EIIElection Integrity Index

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses verification and certification of voter initiative petitions—specifically the oath-taking and notarization process for petition circulators. It does not govern voting systems, election results, device records, certificates related to voting infrastructure, or result signatures. The criterion asks about a downloadable public package of election-related technical artifacts, which is entirely outside the scope of this petition verification statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

The section addresses paper records from voting machines but only as optional ('if the machine is provided with'). It does not mandate that voting machines must have a voter-verifiable paper trail capability, nor does it require hand-marked paper ballots. The provision makes paper records permissible but not legally required, falling short of satisfying a criterion that requires such records to be mandated.

“If the machine is provided with a device for printing or photographing candidate and question counters, it is not necessary to open the door concealing the counters.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses public inspection and retention of completed code forms submitted by candidates, and designates certain codes as public records under Title 1, section 408-A. It does not address citizen re-tally rights or the publication of precinct-level election data from which citizens could perform independent tallies. The criterion asks whether citizens can legally re-tally from published precinct data, which is a distinct procedural and data-access matter not covered by this public records retention provision.

The section mandates tamper-proof ballot security containers with approved security mechanisms and requires logging of container numbers, security mechanism identifiers, sealing person, and time. This satisfies the tamper-evident requirement with documented logging, matching a score of 4 (tamper-evident + logged).

“Each tamper-proof ballot security container must be secured with the security mechanism supplied or approved by the Secretary of State before leaving the voting place. Each sealed container must be recorded on a certificate identifying the container number, any unique numbers associated with the security mechanism and the person sealing the container and the time of sealing.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses designated voter registration agencies under the National Voter Registration Act and lists the departments and offices responsible for voter registration activities. It contains no provisions regarding vote-casting equipment, network connectivity, internet access, Wi-Fi, cellular connectivity, or any hardware requirements related to voting machines.

The statute requires documentation of sealed containers through certificates recording container numbers, security mechanism identifiers, sealers, and times. However, it does not explicitly state that this documentation is publicly available, which is a key component of the full criterion. The requirement addresses chain-of-custody documentation but lacks the public availability mandate.

“Each sealed container must be recorded on a certificate identifying the container number, any unique numbers associated with the security mechanism and the person sealing the container and the time of sealing.”

The statute explicitly prohibits tampering with voting devices and establishes a criminal penalty for violation. Section 2 specifies that violation of subsection 1 constitutes a Class B crime, which is an explicit criminal penalty for unauthorized device access.

“a person may not intentionally or knowingly: A. Tamper with or injure a voting device, ballot or other record or equipment used in the election or interfere with the correct operation of such a device or equipment or the secrecy of voting”

The statute requires the Secretary of State to report on post-election audits that have been conducted, but does not mandate that post-election audits be performed for every election. The language describes audits as optional activities ('any post-election audits'), not mandatory requirements. This creates a transparency and reporting mechanism but fails to establish a legal requirement that audits must occur.

“A summary of any post-election audits conducted”

The statute mandates that post-election audits be conducted using statistical principles designed to limit risk of incorrect outcomes, with a pre-established risk limit. This describes a risk-limiting audit (RLA) methodology. The section also requires visual examination of original paper ballots and review of chain of custody documentation, but does not explicitly mandate reconciliation with cast vote records or other ballot comparison elements.

“Post-election audits must be conducted on the basis of statistical principles designed to limit the risk that certified election returns may produce an incorrect outcome. The risk limit must be established by the Secretary of State prior to each eligible election.”

