EAdIElection Administration Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses jurisdictional authority and filing procedures for campaign finance disclosures to the Missouri Ethics Commission, but contains no statutory requirement for election commissioners or senior election staff to disclose their own financial interests, vendor relationships, party positions, or candidate connections. The section does not establish conflict-of-interest disclosure obligations for election administrators themselves.

The statute explicitly codifies the right to judicial review of election-authority determinations on ballot petitions, with clear standing (any registered voter), defined timelines (within ten days of refusal or determination), specified remedies (writ of mandamus, court-ordered reversal), and venue (circuit court of Cole County for Secretary of State, county where election authority is located otherwise). This satisfies all structural elements of COI.2.

“If the secretary of state or the election authority refuses to file a petition for the formation of a new party or the nomination of an independent candidate or refuses to issue a statement setting forth such person's determination within the time prescribed, any registered voter may apply, within ten days after the refusal, to the circuit court for a writ of mandamus to compel such person to file the petition or issue the statement. Within ten days after the secretary of state or the election authority issues a statement setting forth such person's determination, any registered voter may apply to the circuit court to compel the secretary of state or the election authority to reverse such person's determination.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 115.013 is a definitional section that establishes terminology for election administration purposes. It contains no provisions regarding the election commission's existence, structure, appointment, mandate, or constitutional grounding. It does not address whether the commission is created by constitution, statute, regulation, or executive order. This section is silent on the institutional framework required by COMM.1.

The statute provides gubernatorial appointment with Senate advice and consent, which involves two branches (executive and legislative). However, the 'advice and consent' structure places primary appointment power in the executive, with the Senate exercising only a constrained veto role rather than co-equal appointment authority. True multi-branch appointment under COMM.2 requires appointment mechanisms where multiple branches exercise substantive, independent selection authority (e.g., legislature appoints some members, judiciary appoints others, governor appoints others). This structure does not meet the dual-scholar test of clear, unambiguous multi-branch control.

“appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate”

This section protects incumbent commissioners from premature termination during their existing term and references statutory removal grounds (§ 115.037), but it is a protective/transitional provision for sitting commissioners only. It does not define the length of commissioner terms, establish staggered cycles, or specify removal grounds—those must be found in other sections of ch. 115. Standing alone, this section provides only negative protection, not affirmative term structure.

“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed in any way as interfering with or discontinuing the term of office of any person now serving as an election commissioner until the term for which he was appointed has expired, or until he has been removed as provided in section 115.037”

The statute provides a clear, binding political-balance requirement: exactly two commissioners from each major party, with prohibition on party-same chairman and secretary. This statutory structure prevents single-party capture by mandating bipartisan composition and ensuring divided leadership regardless of which party the governor belongs to. The balance is codified and enforceable.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 115.449 addresses ballot counting procedures and mechanics at the polling place — the duties of election judges, tally sheet recording, and vote announcement. It contains no language regarding election authority budgeting, budget structure, appropriations, funding lines, or protection against mid-cycle reallocation. This section is procedurally focused and does not implicate funding independence.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: § 130.179 prohibits foreign nationals from participating in election influence activities and making contributions to influence ballot measures, but it does not address funding of the election authority itself or election administration vendors. The statute regulates private political activity, not the structural independence or funding sources of the state election administration apparatus, which is the subject of FUND.3.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute mandates that all election authorities establish training courses for election judges and requires that the curriculum include the secretary of state's developed standards aligned with HAVA. This provides clear statutory grounding for mandatory training with defined content.

“All election authorities shall establish training courses for election judges. Such courses shall include substantially the curriculum developed by the secretary of state's office in accordance with the Help America Vote Act of 2002.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute codifies the Secretary of State's authority to approve voting equipment and requires rules under the Administrative Procedure Act (ch. 536), providing structural safeguards against arbitrary approval. However, the section does not codify the certification criteria themselves (evaluators, timeline, or public-comment procedures) in statute—those details are delegated to agency rulemaking. While subsection (2) specifies technical standards for equipment approval, the certification *process* (evaluators, timeline, public-comment period) is not codified in this section.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute defines one specific ground for decertification (failure to participate in cyber security testing) and establishes the secretary of state's authority to revoke certification. However, the section is truncated mid-sentence and does not provide a complete, codified procedure for decertification (e.g., notice requirements, hearing rights, appeal process). The grounds are narrowly defined to cyber security failures and test participation rather than comprehensive vendor performance standards, and procedural safeguards are absent from the visible text.

“The secretary of state shall have authority to require cyber security testing, including penetration testing, of vendor machines, programs, and systems. Failure to participate in such testing shall result in a revocation of vendor certification. Upon notice from another jurisdiction of cyber security failures or certification withholds or revocation, the secretary of state shall have authority to revoke or withhold certification”