EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses procedures for circuit clerk duties upon petition filing, including summons service, mail notice to election authorities, and answer filing deadlines. It does not enumerate which parties have standing to contest an election. The section assumes a 'contestee' and 'contestant' exist but does not identify or specify which persons, candidates, parties, or qualified voters may initiate election contests. Standing enumeration would typically appear in a separate statutory section defining who may file a contest petition, not in this procedural provision governing post-filing clerk duties and respondent answer procedures.

RSMo § 115.557 explicitly specifies that the Missouri Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests. The statute clearly designates the court of original jurisdiction—the supreme court—and establishes both venue (office of the clerk of the supreme court) and the filing location. This satisfies the criterion's requirement that the court of original jurisdiction be specified by statute. The language is unambiguous and leaves no discretion regarding which court hears election contests.

“The supreme court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to the contest”

§ 115.577 explicitly specifies a filing deadline for election contests: not later than thirty days after the official announcement of the election result. This is a clear, bright-line temporal rule tied to a defined event (official announcement of results by the election authority). The deadline is codified in statute and leaves no discretion regarding when contests must be filed. This directly satisfies the criterion requirement that the deadline for filing an election contest be specified by statute.

“Not later than thirty days after the official announcement of the election result by the election authority, any person authorized by section 115.553 who wishes to contest the election for any office or on any question provided in section 115.575 shall file a verified petition in the office of the clerk of the appropriate circuit court.”

Missouri § 115.599 codifies procedural rules for evidence-gathering in election contests (depositions, witness subpoenas) by incorporating civil procedure by reference. This addresses evidentiary PROCEDURE and admissibility mechanics ('may be read in evidence'). However, the statute does not codify a substantive STANDARD OF PROOF (e.g., clear and convincing, preponderance, beyond reasonable doubt) for resolving contested-election claims. The reference to 'as in civil cases' delegates the standard of proof to the civil procedure framework rather than establishing an election-specific codified standard. The section satisfies the 'evidentiary rules' component (depositions, witness process) but not the 'standard of proof' component, yielding a score of 1 rather than 2.

“the contestant and the contestee shall be allowed process for witnesses, and either party may take depositions, as in civil cases, to be read as evidence at the trial, as is authorized in civil cases”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: While § 115.600 grants authority to petition for a recount and establishes a general evidentiary standard ('irregularities sufficient to cast doubt on the outcome'), it does not define recount procedures themselves. The statute does not codify: who physically conducts the recount, the method or process for recounting ballots, chain-of-custody protocols, observation rights, reporting requirements, or time limits for completion. The provision delegates these procedural details implicitly to court discretion or to regulations/administrative directives not quoted here. The statute answers 'whether' a recount may occur but not 'how' it is to be conducted.

The statute provides a threshold-based trigger (margin of defeat) but only in the narrow context of vote validity disputes. It establishes that a prima facie case exists when questioned votes equal or exceed the margin of defeat. However, the broader recount trigger—'irregularities which place the result in doubt'—is not enumerated with specificity. The statute does not codify what constitutes irregularities, does not establish an automatic recount mechanism based on margin percentage, and does not enumerate other potential triggers (e.g., machine malfunction, procedural violations). The margin-of-defeat rule is enumerated but applies only to a subset of recount petitions. This represents partial codification of triggers rather than comprehensive enumeration.

“If the court finds there is a prima facie showing of irregularities which place the result of the primary election in doubt, the court shall order a recount of all votes brought in question by the petition or its answer. Where the issue is drawn over the validity of certain votes cast, a prima facie case is made if the validity of a number of votes equal to or greater than the margin of defeat is placed in doubt.”

RSMo § 115.547 clearly allocates recount costs by statute. It provides that costs and expenses of an election contest, explicitly including the recount, may be adjudged against the unsuccessful party, with enforcement mechanisms parallel to civil cases. This establishes a codified cost-allocation rule: the losing party bears the cost. The statute further permits courts to require contestants to post bond before pursuing the contest, creating a gatekeeping mechanism. While the statute grants courts discretion ('may require' and 'may be adjudged'), the allocation rule itself is statutory and does not depend on case-by-case judicial determination—it is outcome-dependent (unsuccessful party pays), meeting the criterion for procedural clarity in cost allocation.

“The costs and expenses of any election contest, including the cost and expense of a recount, may be adjudged against the unsuccessful party with the payment of the costs and expenses enforceable as in civil cases.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section establishes a clear 30-day deadline for filing an election contest petition, measured from when 'the official announcement of the election result is issued by the secretary of state.' However, the criterion asks whether the CERTIFICATION DEADLINE itself (when the result becomes official) is set by statute. This section does not codify when the secretary of state must issue the official announcement or what triggers it—only that the contest deadline runs 30 days thereafter. The statute references 'official announcement' and 'certified by the secretary of state' without defining the timing mechanism for either event. Thus the section provides procedural timing for contests but does not actually specify the statutory certification deadline itself. For qualification contests, it references 'thirty days after the results of the general election have been certified by the secretary of state,' again presupposing certification timing without codifying it.

“Not later than thirty days after the official announcement of the election result is issued by the secretary of state”

RSMo § 115.533(2) explicitly codifies a statutory stay mechanism that operates automatically upon notification of a filed petition. The statute mandates that election authorities 'immediately suspend all action on the office until the contest has been determined,' which directly addresses the criterion's requirement for a mechanism to stay certification while a contest is pending. This is a clear, mandatory stay provision triggered by petition filing and notification, not discretionary or subject to judicial determination. The provision satisfies the binary criterion by establishing a definite statutory obligation to halt certification proceedings.

“All officers and election authorities so notified shall immediately suspend all action on the office until the contest has been determined.”