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute establishes post-election audits as public proceedings and explicitly grants access to members of the public and representatives of the media, satisfying the requirement for observer access. While the Secretary of State may limit attendance due to space constraints, the default rule guarantees public and media observation.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section describes the commission's power to conduct investigations and audits, including subpoena authority and confidentiality rules, but does not address whether audit results are binding on final certified election results. The section focuses on procedural mechanisms for investigations, not on the legal effect of audit findings on certified results.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses campaign finance reporting and candidate registration requirements for state, county, and municipal offices in Maine. It contains no provisions whatsoever regarding voting system source code accessibility, disclosure, or verification. The section is entirely outside the scope of software verifiability and voting system transparency.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the physical production, packaging, and distribution of official ballots by the Secretary of State. It contains no provisions regarding software, source code, binary builds, or reproducibility of any digital systems. The criterion concerns software reproducibility in a voting system context, which is not addressed by this ballot distribution statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions of voting equipment and systems but does not address the publication, signing, or timing of ballot contests, layouts, or tabulation rules before polls open. It is a definitional statute that does not establish requirements for pre-election publication of election materials.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section establishes post-election audits based on visual examination of paper ballots and chain-of-custody review, but does not address verification that running election software binaries match committed ones. The statute focuses on auditing election outcomes through manual ballot examination, not software verification or binary integrity checks.

The statute requires the municipal clerk to arrange for poll watchers and others to be present at the polls, which addresses observer access. However, the section does not specify what 'full procedural access' entails, does not detail the rights or restrictions on observers, does not mention party or civil-society observers explicitly, and does not guarantee access to all phases of election administration (e.g., equipment testing, ballot preparation, vote tabulation). The language is permissive but minimal.

“Make arrangements in advance of election day for poll watchers, petition circulators and others who request to be present at the polls”

No matching sections in corpus.

The section requires posting of unofficial precinct-level results 'as soon as practicable,' which mandates public availability at the precinct but uses vague timing language rather than a specific 24-hour deadline. The requirement falls between a 48-hour mandate and 1-week publication timeframe, suggesting a score of 3.

“As soon as practicable after the election return is prepared under section 711 , if a secure place is available at the voting place or municipal office where the public may view a paper copy of the unofficial election results even when the voting place or municipal office is closed, an election official shall post a paper copy of the unofficial results of the election.”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 812 establishes technical requirements for voting machines including secrecy, vote limits, write-in capability, and paper audit trails, but does not require a public, signed, append-only election event log. The section mandates paper records for audit purposes and machine counters, but these are not the same as a public, signed, chronological event log of election system activities.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section governs the design, approval, and use of official ballot boxes but does not address vendor certification, multi-vendor operation, or vendor independence. It concerns ballot box specifications and Secretary of State approval requirements, not vendor plurality in elections.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section of Maine law addresses disclosure requirements for political public communications and campaign funding transparency. It has no relevance to vote-format standards, device protocols, or open technical specifications for voting systems, which is the subject of criterion 5.2.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section provides definitions for campaign finance terms (campaign, committee, contribution, expenditure, etc.) under Maine's election law. It does not address vendor contracts, contract duration, or any measures to prevent perpetual lock-in with vendors. The criterion concerns vendor independence and contract caps, which is entirely outside the scope of this definitional statute.

No matching sections in corpus.

The statute permits secret ballots but does not legally guarantee or mandate their use—it merely allows caucuses to 'order' voting by secret ballot as an option. The first voting method (checking names on a list) does not protect ballot secrecy. Since ballot secrecy is discretionary rather than guaranteed and enforceable, the criterion is not satisfied.

“The caucus may order voting to be done by secret ballot which may be printed, or written on plain paper.”

The section mandates accessibility for publicly owned voting places and privately owned facilities used as voting places, but the accessibility requirement is limited to physical/architectural accessibility (accessible routes per Title 5) and does not address vision, motor, or language accessibility standards comprehensively. The criterion asks for accessibility standards covering vision, motor, and language at every polling place, but this statute only addresses physical building accessibility, leaving vision and language accessibility unaddressed.

“all publicly owned buildings that are used as voting places must be accessible as defined in subsection 1”

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: This section addresses the mechanism for casting votes when a voter is challenged (disputed eligibility), specifically requiring paper ballots instead of voting machines in such cases. It contains no provision establishing a minimum number or density of polling places per population or geographic area, which is what the criterion asks.