EDRIElection Dispute Resolution Index

No matching sections in corpus.

No matching sections in corpus.

No section in the FTS-surfaced candidates satisfies this criterion. Best signal: Section 698 addresses ballot packaging, storage, sealing, and return procedures following the election count. It establishes timelines for when ballot containers must remain sealed (2 months for some materials, 5 business days for voting lists and absentee envelopes) and procedural requirements for handling election materials. However, it contains no language specifying a deadline for filing an election contest, whether measured in days after certification or after any defined event. The section is purely administrative/procedural regarding ballot handling and does not address the substantive question of when disputes must be filed. To satisfy CONT.EDRI.3, the statute must codify the deadline for initiating an election contest; this section does not do so.

No matching sections in corpus.

Section 732 establishes a clear trigger for recount (apparent tie) and designates the Secretary of State as the responsible party. However, the statute is severely limited in procedural detail. It does not specify: (1) who physically conducts the recount (Secretary of State staff, election officials, bipartisan observers); (2) how the recount is conducted (machine vs. manual, county by county, statewide); (3) what evidence or documentation is required; (4) what burden of proof applies to determine 'apparent tie'; (5) notice and observation rights; or (6) timelines for completing the recount. The statute addresses only the tie-breaking mechanism (lot drawing for primaries, special election for general elections), not the recount process itself. This is a procedural framework for outcomes, not for the mechanics of counting.

“When there is an apparent tie vote, the Secretary of State shall automatically initiate a recount. If a recount confirms a tie vote, the following provisions apply.”

No matching sections in corpus.

Maine Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 738(2) codifies comprehensive cost allocation rules for statewide referendum recounts. The statute specifies: (1) when no deposit is required (margin ≤1% or ≤1,000 votes, with petitioners bearing no costs); (2) deposit amount when required ($5,000 or 10% of estimated cost, whichever is greater); (3) cost responsibility if recount does not change the result (petitioners pay full cost); (4) cost responsibility if recount reverses the result (deposit returned to petitioners); and (5) deposit forfeiture if petitioners withdraw after ballots are in custody. These provisions directly answer who pays under what outcome, satisfying the criterion's requirement that cost allocation be allocated by statute.

The statute codifies the trigger for recounts (apparent tie) and specifies what happens if a recount confirms a tie (tie-breaking procedures apply). However, the statute does not explicitly codify what effect a recount has when it DOES NOT confirm a tie—i.e., whether the recount finding is binding, replaces the original count, or is merely advisory in cases of discrepancy without a tie. The recount-finding effect is partially addressed (the recount is automatic and its confirmation triggers specific consequences), but the statute leaves ambiguous whether a recount that produces a different result than the original count mandatorily amends the certified result or requires further action. The effect is clear only in the tie scenario, not in the broader recount-result scenario.

“When there is an apparent tie vote, the Secretary of State shall automatically initiate a recount. If a recount confirms a tie vote, the following provisions apply.”

The statute explicitly establishes a certification deadline and mechanism: the Secretary of State must tabulate within 20 days and submit certified tabulation to the Governor. Critically, the statute defines the moment results become final and official—'as of the date the certified copy is submitted to the Governor.' This is a bright-line rule set by statute, not discretionary. The exception for pending recounts acknowledges that the statutory framework accounts for dispute resolution procedures. The use of mandatory language ('shall') and the specific definition of finality ('is considered final') satisfy the criterion for a codified certification deadline.

“Within 20 days after an election, the Secretary of State shall tabulate the election returns and submit a certified copy of the tabulation to the Governor. The tabulation of a candidate or referendum election is considered final as of the date the certified copy is submitted to the Governor, except for any contests in which a recount is pending.”

Section 337 addresses challenges to primary petitions—a pre-election dispute mechanism—not post-election recounts or contests. While it provides a discretionary stay mechanism at paragraph D(6) (a justice may 'enjoin or stay the effect of the ruling upon the terms and conditions as the Chief Justice determines proper'), this applies only to challenges of petition validity, which are administrative determinations by the Secretary of State subject to Law Court appeal. The section does not codify a mechanism to stay certification of election results pending a recount or post-election contest. The discretionary stay language is permissive ('may enjoin or stay') rather than mandatory, and it applies to administrative petition disputes, not election certification disputes. For TIME.2, the criterion requires a statutory stay mechanism specifically for certification while recounts or contests are pending—a different procedural phase than petition challenges. This section satisfies the criterion only partially: it demonstrates that Maine law contemplates judicially-managed stays in election-related disputes, but does not directly address certification stays.

“An appeal under this paragraph does not automatically stay the ruling on appeal. The Chief Justice or, in the Chief Justice's absence, any other justice may enjoin or stay the effect of the ruling upon the terms and conditions as the Chief Justice determines proper.”