EIIElection Integrity Index
How well does the legal framework defend against vote-altering attacks?
Dimensions
Citizen Verifiability
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1Public verification artifactDoes law mandate a downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, and result signatures? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter registration record verification and updates based on postal service data. It does not mandate any downloadable public package, certificates, device records, or result signatures as required by the criterion. The section is about address verification procedures, not public verification artifacts or election result documentation. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 4.2End-to-end verifiability permittedDoes law permit (or require) per-voter cryptographic receipts that prove inclusion without revealing the vote? | 0/50.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-31 |
| 4.3Voter-verifiable paper trailIs voter-verifiable paper record (VVPAT or hand-marked paper) legally required? | 1/1100.0% | ORS § 246.560(1)(h) explicitly requires that voting machines contain a device that duplicates votes onto a paper record copy. Additionally, subsection (1)(i) requires a device allowing each elector to view their paper record copy, establishing a voter-verifiable paper trail as a mandatory feature of approved voting equipment. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 4.4Citizen re-tally rightCan any citizen — not just parties — legally re-tally from published precinct data? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 251.430 addresses the temporary exemption of candidate materials and ballot measure arguments from public records disclosure. It does not address citizen re-tally rights, precinct data publication, or any aspect of election result verification. The section is about access to campaign materials before a filing deadline, not about post-election data availability or verification procedures. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
Custody Hardware
12.5% · 1/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1Hardware tamper standardAre tamper-evident or tamper-responsive hardware standards mandated? | 1/520.0% | The section prohibits tampering with voting machines and vote tally systems and restricts unauthorized possession of keys, establishing a legal framework against tampering but does not mandate tamper-evident seals, tamper-responsive mechanisms, or logged tamper detection. It is a prohibition on conduct rather than a requirement for tamper-detection hardware standards. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 2.2Network isolation mandateIs internet/Wi-Fi/cellular connectivity legally prohibited on vote-casting equipment? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORS § 260.268 addresses disclosure requirements for synthetic media in campaign communications. It contains no provisions regarding network isolation, internet connectivity, Wi-Fi, cellular connectivity, or any technical specifications for vote-casting equipment. The section is entirely unrelated to the custody or hardware specifications of voting machines. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 2.3Custody documentationIs full chain-of-custody documentation required and publicly available? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses tax and fee restrictions on real property transfers. It has no relevance to election integrity, custody documentation, or chain-of-custody requirements for voting equipment or materials. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 2.4Tamper criminal penaltyAre there explicit criminal penalties for unauthorized device access? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-31 |
Post Election Audit
66.7% · 6/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1Mandatory auditIs a post-election audit legally required for every election? | 1/1100.0% | The statute mandates that at every primary, general, and special election, the county clerk must conduct either a hand count audit or a risk-limiting audit. There is no exception or discretionary waiver—the clerk must choose one of these two audit methods for each election. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 3.2Audit methodWhat audit method is mandated? | 4/580.0% | The section mandates that county clerks must conduct either a hand count or a risk-limiting audit at each election, with detailed specifications for risk-limiting audits. The statute establishes risk-limiting audit as an available and regulated method, meeting the ordinal level 4 requirement for a risk-limiting audit framework. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 3.3Audit triggers beyond mandatoryDoes law trigger additional audits on close margins or sworn challenges? | 0/10.0% | The statute mandates hand counts based on margin thresholds (less than 1%, 1-2%, or 2%+ of total votes cast), which are triggered automatically by vote totals rather than by sworn challenges or discretionary triggers beyond the mandatory audit framework. The law establishes margin-based audit triggers but does not provide for additional audits triggered by sworn challenges or other mechanisms beyond the systematic margin-based requirements already in place. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 3.4Public observation of auditAre parties, media, and citizens granted observer access to the audit? | 1/1100.0% | ORS 254.532(4)(a) explicitly requires that risk-limiting audits must permit members of the public to observe the procedures and verify the results. This directly satisfies the criterion by granting observer access to parties, media, and citizens conducting the audit. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 3.5Binding forceAre audit results legally binding on the final certified result? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section contains only definitional provisions for terms used in ORS Chapter 251, such as 'candidate,' 'city office,' 'county clerk,' 'elector,' and 'measure.' It does not address post-election audits, audit results, or the binding force of audit findings on certified election results. The section is entirely inapplicable to the criterion. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
Software Verifiability
0.0% · 0/9| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1Source code disclosureIs voting system source code legally accessible? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses voter privacy and the exemption of residential addresses from public disclosure under Oregon election law. It has no relevance to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1. The section does not discuss software, source code, or any mechanisms for code disclosure or verification. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 1.2Reproducible builds requirementMust the binary that runs in production be reproducibly buildable from public source? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-31 |
