EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses registration record verification through house-to-house canvasses and other checking methods, but does not mandate any downloadable public package containing certificates, device records, or result signatures. It is entirely unrelated to the criterion of providing public verification artifacts for election results.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute explicitly mandates the use of paper ballots with specific identification and numbering requirements. This establishes a voter-verifiable paper trail through hand-marked paper ballots, which serves as a physical record that voters can verify their selections upon.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses record-keeping and public inspection of nominating petitions and filing fees. It does not concern vote tallying, precinct data, or citizen rights to re-tally election results. The criterion asks whether citizens can legally re-tally from published precinct data, which is entirely outside the scope of this provision.

The statute requires ballot containers to be capable of being sealed with a metal seal, which is a tamper-evident measure. However, it does not mandate tamper-responsive systems with automatic quarantine or comprehensive logging of seal integrity, falling short of the higher ordinal levels. The requirement for metal seals aligns with level 2 (tamper-evident seals required).

“It is capable of being sealed with a metal seal.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electronic filing and internet disclosure of campaign finance reports by county clerks and committees. It is entirely unrelated to vote-casting equipment, network isolation, or cybersecurity measures for voting machines. The criterion concerns technical requirements for election equipment security, which is outside the scope of campaign finance filing procedures.

The statute requires county clerks to provide a receipt when receiving ballot boxes, which is a minimal form of custody documentation. However, it does not establish a comprehensive chain-of-custody system or require that documentation be publicly available, only that officers and clerks exchange receipts between themselves.

The section imposes a criminal penalty (misdemeanor) but only for using unapproved ballot containers, not for unauthorized access or tampering with devices. The penalty addresses procedural non-compliance rather than explicit criminal liability for actual tampering or unauthorized device access.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes procedures for postcertification recounts by boards of canvassers but does not impose a legal requirement that post-election audits be conducted for every election. The statute explicitly distinguishes recounts (which count votes) from audits (which investigate election conduct), and it does not mandate that audits occur. The section addresses only the voluntary recount process and its scope.

The section mandates that recounts must be conducted but does not specify the audit method (hand recount, comparison audit, risk-limiting audit, etc.). The statute requires recounts to be fair, impartial, and uniform, but refers to sections 878-894 for the actual method details, which are not provided in this section.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 4 addresses voting rights, registration, ballot access, and identity verification procedures. It does not contain any provisions regarding post-election audits or observer access to audit processes. This section is focused entirely on pre-election and election-day procedures, not post-election activities.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: The statute explicitly states that election audits do not change any certified election results. This directly contradicts the requirement that audit results be legally binding on the final certified result. The audit is informational and supervisory in nature, not a mechanism that can alter official election outcomes.

The statute mandates source code escrow with access limited to the secretary of state and authorized agents for analysis and testing purposes. This restricts access to a certifying authority rather than the vendor alone, but the statute explicitly prohibits disclosure to other persons or agencies without vendor consent, excluding academics and the public. The access is narrower than full public disclosure but broader than vendor-only control.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs the capture and transmission of voter signatures to the qualified voter file. It addresses administrative procedures for signature handling but contains no provisions regarding software build reproducibility, source code publication, or binary reproducibility. The criterion concerns software development practices; this section is entirely about voter registration administration.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section concerns recall petition signature verification procedures, using qualified voter files and signature comparisons. It is entirely unrelated to software, cryptographic commitments, hash publication, or pre-election binary commitments. The criterion addresses election technology infrastructure; this statute addresses administrative recall processes.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides a definitional statement about what constitutes a primary election under Michigan law. It does not address ballot contests, layouts, tabulation rules, or any requirement that such materials be signed and published before polls open. The criterion concerns pre-election publication and verification of ballot materials, which is unrelated to this definitional provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses electronic filing and internet disclosure systems for campaign finance reporting, including requirements for electronic filing and signature verification of statements. However, it does not address or grant any right to verify that the actual running binary of election software matches a committed one—a technical requirement for post-election software integrity verification. The section is focused on campaign finance disclosure procedures, not software verifiability or election system auditing.

The section explicitly grants party and civil-society representatives (candidates, their counsel, and designated observers) full procedural access to observe ballots as they are called, challenge tabulations, and take notes. This directly satisfies the criterion for domestic observer rights with comprehensive procedural access.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 798b addresses the format and compilation of accumulation reports of unofficial results and the structure of precinct-level reporting, but contains no temporal requirement mandating publication within any specific timeframe. The section requires that unofficial results be compiled and published in a specified format but does not establish a deadline (24 hours, 48 hours, or otherwise) for when precinct-level results must be published after polls close.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 168.794 contains definitions of election-related terms (audit trail, ballot, electronic tabulating equipment, etc.) but does not establish any requirement for a public, signed, append-only election event log. The section is definitional in nature and does not impose obligations regarding event logging or public transparency mechanisms.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance reporting requirements for expenditures made by agents and independent contractors. It does not address vendor certification, election administration systems, or the ability of multiple vendors to operate in the same election. The criterion concerns election technology or service vendor competition, which is unrelated to the subject matter of this campaign finance reporting provision.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 168.721 addresses the hours for opening and closing polling places and is governed by time zone considerations. It contains no provisions regarding vote-format standards, device protocols, vendor independence, or open protocol documentation. The section is entirely unrelated to the criterion of open and publicly documented election technology standards.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 168.37 addresses the selection and implementation of a uniform voting system but does not impose any cap on the duration of vendor contracts. The section discusses the selection process, certification requirements, implementation schedules, and the ability to re-select a different system, but contains no language limiting how long a contract with a voting system vendor may remain in effect.

The statute mandates that vendors providing voting system software must place source code in an escrow account, which satisfies the requirement for source-code escrow with the state as a condition of providing such systems. The section establishes this as an affirmative obligation ("shall place") for vendors of electronic voting systems.

The section requires use of a secrecy sleeve to conceal votes from observation, which is a procedural mechanism intended to protect ballot secrecy. However, this addresses visual concealment during the voting process, not voter–ballot unlinkability in the sense of preventing the linkage of a voter's identity to their specific ballot or votes cast, which is the core meaning of the criterion. The statute does not establish mechanisms to prevent election officials or systems from linking votes back to individual voters.

The section mandates that electronic voting systems must include accessible voting devices with nonvisual accessibility for blind and visually impaired voters, ensuring equal opportunity for access and participation. Subsection (3) further requires each polling place to equip at least 1 such accessible voting device, establishing a comprehensive accessibility mandate across all polling places.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the duties of election inspectors regarding pre-poll preparation, ballot verification, and equipment certification. It contains no provisions regarding polling-place density, minimum numbers of polling places per voter population, or geographic distribution requirements for polling locations.