EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses signature verification on new party and independent candidate petitions between county and city election authorities. It does not address downloadable public packages, certificates, device records, or result signatures related to election auditing or verification—the topics encompassed by criterion 4.1 on citizen verifiability.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute permits the use of paper ballots as a fallback when electronic machines fail, but only as a contingency measure, not as a required voter-verifiable trail for all voting. The language 'may be used' indicates paper ballots are optional and used only when machines cannot be repaired or replaced, rather than mandating a voter-verifiable paper record for all votes cast.

“paper ballots made as nearly as practicable to the official ballot may be used”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the procedures for a recount hearing and what the court shall consider, but it does not address whether citizens (as opposed to official parties or contestants) have a legal right to re-tally votes from published precinct data. The section concerns judicial review of alleged irregularities, not public access to data for citizen verification.

The statute mandates tamper-evident seals on containers used to transport ballot cards and write-in forms, requiring that seals be broken beyond repair if opened. However, the provision does not require tamper-responsive systems that automatically quarantine compromised equipment, nor does it mandate logging of tamper events beyond the statement required when a container arrives unsealed.

“The container shall be securely sealed in such a manner that if the container is opened, the seal will be broken beyond repair.”

The section defines 'automatic tabulating equipment' as air-gapped and 'not physically able to be connected to a network,' which addresses network isolation. However, this is a definitions section that establishes terminology rather than mandating prohibitions. It describes requirements for equipment definitions but does not establish binding legal prohibitions on network connectivity for vote-casting or tabulating equipment.

“the apparatus necessary to examine and automatically count votes, and the data processing machines which are used for counting votes and tabulating results and which are air-gapped and not physically able to be connected to a network”

The section requires a written statement only for unsealed ballot containers, not comprehensive chain-of-custody documentation for all ballots and supplies. Additionally, the statute does not address whether such documentation is publicly available. The requirement is limited in scope and does not establish full chain-of-custody procedures.

“the election authority shall make a written statement of the facts which includes the location of the polling place and date of the election printed on the container and the reason the container is not sealed, if known”

The statute explicitly establishes criminal penalties (felony classification with imprisonment up to five years or fines of $2,500-$10,000) for unauthorized access to and tampering with voting machines and tabulating equipment. This directly addresses criminal penalties for unauthorized device access.

“Willfully tampering with, disarranging, defacing, materially altering, impairing, or destroying any voting machine or automatic tabulating equipment owned or leased by or loaned to an election authority.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses recount procedures when a recount is ordered by a court following an election contest, not a mandatory post-election audit for every election. The section describes who may be present and participate in a recount that is discretionary (ordered 'pursuant to section 115.539 or 115.601'), not a universal audit requirement applied to all elections.

The statute mandates a recount, which is defined as a hand count of all votes. This is a fixed-method hand recount triggered when a candidate loses by less than one percent (or one-half of one percent for state-level contests). However, this is triggered only upon contestant request in close races, not as a routine post-election audit procedure, and it is a full manual recount rather than a risk-limiting or comparison audit methodology.

“For purposes of this section, "recount" means one additional counting of all votes counted for the office or on the question with respect to which the recount is requested.”

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses complaint filing procedures and investigation by the ethics commission, not post-election audits or public observation rights. It focuses on the complaint process for campaign finance disclosure violations and does not mention audit procedures, observer access, or citizen participation in any audit process.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the jurisdiction of Missouri's Supreme Court to hear contested elections for state offices and constitutional matters. It does not address post-election audits or the binding force of audit results on certified election outcomes. The section is about election dispute resolution procedures, not audit requirements or their legal effect.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance disclosure requirements for political contributions, requiring committees to disclose contributor names, addresses, and donation amounts. It has no relationship to voting system source code accessibility, which is the subject of criterion 1.1.

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the retention and inspection of voted ballots, ballot materials, and election records for 22 months post-election. It does not address whether ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or election definitions are signed and published before polls open. The criterion concerns pre-election publication of election parameters, while this section only governs post-election record retention.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section explicitly grants party representatives the right to designate challengers with full procedural access to observe both in-person voting (until all ballots are cast) and absentee ballot counting procedures. This directly establishes domestic observer rights for party-designated challengers at all critical election phases.

“The chair of the county committee of each political party named on the ballot shall have the right to designate a challenger for each polling place, who may be present until all ballots are cast on the day of election, and a challenger for each location at which absentee ballots are counted, who may be present while the ballots are being prepared for counting and counted.”

The statute permits international observers to enter polling places, but only if they have registered with the election authority beforehand. This is not admission 'by default' as the criterion asks, but rather requires affirmative prior registration, creating a gate-keeping mechanism. The statute does not specify whether OSCE, EU, or IFES observers are automatically admitted or merely permitted subject to registration conditions.

“international observers who have registered as such with the election authority”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes procedures for filing and investigating complaints about HAVA Title III violations, focusing on complaint handling, investigation timelines, and reporting mechanisms. It contains no provisions regarding precinct-level results publication timelines or requirements.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The section addresses approval of voting equipment, voting system standards, cybersecurity reviews, and touchscreen machine restrictions, but contains no requirement for a public, signed, append-only election event log. The cybersecurity and testing provisions do not establish a public event log requirement.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute addresses approval and certification of electronic voting systems by the secretary of state, and requires compliance with federal standards. However, it does not explicitly permit or require multiple certified vendors to operate in the same election. The section focuses on equipment approval, testing standards, and security requirements, but contains no language addressing whether multiple vendors can be used simultaneously within a single election.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses polling place designation, accessibility, and location requirements. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, vendor independence, or technical documentation requirements. The statute is entirely unrelated to the criterion being evaluated.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 115.642 addresses complaint procedures, investigations, and the secretary of state's powers to investigate election violations and issue subpoenas. It contains no provisions regarding vendor contracts, contract duration, or caps on contract periods. This section is entirely unrelated to the criterion of vendor contract duration limits.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses violations of campaign finance and lobbying contribution/expenditure rules, including enforcement mechanisms, refunds, disgorgement, and penalties. It contains no provisions relating to source-code escrow, election technology certification, or vendor independence requirements. The section is entirely outside the scope of the criterion.

The statute explicitly requires that voting machines permit voting in absolute secrecy, which establishes a legal guarantee of voter-ballot unlinkability. This is an enforceable requirement for all voting machines used in Missouri.

“Permits voting in absolute secrecy”

The section establishes a mandatory grant program requiring election authorities to make polling places accessible to individuals with disabilities, including those who are blind or visually impaired, and to provide the same opportunity for secret, independent, and verifiable participation. The comprehensive scope covers path of travel, entrances, exits, and voting areas at every polling facility, and includes provisions for information and training on accessibility accommodations.

“To make polling places, including path of travel, entrances, exits and voting areas of each polling facility accessible to individuals with disabilities, including the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and secret, independent and verifiable participation, including privacy and independence, as for other voters”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section prescribes the form and content of tally books used to record voting data at polling places in electronic voting systems. It does not address polling-place density, the number of polling places required per voter population, or geographic area coverage requirements. The section is purely about record-keeping procedures.