EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

This section establishes that circuit court is the court of original jurisdiction for election contests by cross-referencing ORS 258.036. However, the section itself does not fully specify venue. While it references 'the circuit court described under ORS 258.036,' the actual venue specification is delegated to another statute section. The section does establish clear procedural requirements (notice publication, timing, service rules, hearing procedures) but does not independently codify which specific circuit court has jurisdiction. To fully satisfy the criterion, the venue rule should be explicitly stated within the section or the referenced statute should be examined to confirm venue is clearly specified. The section meets half the requirement by establishing circuit court jurisdiction generally, but lacks complete independent clarity on venue specification.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: ORS § 260.014 addresses campaign contribution limits and permissible contributors to candidates and political committees. It contains no provisions concerning election contest filing deadlines, certification timing, dispute resolution procedures, or any procedural mechanism for challenging election results. The section is entirely focused on campaign finance regulation, not election dispute resolution. The criterion requires specification of a deadline for filing an election contest measured in days after certification or after a defined event. This section does not address election contests or their procedural requirements at all.

ORS § 258.055(5) codifies a clear standard of proof—'clear and convincing evidence'—which addresses the first component of the criterion (standard of proof is codified). However, the statute does not codify admissibility rules or evidentiary standards governing what evidence may be introduced, how it is authenticated, or how it is weighed. The section provides only procedural framework (notice, service, hearing timeline, jury trial waiver, written findings) and burden allocation, but lacks substantive evidentiary rules that would permit consistent case-by-case application of evidence standards. A score of 2 would require codification of both the burden and specific evidentiary rules (e.g., who may testify, what documents qualify, hearsay exceptions, chain-of-custody rules). This section satisfies approximately half the criterion.

ORS § 254.485 codifies general recount procedural elements in statute: it specifies who counts (counting board members and county clerk), how the count proceeds (without adjournment, in presence of authorized persons, with audible announcement, using pen and ink), and establishes a 12-hour relief mechanism. However, the statute addresses ballot tallying generally rather than recounts specifically. The section does not codify recount-specific triggers (when a recount is mandated or requested), recount cost allocation, or the evidentiary standard for finding legal effect of recount results. The delegation to the Secretary of State to establish recount procedures by rule (subsection 7) indicates that material recount mechanics are reserved for administrative rulemaking rather than statutory specification. Thus the statute provides a partial framework: some procedural clarity on basic counting mechanics, but incomplete codification of recount-triggering conditions, cost rules, and result-effect provisions.

ORS 254.529 clearly enumerates automatic recount triggers based on margin thresholds. The statute specifies three margin-of-victory thresholds that trigger mandatory hand count procedures: (1) less than 1% margin requires 10% precinct recount; (2) 1-2% margin requires 5% precinct recount; (3) 2% or greater margin requires 3% precinct recount. The triggers are mechanistic and based on objective vote margins rather than discretionary or petition-based processes. The statute further specifies the scope of required hand counts, the timeline (days 27-35 post-election), and the comparison standard (one-half of one percent threshold). These enumerated margin triggers satisfy the criterion's requirement that recount triggers be clearly codified.

ORS § 258.280(3) explicitly allocates recount costs by statute based on the type of office at issue. The statute clearly specifies which governmental unit bears the cost of the recount: the county pays for county offices, the city pays for city offices, the special district pays for special district offices, and the state pays for all other offices. This is a straightforward, codified cost allocation rule that eliminates discretion and provides clear guidance on who pays for automatic recounts triggered under subsections (1) and (2). The allocation is outcome-based (tied to the type of office) rather than conditioned on the recount results, which provides complete procedural clarity on cost responsibility.

ORS § 258.241 directly codifies the legal effect of recount findings. Subsection (1) establishes that a full recount result becomes the binding official return of the election, creating a mandatory amendment effect. Subsection (2) clarifies the partial recount scenario, specifying that partial recount abstracts are not certified and the original count remains the official return. These provisions clearly establish that full recount findings have binding legal effect—they replace the original count as the official election return. This satisfies the criterion's requirement that recount-finding effects be codified in statute rather than left to discretion or case law.

ORS § 248.023(3) establishes a hard statutory deadline of the 35th day after a primary election by which the county elections official must prepare and furnish the certified list of elected precinct committeepersons. The use of mandatory language ('shall') and a specific numerical deadline ('35th day') removes discretion from administrative officials. This directly codifies when certification of results becomes official for precinct committeeperson offices. The provision satisfies the criterion because the certification deadline is set by statute and not subject to administrative discretion.