon on the last business day before canvass (subsection 1(c)(iii)(B)). This is statutorily grounded, clearly specified, and provides defined pathways for provisional ballot cure without administrative discretion.

“either failed to provide valid voter identification or the documents provided as valid voter identification were inadequate and the poll worker recorded that fact in the official register but the county clerk verifies the individual's identity and residence through some other means”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: UCA § 20A-4-304 addresses canvassers' declarations of results and reporting requirements but does not establish any appeal procedure for rejected identification or rejected provisional ballots due to ID issues. The statute focuses on the administrative canvassing process and vote tabulation; it does not provide statutory language governing how voters can appeal ID rejections or provisional ballot rejections related to identification.

The statute explicitly sets the registration deadline as a fixed, enumerated period: 11 calendar days before the election, with a specific time (5 p.m.). This is directly codified in statute, not delegated to administrative discretion or regulation. The deadline is unambiguous and operationally clear.

“ensure that the voter registration form is received by the county clerk no later than 5 p.m. 11 calendar days before the date of the election”

This section enumerates mail registration as a method but does not exhaustively list all available registration methods. The criterion requires enumeration of ALL available methods (in-person, online, motor-voter, automatic, same-day, etc.), not just mail. To satisfy the criterion, the statute would need to comprehensively state what registration methods exist across the jurisdiction, or this section would need to reference such an enumeration elsewhere. This section addresses only mail registration procedure.

Section 20A-2-304(2)(c) establishes a statutory cure procedure for incomplete registrations: it requires the county clerk to notify the applicant that the form is incomplete and provide instructions on how to complete it properly. This is statutorily mandated, enumerated, and provides a defined path for the voter to correct deficiencies.

The statute explicitly codifies a voter's right to challenge a registration removal due to non-citizenship determination. The procedure is fully enumerated in statute: the election officer must notify the individual in writing (with specified methods in Subsection 7), provide the reason, grant a 30-day opportunity to dispute, and only remove after the dispute period closes without refutation. The cure path (providing documentary proof of citizenship) and appeal mechanism (the dispute period itself) are both statutorily defined.

This statute explicitly establishes the criteria for removal from the voter roll on grounds of change of residence, specifying two pathways (written confirmation or failure to vote and respond within defined timeframes) and requiring clear notice procedures. The section is comprehensive, setting forth statutory criteria rather than delegating to regulation or administrative discretion, and applies the dual-scholar test: both election reform advocates and election security proponents would recognize this as clear statutory procedure governing roll maintenance.

The statute requires county clerks to send a written notice by mail within 31 days when address changes are detected, and establishes a clear cure period: voters can prevent removal by either confirming residence changes in writing or by voting during a specified window (from notice through the second regular general election after notice) and responding to the notice. The removal procedure is entirely statutorily grounded with enumerated timelines and required notice form specified in detail.

The statute requires data encryption or similar security for shared records (Subsection 2(b)(iii)), establishing a minimal encryption mandate. However, the statute does not codify breach notification procedures, access logging requirements, or comprehensive security standards across the entire voter registration system. These critical security elements are absent from the statutory text, leaving significant gaps in the data security regime.

“that the record is secure from unauthorized use by employing data encryption or another similar technology security system”

No matching sections in corpus.

This section acknowledges that disability assistance exists and references Section 20A-3a-208, which presumably contains the actual rules for who may assist and the voter's right to choose an assistant. However, the criterion requires that these rules be 'codified in statute' within the operative text itself. This section merely cross-references another statute without enumerating the substantive rights or rules for assistance. The procedural details governing disability assistance are delegated to another section, so this standalone section does not satisfy the criterion's demand for codification of the assistance rules.

“except in the case of voters who have received assistance as authorized by Section 20A-3a-208”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the county clerk's duty to deliver and verify the official register before polls open, but it does not set or enumerate statutory polling-place opening and closing hours. The statute mentions that polls open at early voting centers and polling places but does not specify what those hours are or which entity sets them. No statutory hour requirement is stated or referenced.

The statute sets forth mail-in voting procedure with statutory grounding and enumeration: ballot mailing deadlines, signature verification, and notification of disqualification are codified. However, there is no cure procedure allowing voters to correct signature mismatches or other defects before ballots are disqualified. Section 20A-7-609(2) (which typically contains cure procedures for mail ballots in Utah) is explicitly exempted by Subsection (5)(h), and no alternative cure mechanism is provided in this section. The notification requirement alone does not constitute a curative remedy.

The statute enumerates three specific methods for applying for military-overseas ballots (federal postcard application, electronic equivalent, or written request), establishes eligibility based on covered-voter status, and directs the lieutenant governor to ensure electronic transmission capability. The framework is entirely statutory, with clear application procedures and no delegation to unbounded administrative discretion.

This section references an early voting period in UCA 20A-3a-601 but does not itself enumerate the period or locations. The statute delegates the actual specification of early voting rules to another section, rather than setting them directly here. While the reference demonstrates statutory grounding in principle, this section does not independently establish the period or locations—it merely incorporates them by reference. A complete statutory answer would require the actual dates, times, and location rules to be stated or fully enumerable from the cited section.

“during the early voting period described in Section 20A-3a-601”

The statute explicitly defines drop-box placement (at least one per municipality/reservation), security (24-hour video surveillance without audio, required signage), and chain-of-custody (video access limited to named officials and voters, retention requirements until end of calendar year or election contest resolution). All procedures are grounded in statute with enumerated requirements rather than administrative discretion.

The statute establishes a clear right to cast a provisional ballot with enumerated eligibility conditions (subsection 1), defines the procedure when conditions are met (subsection 2—registration and counting), specifies when provisional ballots are retained uncounted (subsection 3), and provides a defined review path via court order (subsection 4). All elements are statutory and procedurally clear.