| 1.3Pre-election binary commitmentIs the running binary cryptographically committed (hash published) before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORS § 260.011 addresses cryptocurrency contributions to political candidates and committees. It is unrelated to software verifiability, cryptographic commitments of running binaries, or any pre-election procedures. The section prohibits a payment method but says nothing about election software, binaries, or hash commitments. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 1.4Election definition publicationAre ballot contests, layouts, and tabulation rules signed and published before polls open? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORS 251.067 addresses the inclusion of candidate portraits, statements, and ballot measures in state and county voters' pamphlets. It does not address signing or publishing ballot contest definitions, layouts, or tabulation rules before polls open. This section is about voters' pamphlet content requirements, not pre-election publication of ballot design or tabulation procedures. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 1.5Post-election integrity checkDoes law grant a right to verify the actual running binary matches the committed one? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns verification of candidate residence and inhabitancy requirements for legislative candidates. It does not address software verification, binary code matching, election systems integrity, or any post-election technical auditing. The criterion relates to cryptographic or technical verification of voting software against committed versions, which is entirely outside the scope of this residence verification statute. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
Transparency Observation
0.0% · 0/8| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1Domestic observer rightsAre party and civil-society observers given full procedural access? | 0/10.0% | The statute requires counties to include 'security procedures governing election observers' in their elections security plan, which acknowledges observer rights exist but does not define or guarantee full procedural access. The section only mandates that security procedures be documented, not that observers receive comprehensive access or detailed procedural protections. Additionally, the security plan itself is kept confidential under subsection (2), which may limit transparency about observer procedures. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 6.2International observer accessAre OSCE/EU/IFES international observers admitted by default? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-31 |
| 6.3Precinct-level results publication speedAre precinct-level results legally required to be published within 24h of poll close? | 0/50.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses audits and reporting requirements for state agencies receiving lottery funds for parks and natural resources, not election results or precinct-level data publication. It is entirely unrelated to election integrity, vote counting, or election night reporting timelines. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 6.4Public election event logIs a public, signed, append-only election event log legally required? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-31 |
Vendor Independence
0.0% · 0/4| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1Multi-vendor capabilityDoes law permit multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses contractor and subcontractor liability for violations in petition signature gathering, not the operation of multiple certified vendors in elections. It has no relevance to vendor independence or multi-vendor capability in election systems. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 5.2Open protocol standardsAre vote-format / device-protocol standards open and publicly documented? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes a Translation Advisory Council and its membership, qualifications, and duties related to voters' pamphlet translations. It does not address vote-format or device-protocol standards, which are the subject of criterion 5.2 on vendor independence. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 5.3Contract duration capAre vendor contracts capped in duration, preventing perpetual lock-in? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This constitutional provision addresses funding restrictions for state house construction prior to 1865 and is entirely unrelated to vendor contract duration or independence. It contains no language governing contract terms, vendor relationships, or duration caps. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 5.4Source-code escrowIs source-code escrow with the state required as a condition of certification? | 0/10.0% | No matching sections in corpus. | no FTS match 2026-05-31 |
Voter Access
42.9% · 3/7| Datapoint | Score | Rationale & evidence | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1Ballot secrecy guaranteeIs voter–ballot unlinkability legally guaranteed and enforceable? | 1/1100.0% | The statute explicitly mandates that ballot marking arrangements 'shall ensure' the elector may mark with 'absolute secrecy,' which is a legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. The use of mandatory language ('shall') makes this enforceable. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 7.2Accessibility mandateAre accessibility standards (vision, motor, language) legally required at every polling place? | 2/540.0% | This section addresses accessibility for persons with disabilities but only for signing documents—a narrow subset of polling place accessibility. It does not establish comprehensive accessibility standards covering vision, motor function, or language access at polling places themselves, nor does it mandate accessibility features at every voting location. | § view source 2026-05-31 |
| 7.3Polling-place density floorIs there a legal floor on polling places per N voters or per geographic area? | 0/10.0% | No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORS § 248.007 addresses the organization of major political parties, selection of delegates, notification to the Secretary of State, and precinct committeeperson elections. It contains no provisions regarding polling-place density, the number of polling places per voters, geographic polling-place requirements, or any related standards. This section is entirely outside the scope of the criterion. | § view source 2026-05-31 |